District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.

COLUMBIA, Appellant, OF DISTRICT

v. U.S.A., CORP.,

BERETTA, al., Appellees.

et Lawson, al.,

Bryant Appellants, et U.S.A., al.,

Beretta, Corp., Appellees. et 03-CV-24,

No. 03-CV-38. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court of En

Argued Banc Jan. 2005. April

Decided 2005. Council, Jr., Liability Advisory McKay, the Product James C. Senior Assistant District of Co- Inc. Attorney General for the

lumbia, Spagnoletti, with whom Robert J. WAGNER, Judge, Before Chief Attorney for the District of Co- General TERRY, FARRELL, REID, lumbia, Schwab, Deputy E. Edward WASHINGTON, GLICKMAN, and of Co- Attorney General for the District PRYOR, Judges, and Senior Associate brief, lumbia, appellant were on the Judge. No. 03-CV-24. Judge Opinion for the court Associate Mogilnicki,

Eric Washington, with J. FARRELL. Hut, Jr., Stephen Payton, whom A. John Molot, Bailey, David R. Karen C. S. Kevin FARRELL, Judge: Associate Stutz, A. Daly, Rachel Zakar Michael indi- The District of Columbia nine Mugmon, Boggs, Roderick V.O. and Susan plaintiff's from the dismissal appeal vidual brief, appellants E. Huhta were on the manufacturers or dis- of their suit in No. 03-CV-38. alleging tributors of firearms common-law L. S. and Michael Lawrence Greenwald nuisance, as negligence public well Rice, Fennell, with whom Thomas E. § liability under 7-2551.02 strict D.C.Code Wilderotter, Reichert, Paul James A. R. (2001). judgment trial court entered The Fletcher-Hill, P. A. Lawrence Catherine all pleadings on the for the defendants on Scott, Jr., Bledsoe, Por- Robert E. Guido counts, that the ruling substance counts carelli, Griffin, III, M. E. William Jonann public negligence and nuisance failed Strain, Hill, III, Coniglio, Paul F. M. King duty, foreseeability, re- basic tests of and Dorr, Olson, James P. Sarah L. F. John that the District of pleaded; moteness as Renzulli, Malsch, Al- Jeffrey M. Scott C. an action under bring Columbia could len, Coleman, III, L. R. Charles Warwick that, 7-2551.02; the § and as to individual Furr, II, Hewitt, Michael C. Michael J. statutory tort was insuffi- plaintiffs, the Tarics, Zomcik, Robert C. Michael Brani- and, event, ciently pleaded sa, Rixse, Ivey, F. L. Lau- Gerald Amanda unconstitutional exercise of extra-territori- Bumann, Lacey, ren A. Paul Timothy regulation by al the Council of District Schleifman, Nelson, Tina Jeffrey S. and of Columbia. brief, on for appellees. Schaefer were of the statuto- reverse the dismissal We Siebel, plaintiffs, Washington, ry Brian J. with whom count as to individual brief, they may Henigan holding A. was on as advance discov- Dennis liability notwithstanding the Brady ery curiae on behalf of the Cam- on strict amicus may confront. paign proof they to Prevent Gun Violence. difficulties of that count also the dismissal of We reverse Jr., Untereiner, Roy E. Englert, T. Alan ex- of Columbia as to District Amundson, filed Quentin Riegel S. and Jan it only the extent —that seeks tent —but curiae, Washington, a brief as amicus subrogated damages to named individu- Man- behalf the National Association of whom has incurred medi- plaintiffs al ufacturers. we sustain the expenses. cal Otherwise court, MO, Beck, holding the trial City, judgment Kansas James M. stated a valid Eisenhart, Dyer, plaintiffs Gregory Frank none J. J. common-law D.C., negligence and Hugh Young, F. claim Washington, public a claim of Jr., District has not stated a brief as amicus curiae on behalf filed stores, nuisance on the facts alleged.1 retail show sales sellers typically who lack federal firearm licenses Background I. and are not required purchaser to do back- This is the second time in the District of ground checks. Columbia that an link actionable has been complaint alleges The the defen- attempted to be drawn between manu- dants have distributed their firearms with- facture or distribution of firearms and the out adequate self-regulation supervision or criminal weapons use of those kill or sales, in order to knowing increase firearm injure. See Delahanty Hinckley, or constructively knowing they are creat- (D.C.1989) (on A.2d 758 question certified ing, maintaining, supplying or the unlawful court, from federal finding no common law flow of firearms into the simi- basis on facts alleged holding handgun larly knowing those will used to be manufacturers and their officers un- liable commit crimes such as the that have ones der D.C. law for gun by criminal use of caused death injury to the individual Jr.). Hinckley, plaintiffs John W. persons they represent. The present case are the District of Colum- complaint alleges further numerous illus- government bia per- and nine individual trative means which the are defendants sons who themselves were wounded or able to restrict or impede the unlawful represent decedents shot and killed flow of firearms into the District but have persons unlawfully using firearms (to not done so. just These include name District of Columbia.2 The defendants are three) directing encouraging their dis- manufacturers, numerous importers, or tributors and dealers to refuse sell distributors of Underlying firearms. all circumstances where the dealer knows or three counts of complaint allega- buyer should know that the seeks make may tions that be summarized as follows: purchase; requiring straw dealers such Although the District of Columbia itself to refuse to sell more than handgun one laws, stringent gun control there none- month to person holding not a federal theless exists an illegal unchecked flow of license; firearms requiring their dis- firearms into the District to which the dealers,” tributors to sell to “stocking by defendants action and inaction have ie., guns retailers who stock from retail contributed. guns place This flow of takes stores, and not to “kitchen table” dealers ways, numerous including pur- “straw gun or at shows. (purchases chases” from licensed dealers persons on behalf of other qualified not to general Based on these allegations, law), buy applicable (Strict under multiple I complaint sales Count of the Liability) (multiple purchases over a short stretch of alleged that the defendants are liable to by persons time intending to sell or trans- the District of Columbia under D.C.Code fer to not qualified buy), by § others sales 7-2551.02 and related statutes for health costs, the defendants to “kitchen table” dealers care expenses, Medicaid and other licensed to sell but who do not do so from costs of assistance and compensation paid men, present opinion by 1. The the court en banc flee from three armed all of whom were supersedes opinion issued division of subsequently aggravated convicted of assault court, (D.C. published the 2004). at 847 A.2d 1127 arising shooting. or related crimes from the shooting, qua- As a result of the is a Lawson driplegic and suffers other ill effects of his illustrate, complaint alleges 2. To that disabling injuries. plaintiff Bryant Lawson was shot a semi- early automatic firearm in 1997 as he tried to standards, we by the to or these consider Applying District on behalf victims civilians, offi- including police alleged, violence the two common-law counts first cers, firefighters, and are liable to statutory count as relates then individual for direct and conse- of plaintiffs. of the classes each two damages quential proximately caused Negligent III. Distribution (Negli- Count II defendants’ conduct. Distribution) gent that alleged the defen- court the count The trial dismissed dants “a to the District and breached on negligent primarily distribution

