UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a body corporate and politic under Utah law, and Michael K. Young, President of the University of Utah, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Mark L. SHURTLEFF, Utah Attorney General, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030877.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 8, 2006.
2006 UT 51
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att‘y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att‘y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
M. Guy Taylor, Robert H. Rees, Chris Parker, Salt Lake City, for amicus State Legislature.
PARRISH, Justice:
¶ 1 For many years, the University of Utah has enforced a policy prohibiting its students, faculty, and staff from possessing firearms on campus. During its 2004 General Session, the Utah Legislature passed
¶ 2 Relying on
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The University is a public university established by Utah‘s constitution and statutes. Over 44,000 students, faculty, and staff comprise the University community. The main campus includes not only the requisite classrooms and offices but also an assortment of facilities ranging from an extensive health sciences complex to a preschool. In addition, it includes facilities frequented by guests of the University, such as a 46,000-seat football stadium, a 15,000-seat indoor arena, and cultural and entertainment centers.
¶ 4 Utah‘s Enabling Act requires the University to “forever remain under the exclusive control of the State of Utah.” Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107, 110. To that end, the Utah Legislature created the Utah State Board of Regents, which has authority to “enact regulations governing the conduct of university and college students, faculty, and employees.”
¶ 5 One of the regulations enacted by the University is a firearms policy. The policy, which prohibits students, faculty, and staff from carrying guns on campus and “while conducting University business off campus,” authorizes disciplinary action for violations. Numerous University administrative bodies endorse the policy, and those responsible for campus safety view it as a success.
¶ 6 The University‘s firearms policy became the subject of heated debate in 2001, when Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff issued Opinion No. 01-002, in which he opined that a Utah Department of Human Resource Management rule forbidding state employees to carry guns in state facilities violated Utah‘s Uniform Firearms Act. In footnote thirteen of that opinion, the Attorney General expressed his agreement with the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel‘s Formal Opinion 98-01, which had concluded that the University‘s firearms policy was contrary to the Uniform Firearms Act. After issuing Opinion No. 01-002, the Attorney General reiterated on numerous occasions his view regarding the illegality of the University‘s firearms policy.
¶ 7 In response, the University sued the Attorney General in the United States District Court for the District of Utah (“federal court“), seeking a declaration that Utah law does not prevent it from enforcing its firearms policy and that any interference with the policy would violate its right to academic freedom as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Attorney General moved for judgment on the pleadings. The University, in turn, moved for summary judgment.
¶ 8 Because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution immunizes the Attorney General from suits under state law in federal court, the federal court found that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the University‘s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. It also invoked the federal Pullman abstention doctrine, declining to consider the University‘s federal constitutional claims until a court with proper jurisdiction decided the University‘s state law claims. See R.R. Comm‘n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The federal court directed the University to seek adjudication of its state law claims in state court and, pursuant to Pullman, retained jurisdiction over the federal claims.
¶ 9 The University then sued the Attorney General in Utah state court, seeking a declaration that its firearms policy was contrary to neither the Uniform Firearms Act,
¶ 10 The district court denied the Attorney General‘s motion to dismiss and granted the University‘s motion for summary judgment, holding that the University‘s firearms policy was not contrary to Utah law. The court reasoned that the Uniform Firearms Act merely “established uniform criminal penalties for” those who violated Utah‘s firearms laws and that the Concealed Weapon Act merely “addressed the validity of a concealed weapons permit, the circumstances under which one must be issued, and the circumstances under which a valid permit holder may nevertheless be subject to criminal prosecution for possession of a concealed weapon.” It concluded that the University‘s fire-
¶ 11 The Attorney General appealed. Shortly after he filed his initial brief, the legislature passed Senate Bill 48, later codified at
¶ 12 Because the enactment of
¶ 13 The University contends that
¶ 14 During oral argument, we inquired as to whether
¶ 15 Before turning to the merits of the University‘s constitutional claim, we pause to discuss the applicable standard of review. This case is before us on appeal from the district court‘s entry of summary judgment in favor of the University. However, the enactment of
ANALYSIS
¶ 16 We begin by addressing the additional question we asked the parties to brief, namely, whether
I. THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
¶ 17 After oral argument, we asked the parties to supplement their briefing to address whether
¶ 18 At the time of statehood, the State of Utah “committed its whole lawmaking power to the legislature, excepting such as is expressly or impliedly withheld by the state or federal constitution.” Utah Sch. Bds. Ass‘n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ¶ 11, 17 P.3d 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
¶ 19 When we interpret constitutional provisions, “our starting point ... is
¶ 20 The second clause of
¶ 21 Because the state‘s “whole lawmaking power” is vested in the legislature, Utah Sch. Bds. Ass‘n, 2001 UT 2, ¶ 11, only the legislature may “defin[e] the lawful use of arms” unless it delegates that power to another governmental entity.3 The enactment of
¶ 22 The legislature‘s power to “defin[e] the lawful use of arms” must necessarily be exercised through its lawmaking power because the legislature has no other constitutional authority to define suggested firearm use. Indeed, its only mechanism for “defining the lawful use of arms” is through legislative enactment.
