*1 AIRLINES, UNITED INC. McDONALD Argued No. 76-545. March 1977 Decided June *2 Brennan, J., Court, opinion in which Stewart, delivered JJ., joined. J., filed a Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell, and Marshall, opinion, J., joined, post, dissenting J., p. in which Burger, White, Stevens, J., part no case. took in the consideration or decision argued Stuart Bernstein filed briefs the cause and petitioner. argued respondent. the cause for
Thomas R. Meites With Lynn brief were Sara Frackman Kenneth N. him on the Flaxman. opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice Stewart
Mr. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 24 requires application that an federal litigation must be “timely.” In this case a motion to intervene was filed promptly after final judgment of a District Court, for purpose of appealing the court’s earlier class action certification. The question presented is whether “timely” this motion was under Rule 24.
Until November 7, United required Airlines its female stewardesses remain unmarried employ- as a condition of parallel no ment; imposed restriction was employ- male *3 ees, including male stewards flight and cabin attendants.1 This “no-marriage rule” in resulted the termination of the employment of large a number and in turn stewardesses, spawned a deal good litigation.
One of the first challenges to this rule was brought Mary who timely filed charges Equal with the Sprogis, Employment Opportunity Commission in August 1966, contending that her discharge sex constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Rights Civil Act of 78 1964. Stat. as seg. S. C. 2000e et 42 amended, § (1970 V). U. Supp. ed. and The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that United’s 2 policy illegal, issued “right a sue Sprogis letter.” then filed a individual action in a Federal District Court, agreed and the court no-marriage that the rule violated Sprogis Lines, Inc., v. United Air generally See 444 F. 2d 1197- (CA7). statutory provision time, The relevant (e), at that C.S. 2000e-5 § days stated if charge within 30 after a filed with the Com days period or within expiration mission a reference of charge employment agency, to a state or local fair Commission voluntary had compliance, been unable to secure notify it so “shall person aggrieved may, thirty days and a civil action thereafter, within brought” by charging period party. days was extended to 90 (f) (1970 U) ed., V). Supp. 2000e-5 § took (ND Ill.). United Supp. Title VII. F. issue (b) on the § U. C. 1292 interlocutory appeal under 28 Circuit for the Seventh Appeals Court of liability, and the v. United Sprogis discrimination. sex finding affirmed Inc., 444 2d 1194. Lines, Air pres- pending, the Sprogis in the case was
While the by Carole in the District Court was filed same ent action discharged stewardess who a United Romasanta, charges with She, too, had filed marriage. 1967 because of her of cause believe EEOC, finding to a leading right- of a Title VII and the issuance no-marriage rule violated present suit promptly then filed Romasanta to-sue letter. other United of herself and all on behalf class action rule. no-marriage because discharged stewardesses to intervene permitted was later Another. United stewardess plaintiff. a named United’s granted months District Court Several later, complaint’s ruling that allegations, strike the motion to who, stewardesses properly could consist of those the class marriage, had employment because of upon the loss or United’s employment statute under either a fair charges As thus collective-bargaining agreement. defined, did not the court’s view more 30 and not than numbered *4 Proc. Rule Civ. satisfy numerosity requirement of Fed. (a)(1).3 order, however, District part 23 As of its the ter- protested who 12 stewardesses had allowed married as additional to intervene employment mination of their (b), § 1292 plaintiff. Pursuant 28 S. C. parties striking the appeal order certified District Court this accept declined to Appeals but the Court allegations, interlocutory appeal.4 a class action (a) (1) prerequisite to maintenance of lists as one Rule 23 impracticable.” joinder all members is is so numerous that "the class interlocu Circuit, is an of class certification In the a denial Seventh judgment. entry of final right
tory as of until order not reviewable Cruises, 1364. Even were we Inc., 544 2d Anschul v. Sitmar The litigation proceeded joint as suit on behalf original and the intervening ultimately the court plaintiffs, determined that those not yet in jobs reinstated were entitled to that every plaintiff and that remedy, backpay. entitled To aid in amount of determining the each backpay award, the appointed court Special as a Master person performed same who had a similar task in the Sprogis litigation.5 Following guidelines adopted Sprogis, the parties eventually agreed upon be the amounts to awarded each upon plaintiff, and consummation of agreement trial judgment court entered a of dismissal 3, on October specific
