Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
T1 This case involves the interplay between two fundamental tenets of the justice system: protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations and ensuring a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. After entry of a guilty verdict, defense counsel obtained juror affidavits suggesting that one of the Jurors exhibited racial bias against the defendant during deliberations. The trial court refused to consider these affidavits, finding that Colorado Rule of Evidence ("CRE") 606(b) barred their admission, and the court of appeals affirmed. People v. Pena-Rodriguez,
12 We hold that the affidavits regarding the juror's biased statements fall within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they do not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. We further hold that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. Facts and Procedural History
T3 In May 2007, a man made sexual advances toward two teenage girls in the bathroom of the horse-racing facility where Petitioner Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez worked. Shortly thereafter, the girls identified Petitioner as the assailant during a one-on-one showup. The People subsequently charged Petitioner with one count of sexual assault on a child-victim less than fifteen; one count of unlawful sexual contact-no consent; and two counts of harassment-strike, shove, or kick. After a preliminary hearing, the court bound over the first count as attempted sexual assault on a child-victim less than fifteen.
14 At the start of a three-day trial, the jury venire received a written questionnaire, which inquired, "Is there anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this case?" During voir dire, the judge asked the panel, "Do any of you have a feeling for or against [Petitioner] or the Prosecution?" Later, defense counsel asked the venire whether "this is simply not a good case for them to be a fair juror." None of the jurors subsequently impaneled answered any of these questions so as to reflect racial bias. The jury ultimately found Petitioner guilty of the latter three counts but failed to reach a verdiet on the attempted sexual assault charge.
15 Two weeks later, Petitioner filed a motion for juror contact information, alleging that "some members of the jury used ethnic slurs in the course of deliberations." The trial court ordered Petitioner to submit affidavits regarding the " 'who, what, when, and where' of the allegations of juror misconduct." Petitioner's counsel subsequently filed an affidavit averring that, shortly after entry of the verdict, two jurors informed her that "some of the other jurors expressed a bias toward [Petitioner] and the alibi witness because they were Hispanic."
4 6 Thereafter, Petitioner submitted affidavits from jurors M.M. and LT., both of whom alleged that juror H.C. made racially biased statements during deliberations. According to M.M., H.C. said that "I think he did it because he's Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want." She also stated that H.C. "made other statements concerning Mexican men being physically controlling of women because they have a sense of entitlement and think they can 'do whatever they want' with women." L.T. stated that H.C. "believed that [Petitioner] was guilty because in his experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women." L.T. further averred that H.C. "said that where he used to patrol, nine times out of ten Mexican men wеre guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls." Finally, LT. stated that H.C. "said that he did not think the alibi witness was credible because, among other things, he was 'an illegal'" Based on these affidavits, Petitioner moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding that CRE 606(b) barred any inquiry into H.C.'s alleged bias during deliberations.
¶ 7 Petitioner appealed, and a split division of the court of appeals affirmed. Pena-Rodriguez, ¶ 3. The majority first held that CRE 606(b) controlled the admissibility of the jurors' affidavits and that the affidavits did not satisfy the rule's exceptions. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 38, 41-42. The majority then rejected Petitioner's constitutional challenge regarding his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, holding that Petitioner "waived his ability to challenge the verdict on this basis by failing to sufficiently question jurors about racial bias in voir dire." Id. at 148. Writing in dissent, Judgе Taubman did not disagree with the majority's general analysis of CRE 606(b). Id. at ¶107 n.3. He concluded, however, that CRE 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 1107. We granted certiorari.
II. Standard of Review
18 The general applicability of CRE 606(b) is a question of law that we review de novo. See Kendrick v. Pippin,
III. Analysis
T 9 This case requires us to resolve whether CRE 606(b) bars admission of juror affidavits suggesting that a juror made racially biased statements during deliberations. To do so, we first examine the plain language of the rule аnd its overarching purpose. We then conclude that such affidavits indeed implicate CRE 606(b) and do not fall within the rule's "extrancous prejudicial information" exception. Finally, we consider whether the rule was unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner, and we determine that enforcing the rule did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
A. CRE 606(b): Language and Purpose
T10 CRE 606(b) is broad in scope: It precludes courts from peering beyond the veil that shrouds jury deliberations. Specifically, the rule provides as follows:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.