¶ 23 While this principle may seem almost tautological, it has great importance here because it establishes the legislature as the only entity with authority to enact legislation defining the “lawful use of arms.” We must therefore determine whether the University‘s adoption of its firearms policy is legislative in nature. We conclude that it is not.
¶ 24 To determine whether an internal policy rises to the level of legislation, we must take into account the nature of the institution establishing the policy and its relationship to the class of persons affected by it, as well as the legal effect of the policy‘s violation. Because the precise distinction between a legislative act and a mere policy is a matter of first impression in this court, we begin by examining the characteristics of those actions that are indisputably legislative in nature.
¶ 25 When a legislative body, whether of the state or of a local government, enacts a statute or an ordinance, that law applies to everyone within the geographical area over which that body has jurisdic-
¶ 26 As a corporate entity engaged in the enterprise of higher education, the University is distinct from an administrative agency that may exert authority over an entire industry or occupation. Indeed, the University‘s firearms policy appears in the University‘s personnel policies and in its code of student conduct.4 The policy does not purport to apply to the population at large or even to the entire category of higher education students or staff, but only to those students enrolled at and those faculty and staff employed by the University itself. And the policy applies only to these individuals because of their contractual or quasi-contractual relationships with the University, not because the University has jurisdiction over a particular geographic area or a particular field of endeavor.5 See Piacitelli v. S. Utah State Coll., 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1982) (holding that the school‘s policy manual created only a “contractual obligation” and did not create “statutory or constitutional rights“); Logan City Sch. Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348, 354 (1938) (indicating that children are admitted to public schools outside of their home districts under a contractual right).
¶ 27 With regard to its legal effect, the policy indicates that the University may undertake “disciplinary action” against a student or an employee who violates it. This may result in a student‘s “written reprimand, the imposition of a fine or payment of restitution, community service, probation, suspension, or dismissal from the University” or an employee‘s “written reprimand, written warning, disciplinary suspension without pay, demotion, dismissal for cause, or other action deemed appropriate by the supervisor.” Most of these actions involve placing a burden on the violating party‘s relationship with the University, and the harshest of them involve severing that relationship. Although a fine may be imposed on students, the policy does not indicate any mechanism for enforcing such a fine other than the threat of withholding student records or other such disciplinary action. A private institution would be equally able to impose these types of penalties because the power to impose them derives from the contractual or quasi-contractual relationship between the institution and the violating party, not from the institution‘s governmental status. See Jones v. Vassar Coll., 59 Misc.2d 296, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (1969) (recognizing the “contractual relationship between the student and the college which is subject to the rules and regulations of the college“). In other words, it is only because there exists such a relationship that the institution has the ability to punish the violation of its policy.
