Appellant Robert Alvord is the personal representative of the estate of Dorothy Reilly and trustee of the Residence Trust, a part of that estate. Appellees John Reilly and Margaret Reilly Heffern have sued Mr. Alvord in his capacities as representative of the estate and trustee of the Residence Trust, as well as in his individual capacity, claiming the right to the Residence Trust. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, restraining Mr. Al-vord from drawing on funds in the Residence Trust to pay for the costs of litigation. Mr. Alvord filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing that the Reillys failed to establish the threat of irreparable injury, a substantial probability of success on the merits, or that the balance of harms supported granting the injunction. We disagree and affirm.
I. Background
The appellees are the children of Gerard Reilly, a former Chief Judge of this court, and his first wife Eleanor, who died in 1980. Dorothy Reilly, was Gerard Reilly’s second wife. When Eleanor died, Gerard Reilly became the owner of their residence located at 3515 Lowell Street, Northwest. Upon his death in 1995, one half interest in this residence was devised to Dorothy, and the other half was devised to the appellees in equal shares, with the restriction that the right of partition could not be exercised against Dorothy for one year.
In 1998, Dorothy created two trusts: the Residence Trust and the Revocable Trust. The Residence Trust consisted entirely of Dorothy’s one-half interest in the Lowell Street property, and the appellees were its beneficiaries. The Revocable Trust was funded by Dorothy’s personal property, and its ten beneficiaries are her family members living in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Maine. The Revocable Trust’s purpose is to assist its beneficiaries with their educational expenses.
Dorothy revised the Residence Trust in 1999, removing the appellees as beneficiaries and replacing them with the Revocable Trust, effectively directing all of the property to her own relatives. Dorothy died in 2002. Mr. Alvord, who drew the wills of both Gerard and Dorothy Reilly, and who was a co-trustee of both the Residence and Revocable Trusts, was appointed executor of Dorothy’s estate.
In 2003, the appellees filed suit against the Estate, alleging breach of contract to devise real estate. Count I of their Complaint alleged that there existed an oral agreement between Gerard and Dorothy Reilly by which Gerard Reilly agreed to *834 convey one-half interest in the residence to Dorothy in consideration for her promise to devise her interest to his children. Count II of the Complaint was for recovery of fair rental value of the property; Count III alleged intentional interference with inheritance; and Count IV sought partition of the property. Mr. Alvord answered with a counterclaim for abuse of process. Count IV became moot when the appellees agreed to the sale of the property, with half of the proceeds going to the appellees and the other half going to the disputed Residence Trust. The appellees subsequently filed a separate action against Mr. Alvord in his personal capacity alleging malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.
Thereafter, Mr. Alvord moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III of the complaint against the estate. The trial court granted the motion with respect to Count III, holding that the District of Columbia does not recognize the tort of intentional interference with inheritance. It denied the motion, however, with respect to Count I, the claim based upon breach of the oral agreement. The court held that the Statute of Limitations did not dictate summary judgment on this claim because (1) an ambiguity in the language of a tolling agreement between the parties made summary judgment inappropriate, and (2) the court construed the appellees’ claim as seeking the imposition of a constructive trust, which exempts the claim from the Statute of Limitations. Dealing next with Mr. Alvord’s Statute of Frauds defense to Count I, the court held the defense failed because there was part performance by Dorothy, and also because the Statute of Frauds does not apply to a constructive trust.
Thereafter, appellees filed a motion for a protective order to freeze the assets within the Residence Trust and to compel Mr. Alvord to return monies already withdrawn for litigation expenses. At the time the parties submitted their briefs, the Residence Trust held $882,284, and the Revocable Trust held $72,741. The court treated the motion as one for a preliminary injunction. It granted it in part, and denied it in part, holding that assets already paid out in attorneys’ fees could not be recovered, but enjoining any further dissipation of Residence Trust funds for litigation expenses. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
There are four criteria to be considered by a trial court when granting a preliminary injunction.
A proper exercise of discretion requires the trial court to consider whether the moving party has clearly demonstrated (1) that there is a substantial likelihood he [or she] will prevail on the merits; (2) that he [or she] is in danger of suffering irreparable harm during the pendency of the action; (3) that more harm will result to him [or her] from the denial of the injunction than will result to the defendant from its grant; and, in appropriate cases, (4) that the public interest will not be disserved by the issuance of the requested order.