The controversy us entry before arose after the judgment. The respondent, a former United steward- ess, had been discharged account of no-marriage rule. She was a putative thus member of the defined original Romasanta complaint. Knowing that other stewardesses challenged no-marriage United’s she had rule, not filed charges with the EEOC or a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement.6 assume, arguendo, that wrong recognizing Seventh Circuit is in not doctrine, the so-called death-knell permits appeal which immediate adverse class determinations where the claims are so small that individual uneconomical, suits are final before not have been would lawsuit, available in this suificiently for the large individual claims were permit proceed, did, the action to on an it individual basis. See generally Wright 7A Miller, & A. Federal Practice and Procedure (1972); id., pp. (Supp. 1977). 271-277 at 129-130 § Sprogis, following by affirmance Appeals the Court of finding liability, Court’s District case was remanded for further proceedings. Special appointed by Master the District Court recom plaintiff $10,000 mended that in damages, awarded over approved award, District Court Appeals and the Court of affirmed. Sprogis Lines, United Air 387, 389-390, See Inc., (CA7). 517 F. 2d opinion Paper Moody, As the in Albemarle Co. v. makes U. S. clear, full “may relief under Title VII be awarded on a . . class basis . without exhaustion of procedures administrative the unnamed class *5 Id., Transp. members.” Co., 414 n. 8. See also Franks v. Bowman 424 U. 771. in the entered had been a final learning
After that do attempt their earlier Romasanta suit, despite that and chal- an now intend file so the did not she filed lenging the District Court’s certification, District purpose appealing for a motion to intervene motion Her Court’s adverse class order. determination thus and days judgment, filed 18 District Court’s final after the taken.7 appeal to be 30-day period an within well stating: Judge The denied the motion, District years this is five my in judgment, “Well, gentlemen, lady not seen this has litigation, now this has in and in Court any fit here relief from this to come in and seek must litigation way time, during period and is an I Of deny course, must this motion. end. I if in error then am appealable itself, order a grant will can reverse me and we Appeals Court of in.” come my judgment late to hearing, but too interven- promptly appealed The the denial of Court to the as well denial of class certification as the tion court re- Appeals appellate Circuit. for the Seventh wrong the District had been versed, holding that untimely under believing motion to intervene was certify the class refusing Rule and had also erred (b),8 in the Romasanta consisting complaint as described —a no-marriage discharged all United stewardesses because formally they protested whether or the termina- not rule, Airlines, Romasanta v. United employment. tion of their Inc., 2dF. (a). App. Fed. Proc. See Rule 24(b) provides: part, In relevant Rule in an anyone may permitted
“Upon application the main have claim or defense applicant’s action . . . when exercising discretion question in common. or fact ... law delay unduly prejudice will or consider whether court shall intervention original parties.” rights of the adjudication of the *6 petition for United’s certiorari did not seek review of the determination rule no-marriage violated nor VII, that Title did it contest the of merits the of on Appeals’ decision the Instead, class issue. challenged only certification it the Court Appeals’ ruling respondent’s of post-judgment application timely. for granted intervention was peti- We tion, S. to consider single U. issue.
In urging reversal, upon United relies American primarily Pipe Utah, & Construction Co. v. 414 U. That case private involved a antitrust class action that had days of expiration short of statutory limitations period.9 The trial court later class because denied certification purported did satisfy numerosity requirement not of (a)(1).10 Rule 23 any Neither plaintiffs the named nor unnamed member of appealed the class then order, either or Eight later time. days entry order, after of the putative number class members to intervene as moved but the plaintiffs, untimely. trial court denied the motions ultimately This Court reversed that decision, ruling that those circumstances “the commencement of the original suit tolls purported the statute for all running members class who motions make intervene after court has found inappropriate the suit class action status.” S., days at 553. Since remained when statute of limitations again began to run class certifica- tion, the motions to intervene as were filed days eight they timely. Id., after that were at 560-561. denial, under position that, It United’s rele- Pipe, began vant statute limitations to run after the denial class certification in the Romasanta action. United thus respondent’s reasons that motion to intervene was time support position barred, makes alternative S., at 541-542. See 414 U. supra. n. See periods of limita- statutory two on different based arguments by Title VII.11 prescribed tions if the persuasive might argument
This plaintiffs in join named in order to intervene sought illegality based claim her individual *7 litigating occupied have for she then would rule, no-marriage United’s But Pipe. intervenors in position same as the wholly for a in this case was to intervene the later motion appellate obtain purpose was to purpose. That different action status denying class of Court’s order review the District with, as complied motion lawsuit,12 and the in the Bomasanta lodging required to, the time limitation it was in that (a). 4 by App. Rule Proc. Success prescribed Fed. named class, certification of a would result in the review of limita- with the statute complied which had members of against whom respondent is a member of that class tions; the was time the class action statute not run at commenced. of filing a commenced lawsuit had been
The
“the
with
providing United
complaint
relief,
for classwide
subject
to determine both
necessary
information
essential
ordinarily re
employment
is
11 A
discrimination
person complaining of
days
of
quired
charge
occurrence
file a
with the EEOC within
V).
