Pappas v. Philip Morris, Inc.
915 F.3d 889
2d Cir.2019Background
- Hazel Pappas (pro se), administratix and sole alleged beneficiary of her late husband James Pappas’s estate, sued Philip Morris in federal diversity court claiming that decades of smoking Marlboros caused his fatal respiratory and heart disease.
- Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA), CUTPA, loss of spousal and parental consortium (derivative), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- The district court dismissed: (1) the CPLA and derivative consortium claims because it concluded Connecticut law forbids a non-attorney from representing an estate pro se; and (2) the CUTPA and NIED claims as time-barred by Connecticut statutes of limitation.
- Pappas appealed the pro se-representation ruling and the statute-of-limitations dismissals. She did not contest the limitations rulings on appeal (abandoned those claims).
- The Second Circuit reviewed de novo and held federal law governs who may appear pro se in federal court; it reinstated the CPLA and derivative consortium claims but affirmed dismissal of the time-barred CUTPA and NIED claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a non-lawyer administratrix who is sole beneficiary and alleges the estate has no creditors may represent the estate pro se in federal diversity court | Pappas: §1654 and federal practice permit her to proceed pro se for the estate because she is the sole interested party and the estate has no creditors | Philip Morris: Connecticut law bars non-attorneys from representing estates; federal court must follow state law in diversity cases | Federal law (28 U.S.C. §1654) governs practice before federal courts; Pappas may proceed pro se for the estate under the circumstances recognized in Guest; district court’s application of Connecticut rule was erroneous |
| Whether Connecticut law (Ellis) preempts federal rule on who may appear in federal court | Pappas: Guest controls; Erie does not require state rule to displace federal procedural rules | Philip Morris: Erie requires application of state substantive law, so Connecticut’s ban on pro se estate representation applies | The court held Erie does not override federal procedural governance; who may practice in federal court is procedural and federal courts may apply §1654 and related precedents |
| Whether derivative consortium claims must be dismissed because the underlying CPLA claim was dismissed for lack of pro se standing | Pappas: Consortium claims derive from CPLA and should proceed if CPLA proceeds | Philip Morris: If CPLA dismissed, derivative claims fall with it | Because the CPLA claim is reinstated, the derivative loss-of-consortium claims are likewise reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2010) (pro se administrator who is sole beneficiary and estate has no creditors may represent estate in federal court under §1654)
- Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law)
- Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (distinguishes procedural federal rules from state substantive law under Erie)
- Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (procedural/substantive classification governs whether federal rules apply in diversity cases)
- Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (federal regulation of practice before federal agencies can preempt contrary state rules)