PAUCEK v. SHAULIS, 1:24-cv-09807

Plaintiffs Chip Paucek (a tech CEO) and Pro Athlete Community, Inc. (“PAC”) sued Dahn Shaulis (an education-sector blogger) for allegedly defamatory online statements calling Paucek a “consummate con man” and issuing a “scam alert” about PAC.
Plaintiffs allege defamation and tortious interference with business relations, after Shaulis made critical posts on his blog and social media.
Shaulis responded by seeking protection under New Jersey's recently enacted anti-SLAPP statute (UPEPA), aiming to recover legal fees if he could get the suit dismissed.
Plaintiffs argued that New Jersey’s UPEPA does not apply either because of choice of law principles (they argued for Maryland and Delaware law) or because they claim UPEPA conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court’s opinion is limited to whether New Jersey’s anti-SLAPP law applies in federal court and to these parties, i.e., about fee-shifting if Shaulis prevails under Rule 12 or 56.
The dispute arises in federal diversity jurisdiction, and the statements at issue were made by a New Jersey citizen about plaintiffs domiciled or headquartered in other states, but were published nationwide.

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument	Defendant’s Argument	Held
Does UPEPA’s anti-SLAPP law apply in federal court?	UPEPA conflicts with Federal Rules 12 & 56, so cannot apply.	UPEPA’s fee-shifting provision is substantive and matches Rules 12 & 56.	UPEPA’s fee-shifting provision (when dismissal is under Rule 12 or 56) applies in federal court.
Which state’s law governs these claims?	Maryland law for Paucek; Delaware law for PAC, so UPEPA can’t apply.	New Jersey law governs—the allegedly defamatory speech came from New Jersey.	New Jersey law governs all claims; PAC failed to show Delaware as its principal place of business.
Are any UPEPA procedural provisions applicable?	All conflicting provisions should make UPEPA inapplicable in federal court.	Only procedural provisions that mirror the Federal Rules are valid.	Conflicting provisions (e.g., burden-shifting, interlocutory appeal) do not apply, but fee-shifting does.
Can fee-shifting be claimed as a counterclaim?	N/A (no counterclaim should be available).	Asserted fee-shifting as a counterclaim under UPEPA.	UPEPA fee-shifting must be sought by motion, not counterclaim.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (federal courts apply state substantive, not procedural, law in diversity jurisdiction)
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (direct collision analysis between federal rule and state law)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (significance of robust debate and chilling effect)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (fee-shifting rules tied to substantive state policy apply in diversity)
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (statute-federal rule conflict, and severability)
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (defining principal place of business for corporations)
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (Maine's anti-SLAPP law applies in diversity, discussing Erie analysis)
Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803 (upholding Nevada anti-SLAPP fee-shifting in federal court)
La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (California anti-SLAPP conflicts with Fed. Rules, doesn't apply in federal court)
Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328 (state anti-SLAPP higher burden cannot displace Rules 12, 56)
Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176 (federal courts in diversity apply choice-of-law rules of forum state)