its residents not create unreasonable decision, Delahanty, supra. That basis risk foreseeable harm from the distribu- overruled, appears to bar unless indeed firearms, tion of and to their take reason- attempt plaintiffs’ plead negligence limit steps able this risk once it had resulting harm from the unlawful ac for (Public In III Nui- been created.” Count Delahanty parties. tions of third came sance) alleged the District alone as a certified before division court pub- defendants have “created an ongoing from the Court of question United States lic readily handguns nuisance of available “whether, Appeals asking in the District of unreasonably and machine inter- Columbia, ‘manufacturers and distributors enjoyment feres residents’ Saturday Specials may strictly Night be health, safety, peace.” injuries arising these guns’ liable from ’ II. Standard Review Delahanty, 564 criminal use.” A.2d omitted). (citation panel’s answer judg

The defendants moved for widely, question ranged how more counts, ment the pleadings on as to all that, pointed although It out ever. 12(c), “[t]he Super. Ct. Civ. R. and the trial certifying focused whether this court court granted motion and dismissed adopt theory court would the strict each count for to state failure a claim Indus., 12(b)(6); Kelley described in R.G. [v. which can be granted. relief Rule (Md.1985)],” see Md. Argana, A.2d Osei-Kuffnor (D.C.1993) (standards “‘the court noted that theoretical under same for dis 12(b)(6) pinnings Kelley missal under Rule unclear’ judgment [of ] somewhat 12(c)). under reviewing question Rule that deci and that the certified was sion, particu this court a de to this to a “conducts novo review intended restrict court record, all in De construing facts and lar rationale for this cause of action.” (citation omitted). light lahanty, ferences most to the 564 A.2d at 760 favorable plaintiff[s] Further, taking complaint’s and alle this court is “not limited because gations true.” law designated question [in Duncan to the Children’s Ctr., (D.C. 207, Nat'l to may prerogative Med. 702 A.2d but ‘exercise our event] 1997). fit complaint may A not be issues see for an dismissed frame basic as we ’ decision,” and merely because the court “doubts that informed because Dela claim,” plaintiffs] hanty appellants relying will on a id. were “exclu prevail [the] not (citation omitted), Kelley theory on but con sively but “dismissal for failure have court all the may properly granted to state a claim be tinued to advance this we appears beyond complaint,” where it doubt that theories in their “ex inquiry ques to include the plaintiffs] prove panded] can no set of facts our theories of tort support of claim which would entitle tion whether established [the] (citation provide in the quota to relief.” Id. law District Columbia [them] omitted). manufacturers against gun tion cause of action marks injuries and distributors for from arising product be associated with the to the con- (citation out, the guns’ trary,” pointing criminal uses.” among other id.— omitted). things, appellants’ attempt make actionable the manufacture or distri- Just as the federal District Court had bution of “a certain class of inexpensive complaint dismissed the entire for failure (i.e., allegedly handguns” unreliable claim, “reject[ed] to state a this court each Saturday Night Specials) ignored fact appellants of the theories have advanced capable “[a]ll firearms are of being the federal courts and in this court.” Id. used for criminal activity.” Id. at 761-62 rejected first theory We their of strict (citation quotation and internal marks liability for product, sale a defective omitted). based not on a claim design of defective Finally, rejected we the cause of action manufacture —no such claim was ad- distribution, for negligent manufacture or vanced—but on the assertion “that explaining: duty manufacturers had a to warn of the “In general no exists in tort dangers of criminal gun.” misuse of the harm resulting from the criminal acts warn, answered, There no duty we parties, third although liability for such when a potential danger is known and harm may imposed sometimes be “[bjecause recognized, and hazards of fire- special basis of some relationship be obvious, arms are the manufacturer had no parties.” tween the Hall v. Ford En duty (citing to warn.” Id. inter alia RE- Ltd., ters., 610, (D.C.1982); (SECOND), STATEMENT OF TORTS see also Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts j). § 402A cmt. paused only slightly We Apartment Corp., Ave. 141 U.SApp. longer appellants’ attempt over the ap- 370, 375-76, D.C. 439 F.2d 482-83 ply theory “abnormally dangerous (1970) (relationships giving rise to a activity,” see §§ RESTATEMENT protection include landlord to the marketing handguns. That tenant, student, school district em action, cause of explained, we ployer to employee, hospital to pa applies only to activities that are dan- tient); Doe, Columbia v. gerous in themselves and to (D.C.1987) (school A.2d to stu result directly from the dangerous activ- dent). not We are inclined to extend the ity. marketing of a handgun is not rationale of these pres decisions to the dangerous itself, in and of and when ent Appellants alleged case. have no occurs, injury the direct result special relationship gun with the manu itself, of the sale but rather ... of ac- suggested facturers and have no reason party. tions taken a third way able manufacturers could (citation Delahanty, 564 A.2d purchasers screen the of their omitted). quotation again marks We em- prevent criminal misuse. phasized “any that likelihood that ... Delahanty, 564 A.2d at 762. harm great will be ... would result from use, such, the marketing the as of Although rejection liability our of handguns.” rejected Id. And we for simi- in Delahanty throughout rested on the lar utility” theory reasons the “social of absence of a direct link the manu between tort adopted by Maryland the handguns courts facture or distribution of and Kelley, supra “requiring proof that the