II. THE UNIVERSITY‘S CLAIM TO INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY UNDER ARTICLE X, SECTION 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
¶ 29 Having concluded that
¶ 30 The cardinal rule of constitutional interpretation is to begin with the plain language of the provision in question. Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ¶ 29; Utah Sch. Bds. Ass‘n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 2001 UT 2, ¶ 13. In this regard, we attempt to employ an “objective” analysis, State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 11, 122 P.3d 615, and avoid examining the language in “isolation.” Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Ins. Co., 2004 UT 104, ¶ 13, 106 P.3d 700. When confronted with potential conflicts between constitutional provisions, we construe them in a manner to harmonize them with one another. Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487, 488 (1906). And when confronted with a constitutional challenge to a statute, we presume the statute to be constitutional, resolving any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. Utah Sch. Bds. Ass‘n, 2001 UT 2, ¶ 9. To determine the scope of the University‘s right to institutional autonomy under
¶ 31 As previously discussed, the Utah Constitution “committed [the state‘s] whole lawmaking power to the Legislature,” and the legislature‘s “authority is absolute and unlimited, except by the express restrictions of the fundamental law.” Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 4-5 (1899). We accordingly presume that the legislature possesses plenary authority to regulate the University unless a constitutional provision provides to the contrary. Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of Exam‘rs, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 360 (1956) (indicating that “in order that the legislative body be restricted in educational as well as all other matters, it is imperative that the Legislature be restricted expressly or by necessary implication by the Constitution itself“).
¶ 32 With these general principles in mind, we turn to the text of
The general control and supervision of the higher education system shall be provided for by statute. All rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments originally established or recognized by the constitution for any public university or college are confirmed.
¶ 33 Nothing in the first sentence of this section could be read to limit the legislature‘s right of control over the University. To the contrary, the phrase explicitly confirms the legislature‘s right to “general control and supervision of the higher education system” through its lawmaking power. Absent any restrictive language, the legislature may supervise and generally control all University functions.
¶ 34 The basis for the University‘s claimed right of institutional autonomy is the second sentence of
¶ 35 The original constitutional provision governing higher education, article X, section 4, remained unchanged from the time of statehood until the adoption of the current provision. The original version provided:
The location and establishment by existing laws of the University of Utah, and the Agricultural College [Utah State University] are hereby confirmed, and all the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said University and Agricultural College respectively.
¶ 36 By its plain language, this original constitutional provision did not create or confer any new powers or authority on the University. Rather, it simply “perpetuated” the rights enjoyed by the University at the time of statehood. We therefore must examine the scope of the rights enjoyed by the University at the time our constitution was adopted.
¶ 37 This court exhaustively examined the historical record and outlined the scope of the University‘s rights at the time of statehood in the case of University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956). As explained in that opinion, the University was “instituted and incorporated [in 1850] by an ordinance of the State of Deseret.” Id. at 350. In 1892, just four years prior to statehood, the territorial legislature enacted a new comprehensive statute governing the University and repealed all other laws in conflict with its provisions (the “1892 Act“). The 1892 Act described the University as “a body corporate with perpetual succession” with “all the property, cred-its, effects and franchises of the existing corporation, subject to all [its] contracts, obligations and liabilities.” Utah Rev. Stat. § 2295 (1898). It vested management of the University in a board of regents. Id. Finally, it provided that the University “shall be deemed a public corporation and be subject to the laws of Utah, from time to time enacted, relating to its purposes and government.” Id.
¶ 38 The University reasons that because the 1892 Act vested management of the University in a board of regents and gave it power to employ instructors and employees,6 the University has authority to supervise and control University activities and is protected “from legislative interference of the University‘s autonomy in relation to academic matters.” We disagree.
¶ 39 The territorial legislature gave the University broad authority to regulate its day-to-day affairs, and it retained the powers typically bestowed on corporations, such as the authority to make contracts, purchase property, and use the proceeds of such property. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1 (2006) (generally listing the attributes of a corporation). But the University was never given the power to act in contravention of legislative enactments. Rather, the authority conferred on the University by the 1892 Act, which was later incorporated into the Utah Constitution, was limited by the language rendering the University “subject to the laws of Utah.” 1892 Laws of Utah, ch. IX, § 1. As we concluded in Board of Examiners, although the University retained certain rights, privileges, immunities, and franchises associated with public corporations, it was never exempt from the obligation of all Utah citizens and entities to follow Utah law. Its authority was subject to general legislative oversight, even to legislative enactments relating to its core academic functions.
