Pecina, Alfredo Leyva
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 143
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- A Texas jury convicted appellant of murdering his wife after custodial interrogation at the hospital following magistration under Article 15.17; a magistrate informed him of rights in Spanish and he indicated a desire for a court-appointed attorney but also agreed to speak with detectives outside the room.
- Detectives later questioned appellant after Miranda warnings were given; appellant waived his rights and provided statements, which were admitted at trial.
- The trial court denied suppression, and the Fort Worth Court of Appeals initially affirmed; on discretionary review, this Court reversed to address Fifth vs. Sixth Amendment invocation post-Montejo.
- Montejo v. Louisiana overruled Michigan v. Jackson, clarifying the distinction between the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel, and their invocation via Miranda warnings.
- On remand, the court of appeals held suppression was required because appellant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right at magistration; this Court reversed, holding no invocation occurred during custodial interrogation after Miranda warnings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Pecina unambiguously invoke the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel during custodial interrogation? | Pecina argues invocation occurred when asked about counsel, triggering protection. | Pecina contends no clear invocation occurred; magistration is separate from interrogation. | No invocation during custodial interrogation; waiver valid. |
| Did the magistration (Article 15.17) trigger the Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel for post-magistration interrogation? | Pecina argues Sixth Amendment rights were triggered at magistration. | Pecina contends only Miranda warnings after interrogation trigger rights; Jackson overruled. | Magistration does not trigger Sixth Amendment invocation for post-magistration interrogation; waiver proper when warnings given. |
| Should the courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances standard to determine whether an invocation occurred under Miranda Edwards Minnick after Montejo? | Pecina asserts objective standards support invocation. | Pecina argues that the magistrate’s and officers’ actions do not create an unambiguous invocation. | Yes; invocation must be unambiguous under the Miranda regime; here no such invocation occurred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (U.S. 2009) (disentangles Fifth and Sixth Amendment invocation; overruling Jackson)
- Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1986) (earlier rule that arraignment invoked right to counsel for post-arraignment interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (prophylaxis to prevent police badgering after invocation)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (requires warnings before custodial interrogation and voluntary waiver)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1991) (anticipatory invocation outside custodial interrogation not recognized)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (unambiguous invocation standard for requesting counsel)
- Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (U.S. 1991) (Edwards/Minnick line reinforcing counsel invocation protections)
- Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (Texas case applying Montejo to state proceedings)
- Pecina v. State, 326 S.W.3d 249 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010) (discusses Fifth Amendment invocation at magistration and interrogation)
- Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (U.S. 2008) (magistration signals attachment of Sixth Amendment right to counsel)