Feaster v. Vance,
it is not our task to resolve the overall merits of the dispute between the parties .... Rather, our role is confined to (1) examining the trial court’s findings and conclusions to see if they are sufficiently supported by the record; (2) assuring that the trial court’s analysis reflects a resolution of all the issues which necessarily underlie the issuance of an *835 injunction; and (3) inquiring into any other claims of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Zirkle v. District of Columbia,
A. Irreparable Harm
Mr. Alvord argues that the trial court erred in finding that the appellees were in danger of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction. He bases this argument (1) on the fact that attorneys fees are expressly authorized by the trust, (2) on the “American Rule,” by which each party is responsible for its own attorneys fees, and (3) on the fact that the appellees are pursuing a separate remedy at law capable of redressing their wrong, that is, the suit against Mr. Alvord for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. We address these arguments seriatim.
The fact that attorneys’ fees are expressly authorized by the trust is of no help to Mr. Alvord. Indeed, the law is clear that a trustee may use funds from the trust to defend it in litigation, regardless of the outcome.
See, e.g.,
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 88 cmt. d (2005) (“The right of indemnification applies even though the trustee is unsuccessful in the action, as long as the trustee’s conduct was not imprudent or otherwise in violation of a fiduciary duty.”). The potential harm is irreparable precisely because Mr. Alvord had the legal right to use trust assets to pay attorneys fees. If it were improper for Mr. Alvord to use the funds to defend against a successful claim, then he would be liable to the appellees for any improper withdrawals, and there would be no need for an injunction. In this case, the legality of the act is what requires the court to prevent it. Furthermore, we have previously upheld the imposition of a preliminary injunction preventing a party from engaging in acts that were otherwise perfectly legal, absent the injunction.
See, e.g., Simpson v. Lee,
Mr. Alvord also makes the argument that the injunction runs afoul of the “American Rule” governing attorneys’ fees. “Under the so-called American Rule, ‘a prevailing litigant ordinarily may not recover attorneys’ fees from the defeated party when a case is concluded’ unless that party acted in bad faith.”
Lowrey v. Glassman,
Finally, Mr. Alvord claims that there is no irreparable harm in this case because the appellees have filed a suit against him in his personal capacity alleging malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and, he contends, can through that action obtain any damages he has caused them should appellees prevail there. “The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”
Zirkle, supra,
B. Substantial Likelihood of Success
Mr. Alvord further argues that the trial court erred in finding a substantial likelihood of success of the appellees’ claim, which in this context would be defined as the imposition of a constructive trust. Instead, he argues that he should succeed as a matter of law under the doctrine of *837 laches, the Dead Man Statute, and the Statute of Frauds.
[A] party seeking temporary equitable relief need not show a mathematical probability of success on the merits. Rather, the level of probability of success that must be demonstrated will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other factors pertinent to the analysis. Thus, a stay may be granted with either a high probability of success and some injury, or vice versa. Thus, if irreparable harm is clearly shown, the movant may prevail by demonstrating that he or she has a substantial case on the merits.
Akassy v. William Penn Apartments, Ltd. P’ship,
“A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain it.”
Dennis v. Edwards,
it is not at all self-evident that substantial prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend himself is an inherent consequence of plaintiffs delay in prosecuting the case. As distinguishable from a suit over a discrete event, an equitable action involving property rights is by nature not so time-sensitive.... Rather, the guiding principle is one of laches.
Granville v. Hunt,
1. Laches
Mr. Alvord argues that the doctrine of laches is a complete bar to the appellees’ constructive trust action, because in cases of mixed law and equity, courts “consider themselves bound by statutes of limitations governing actions of law.”
King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc.,
“A successful defense of laches has two elements: an unreasonable and unexplained delay by one party, and prejudice to the other party resulting from the delay.”
Id.; accord M.M. & G., Inc. v. Jackson,
the utmost leniency is manifested by the courts where it appears that the delay is due to the intimate personal relationships existing between the parties and the high degree of confidence reposed by one in another. In such cases, and especially when the family relation exists, the same degree of diligence is seldom required.
Interdonato, supra,
Here, Mr. Alvord puts forth no argument as to why any delay was unreasonable, or how such delay prejudiced his ability to defend the action. Instead, he argues merely that the limitations period bars the appellees’ claim as a matter of law. Such an argument cannot have merit with respect to the imposition of a constructive trust, where a defense of laches cannot be based on “the length of time in and of itself.”
Granville, supra,
2. Dead Man’s Statute
Mr. Alvord also argues that the appellees’ claims are defeated by the Dead Man’s Statute.
