Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Group, 64 A.3d 158

Protesters affiliated with DARTT demonstrated outside Goldman Sachs DC offices and Paese’s home from Aug-Oct 2010 to highlight Goldman’s dealings with Fortress/HLS.
Protests followed a pattern: groups of 4–6 protestors with bullhorns, chanting accusations of animal cruelty and sometimes entering the lobby.
Plaintiffs Goldman Sachs and Paese sued Ortberg, Weber, DARTT, and others for private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy, seeking a TRO and a preliminary injunction.
Trial court granted a preliminary injunction, finding likely success on private nuisance and conspiracy for Paese; and IIED likely for Paese.
Ortberg and Weber appealed, challenging the judgment on IIED and nuisance grounds; the court reverses the injunction on the merits.
The decision remands for further proceedings, clarifying that the injunction’s scope and First Amendment implications require separate consideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether IIED was properly shown.	Paese argues defendants’ conduct was extreme/outrageous and caused severe distress.	Ortberg/Weber contend conduct was not extreme/outrageous or causally linked to severe distress.	No clear evidence of extreme/outrageous conduct or severe distress; IIED rejected.
Whether private nuisance is cognizable as an independent tort and its application here.	Paese/Goldman contend private nuisance exists independently and was shown at home and office.	Defendants argue nuisance is not an independent tort or was not shown here.	Private nuisance remains viable as an independent tort; substantial likelihood shown for Paese’s home but not for Goldman’s office.
Whether the home nuisance claim meets substantial likelihood of success.	Paese’s home disturbance from repeated loud protests supports nuisance claim.	Office-related nuisance lack of substantial interference; home disturbance more compelling.	Paese home nuisance adequately supported; injunction as to home may proceed on remand.
Whether the preliminary injunction was overbroad under the First Amendment.	The injunction is narrowly tailored to remedy demonstrable harms.	Broad restrictions on protests and speech violate First Amendment protections.	Injunction overbreadth; vacate and remand for narrower, tailored relief.

Baltimore & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883) (nuisance acknowledged as interference with property use where continuous)
Fowler v. District of Columbia, 497 A.2d 456 (D.C. 1985) (nuisance may rest on negligence or independent bases depending on context)
Reese v. Wells, 73 A.2d 899 (D.C.1950) (continuity/recurrence factors for nuisance; substantial injury standard)
Beretta v. District of Columbia, 872 A.2d 633 (D.C.2005) (en banc; private nuisance treated within Restatement framework; public nuisance focus distinct)
Wood v. Neuman, 979 A.2d 64 (D.C.2009) (nuisance exists as independent tort; nuisance damages standard)
Tucci v. District of Columbia, 956 A.2d 684 (D.C.2008) (nuisance context; limitations post-Beretta)
Feaster v. Vance, 832 A.2d 1277 (D.C.2003) (preliminary injunction standard; likelihood of success)
In re Estate of Reilly, 933 A.2d 830 (D.C.2007) (merits consideration when close to likelihood threshold)
Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812 (D.C.1998) (outrageous conduct standard for IIED)
Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C.1980) (outrageousness threshold in context)