caused the criminal misuse of — danger of product outweighs the its social those weapons, especially it is the refusal utility and that no legislative imprimatur “to extend the rationale of decisions” [our] stemming directly from the criminal acts theory alleged the that negligence there plaintiffs asserting persons. the must confront in third But see Workman v. of Comm., negligent their of distribution here. 355 U.S.App. claim United Methodist 259, the They argue negligence first dis- D.C. 320 F.3d Delahanty cussion in was the given dictum and (surveying court’s decisions con this precise phrasing ques- of the D.C. Circuit’s requirement cluding them “the that under however, fact, tion. “ex- we able fore that the defendant been [has] panded] inquiry” certifying the our likely commit party see that third would —as might court foresaw we render “an has, ordinarily perhaps a criminal and act —to on the reach of “estab- informed decision” have, component”). We must a relational lished of tort law the District of theories that our decisions nevertheless conclude Columbia,” id. at does not make our concepts duty addressing general tort analysis advisory. any of those theories foreseeability permit recogni and do not reasoning That would make an entire sub- negligence tion of a claim for common-law e., questions set of to certified answers —i. on the facts here. alleged those in which exercise “latitude” we the injury is caused the Where given nondesignated ] us to “consider[ intervening party, act of a third criminal reformulat[e], questions if [to] neces- repeatedly this court held liabil certified,” sary, questions as [the] ity depends heightened a more upon Abramson, Penn Mut. Ins. Co. v. Life showing foreseeability than would be (D.C.1987) non-binding A.2d — required merely negli if act the were dicta, contrary to our law an- that such case, In gent. plaintiff such a bears swers are “stare decisis of this court.” establishing that the the burden of crim bottom, argue At that De- duty inal act that a was so foreseeable because, decided, lahanty wrongly was arises to it. Because of guard contrary holding, to its District of Colum- extraordinary nature criminal bia requires “special law no relationship conduct, requires that fore the law (such parties” between the as that of land- seeability precisely be more of the risk tenant) permit lord negli- shown. gence others, long for criminal acts of so Columbia, Potts as the defendant realized should have (citations (D.C.1997) 1249, 1252 and inter negligent realized the likelihood his omitted; quotation emphasis marks nal conduct would cause harm to foreseeable added). context, then, In banc, requisite this plaintiffs. Sitting en we decline negligence3 is a duty required this care Delahanty. invitation to overrule And foreseeability, arising only function of pass we question “spe- over whether a alleged foreseeability when commensu plaintiff cial and a relationship” between extraordinary nature of undergird [in rate with “the defendant must claim And, tervening] conduct.” Id.4 negligence in the District on harm criminal based Workman, plaintiff noted the the- negligence 3. must 4. the D.C. Circuit establish ‘TT]o blending oretically prove duty anomalous of care owed defendant somewhat foreseeability in this court’s deci- duty by of that plaintiff, a breach defendant, relationship ("Ordinarily, between damage to the sions interests of determining parties key plaintiff, by the whether proximately caused breach.” is Harris, duty legally enforceable 87 the defendant had a Columbia v. District of decedent), (or (D.C.2001) (citations plaintiff quotation her whereas internal omitted). important proxi- of foreseeability to issues marks Potts, lot, in opinions we further stated parking only “[o]ur the store “the evidence have demanding made clear the nature presented respect shooting’s [the] of requirement ‘precise’ proof foreseeability was an expert’s opinion of ‘heightened showing foreseeability’ in police reports based on activity criminal the context of an intervening criminal act in surrounding area. No evidence involving discharge weapons.” Id. involving] any gun-related was introduced (citations omitted; added). emphasis particular shopping incidents at the mall mark, were, high-water showing of a Potts, in shooting which the occurred.” duty facts sufficient to create a to pro at (summarizing A.2d basis against tect such conduct inwas District of holding). Clement’s In Bailey v. District Doe, (D.C.1987), Columbia v. 524 A.2d 30 Columbia, (D.C.1995), 668 A.2d 817 where the claim was that pro reasonable plaintiff where the was shot after attend- by tective measures the District of Colum ing cheerleading competition junior at a prevented bia could have a child from be high school as leaving she was the build- ing raped at a elementary school. ing, she offered the affidavit of witnesses Acknowledging requirement of a neighborhood who asserted heightened showing of in foreseeability “high drug around the school was a area” context, id. at we nonetheless and that shootings and other criminal acts identified specific evidence to that school place had taken there. Rejecting this surrounding area that “could be insufficient, showing as explained we by viewed reasonable factfinders as en in, “[a]lthough shootings the occurrence of hancing foreseeability danger from of, vicinity public the District’s intruders, thereby creating duty on the schools an unhappy reality, such part of protect District officials to the stu information,’ ‘generic itself, does dents from type activity.” this of criminal duty create a on part of the District cases, Id. at 34.5 In three succeeding contrast, rejected protect we the use of firearms un- as a matter (hence of law where foreseeability duty) der the presented circumstances here.” was not limited any evidentiary Potts, refer at Finally, 820.6 supra, the precise ence to a per location or class of injured by were gunshots from sons. an unknown they leaving source as were Washington Store,