4
That Statute precludes entry of judgment in favor of a plaintiff suing a representative of a deceased person, if that judgment is based solely on the plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony as to interactions between her and the deceased or incapable person.
Gray, supra,
Here, the appellees offer their own testimony, corroborated by the evidence of Dr. Deborah Fort, a friend of Dorothy Reilly. In a sworn letter, Dr. Fort stated that Dorothy had told her that she had promised her husband to leave her half of the residence to his children. She also told Dr. Fort that she changed the terms of the Residence Trust in violation of this promise, swearing her to secrecy. Should the trial court credit this evidence, the appel- *839 lees will overcome the requirements of the Dead Man’s Statute. 5
3. Statute of Frauds
Finally, Mr. Alvord argues that the ap-pellees’ action is barred by the Statute of Frauds. The trial court held that the Statute of Frauds did not apply to the appellees’ claims for two separate reasons. First, regarding appellees’ attempt to prove the existence of an express trust, he held that the Statute did not apply because there was part performance of the oral agreement. Second, understanding appel-lees’ claim in the alternative to be the existence of an implied trust, he held that constructive trusts are never subject to the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds requires that agreements creating a trust of real estate be in writing. D.C.Code § 28-3503 (2001). Oral agreements are exempt from this rule, however, if “acts of part performance ... constitute unequivocal evidence of the alleged agreement.”
Hackes v. Hackes,
Express trusts are created when the settlor manifests an intent to place trust property in the hands of the trustee for the benefit of another, and the settlor must use written words to express her intentions if she wants the trustee to be bound.
See
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 17 (1959). Thus, the basis for express trusts is the written manifestation of the settlor’s intent, and the Statute of Frauds operates. The basis for implied trusts — indeed, their most evident difference from express trusts — is the
absence
of any expressed words evincing the intent of the would-be settlor to create a trust for the would-be beneficiary. The existence of such words obviates a claim for a resulting trust (where the settlor designated one person as the beneficiary but, the claimant argues, meant for someone else to be the beneficiary) or a constructive trust (where
*840
the settlor designated one person but, the claimant argues, equity demands a different beneficiary).
See Hertz, supra,
In summary, Mr. Alvord’s arguments against the appellees’ likelihood of success on the merits are based almost entirely on legal bars to recovery, which analysis shows do not exist here. He presents no argument about the actual strength of the appellees’ evidence. Because of this, and given the strong showing of irreparable harm made by the appellees,
see Akassy, supra,
C. Balance of the Harms
Finally, Mr. Alvord argues that the trial court erred in finding that the balance of harms favors the imposition of an injunction. Before granting a preliminary injunction, the trial court “must determine that
‘more
harm will result to the movant from the denial of the injunction than will result to the nonmoving party from its grant.’”
District of Columbia v. Greene,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary injunction imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
Affirmed.
Notes
. We note that a provision of the Revocable Trust agreement, non-existent in the Residence Trust agreement, provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the surviving Trustee shall have the power, but not the duty, upon my death, to make such expenditures out of the property held in trust hereunder in order to facilitate the settlement of my estate. In exercising such power, the Trustees may pay, in part or in whole, ... counsel fees, personal representative commissions and all other items in connection with the settlement of my estate.
. In cases where this rulé has been applied, the alternative relief required no showing beyond success on the merits in the instant action.
See,
e.g.,
Zirkle, supra,
.Mr. Alvord accuses the appellees of filing the malpractice action separately as "an end run around amending the complaint in the present action.” We note that our holding would be no different if the malpractice action were in the same proceeding as the probate action, for the two claims are separate and distinct.
See Astor Pictures Corp. v. Shull,
. D.C.Code § 14-302(a) (2001) ("In a civil action against ... [the] representative of a deceased person ... a judgment or decree may not be rendered in favor of the plaintiff founded on the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff ... as to any transaction with, or action, declaration or admission of, the deceased ... person.”).
. Mr. Alvord argues that Dr. Fort’s letter is inadmissible because it does not meet certain procedural requirements and because the date of the notary signature on the letter, when compared to the date on which the letter purportedly was written, indicates that the letter was not signed before the notary public. We decline to address such irregularities at this stage of the proceedings. Were this a final judgment, then the admissibility of the letter would be at issue. Because we are only reviewing the issue of appellees’ substantial likelihood of success, however, we need not apply the procedural rigor that the trial court would to each piece of evidence as presented at trial.
See Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,
. We find no merit in Mr. Alvord's reliance on
Duggan
v.
Keto,