¶ 40 Our conclusion in this regard is not only supported by the language of the 1892
¶ 41 The University acknowledges that it is “subject to legislative control regarding its budget and finances,” but maintains that this court has never held that the legislature may control the University‘s central academic purpose. While the University is correct that our prior cases did not involve legislative action directed at the University‘s academic mission, the fact remains that the reasoning of those cases is incompatible with the University‘s position. Our prior case law construing
¶ 42 In Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18 (1950), this court upheld the ongoing authority of the legislature to alter the controlling board of what is now Utah State University. In describing the purpose and effect of
[W]hile the article does make mention of perpetuating the rights, franchises, immunities and endowments previously granted, its wording does not, even by implication, suggest an intent to oust the legislature from ever dealing with any affairs of the college, be the dealing favorable or prejudicial to its welfare.
¶ 43 In Board of Examiners, this court examined the question of whether ”
¶ 44 The Board of Examiners opinion distinguished Utah‘s constitutional language from that of other states whose constitutions vest their institutions of higher learning with the institutional autonomy the University seeks. Id. at 355-60. After discussing the differences between those constitutions and Utah‘s constitution, it reasoned:
If the framers of the Utah Constitution had intended to create the University of Utah a constitutional corporation, completely autonomous and free from legislative control, it is difficult to understand why language such as was used in the constitutions of Michigan, Minnesota and the other constitutions referred to was not used.
...
That the framers of the Utah Constitution did not adopt language similar to the constitutions of Minnesota and Idaho, even though the convention had before it the constitutions of those states is evidence that a different result was intended.
Id. at 360. It concluded:
There is not in
Article X, Section 4 , or elsewhere in the Constitution of Utah any express prohibition against action by the legislature respecting the University. Nor do we believe that the Constitution con-tains any implied restraint against such action. ...
Nothing in the arguments and debates in the Constitutional Convention on the education article, (X) and more particularly, on Section 4, tends to suggest that it was considered by the delegates that the Legislature by said article would be prohibited from acting in respect to the University, except in matters of location and establishment.
¶ 45 In State Board of Education v. State Board of Higher Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1193, 1195-96 (1973), this court described its prior decisions interpreting
¶ 46 Our interpretation of the language in
¶ 47 We rejected the association‘s premise that the phrase “general control and supervision” limited the Board‘s authority. Instead, we concluded that the “common and ordinary understanding” of the phrase encompassed “the authority to direct and manage all aspects of the public education system in accordance with the laws made by the legislature.” Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 48 Applying this plain language interpretation to
¶ 49 Our holding in this regard is also consistent with the language of Utah‘s Enabling Act. Section 11 of that Act indicates that the University “shall forever remain under the exclusive control of [the] State.” Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107, 110. “Exclusive” suggests that other entities may not exercise that control. See Webster‘s II: New Riverside University Dictionary 450 (1988 ed.). The Enabling Act therefore supports our conclusion that the legislature‘s role in relation to the University goes beyond merely financing its operations.
¶ 50 As support for its view that the framers intended the University to be free from legislative control, the dissent relies on the fact that the framers did not preserve the legislature‘s powers to amend the Universi-
¶ 51 In summary, we simply cannot agree with the proposition that the Utah Constitution restricts the legislature‘s ability to enact firearms laws pertaining to the University. The plain language of
III. POLICY CONCERNS AND THE UNIVERSITY‘S CLAIM TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM
¶ 52 The University devotes much of its briefing to the policy reasons supporting its claim to institutional autonomy, arguing that its firearms policy is a necessary component of an environment necessary to fulfill its educational mission. Specifically, the University asserts that failure to recognize a right of institutional autonomy will lead to undesirable results, including safety concerns, a hampering of the free exchange of ideas, and potential disruption of “the work and discipline of the school.”
¶ 53 No matter how persuasive we may find such arguments, we are constrained by our judicial role. Our role is one of interpreting, not drafting. “This court is not called on to decide which is better, an autonomous University or a legislatively controlled University. Rather, it is our duty to give proper effect to the language of the Constitution and the territorial statute bearing on the question.” Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of Exam‘rs, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 354 (1956). We are not free to disregard constitutional and statutory language on the basis of policy considerations. “[U]nless it appears so clearly ... beyond a reasonable doubt that there is some violation of a constitutional provision, or irreconcilable conflict therewith, the courts should leave that responsibility where the constitution expressly placed it: with the legislature.” Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1978) (Crockett, J., concurring).