In Convention Center Clement v. Peoples Drug (WCC) (D.C.1993), attending boxing after A.2d 425 event or- employer which an ganized Promotions, was negligence arising by Spencer They sued for from the Inc. others) shooting employees death of one of organizer its sued the (among area”; conformity mate surrounding causation and to the curred] stan- in the and the care, dard of issues that arise after a system security school was defective due to an found.”), has been but that nevertheless "the lock, open gate, rear doors that would not repeatedly D.C. spoken courts have of the intercom, malfunctioning and a permitting heightened foreseeability requirement freely throughout "adult males [to] roam[] duty.” U.S.App. terms of D.C. at Doe, the school.” A.2d at 34. 320 F.3d at 265. We see no need to reconsid- analysis er that framework of in this case. particular, 6. In "there was no evidence prior gun-related violence or assaults occur- particular, 5. there was evidence that ring many at the [even] school or against persons "crimes [had been commit- cheerleading competitions that had been held [including] ted] in and around the school ... robbery anywhere city.” Bailey, playground; in the 668 A.2d at the school’s sexual activity assaults and violent [had other oc- 821.

643 number from the sheer recognized, results negligence. the District of Golumbia firearms, any despite ways in which of Relying principally Bailey on Clem- can manufacturers precautions reasonable ent, summary grant we sustained a of take, hands may reach the expected to be “plaintiffs prof- judgment [had] because number wrongdoers- sheer of criminal any prior gun-related fered no evidence of —the words, links, between in other of causal any held at the violence at other event of manufacture and distribution licensed by Spencer Pro- promoted WCC injure to kill or and their use firearms motions, specific nor other evidence decisions, con- we others. This court’s foreseeability of bearing directly on the clude, of a com- permit recognition do shooting incident at issue here.” limitless no- resting tort on such mon-law A.2d at 1252. foreseeability. also duty of See tions Potts, Bailey, and Clement were Columbia, 424 A.2d Lacy v. District of than summary judgment on rather decided (citation (D.C.1980) and inter- 320-21 dismiss, they demonstrate a motion to but omitted) (recognizing, marks quotation nal “ tight requiring ‘precise’ “policy,” a matter of the existence boundaries — showing of foresee proof ‘heightened of a liability-limiting consid- our law of “various Potts, ability,”’ 697 A.2d at 1252—within reheve the defendant erations which negligence which a claim of common-law actually harm he caused where liability for jurisdiction “in the must be framed this appears highly extraor- the chain of events act in intervening retrospect”).7 context of an criminal dinary Id. volving discharge weapons.” negli- rejecting courts claims Among broadly allege in this case plaintiffs The similar to the distribution of firearms gent harm to District duty and foreseeable “the Appeals New York Court plaintiffs’, the and its residents.” Com [of Columbia] Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., in Hamilton v. ¶ duty plaint, 151. That is unlike even 7, 750 N.E.2d N.Y.2d 727 N.Y.S.2d one claimed to be owed subclasses of resi denied, (2001), appeal leave to store, chil (shoppers particular dents at a 200, 801 N.E.2d 769 N.Y.S.2d N.Y.2d school, given at a of a dren attendees cogent the most provided event) particular regarding whom we have decision, Delahanty analysis. Like our repeatedly “generic” proffers said that questions certified Hamilton answered foreseeability do not suffice to create a Court, includ- the federal Circuit law from duty of care. The class to whom the de York decisional ing under New whether duty here is allegedly duty fendants owed a law, owed “the defendants except by popula in the market- potentially unlimited reasonable care to exercise they Columbia, any handguns mem ing tion of the District of and distribution 1059. The federal victim. manufacture.” Id. at shooting of which could be a ber duty “imposed had have District Court indeterminacy, as other courts That could, technically Carlson, had though the driver even Columbia v. 7. (D.C.2002), by failing help plaintiffs. does not statute” "violated criminal pains It concerned the District’s maintain we took right way. Id. But yield the signals working installed at condition traffic negligence "was not add that the driver’s pedestrian crosswalks. intersections act,” 1291, reflecting our at id. an intentional the District could main issue was whether very "the inter- different awareness of how negligent reasonably "that a driver foresee Carlson, id. at was in vening act of another" crossing pedestrian the street” might strike a actions criminal the unforeseeable from working. light was not when the traffic Potts, Bailey, Clement. parties in of third Unsurprisingly, court held that 1290. illegal gun risk of ability to reduce the steps ‘to take reasonable manufacturers through control of market- pri- trafficking of ... sale to the point available at the of their possibility ing products,” the and distribution mary distributors reduce a pointing “impos[e] gen- fall into the out such these instruments will ” only an duty them.’ of care would create not likely hands of those to misuse eral omitted). (citation plaintiffs The New indeterminate class of but also Id. at 1061 rejected class of defendants whose Appeals York Court of indeterminate relationship to negligence. liability might Its have little as a basis for common-law court’s, decisions, controlling illegal of this were “cau- the benefits prior [social] like the Although plain- Id. at 1063.8 extending guns.” defen- tious a “presented with [the court] for their failure to control the con- tiffs had dants others,” marketing po- of a “judicial theory negligent duct of resistance novel — yet product, based duty [growing] tentially legal out of lethal expansion of manufacturer, the acts not of one but practical potentially upon concerns both about unconvinced,” industry limitless liability and about the unfairness of an —we concluded, before of anoth- court that “on the record imposing liability of the acts duty plaintiffs impose wish to duty imposed er.” Id. at 1061. us[ ] Under Court, contrast, by either reasonable or circumscribed.” by “[t]he the District plaintiffs very large— at 1068. pool possible of any of the thousands of victims

potentially, out that Hamil- plaintiffs point here (footnote omitted). gun of violence.” Id. on a motion to dismiss ton was decided Moreover, reasoned, court a trial shown the ab- but after had defendants, the the connection between to harm proof gun “that the used sence is re- wrongdoers plaintiffs criminal injured plaintiff] came from source [the mote, through links in a running several duty of to the exercise of amenable the manufac- consisting chain least plaintiffs impose upon de- care that would turer, federally licensed distributor Id. at 1062. But fendant manufacturers.” wholesaler, and the first retailer. do not claim that plaintiffs in our case includes numerous The chain most often discovery they may be able “tan- through subsequent legal purchasers or even “that defendants were gibl[y]” to show liability, potentially thief. broad Such link in the causal chain that resulted direct victims, gunshot all crime encompassing injuries,” (emphasis add- plaintiffs’ id. a more imposed should not be without cases, ed) that, our language in the — that defendants were a tangible showing to the de- those were foreseeable link in chain that re- direct the causal entail- “heightened” in the sense fendants injuries, and that de- plaintiffs’ sulted knowledge and ing “‘precise proof” of realistically position in a fendants were required corresponding ability prevent wrongs. prevent Potts, At most supra. our decisions. Id. at 1061-62. allege that the defendants that a num- aggregate know sizeable rejected plain-