(1970 ed., Supp.
discriminatory
(e)
S. C.
act.
U.
§2000e-5
and the EEOC sends
process has been exhausted
Once
administrative
letter,
court
right-to-sue
a
in federal district
complainant
civil action
a
right-to-sue
2000e-5
days
receipt of the
letter.
§
must be
within
nearly
2, supra.
three
V),
n.
(f)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp.
discussed in
Since
years
passed
the adverse class determination before
theory
whichever
barred
action, under United’s
her action
time
took
thought
periods is
to be the relevant one.
of the two limitations
Courts, Agencies,
Thoughts on Intervention Before
Shapiro, Some
Cf.
(1968) (“It
721, 727
is both feasible
Arbitrators,
L.
81 Harv.
Rev.
concept
a number
down
of intervention into
and desirable to break
given
litigation rights
person
that a
has one or some
and to conclude
all”).
rights
but not
these
matter
prospective
and size
litigation
. . . .” American
Pipe, supra, at 555.13 To be
the case
sure,
“stripped
of its
upon
character as
class action”
certification
by the
Advisory
District Court.
Note
Committee’s
1966 Amendment
to Rule
App., p.
S.
But “it does not
. .
follow
be treated
must
.
case
as if there
brought
never was an action
on behalf of
absent class
Ana-
Electric Co. v.
Philadelphia
members.”
Co.,
Pa.).
(ED
conda American Brass
F. R.
D.
certify
ap-
District Court’s refusal
subject
pellate
review after
final
the behest of the
named plaintiffs, as United concedes.14 And since the named
13The
alleged
unlawful
complaint
discrimination
in the
—enforcement
the no-marriage
plainly part
companywide policy
rule —was
aof
uniform
p.
that had
applied
Rep.
92-415,
to all stewardesses. See also
No.
*8
(“[T]itle
very
27 (1971)
by
YII actions are
nature class cóm-
plaints”),
Paper
Moody, 422
S.,
cited in Albemarle
Co. v.
at 414 n. 8.
14See,
g.,
(CA9);
Properties Q., Inc.,
279,
e.
Air
2d
Share
F.
283
v.
538
Laboratories,
Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
508,
Zenith
Inc.
530 F. 2d
v.
512
(CA3);
Hospital, Inc.,
1181,
Penn v. San Juan
F. 2d
1188-1190
Bailey
(CA10);
Ryan Stevedoring Co.,
551,
(CA5);
v.
528 F. 2d
553-554
Wright
Corp.,
v. Stone
1058,
(CA8);
Container
2dF.
1061-1063
Paton
Prade,
v. La
862,
(CA3); Haynes
Logan
2d Furniture
874-875
v.
Mart, Inc.,
1161,
(CA7);
Levine,
503 F. 2d
1162-1165
v.
2d
Galvan
490 F.
(CA2);
;
1260-1262
Co.,
(CA6)
Roberts v. Union
F. 2d
Esplin Hirschi,
v.
(CA10).