¶ 54 In this case, we conclude that the legislature has not overstepped its constitutional bounds. The plain meaning of
¶ 55 Finally, we reiterate that the University‘s claims based on the right to academic freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are not before us. The federal district court has retained jurisdiction over these claims. With the University‘s state law claims resolved, the parties are free to return to federal court for resolution of the University‘s federal law claims.
CONCLUSION
¶ 56 We hold that the University lacks the authority to enact firearms policies in contravention of Utah statutory law. Having determined that
¶ 57
¶ 58 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH‘s opinion.
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
¶ 59 I concur with the majority‘s analysis in Part I but respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached in Part II.
¶ 60 The dispositive question before the court is whether
¶ 61
The general control and supervision of the higher education system shall be provided for by statute. All rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments originally established or recognized by the constitution for any public university or college are confirmed.
The University rests its claim of autonomy on the second sentence of this section. Essentially, it argues that the constitutional language perpetuating “[a]ll rights, immunities, franchises and endowments originally established or recognized” reserves to the University the power to take whatever action it deems necessary to carry out its mission of providing higher education to the people of the state. I therefore examine the meaning of this second sentence more closely.
¶ 62 The use of the phrase “originally established or recognized by the constitution” in the second sentence of
¶ 63 This court faced the same question previously when the University sought a declaration that it was not subject to state legislative enactments “requiring preaudit of bills, submission of work programs and deposit of funds into the State Treasury.” Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of Exam‘rs, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 350 (1956). The court denied the University‘s claim, relying primarily on an 1892 territorial enactment that declared the University “‘a public corporation [that shall] be subject to the laws of Utah, from time to time enacted, relating to its purposes and government.‘” Id. at 352 (quoting 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 8). The Attorney General
¶ 64 Although I agree that Board of Examiners rejected the University‘s claim of absolute autonomy, I disagree that the court in that decision conclusively subjected the University to legislative control on all matters. As quoted above, the 1892 Act designated the University a “public corporation.” One treatise has explained:
A public corporation that is not municipal is one created by the state solely as its own device and agency.... A state university constitute[s], if incorporated, [an] illustration[] of this class. Because the independent powers of such corporations are frequently nominal, or small ... these organizations are sometimes described ... as public quasi corporations.
1 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 2.03.20 (3d ed. rev.1999). It does not necessarily follow, however, that all incorporated state universities have only nominal independent power, particularly where the university in question is provided for in the state constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Black v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201, 205 (1921) (recognizing the University of Idaho as “a constitutional corporation with granted powers“); Sterling v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253, 257 (1896) (interpreting the extensive powers granted to the University of Michigan by Michigan‘s constitution); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951, 952-54 (1928) (discussing the constitutional corporate status of the University of Minnesota). Although the language in our state‘s constitution varies from the language in the constitutions of Idaho, Minnesota, and Michigan,1 our constitution nevertheless recognizes the University‘s corporate powers.
¶ 65 Significantly, the University was the only corporate entity, public or private, whose corporate powers the framers of the original 1896 constitution sought to insulate from subsequent legislative control. Elsewhere, the constitution specifically states that “[n]o law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or immunity.”
¶ 66 Also in line with this interpretation, the two justices who concurred in the Board of Examiners’ lead opinion qualified their concurrence by acknowledging that the University was a “constitutional corporation” in that “its corporate status and existence” were “beyond the power of legislative control.” 295 P.2d at 371 (Crockett, J., concurring); see also Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Utah 1982) (recognizing that “the University of Utah ... enjoys a degree of constitutionally rooted independence” distinct from “an executive department agency“). The concurrence thus recognized that “[i]t would undoubtedly require a change in the Constitution to abolish the University or to change substantially its nature or function” and noted that the case before it did not involve “any question of interference with the corporate existence or the operation of the institution in any manner that would substantially alter its function as a university.” Bd. of Exam‘rs, 295 P.2d at 371 (Crockett, J., concurring). Here, in contrast, according to the University, the question of its authority to prohibit students and employees from carrying firearms is directly tied to its ability to carry out its academic function.