The court therefore they the firearms manufacture duty of care general tiffs’ assertion of “a ber practices way, through their dealer manufacturers’ make aris[ing] out said, it, guns, viewing negligently marketed and distributed way the court 8. Another guns in opposed presented all "tend- to the risk evidence had been offered was no Hamilton, plaintiffs’] society.” 727 N.Y.S.2d ing degree [the to show to what presence N.E.2d at 1062. injury risk of was enhanced discharge excep as an limit, wrongful the tort of reasonably could into the Dis- they gov and into the hands doctrine trict of Columbia tion to the traditional at-will criminals, “only short sometimes employment, where erning termination a between the retail sale of passing time of clear mandate discharge violates “a and its crimi- firearm outside the District Although we Id. at 164. public policy.” Complaint, nal misuse in the District.” of the tort to be applications left future ¶ claim, if, discovery they Even 123. basis, case-by-case we on a decided may particular weap- them to tie a enable must be application such stressed injure kill a named plaintiff on used to or poli fundamental “carefully tethered to a manufactur- particular or his decedent to municipal in implicit “statute[s] cies” er, they would still not have established in the Constitution.” Id. regulation[s], or circum- cognizable i.e., “reasonable — important present pur for at 164. More Hamilton, scribed,” supra —common-law succeeding in cases divisions poses, duty plaintiffs to these rather than a of apply have declined to this cause court potential to the class of all victims question in was not policy action where the not, They in the District. would violence in some related implicit i.e., embodied — sum, in have stated a claim under our “explicit rather was statute —but negligence for common-law based decisions directly” a statute [might] apply through from criminal acts resulting v. addressing the matter. Freas expressly parties. of third Servs., Inc., 998, 1002 716 A.2d Archer why There is an additional we reason (D.C.1998) (rejecting application of Carl as claim recognize plaintiffs’ decline to on stat unnecessary where suit was based negligence common-law the distribution retaliation utorily banned and actionable of firearms. The of the District of Council exercising rights under the Workers’ in this precisely Columbia intervened Act); v. Compensation see also McManus by enacting area a strict statute Corp., 748 A.2d MCI Communications governing the manufacture and sale (D.C.2000) (noting applying (assault weapons) subclass firearms rejection argu previous court’s of “the character, judgment, whose lethal its exception to public policy ment ... that a outweighs any utility they may social have. alleged to an applies the at-will doctrine § See D.C.Code 7-2551.02. Under violation”). That deference to statutory statute, V, infra, part as we hold itself to us legislative role commends plaintiffs individual have stated a valid §of 7- this case as well. The existence (and may claim the District as well have unwillingness to re 2551.02 reinforces our subrogation rights). analogous limited ' standards, “liability-limiting” lax basic circumstances, this court has refused foreseeability, and duty, Lacy, supra, of expand the boundaries of a common-law recognize the cause causal remoteness to Specifically, in tort. cause of action negligence the action for common-law Hosp., v. 702 A.2d 159 Carl Children’s (D.C.1997) (en banc), full court advocate.9 adopted such, Baker, arbitrary only limitation as subject Williams 9. also Cf. (D.C.1990) (en banc), adopting impose_[T]he issue of wheth- where in we should limiting danger damages the class of plaintiff the zone of test for fear er a can recover negligent persons may infliction of question who claim person is a of harm to a third distress, explained: court, the court emotional one to be deter- policy for the case-by-case determination of mined on jurisdiction not cast itself should [T]his injury was foreseeable. foreseeability, whether the a sea infinite adrift on definition ex- Even the RESTATEMENT Nuisance IV. Public par- “reference to plains “nuisance” two have said so far Much of what we of two ticular kinds of harm —the invasion reject plead on the explains why we also interests[, public private] by kinds of — brought ings public the claim for nuisance tortious into conduct if falls alone. The by the District Columbia liability.” RE- categories the usual tort (SECOND) RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) OF TORTS STATEMENT (1) (1979) § that tort as “an 821B defines added). (emphasis § cmt. c 821A right unreasonable interference with dispute, do not The defendants here Dis general public.” to the common however, separate public that a tort of of action does argues trict that this cause District of cognizable nuisance is claim, negligence from its but is not derive Columbia, that the RESTATEMENT or of action with dis independent an cause “an (1) appropriate definition: provides elements, namely, an interference tinct right with a unreasonable interference public right that is unreasonable. public.” accept to the common We to that defini Although this court referred ques- case us on that basis. The before Mgmt., of the tort in B & Inc. v. tion W nevertheless, tion, the District is whether Co., (D.C.1982), Tasea Inv. 451 A.2d 879 cause of ac- sufficiently pleaded that that argue and their amici defendants tion, critically on depends and the answer nui recognized public we have never to loosen the tort prepared how we are claim that did not involve either sance moorings duty, (and of) from the traditional property, control real ownership causation, foreseeability, and re- proximate violations, tor independently criminal or reject made us moteness that have negligence tious conduct such as —none negligence. For the plaintiffs’ claim sufficiently alleged, in alleged, is which reasons, are not convinced following we this case. nuisance cause of action the public that the tort, nui- independent claims of As sufficiently distinguish- alleges not viewed favor- sance have indeed been justify claim to negligence from its able we ably by this court. recent cases result. different is a type have even said that “nuisance by the pointedly The issue was defined recovery in damage theory and not a People majority dissenting opinions and itself,” v. and of Jonathan Woodner Co. Co., Sturm, Spitzer Ruger rel. v. & ex (D.C.1995), Breeden, 929, A.2d so 91, 192, ap- leave to A.D.2d 761 N.Y.S.2d cases, all, recovery in such “if at [must denied, 514, 100 N.Y.2d 769 NY.S.2d peal Bernstein theory negligence,” on the be] where the 801 N.E.2d (D.C. Fernandez, essentially public suit for nuisance state’s 1991) (citation quotation and marks omit- allegations in this mirrored the District’s ted), theory such as intentional or another case: infliction of emotional distress. Jonathan Co., ... claims that ille- argues complaint Plaintiffs supra. The District

