416 P.3d 389
Utah2017Background
- Outfront Media (CBS) owned a billboard at 726 W. South Temple leased from Corner Property; its lease was expiring and CBS sought to relocate the billboard nearby under Utah Code § 10-9a-511(3)(c)(i).
- Corner Property simultaneously sought to relocate a different billboard into the 726 lot; both relocations conflicted with Salt Lake City’s “gateway” zoning and a 500-foot spacing rule that prevented two freeway-oriented billboards being that close.
- Mayor Ralph Becker denied CBS’s relocation request and—on the same day—approved Corner Property’s request, achieving a net removal of one billboard from a gateway area; Becker did so without City Council approval.
- CBS appealed administratively (hearing officer upheld the City) and in district court (court affirmed). CBS appealed to the Utah Supreme Court claiming the denial was illegal (an eminent-domain taking requiring legislative approval), violated the City ordinance, and was arbitrary and capricious.
- The core legal question was whether Utah’s Billboard Compensation Statute (§ 10-9a-513) transforms a municipality’s denial of a qualifying relocation request into an exercise of eminent domain (bringing Eminent Domain Statutes’ procedural requirements into play), or instead merely creates a standalone compensation remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of a qualifying billboard relocation is an exercise of eminent domain requiring governing-body (city council) approval under the Eminent Domain Statutes | Denial is an acquisition "by eminent domain" under § 10-9a-513, so Eminent Domain Statutes (including council approval) apply | § 10-9a-513 only "considers" a municipality to have initiated acquisition for compensation purposes; it does not invoke formal eminent-domain procedures, so Eminent Domain Statutes do not apply | Held: Eminent Domain Statutes do not apply; § 10-9a-513 creates a standalone compensation scheme (denials are "considered" acquisitions only for compensation) |
| Whether Salt Lake City’s billboard ordinance barred denial of relocation requests that would trigger compensation under state law | Ordinance language (“relocated except as mandated by the requirements of Utah state law”) means relocation must be approved when state law would require compensation | Ordinance does not mandate relocation; state statutes give the city discretion to grant or deny and merely require compensation if denied—so ordinance does not forbid denial; if interpreted otherwise it would be preempted by state law | Held: Ordinance does not forbid denial; in any event a reading that forbids denial would be preempted by state statute |
| Whether the Mayor’s decision was arbitrary and capricious (e.g., because based on an unwritten policy or conflicting with ordinance) | Mayor’s unwritten policy to reduce billboards is impermissible or conflicts with ordinance; decisions arbitrary without written policy or council action | Substantial evidence shows Becker had a longstanding policy of reducing billboards; executives may follow informal policies; reducing billboards is consistent with ordinance limiting billboards | Held: Not arbitrary or capricious—decision was supported by substantial evidence and furthered mayor’s goal to reduce billboards in gateway areas |
Key Cases Cited
- Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 332 P.3d 900 (Utah 2014) (discusses how disparate statutory grants of eminent-domain authority are typically constrained by Eminent Domain Statutes)
- Fox v. Park City, 200 P.3d 182 (Utah 2008) (describes appellate review approach when courts review district-court judgments in land-use administrative appeals)
- Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003) (defines substantial-evidence standard for arbitrary-and-capricious review)
- Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (illegal decision in land-use context depends on correct interpretation and application of law)
- Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006) (reinforces judicial role in statutory interpretation and limits courts from rewriting statutes)