¶ 67 Based on my examination of the early history of Utah‘s higher education system, as related in Board of Examiners, I agree with the concurrence in that case that “[the importance and desirability of a high degree of independence of [the University‘s] internal function, and of [its] academic freedom, was unquestionably recognized by the founders” of our constitution. Id. (Crockett, J., concurring). Significantly, the 1892 Act relied on in Board of Examiners clearly distinguishes between the state‘s general control over the University‘s purposes and government and the University‘s internal regulation of its academic affairs. In regard to the former, both the territorial legislature and the framers of our constitution were concerned with the relationship between the University and other institutions of public education. By retaining control over the University‘s purposes and government, the legislature intended to en-
“The University shall be the highest branch of the public system of education in Utah, and, as far as practicable its courses and methods of instruction shall be arranged to supplement and continue the instruction in other branches of the public system, and with a view to afford and complete a thorough education to students of both sexes in arts[,] science and literature, and in such professional branches as may be included in its courses of instruction.”
Bd. of Exam‘rs, 295 P.2d at 352 (quoting 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 2). The 1892 act directed that the University include a department that would engage in “practice in teaching and instruction in pedagogy,” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 5, a “school for deaf mutes,” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 6, a “military department,” at least until June 1894, 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 7, and a preparatory program, 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 8.
¶ 68 At the same time that the 1892 Act identified the University‘s role as the highest educational institution in the state and designated particular fields of instruction, the Act provided for the University‘s relative independence in regard to its internal academic affairs. The Act vested in the board of regents, the corporate officers of the University3 (now the board of trustees), the authority to “adopt by-laws” governing its own organization and conduct and to “employ or provide for the employment of all instructors and employees.” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 11. The board was further authorized to provide for the organization of a faculty of the instructors of which the President shall be the chairman and executive officer, and ... [to] commit to the faculty the general management and control of instruction, and the exercise of such powers regarding the examination, admission, classification and instruction of students as the regents may deem proper. Id. This provision of the 1892 Act indicates that the University itself, as a corporate entity, was given control over internal academic matters regarding the hiring of faculty and the admission and instruction of students.
¶ 69 The framers of the 1896 Utah Constitution did nothing to controvert this authority. Rather, they were concerned with the distribution of educational purposes between the two institutions of higher education that then existed—the University and the Agricultural College (now Utah State University)—and with maintaining the unique function of each. While some delegates “supported consolidation [of the two institutions] on the ground of efficiency and economy,” others “argued that agricultural subjects would be overshadowed by classical subjects if the schools were united.” Bd. of Exam‘rs, 295 P.2d at 368. By establishing the two institutions in their separate locations, the framers decided against consolidation. Id. In 1905, the legislature deter-
¶ 70 When presenting the 1896 constitution to the people for adoption, Utah‘s constitutional convention declared that “[t]he article on the proposed Educational System has absorbed the best thoughts and efforts of the Convention, and draws around the Public Schools such protection and defense as will secure for them, it is believed, the steady upward progress which is the enthusiastic desire of this people.” 2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 1847 (1898). I believe that the analysis above shows that the framers intended to secure the University‘s “protection and defense” by perpetuating its autonomous control over internal academic affairs, as originally granted in the 1892 Act. By retaining control over the University‘s purposes and the structure of its governing board, the 1892 territorial legislature ensured the government‘s ability to distribute various specialized educational endeavors among different public educational institutions and to regulate the entire higher education system with maximum efficiency. E.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1193, 1196 (1973) (plurality opinion) (upholding the legislature‘s establishment of the Board of Higher Education, now the Board of Regents, to exercise general control, management, and supervision over the state‘s system of higher education); Spence v. Utah State Agric. Coll., 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18, 22 (1950) (holding the legislature could increase the number of trustees for the Agricultural College). Control over University budgetary matters, as recognized in Board of Examiners, similarly ensured that the state government would retain ultimate authority over the state‘s financial affairs. See 295 P.2d at 370 (“To hold that [the University] has free and uncontrolled ... use of its property and funds, while making the State guarantee said funds against loss or diversion is inconceivable.“). At the same time, the University was granted autonomy over academic matters—matters which it was uniquely competent to control and which were intrinsic to its function as an institution of higher education. This type of internal autonomy is consistent with the powers that a private university would enjoy by virtue of its corporate status. See 6 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 2545 (“An educational institution ... may exercise those powers expressly conferred by law and its charter as well as those powers necessary to carry out its educational purposes. It generally has the power ... to charge reasonable fees to students; to grant degrees and issue diplomas; to provide specialized training and instruction for the trades and professions; and to regulate student conduct and activities.” (footnotes omitted)).