putative proper party appeal, class was not a on ground to her interests had in the adversely determined trial court. put United of filing notice complaint Romasanta of possibility of liability, classwide and why there is reason pursuit no Mrs. McDonald’s of that claim should not be timely considered under the circumstances presented. here
Our conclusion is with decisions of consistent several federal courts permitting post-judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal.16 The inquiry every critical in such case closely A case point Foundry in is American & Brake Shoe Co. v. Interborough Rapid Co., (SDNY). Transit R. D. That case plan involved a reorganization Interborough for Rapid of the Transit Co. and for Railway. its consolidation with Manhattan Elevated Mannheim, Railway, an owner of a series of bonds in the Manhattan had participated in merely representing District Court not his own inter acting “attorney ests but also in fact” for other owners of bonds. After approved equitable, the District Court plan had as fair and and subsequently had implementation, ordered its filed notice Mannheim a of appeal. He then appeal decided to abandon the and seek to to surrender pursuant his bonds plan. to the terms One of the other holders bonds, of the same acting series for Mannheim had been whom attorney-in-fact, then the purpose prosecuting moved intervene for appeal an on behalf of nonsurrendering herself and all other bondholders. Noting system justice, that it in is “essential administration of our litigants day should have court” the motion was filed appeal might brought, within the time in which an have been timely. Id., District Court ruled that the motion intervene was Pellegrino Nesbit, (CA9), The decision in E. 2d 463 is also similar to the corporation case at bar. There against corporate (b) Exchange officers under Act of Securities § recovery §78p profits. (b), short-swing 15 U. S. for The Dis- defendants, corporation trict Court entered for when the appeal, failed sought purpose a shareholder to intervene for the appealing Appeals, from the District Court decision. The Court of Court, reversing timely the District ruled that the motion was and that permitted. 2d, intervention should have been 203 F. at 465-466. Post-judgment purpose intervention has been found nature, litigation representative even that is not and in *10 acted intervenor the circumstances of all in view is whether NAACP Cf. final judgment. entry after the promptly filed York, 345, 413 U. v. New Here, S. the named in period which time her motion within conclude appeal. We-therefore have taken an plaintiffs could ruling in correct Appeals Court of should and intervene motion to respondent’s granted. have judgment
Affirmed. or in consideration part no Stevens took Me. Justice of this case. decision Justice and The Chief with whom Powell,
Mr. Justice join, dissenting. Justice White Mr. two dis- between the confusingly shifts opinion
The Court’s McDonald’s by respondent raised tinct timeliness questions United against petitioner in this action attempt involves the effect question first Inc.1 The Airlines, direct in thought to have a less might therefore be which the intervenor Hodgson See, g., United phase. e. v. appellate participation in in the terest 129; 417-419, 118, 407, 473 F. 2d Workers, App. C.D. Mine 153 U. S. 175, 378-379, F. 181- App. 372, 2d Hobson, D. C. Smuck 132 U. S. v. 862, 2d discussed Allen, App. 297, D. 182; Zuber F. v. Poretsky, Wolpe 29-30, (DC); Hansen, 18, v. 44 F. D. n. Hobson R. v. 505, 508; Cas. v. 141, 144, 2d States United Co. App. 79 U. S. D. C. Taylor, 521, (CA4). 2d 64 F. 526-527 within the cases were made intervene in these Insofar as the motions to opinion filing they
applicable appeal, are consistent with our time for present and case. 1968, September Respondent petitioner had been terminated The class marriage” then-existing “no rule stewardesses.
under May United filed in complaint in Romasanta Airlines was in December and 1970. The District Court denied class status putative class intervened in the individual number of the members Discovery followed, action. and settlement discussion initial intervening plaintiffs able claims. On were to settle their October *11 of respondent’s statute limitations on petitioner. rights against is question This directly the motion to intervene relevant prerequisite because a for is purpose of intervention any intervenor litigation. the have an interest Peti- the tioner has consistently respondent’s contended interest in this litigation the of statute limitations barred at the time respond- she sought Assuming to intervene. ent’s interest was not time the barred, question second involves discretionary concept the broader and more timeliness of the of her motion to under Fed. Rule intervene Civ. Proc. This was the apparently basis on which the District Court respondent’s denied motion. Pipe American & Utah, Construction Co. v. U. S. 538
(1974), the held that of a action com filing class plaint “suspended period the running only of the limitation during pendency strip the motion to suit of of action Id., character.” (emphasis added). at 561 Time . again commenced to run period under the limitations when the District Court denied class members status, putative class were allowed to in the intervene nonclass only if motions expiration of were before remaining time.
