Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287

Background

Defendant Miguel Angel Pena‑Rodriguez was tried and convicted on several counts; after verdict two jurors submitted affidavits alleging that juror H.C. made multiple racially biased statements during deliberations (e.g., that Mexican men “take whatever they want,” and that an alibi witness was not credible as “an illegal”).
Defense counsel sought juror contact information and filed affidavits; the trial court required affidavits and then denied a new‑trial motion, ruling that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) barred inquiry into statements made during deliberations.
The court of appeals affirmed; defendant petitioned for certiorari to the Colorado Supreme Court on whether CRE 606(b) bars post‑verdict juror statements showing racial bias and whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless requires admission.
The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed de novo the legal applicability of CRE 606(b) and accepted trial‑court factual findings absent abuse of discretion for mixed questions.
The majority held the juror affidavits fell squarely within CRE 606(b), did not qualify as "extraneous prejudicial information," and that admitting them was not required by the Sixth Amendment under Supreme Court precedent.
A dissent argued CRE 606(b) should yield in rare, grave cases of racial bias that directly bear on guilt and that trial courts should have discretion to investigate such allegations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CRE 606(b) bars juror affidavits about racially biased statements made during deliberations	606(b) shouldn't bar evidence of a juror's racial bias because the allegation concerns impartiality, not internal deliberative thought	606(b) broadly forbids juror testimony about statements occurring during deliberations	CRE 606(b) bars the affidavits—statements occurred during deliberations and fall within the rule's scope
Whether the affidavits qualify under 606(b)'s "extraneous prejudicial information" exception	The biased statements are so prejudicial they should be treated as extraneous and admissible	The exception covers external information introduced into deliberations, not jurors' personal beliefs or experiences	Not extraneous—bias derived from juror's personal beliefs/experience and is therefore internal, so exception does not apply
Whether admitting the affidavits is required by the Sixth Amendment (right to impartial jury)	Excluding post‑verdict evidence of racial bias denies the defendant his constitutional right; extreme racial bias should permit inquiry	The Sixth Amendment is satisfied by trial safeguards (voir dire, observation, pre‑verdict reporting, non‑juror evidence), so 606(b) need not yield	Under Tanner and Warger, applying 606(b) here did not violate the Sixth Amendment; exclusion upheld
Whether trial courts should have discretion to investigate post‑verdict racial‑bias claims	Trial courts should be able, in rare grave cases directly tied to guilt, to receive juror testimony and hold hearings	Allowing such inquiries would undermine finality, juror privacy, and candid deliberation	Majority rejects a categorical exception for racial bias; dissent would allow discretionary inquiry in extreme cases

Key Cases Cited

Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (Supreme Court held Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberations even when alleging juror lied in voir dire; safeguarded by Tanner)
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (Supreme Court upheld Rule 606(b) against Sixth Amendment challenge; identified safeguards that protect impartiality)
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (early Supreme Court warning against post‑verdict juror testimony to preserve frank deliberation and finality)
Benally v. United States, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008) (post‑verdict juror testimony barred under Rule 606(b); cautioned against creating exceptions for types of misconduct)
Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2011) (Colorado case addressing scope and exceptions to CRE 606(b))
People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005) (interpreting jury‑deliberation secrecy policy and application of CRE 606(b))
Stewart ex rel. Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316 (Colo. 2002) (noting Colorado rule substantially similar to federal Rule 606(b) and using federal authority for guidance)