Woodner com- handguns are a gally possessed made in the these statements were they nuisance because public, public not mon-law private, of claims for context safety sig- of a endanger the health and in Bernstein not- nuisance but our decision inter- portion population; nificant that, holding in purpose “for the of our ed with, offend, injure and otherwise case,” on fere point depend did not this in the exer- damage public cause to the public alleged “whether the nuisance all; that, Bernstein, common to rights n. cise of 649 A.2d at 1072 8. private.” “a harm” would invite alleged actual con- duct and the being placed after limitless, public guns structive notice that defendants similar theories of flood of sell, being are distribute and market nuisance, against these defen- crimes, have, they their used con- dants, a wide and varied also but omissions, created, maintained duct and and manufactur- array of other commercial nuisance, public and contributed to this Id. at 196- ing enterprises and activities.” manufacture, they distribute because New York decisions validat- 97. Whereas in a handguns allegedly and market claims had ing public “involve[d] nuisance knowingly dispro- places manner to de- directly attributable specific harm portionate handguns number of activity,” id. at 198 fendant or defendant’s them un- possession people who use “im- present complaint n. would lawfully. Plaintiff further claims hand- pose! an undefined of care on ] that certain defendants are on notice distributors,” gun manufacturers and id. types guns, sold certain the “intervention of unlawful despite locales, disproportionately used in frequently violent acts of criminals— of crimes. commission no absolutely defendants have over whom Sturm, Ruger Id. at 194. The dissent in actually, directly, and most control—who position negligence took the that anal- “[a] intentionally, cause the cited harm.” often ysis, requirement of with its the existence court concluded that the Id. at 199. The duty by of a limited concomitant consider- branches were legislative and executive cause, proximate foreseeability, ations of suited to address” the “so- “vastly better fault, intent, tempered by and notions of with, or problems cietal associated follow- equitable apportionment the of economic and ing, legal handgun manufacturing liability, inapposite to an action for may be as marketing,” “problems which public by abatement of a brought nuisance conduct and remote from a defendant’s proper the state the exercise of its control as these.” Id. at 208. police powers.” (Rosenberger, Id. at 208 reasoning, and are agree with this We J., dissenting). a claim of similarly unwilling recognize majority rejected The that proposition, that disre- public common-law nuisance and large part reasoning “based the dilutes, liability-limit- gards, greatly or the Beretta, implications of Hamilton v. III, ing applied part supra. factors [U.S.A., Sturm, supra].” Ruger, Corp., links, resulting sheer number of causal at 194. It determined that N.Y.S.2d attenuation, underlie the District’s reasoning of Appeals’] “much the Court[ inva- injury claim of from the defendants’ mar- dismissing negligent the Hamilton by right described public sion of a were keting complaint logically, aptly, and most in a Supreme Court of Connecticut the applies plain- to our consideration of this Bridge- city brought similar suit public tiffs common-law nuisance claim.” port: particular, Id. at 196. the Hamilton handguns The manufacturers sell “potentially limitless court’s concern about distributors wholesalers impos- liability and about the unfairness federal sales are lawful because those ing liability for the acts of another” was they be licensed requires law negligent marketing “common to both buyers. The distribu- sellers to licensed claims,” because to disre- public nuisance handguns to the retail- tors then sell existence, remoteness, nature gard “the ers, that, required by again, are sales any intervening causes be- and extent of by licensed sellers con- law to be commercial federal tween defendants’ lawful rejected pub have links is Other courts likewise buyers. The next set of licensed holding gun for lic nuisance as a basis guns ei- that the retailer then sells liable, and distributors ei manufacturers buyers, namely, legiti- authorized ther to they found no owed to ther because or, consumers, through the “straw mate from large prevent guns public illegitimate man” or other method wrong criminal ending up in the hands of means, buyers, sales to unauthorized attenuation, doers, reasons of re or for criminal under fed- likely would be moteness, inability of those defendants Next, illegally acquired eral law. Ti generally control the nuisance. See market.” From guns “illegal enter an Dist. #15 v. United oga Pub. School market, guns up end those (8th Co., 915, 920 Gypsum 984 F.2d States Next, ei- hands of unauthorized users. Cir.1993) (“[Liability damage caused buyers the authorized misuse ther a nuisance turns on whether the defen storage pre- guns by taking proper instrumentality dant is in control of the or unin- cautions or other unwarned nuisance, since with alleged to constitute or the unautho- precautions, structed control a defendant cannot abate out to commit buyers rized misuse nuisance.”). County The court in Camden Depend- harmful acts. crimes or other Beretta, Bd. Chosen Freeholders of the conduct of the ing on the nature (3d Cir.2001), U.S.A., F.3d 536 Corp., 273 then guns, users recited “a chain of seven example, municipal neces- expenses incur for such manufac necessary links” to “connect the crime, emergen- investigation sities as handguns municipal crime- ture of injured, cy and medical services for costs,” held that fighting Finally, as a result expenses. or similar simply causal chain is too attenuat- [t]his events, chain of the plaintiffs of this control to the ed to attribute sufficient ultimately ... increased costs for suffer public out a nui- manufacturers to make services, ... municipal various steps, initial the claim. sance residents, Bridgeport’s of and deaths handguns produce manufacturers lawful ... negative impact ... and a on the li- federally to and make lawful sales to live free from ability of the residents distributors, in turn gun who censed apprehension danger. federally lawfully handguns sell those Further down the licensed dealers. Corp., 258 Ganim v. Smith & Wesson chain, parties, third over independent (2001).10 313, 780 A.2d 123-24 Conn. have no con- whom the manufacturers rejected nui- public court a claim of The trol, handguns to unauthorized divert by plaintiff “a situated as brought sance owners and criminal use. conduct as remotely from the defendants’ are, plaintiffs presentf] City or who a court these Id. at 541. The same Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., multifac- lengthy Philadelphia of causation as chain (3d Cir.2002), rejected city’s plaintiffs have.” Id. at 133. F.3d eted as these firearms, residents of complaint, Dis- and use of these Like the Connecticut 10. alleges public injured, that the trict’s nuisance claim be killed and District will "[djefendants’ health, ongoing conduct has created public will continue to fear for its readily ongoing public avail- an nuisance of subjected to safety, and will be and welfare guns handguns ... that able and machines apprehen- that creates a reasonable conduct unreasonably District resi- interferes with danger person property.” sion health, safety, peace enjoyment of dents’ ¶ Complaint, 164. possession .... As a of the continued result in the creation of community will result attempt by “to shorten the causal chain Further, de- arguing ‘thriving illegal market nuisance there. public [it], injures any guns only ... even before ac- that the suggestion spite plaintiffs’ actually quired illegal market are they place on defendants burden would ” used the commission of a crime.’ Id. criminals, loss of sales to is the assertion, at 424. the court ex- This of the burden that magnitude plained, “does not reduce the links that manufacturer and impose on the seek gun separate manufacturer’s sale of by altering their distributor defendants gun’s a licensee and the arrival Finally, is immense. practices business illegal through market a distribution only positive conse- plaintiffs predict ... lawful” and scheme a succes- quences recognized if this —the (such third-party sion of unlawful acts city will be safer and lives will be saved. “likely purchases) long[ ] straw [to be] positive consequences specula- Such (footnote omitted). and ... varied.” Id. best, being assump- based on the tive at recently, Most Supreme Court tion that criminals will not be able to unanimously rejected public Illinois nui by other obtain manufactured City sance claim the of Chicago almost dealers. companies and sold other (unlike identical to the one made here consequence judicially negative suit, the present the defendant-class there imposing duty upon commercial enter- gun included retail dealers as well as man prises guard against the criminal mis- distributors). ufacturers and City See others will be products use of their Beretta, Chicago v. 213 Ill.2d Corp., U.S.A. law expansion unprecedented 290 Ill.Dec. 821 N.E.2d 1099 public nuisance. (2004). Recognizing first added). at 1126 (emphasis manufacturers and distributors were defendants, dealer Even as to the retail law,” “highly regulated by state or federal (inter alia) firearms alleged to have sold the court public held a claim for nui Chicago buyers although “the regularly brought against sance could be them buyers indicate[d] words behavior if, minimum, they at a negligently had weapon illegally,” an intention to use the operations, conducted their business which rejected at the Illinois court the id. in turn presupposed they duty that owed a they “legal the cause” of claim that were Chicago public to the “to exercise reason alleged. The court -public the nuisance prevent able care to firearms from their questions to “the link between the pointed ending up persons in the of hands who use the existence of the existence of a and City in of possess illegally and them the depend inasmuch as legal “[b]oth of cause” Chicago.” Id. at 1109. The court found foreseeability.” Id. at analysis an of on “duty no manufacturers and [of such faced with It noted that it was “not large,” to the 1136. public distributors] owed gun a dealer of whether explaining: question en- negligently hable for might be held foreseeable, reasonably It in a nation buyer an individual trusting weapon to ownership of fire- permits private that buyer might that the it is foreseeable arms, when and that criminals will obtain possess or use inevitable, party allow a third only likely, not but Rather, at 1137. illegally.” Id. gun result. is less and death will It foreseeable to argue that it is “plaintiffs to these defendants that the foreseeable aggregate that the effect ille- these defendants criminal conduct of individuals who occurring transactions of numerous sales particular firearms into a gally take are multiple time and in loca- contends that these defendants aware over different by of, in, no ties operated ways complicit tions businesses with and some even to each other will result in the creation of of practices certain “notorious” deal public city.” nuisance in Id. The surrounding another in the the Dis ers counties all responded court “it is not at clear trict of sell firearms Columbia who indis condition to exist would cease criminately (particularly through [this] straw entirely particular sales) even if these defendants persons know or they should selling ceased firearms”: them possess know intend to use or in the assuming manufacture is District of But even and sale of firearms Columbia. legal. prod- There is a for these that the defendants can be said exercise market of by practices ucts that is served thousands deal- some control over the business of dealers, the country. independent ers all across The sales those the District has by alleged any plain that would otherwise have been made more than did the — City Chicago these dealers would made others. tiffs in to believe be of —reason Ultimately, there would be a shift the exercise of that control would guns unlawfully market share between these dealers abate the nuisance of and, perhaps, persons increase in the hands of District to others price illegal weapons degree. Deplorable of “on the street” perceptible though may be, on had illegal ownership ready availability as those intent these facts weapons further afield in the go large, in search of of firearms nation at and the buy. variety opportunities sheer number and of persons which them acquiring intent Id. As in the case of manufacturers unlawfully so, strong can do counsel re distributors, the court found that “the part on the asked to straint of a court hold consequences imposing duty upon corporate defendants —individual or prevent dealer defendants the creation —an swerable for common-law nuisance that public city Chicago nuisance the crimi aggregate from] the “result[s intent on illegally possessing those many nal acts of over individuals whom using guns city in the far-reach- they City Chicago, have no control.” ing.” It Id. at 1138. concluded: 290 Ill.Dec. at 1138. In 821 N.E.2d alleged public is not so [T]he nuisance keeping with our own decisions others to the defendants foreseeable dealer persuasive, found we have we decline to legal that their conduct can deemed a be of duty, relax the common-law limitations cause of a nuisance the result that is foreseeability, and direct causation so as to acts aggregate the criminal recognize public the broad claim of nui have many they individuals over whom alleged. sance the District has “in- control. This is of those no one may in which a have con- party stances moreover, regard, In this what we stat- way in some tributed remote [to of of negli- ed at the end our discussion yet and it is to sub- inappropriate harm] III, pertinent: gence, part supra, remains ject party liability.” to tort legislature, enacting The D.C.Code Sturm, (quoting Ruger, 761 N.Y.S.2d 7-2551.02, liability-limiting § eased 202) added; (emphasis quotation internal of tort law to create a elements traditional omitted). marks against action gun cause of manufacturers to the distrib- Applied manufacturer and and distributors for individuals us, agree particular utor defendants before we caused a class of lethal fire- having utility. District little social analysis. the Illinois court’s The arms or no circumstances, rifles,” doubly unper- weapons these we are a class of necessity suaded of the or wisdom of have little or no social benefit but at found adopting judicially right of action for time pernicious consequences for the same public applied nuisance to the manufacture safety of residents the health and District guns generally, and sale of where an effect 2(2), § 8- and visitors. See SLA D.C. Law may proliferation be a of lawsuits “not (Dec. 8-289], 2,§ 37 DCR 8482 [Act merely against these ... defendants[ ] but (hereafter 28,1990) “Findings”). ... other of types commercial en- trial court dismissed this count as to The terprises” manufacturers, say, liquor, — defendants, concluding all the stat- SUVs, anti-depressants, or violent video provides ute no cause of action to games myriad order to address —“in (2), case, in any District of Columbia and problems regardless societal of the (a) a claim plaintiffs failed state distance ‘prob- between ‘causes’ of the (b) within Act is an SLA alleged consequences.” lems’ and their attempt unconstitutional at extraterritorial