¶ 71 I therefore conclude that, aside from the selection of general fields of study,4 the power to control academic affairs on its campus is among those corporate rights and privileges perpetuated by the 1896 constitution and confirmed by its 1987 revision of article X, section 4. The majority disagrees, arguing that the University does not have academic autonomy. It bases its conclusion, in part, on the first clause in
¶ 72 As indicated above, the academic powers originally vested in the University relate to matters, such as faculty hiring and student instruction, that directly involve the unique institutional competence of a university. The Attorney General argues that the University‘s firearms policies are an attempt “to create policy contrary to legislative enactments.” The Attorney General thus implies that the University‘s policies simply reflect a different view of the underlying social and political controversy over the potential benefits and harms involved in carrying firearms. I agree that the University has no particular expertise that would put it in a better position than the legislature to decide the state‘s policy in regard to these controversial issues, nor would I argue that the University has any authority to do so. That is a matter squarely within the legislature‘s authority to decide.6 However, I do not regard the University‘s policies as reflecting a social or political judgment on whether, for example, more people carrying firearms generally leads to more or less crime. Applying, as they do, only to University employees and students, and only while these individuals are on the University campus, these policies merely reflect the University‘s judgment on an issue that is within the scope of its academic expertise—namely, the appropriate means by which to maintain an educational environment in its classrooms and on its campus.7
¶ 73 It is significant that, even outside the context of federal “academic freedom” analy-
¶ 74 My conclusion on this point says nothing about whether the policies at issue are reasonable exercises of the University‘s authority. As I perceive it, the issue before us today is which governmental entity—the University or the legislature—has the authority to make such policies, not whether the policies themselves are advisable or constitutionally sound. The University‘s academic interests must be weighed against individual constitutional rights where these rights are properly invoked. A policy that prohibited students and employees from openly brandishing firearms in classrooms would clearly be legitimate. Although I express no ultimate opinion on the matter, it is less immediately clear whether the current policies, which prohibit firearms that are hidden in a student‘s purse or an employee‘s desk, would survive an individual‘s constitutional challenge.
¶ 75 The majority fails to recognize the University‘s authority to establish any policy whatsoever relating to on-campus firearm possession by its students and employees. Under its analysis, the University may not subject a student to academic discipline for flashing his pistol to a professor in class. Because I believe the majority‘s conclusion is inconsistent with the authority that the state constitution grants the University as a corporate entity, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
Likewise, article VIII, section 5 of the Michigan constitution designates each board of regents of the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University as a separate “body corporate” and provides that “[e]ach board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution‘s funds.”All the rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments, heretofore granted thereto by the territory of Idaho are hereby perpetuated unto the [University of Idaho]. The regents shall have the general supervision of the university, and the control and direction of all the funds of, and appropriations to, the university, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
The current provision in Minnesota‘s constitution is more closely aligned to
Bd. of Exam‘rs, 295 P.2d at 350 (quoting § 4, State of Deseret Ordinance of Feb. 28, 1850). This list includes many of the powers generally considered to inhere in a corporate entity simply by virtue of its corporate status. See 6 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 2485 (listing among a corporation‘s “inherent attributes” “the power of perpetual succession and duration, the power to sue and be sued in the corporate name, the power to purchase, hold, and transfer real and personal property, the power to have a corporate seal, the power to make and amend bylaws, the power to lend and invest money, the power to make contracts and guarantees” (footnotes omitted)).“to sue and be sued; to act as Trustees of the University, to transact, or cause to be transact-ed, all business needful to the prosperity of the University in advancing all useful and fine arts and sciences; to select and procure lands; erect and purchase buildings; solicit donations; send agents abroad; receive subscriptions; purchase books, maps, charts, and all apparatus necessary for the most liberal endowment of any library, and scientific institution; employ professors and teachers; make by-laws, establish branches of the University throughout the State; and do all other things that fathers and guardians of the Institution ought to do.”
The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in the State Board of Education. The membership of the board shall be established and elected as provided by statute. The State Board of Education shall appoint a State Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall be the executive officer of the board.