CRE 606(b) effectuates three fundamental purposes: It "promote[s] finality of verdicts, shield[s] verdiets from impeachment, and proteсt[s] jurors from harassment and coercion." People v. Harlan,
¶12 With the prosecriptive language and purpose of CRE 606(b) in mind, we now consider whether the rule operates to bar admission of the juror affidavits in this case.
B. CRE 606(b) Bars Admission of the Jurors' Affidavits
118 CRE 606(b)s plain language clearly bars admission of the jurors' affidavits in this case. Absent narrow exceptions, the rule unambiguously prohibits juror testimony "as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations." Here, Petitioner seeks to introduce juror testimony precisely to that effect, as the affidavits from both M.M. and L.T. pertain to statements made during deliberations. Therefore, CRE 606(b) precludes their admission.
T14 Petitioner argues that the affidavits do not involve "an inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict" as contemplated by CRE 606(b). In Petitioner's view, the rule only applies to statements regarding the jury's actual deliberative process-that is, how the jury reached its verdict-and not to evidence of a particular juror's racial bias. To the extent that we can even parse this semantic distinction, we deem it immaterial. Petitioner seeks to introduce evidence of comments made during deliberations in order to nullify the verdict and obtain a new trial. Such a request necessarily involves an inquiry into the verdiet's validity, which is the very inquiry that CRE 606(b) prevents.
1 15 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected this exact argument in Warger v. Shauers, — U.S. —, 135 8.Ct. 521, 528,
116 Petitioner next contends that, even if CRE 606(b) applies, the affidavits satisfy the rule's exception for "extraneous prejudicial information." He is mistaken. That exception pertains to "legal content and specific factual information learned from outside the record and relevant to the issues in a case." Kendrick,
T 17 And once again, Wargеr scuttles Petitioner's claim. In that car-crash case, following a verdict for the defendant, a juror reported that another juror stated during deliberations that her daughter had once caused a motor vehicle accident and that "if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life." — U.S. at —,
118 Accordingly, we hold that the affidavits concerning H.C.'s biased statements fall within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they do not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. We now address whether CRE 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied in this case.
C. CRE 606(b) Was Not Unconstitutional as Applied
{19 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury." The question here is whether the trial court's application of CRE 606(b), which functioned to bar evidence of H.C.'s alleged racial bias against Petitioner, violated his Sixth Amendment right.
¶ 20 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar-though not identical-issue in Tanner v. United States,
121 Tanner, then, held that Rule 606(b) was not unconstitutional as applied to cases of juror incompetence. Last year, the Court in Warger extended Tanmer to cases of juror bias. Relying on Tanner, the Court recognized that "(elven if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately assured by the parties' ability to bring to the court's attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is rendered." Warger, — U.S. at —,
122 Combined, Tanner and Warger stand for a simple but crucial principle: Protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations is of paramount importance in our justice system. See Tanmer,
[Llet it onee be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harаssed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.
McDonald v. Pless,
1 23 Turning to the instant case, this case law compels the conclusion that CRE 606(b) was not unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner. A contrary holding would ignore both the policy underlying CRE 606(b) and the unwavering Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the magnitude of that policy. To be sure, neither Tanner nor Warger in
24 Admittedly, bias is less readily visible than intoxication, meaning the second Tan-mer protection-the ability of the court to observe the jury's behavior during trial-carries less force in such cases. But that did not prevent the Warger Court from deeming the remaining Tanner safeguards sufficient to protect a party's constitutional rights, even when a biased juror lied during voir dire. See Warger, — U.S. at —,
1 25 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) to bar admission of the jurors' affidavits did not violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right.