A straightforward of reading Pipe leads filing conclusion that complaint the class action Romasanta v. United Airlines tolled the statute limita- tions for respondent, but “only during pendency strip motion the suit of its action character.” Under Pipe the American rule, the statute of limitations had run years 1975—almost three after class status was final order denied —a dismissing prejudice entered, the suit with all “matters con- troversy having . App. . . been settled and resolved.” On 90-92. 21, 1975, respondent purposes ap- October moved for pealing the point, denial of class status. Before this she had filed no grievance collective-bargaining agreement, charge under no with agency, state or part preceding federal and had taken in the no liti- gation although fully she was aware of the entire situation. — attempted to intervene. time respondent by she against to supple- decision must reflect a Thus, holding the Court’s appli- rule tolling novel Pipe rule with a ment the American purpose appealing for the cable to intervention rule, new statute of class Under this status. action com- filing the class from the apparently tolled or the interven such after final plaint until time unnamed class mem- “the interests can determine that by the named class longer protected bers no [will] I Ante, justification find at 394. no representatives.” *12 precedent policy. or extension, either in from departure marked Today’s opinion represents also under Rule question of 24. established law on timeliness the a motion apparently The has that to Court ruled of status the class is purpose appealing for the of long 24 as so as is law, under Rule a matter it could plaintiffs the named period “within the time in which discretionary Ante, at 396. appeal.” have taken an New emphasized in NAACP of the judgment District Court v. York, is thus eliminated. 365-366 (1973), U. S. Pipe on distinguish American the purports
The Court was not “to respondent’s purpose intervening ground that her individual claim” join plaintiffs litigating the named appellate “to of the District Court’s but rather obtain review Ante, rele- denying order action at 392. The class status.” explained, not undisputed vance of this distinction is factual opinion: major but two themes can be in the Court’s identified respondent justified relying on the First, that named protect by taking appeal, her an interest petitioner prejudiced respondent’s by that was not second, litigation. at the end of These themes have intervention the analytical unwilling- the Court’s weakness, namely, a common consequences accept ness to the District Court’s denial Advisory In status. that class the words Committee amendment to Rule the action was drafted thereby “stripped of its character as a class action.” p. U. S. 7767. App., After the denial of status, class proceeded ordinary action as an by nonclass action the indi- plaintiffs against petitioner.2 vidual Under the Court’s analysis, “critical fact” in this case that the entry “once final made the adverse appealable,” respondent determination “as moved to intervene soon as it clear became interests of [to her] unnamed class members protected no longer by would representatives.” Ante, named class Pervading opinion Court’s is the assumption that the class some- how continued after the class status. District denied But assumption is supported by by neither text nor history Rule 23. To the well those sources contrary, Court’s decision in Pipe view support the denial of class status litigation converts ordinary nonclass action. Reliance on the representatives former class After misplaced. was therefore the denial status, they simply plain- were individual with no tiffs obligation members class. Pearson Ecological Corp., Science (CA5 1975). 522 P. 2d *13 the words of Judge Pell, class dissenting below, the denial of point is status “a critical which mem- puts putative they on protect bers notice that must act rights.” to Airlines, Inc., Romasanta v. United 922 915, (CA7 537 P. 2d 1976). prejudice petitioner
The Court’s casual to treatment the assumption persisted reflects its that also the despite fully the denial of class status. justi- Petitioner was quotes Philadelphia The Court from Electric Anaconda American Co. v. (ED Co., 1968), F. R. D. proposition Brass Pa. for the need “‘be as if a case not there never was that treated an action ” Philadelphia brought Ante, on of absent class behalf members.’ at 393. ultimately by Electric involved the same issue resolved this Pipe question and is otherwise irrelevant to now us. before dispute a nonclass action. attempting resolve fled to petitioner case, settlement of Having achieved a is reopen case. It attempt to by respondent’s prejudiced of class appeal an possibility that true possibility of that existed, but treatment Court’s status is law. petitioner’s position It misconceives both and the petitioner concedes that District suggested “[t]he certify subject appellate review Court’s refusal to plaintiffs ....’’ of the named behest judgment final Ante, petitioner concedes the named at 393. But they appealed denial of class status plaintiffs could have if than litigate rather chosen to the case had final that, as a result of the argues great to settle it. It with force plaintiffs claims, of their the named settlement individual denial of class” status had longer “could no Although Brief years occurred earlier. for Petitioner by question Court,3 not decided this answer has is claim principle clear. The settlement of individual Wright, with it. 13 moots issues associated typically Federal Practice and Procedure Miller, Cooper, § A. & E. cases p. (1975). sharply distinguishable This from case Iowa, Franks v. (1975), as Sosna such S. Co., al- Transp. (1976), Bowman 424 U. where we named individual claims were moot lowed whose represent cases, their classes. those the District continue them previously classes, giving Courts had certified the thus from legal separate by “a status the interest asserted [s] [the Iowa, plaintiffs].” supra, Sosna v. at 399. This case named presents prior situation: The denial of precisely opposite extinguished any representative capacity. class status policy against result strongly Considerations militate long reached Court. Our cases reflect a tradition they respect for statutes of limitations and the serve. values *14 3 Court, ante, 14, by None of the cases cited n. at 393 involves situation.
