Parrott v. State, 312 Ga. 580

Jimmy Lloyd Parrott pleaded guilty (2014) to multiple traffic offenses, including felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (OCGA § 40-6-395(b)(5)) and being a habitual violator, per a negotiated plea.
The court imposed consecutive sentences: five years (two to serve) for the habitual violator count, and five years probation plus a $5,000 fine for the felony fleeing count.
Parrott later moved to vacate the probation portion as void because § 40-6-395(b)(5) expressly prohibits suspension, probation, deferral, or withholding of sentence; the trial court found the probation void but vacated the entire fleeing sentence (including the fine) and announced intent to resentence.
Parrott objected, arguing (1) the sentencing provision violated equal protection because indigent defendants effectively face prison if they cannot pay the fine, and (2) resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.
After a hearing Parrott declined to withdraw his plea and was resentenced to five years’ imprisonment (no fine). He appealed; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether OCGA § 40-6-395(b)(5) violates Equal Protection by treating indigent defendants worse (fine leading to prison)	Parrott: statute effectively forces indigent defendants into prison because inability to pay a $5,000 fine leads to imprisonment	State: statute's text does not condition the fine on ability to pay and does not facially differentiate between indigent and non-indigent persons	Court: rejected Parrott’s claim—no showing the statute facially treats indigents differently and no record evidence the sentence was imposed due to inability to pay
Whether resentencing after vacating a void portion of sentence violates Double Jeopardy or multiple-punishment protections; and whether the court was required to leave the valid fine intact and only excise the void probation	Parrott: because a fine alone is a legal sentence for the offense, the court should have vacated only the void probation and left the fine; resentencing to prison is multiple punishment/double jeopardy	State: trial court may correct a void sentence at any time and has broad discretion to vacate a partially void sentence and resentence within statutory limits	Court: resentencing was permissible; void sentences give no reasonable expectation of finality, and the trial court did not abuse discretion in vacating the entire partially-void sentence and imposing a new lawful sentence

Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788 (2012) (explains requirement to show law treats similarly situated persons differently for equal protection claim)
Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1 (2010) (trial court may correct a void sentence at any time)
von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (2013) (sentence is void if it imposes punishment not allowed by law)
Dennis v. State, 300 Ga. 457 (2017) (trial court free to resentence when original sentence is void)
Stephens v. State, 289 Ga. 758 (2011) (Double Jeopardy protects legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence)
DiFrancesco v. United States, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (federal discussion of expectation of finality in sentencing)
Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49 (2014) (no vested right to finality in a null and void sentence)
Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349 (2015) (where part of sentence is void, that provision must be vacated)
Ellison v. State, 299 Ga. 779 (2016) (same principle as Humphrey regarding vacating void portions)
Riggs v. State, 301 Ga. 63 (2017) (recognizes broad sentencing discretion of trial courts within statutory limits)