IV. Conclusion
CRE 606(b) operates to ensure that the privacy of jury deliberations remains sacrosanct. The rule, and the policy it buttresses, is squarely on point in this case. We thus hold that the jurors' affidavits regarding H.C.'s biased statements fall within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they-do not satisfy the rule's "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. We further hold that the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did not violatе Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Notes
. Specifically, we granted certiorari to consider: "Whether C.R.E. 606(b) bars the admission of juror statements showing evidence of racial bias made during jury deliberations, and if so, whether the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial nevertheless requires such statements' admission."
. The People also charged Petitioner with driving under the influence, but they voluntarily dismissed that charge prior to trial.
. Petitioner's friend, M. Chavez, testified that Petitioner was with him at the time of the incident and thus could not have been the man in the bathroom.
. The trial court did conduct a brief hearing to investigate whether H.C. deliberately misrepresented his experience in law enforcement during voir dire; it found his failure to disclose this information to be inadvertent. This issue is irrelevant to this appeal.
. The court of appeals refused to conduct this analysis, holding that Petitioner "waived his ability to challenge the verdict on this basis by failing to sufficiently question jurors about racial bias in voir dire." Pena-Rodriguez, ¶ 43. But a defense attorney's decision not to ask about racial bias- and to instead attempt to root out prejudice through generalized questioning-is entirely defensible as a matter of strategy. See United States v. Villar,
. We recognize that the Warger Court commented, in a footnote, that [there may be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged." — U.S. at — n.3,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
27 I agree with the majority that CRE 606(b) bars admission of the post-verdiet affidavits in this case. By its terms, that rule of evidence precludes any "inquiry into the validity of a verdict" based on juror testimony regarding statements made during jury deliberations, and Pena-Rodriguez's motion for a new trial "plainly entail[ed] an inquiry into the validity of the verdict," even if it questioned the jury's impartiality and not its thought processes. Warger v. Shauers, — U.S. —,
128 By foreclosing consideration of the evidence of racial bias alleged in this case, the majority elevates general policy interests in the finality of verdicts and in avoiding the potential embarrassment of a juror over the defendant's fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial. Although the majority believes that this result is required to preserve public confidence in our jury trial system, in my view, it has precisely the opposite effect.
129 "The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by principles of due process." Turner v. Murray,
$30 In its recent discussion of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) in Warger, the United States Supreme Court observed that certain features built into the jury system ordinarily suffice to expose juror bias before the jury renders a verdict. Warger, — U.S. at —
131 According to the two juror affidavits obtained by Pena-Rodriguez's counsel, Juror H.C. made several statements during jury deliberations indicating that he relied on racial bias to determine Pena-Rodriguer's guilt:
ePena-Rodrigues "did it because he's Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want."
e Mexican men are physically controlling of women because they have a sense of entitlement and think they can "do whatever they want" with women.
e Pena-Rodriguez "was guilty because, in [Juror H.C.'s] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they cоuld do whatever they wanted with women."
e Where Juror H.C. used to patrol, "nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls."
e Pena-Rodriguez's alibi witness was not credible because, among other things, he was "an illegal." |
1 32 In my view, the circumstances of this case reveal that the safeguards identified in Tanner are not always adequate to protect a criminal defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. Unlike the comment in War-ger, Juror H.C.'s multiple statements in this case evince racial bias toward a criminal defendant. And, importantly, these alleged statements reveal Juror H.C.'s inability to decide impartially the crucial issue in this case: whether Pena-Rodriguez committed the charged crimes, or whether he instead had a credible alibi.
T 33 The majority claims to adhere to "the unmistakable trend" in United States Supreme Court case law "refusing to deem Rule 606(b) unconstitutional." Maj. op. 1 24 n.6. Yet the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged the possibility that juror bias may be so "extreme" as to call into question the adequacy of the usual safeguards to protect the integrity of the process. Warger, — U.S. at — n.3,
T34 The question whether evidence of a juror's racial bias should be admissible in some cases, notwithstanding Rule 606(b), is hardly uncharted territory. In Villar, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the usual Tanner safeguards suffice to protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury where racial or ethnic bias is alleged, as opposed to the type of juror misconduct at issue in Tanner.
135 In Villar, the First Circuit concluded that "the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and ethnically biased comments made during deliberations."