401
These legislative enactments
“are vital
welfare
society
are
they
and
favored
the law,”
“promote
because
repose by
security
giving
and stability and
human affairs”
to activity
“stimulate
punish negligence.”
and
Wood Car-
v.
penter, 101
135,
(1879).
“plaintiff
U. S.
When a
has
on his
slept
rights,” an otherwise meritorious claim is barred,
both
ensure
“fairness
defendants”
“the
to reheve
and
burden
trying stale claims.” Burnett v.
[on
courts]
Co.,
New York
R.
Central
424,
(1965).
Statutes
of limitations thus “make an end to
possibility
litiga-
tion after the lapse of a reasonable time.”
Trust
Guaranty
States,
Co. v. United
304 U. S.
(1938).
nevertheless has reached a decision
who
that rewards those
delay
I
asserting
rights.
injustice
view the result
anas
to petitioner
precedent
ill
the need for
serves
repose.
‘
The Court also ignores
important
“principle that
[set
tlement agreements are highly favored in the
will
law and
be
upheld
possible
whenever
they
because
are a means of ami
”
cably resolving doubts .
.. and preventing lawsuits.’
Pear
v. Ecological
son
Science Corp., supra,
D. H.
176, quoting
Overmyer
Loflin,
Co.
(CA5
v.
2d
1971).
particularly
Settlements
the public
serve
“within
interest
confines of
VII
Title
There is great emphasis
...
where
private settlement
the elimination of
practices
unfair
”
litigation.’
without
Air Lines Stewards
Air
v. American
lines, Inc.,
(CA7
especially this case: important sought to note that had she immediately “It intervention *15 adherence that suggests Court In the support decision, precautionary might Pipe American result to rule' the named possibility guard against to interventions thus status, class the denial of fail plaintiffs would to “ activity Rule which very 'multiplicity of producing ” American Ante, 15, quoting at designed was to avoid.’ n. Rule 23 was I shown, as have But, at 553. Pipe, S.,U. activity any multiplicity designed not to eliminate after is denied.5 status as is analysis questions proper In these my view, of a class action Pipe, filing follows: Under District of limitations until tolls the statute complaint If status class status. regarding makes a decision begins of limitations part, or in the statute is denied in whole from the class. members excluded run as to class again must individuals seek protect rights, order to their such (or file an action possibly in the individual intervene limitations remaining before the time own) of their within sought is period expires. Assuming intervention decision whether district court’s period, limitations denied, the status, after denial of class and her intervention had years ago. three issue have been before this court intervention would Furthermore, assuming because of that her intervention had been denied no-marriage petitioner’s protest requirement rule —the which failure requisite holding the basis this action lacked court’s numerosity have been proceed as a class action —then that issue would years ago. Instead, petitioner chose before this court and decided three prosecuting risks in to sit back and allow others to assume the costs and actions, attempts her dead claim their individual and now she to revive negotiation through years legal argument another suit which finally parties.” 2d, settled to the of all satisfaction (dissenting opinion). 5Moreover, precautionary likely intervention is even under the Court’s Pipe itself, decision. As in American individuals concerned about frequently claims will move to in the nonclass action placing hopes possibility rather than all of their on the that the denial of appeal. class status will be reversed on
to allow intervention made according to the discretionary in NAACP concept interpreted timeliness Rule York, New 345 (1973). U. S. This decision is made in light of all in the case *16 circumstances and is entitled to appeal. substantial But delay seeking deference inter- against vention allowing should militate intervention. Under approach, premium placed this on attempting to intervene possible as soon after the denial of class status. When requirement with combined of Rule 23 (c)(1) as to be decision class status made soon practicable “[a]s brought the commencement of an action as a class approach would ensure that action,” the contours early in litigation. action would be defined This nonclass major concerning would enable the decisions the case to thus expeditiously, speeding ultimate resolution. made today encourages opposite decision result. The Court’s