Parker v. Franklin County Community School Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1783

Plainiffs allege Title IX discrimination in scheduling: girls’ games were primed for non-primetime slots far more often than boys’, harming participation, academics, and morale.
Amber Parker ( Franklin County HS) coached girls’ varsity basketball 2007–2009; Tammy Hurley joined later; fourteen Indiana public school corporations are defendants.
EIAC contracts set schedules for conference games; primetime defined as evenings before school-free days; girls’ primetime share ~53% vs boys’ ~95% in 2009–2010 (and similar gaps in 2007–2009).
Franklin AD Beth Foster sought more primetime for girls but faced resistance from other EIAC athletic directors; scheduling decisions largely cartel-like via contracts.
OCR had warned in 1997 that reserving primetime for boys could violate Title IX’s scheduling requirements; disparity persisted despite efforts to remedy.
District court granted summary judgment for defendants on Title IX claims and on sovereign immunity for §1983; plaintiffs appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether scheduling disparity violates Title IX equal treatment	Parker	Franklin et al.	Disputed but substantial; factual trial needed
Whether school corporations are “persons” subject to § 1983	Parker/ Hurley	Franklin et al.	Yes, entities are “persons”; remand on equal protection merits
Whether the disparity must be program-wide and substantial to violate Title IX	Parker	Franklin et al.	Requires systemic, substantial disparity; lower court analysis vacated for trial

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1998) (private damages action for intentional discrimination under Title IX)
Cannon v. University of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (U.S. 1979) (private damages action under Title IX based on funding conditions)
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (U.S. 2001) (no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations)
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2005) (private right of action exists for intentional acts under Title IX)
Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of the Univ. of Cal., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (damages for student-on-student harassment when recipient is deliberately indifferent)
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1976) (§1983 liability of states and local governments)
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1989) (state employment immunity and “person” concept under §1983)
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (U.S. 1990) (local school districts as “persons” under §1983)
McCormick v. School Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2004) (equal treatment beyond mere accommodation; scheduling harms analysis)
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (scheduling disparities and impact on opportunities; affirmed on appeal)
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing accommodation vs. equal treatment in Title IX context)