186 First, as the majority acknowledges, defense attorneys may, for legitimate tactical reasons, choose not to question jurors about racial bias during voir dire and instead attempt to root out prejudice through more generalized questioning. Maj. op. ¶18 n.5; see also Villar, 586 F.8d at 87 n.5; Kittle, 65 A.Sd at 1155. And even when defense attorneys are willing to probe this sensitive topic directly, jurors may be reluctant to admit racial bias during voir dire. Villar,
137 In my view, the trial court should have discretion in some circumstances to admit evidence of racially biased statements made during juror deliberations. As the Vil-lar court noted, the trial judge will often be in the best position to determine whether an inquiry is necessary to vindicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impаrtial jury. See
138 Should the trial court conclude that further inquiry is appropriate, it must then determine whether a juror was actually biased. If such a juror sat on the case, the defendant is entitled to a new trial without having to establish that the juror's bias affected the verdict. See Commonwealth v. McCowen,
39 The majority admits that Tanner did not implicate "the exact issue of racial bias" but summarily concludes: "[Wle cannot discern a dividing line between different types of juror bias or misconduct." Maj. op. 1 23.
40 Furthermore, the majority overstates its concerns about the potential demise of the jury system should the allegations in this case be admissible in a motion for a new trial. The majority reasons that "the secrecy of jury deliberations is of paramount importance in our justice system," maj. op. 122, yet fails to acknowledge that jurоrs are free to discuss deliberations publicly. See Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room ... But Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L.Rev. 262, 294-95 (2012). Concerns about "post-verdict harassment of jurors," maj. op. 128, are similarly misplaced: 'Even commentators critical of allowing post-verdict evidence of juror bias have observed that the exception in Rule 606(b)(1) for extraneous information already creates an incentive for the losing party to contact jurors after a verdict has been rendered. See Lee Goldman, Post-Verdict Challenges to Racial Comments Made During Juror Deliberations, 61 Syracuse L.Rev. 1, 9-10 (2010). The majority's broader fear that the jury system may not survive absent unbending application of Rule 606(b), maj. op. 1 22,
T 41 The policies of finality and juror privacy that underlie CRE 606(b) are well founded. Moreover, not every stray comment reflecting a racial stereotype warrants a hearing. However, this case presents the extreme exception contemplated in Warger. The multiple comments alleged to have been made in this case were heard by other jurors and were directly tied to the determination of the defendant's guilt. According to the two post-verdict affidavits, Juror H.C. expressed in various ways that Pena-Rodriguez "did it because he's Mexican." I simply cannot agree with the majority that "[plro-tecting the secrecy of jury deliberations" is of such "paramount importance in our justice system," maj. op. 122, that it must trump a defendant's opportunity to vindicate his fundamental constitutional right to an impartial jury untainted by the influence of racial bias. In my view, to foreclose consideration of the allegations presented here is precisely what "shatter[s] public confidence in the fundamental notion of trial by jury." Id. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE EID and JUSTICE HOOD join in this dissent. ,
. I note that the question befоre us is not whether there is sufficient evidence to impeach the jury's verdict. Rather, the question is simply whether the trial court has discretion to consider the allegations made in the post-verdict affidavits and to explore the validity of those allegations in an evidentiary hearing as part of a motion for a new trial.
. These protections include: (1) voir dire; (2) observations of the jury by the court, counsel, and court personnel during trial; (3) pre-verdict reports by jurors of inappropriate behavior; and (4) post-verdict evidence other than juror testimony. Tanner,
. In Tanner, a juror alleged in an interview following the trial that he "felt like ... the jury was on one big party'; that multiple jurors consumed large quantities of alcohol during recesses, smoked marijuana, and ingested cocaine;
. In Kittle, the court noted a split among federal courts of appeals on the question whether evidence of racial or ethnic bias should be admissible and concluded that Villar was more persuasive than conflicting decisions. See 65 A.3d ail 1153-54 & n.9 (comparing Villar,
. On remand, the trial court ultimately determined that the jury's verdict should stand, and that decision was upheld on appeal. See United States v. Villar,
. The majority quotes McDonald v. Pless,