Sturm, Ruger, 761 at 203. N.Y.S.2d regulation, violating both the Commerce Liability Strict

Y. principles process. Clause and of due We therefore confront three issues: I, In Count all have brought § suit under 7-2551.01 SLA, D.C.Code any A. Does other stat- seq. et Weapon the Assault Manu- by implication, give ute District (the facturing Liability Strict Act of 1990 recovery liability right Columbia “Act”). provision “SLA” or The operative SLA; under the statute, 7-2551.02, § states: complaint sufficiently B. Did manufacturer, Any importer, or dealer plead the defendants’ to the weapon of an assault gun or machine so, SLA; and, plaintiffs under the if tort, shall strictly be held liable in with- impermissibly C. Does the SLA bur- regard defect, out proof to fault or or violate due den interstate commerce all consequential damages direct and process? bodily that arise from injury or death if questions We answer these order. bodily injury proximately death discharge results from the of the assault A. Columbia weapon or machine in the District of Columbia. “The text of an enactment is the primary determining source for its draft weapon” SLA defines “assault to in- ers’ intent.” v. District Co Stevenson specific products, clude number of Ethics, Bd. Elections & lumbia gun” invests “machine with the same (D.C.1996) (citation quota meaning § defined D.C.Code 7- omitted). ordinary tion marks “In the i.e., 2501.01(10), shoots, “any firearm which case, doing indication that so absent shoot, designed readily or can be legislature’s] clear in (A) [the would frustrate converted or restored to shoot: Auto- yield patent absurdity, tention or our obli matically, single more than shot (B) gation apply legis the statute as [the trigger; function of the [or] Semiauto- wrote it.” Hubbard v. United lature] matically, more than shots without man- States, 695, 703, SLA, 115 S.Ct. U.S. reloading.” enacting ual (citation (1995) and inter 131 L.Ed.2d weapons D.C. Council understood assault omitted); quotation nal marks see also to “include both automatic and semi-auto- Stores, Inc. v. District weapons,” Peoples Drug matic as well as “some hand- of (D.C. discharge weapon.” of an assault Sec- Columbia, ful 753-54 7-2551.03(b) (e) added). 1983). time, (emphases do not read & At the same we tion isolation; language then, is a statutory subject provisions, words of these paragraphs and related surrounding granted, preserved, right action— understanding to may be instrumental individuals, government, not withheld —of Co., 457 Carey v. Crane Serv. them. See bodily damages arising from to sue for (D.C.1983). “Statutory A.2d weap- injury or death traceable assault endeavor, and, at a holistic construction is ons.11 minimum, account for a statute’s a must division, the District In its brief ..., structure, text, and sub language full legisla- the verb the distinguished between Bank States Nat'l ject matter.” United it from”—and others ture used—“arise Am., Agents Oregon Independent Ins. if it meant to restrict might have used 439, 455, 508 U.S. S.Ct. damages of those entitled to recover class (1993) (citation internal L.Ed.2d 402 injuries,” the to individuals. “Individuals’ omitted). quotations marks reasoned, “are the source standards, we hold Applying these SLA, includ- damages under District’s right of action on that the SLA confers enforcement ing the costs law injured, not the who are but individuals that ‘arise from’ healthcare services The statute makes District of Columbia. individuals.” ‘bodily injury or death’ of strictly and others liable manufacturers 38; Reply also Br. for to Div. at see D.C. consequential dam tort “for all direct and (claiming right Br. for to Div. at 23 D.C. bodily injury from ages that arise expenses “to recover the under SLA proxi bodily injury if the or death death enforcement, it incurred for law [has] of’ mately discharge from the one results services, employ- paid leave health-care 7- firearms. Section of the enumerated ees, attributed to and other services” added). Bodily injury (emphasis 2551.02 violence). only consider the But one need only to self-evidently happen can or death such unboundedness —of magnitude —the corporate entities. persons, individual “damages” implausibility to realize the con Surrounding provisions of the statute provided argument the Council give redress to individ purpose firm the of a verb its choice them the SLA operate “not uals. The statute does may from” well nothing else. “Arise action, cause of other scope limit direct and connote a causal relation less [subchapter], this provided than that than, from,” say, “result but immediate injured by an assault person available to intent to in- legislative freight 7-2551.03(c) (emphasis weapon.” Section array of law enforcement clude the vast added). And, right no of action it affords ser- governmental health-care costs and injured by weapon an assault person to “a inju- weapon vices attributable assault crime,” or to one seek committing while the statute de- as recoverable under ries injury” ing recovery “for a seZ/-inflicted alone can wanton, far more than the verb reckless, or will- mands from “a resulting weapon the one hand and legislative findings accompanying the an assault 11. The (among stating discharge other assault point, this victim of the Act reinforce innocent hand, things) and distribution that the manufacture weapon the manufacturer on the other weapons "expos[es] citizens [of] of assault the victim.” is more at fault than or dealer to a [of Columbia] to the District (em- and visitors at 8483 Findings & 37 DCR harm,” degree high of risk of serious added). phasis or dealer of between the manufacturer “[a]s Relying provi- on these bear. Neither it nor the addition of “con- under the SLA. sequential” damages sions, to the “direct” recov- alleges proxi- that as a complaint expands, judgment, erable our the class conduct, the mate result of the defendants’ given action those cause of incur District “has incurred and will costs SLA. HCARA [the that are recoverable under (1) health care including: MCRA] and the asserts, however, The District treating expenses costs and Medicaid additional and more limited claim for dam (2) ...; costs of gun victims violence ages validity. that we conclude has to officers provided care and treatment complaint that in alleges addition to the Metropolitan and members of the Police right of gives action the SLA the District Department Department and the Fire (a rejected), claim we have the District [injured by guns] the District of Columbia may recover under two other statutes the ...; wages and and leave of absence in expenses medical and related it has compensation paid or other assistance and as a third-party wrongful curred result of paid police firefighters to be officers and § conduct. Specifically, D.C.Code 4-601 et having ... on account of their suffered (2001), seq. Assistance Health-Care ¶ n injuries.” Complaint, 137. None (HCARA), Act Reimbursement of 1984 lat- currently named fits the grants independent, the District “an direct fall categories, appear ter but two two cause of action party third for [a] Thus, plaintiff the first. as to the within the unreimbursed ... value or cost of Lawson, Bryant complaint alleges assistance,” health-care whenever the Dis injuries as a result of he suffered from “provide[d] trict has health-care assistance likely ... a ‘machine bullets “most fired a beneficiary injury who has suffered an manufactured, imported, ... gun’ sold or illness under circumstances lia creating [defendants,” Complaint, one of the bility in party.” § third Id. 4- [that] ¶ 56, 602(a). pay he “relied on Medicaid “Beneficiary” “any means individ medications, surgery, hospitalization, ual who has received health-care assis and, applicable, tance from the District if rehabilitation he needed because of his conservator, guardian, individual’s rely gunshot wounds” and he “continues to personal estate, representative, depen frequent prob- to treat on Medicaid 4-601(1). dants, § and survivors.” Id. being quadri- lems that result from his statute, § seq. Another 5-601 et D.C.Code ¶58. Complaint, Regarding a plegic.” Recovery the Medical Care Act of Ferguson, plaintiff, Gregory second (MCRA), similarly gives District proximate complaint alleges as “right to recover” health-care and funer by bullets having cause of been struck expenses paid police al it has officers weapon, “spent he AK-47-type from an firefighters, and the costs of their days Hospital several D.C. General pay, extended absence with from third- As to year physical therapy.” over parties whose tortious conduct resulted individuals, the authorized these HCARA § employees. to those 5-602. in [this] the District to “[[Intervene beneficiary,” brought by proceeding case,

Applied this both statutes effec- 4-604(a)(2), attempt § to re- D.C.Code tively give rights “legal District in- expenses nonreimbursed medical cover 4-602(b), § subrogation,” D.C.Code It by the District for treatment. curred beneficiary or specified claims a so, having done employee may against a defendant should be viewed have 654 substance, plaintiff each individual al purpose.12 in the for that

may remain case injuries that the he or she leged which 12(b)(6) B. Rule weap by were an assault complains caused By terms, requires gun by § machine the its 7-2551.02 or a as defined on rules of tying weapon or machine “Under conventional liberal proof assault SLA.13 Morris, A.2d bodily injury pleading,” to a ‘notice’ West v. 711 gun that causes death or (D.C.1998); manufacturer, Super. or deal see Ct. Civ. importer, particular manufacturer, 8(a), allegations of an assault R. those were sufficient (“Any er [etc.] ... claim under Rule weapon strictly ... shall be held liable because dismissal state “beyond if bodily injury proper apparent ... results 12 is it is proximately if the discharge plaintiffis] prove the can no set weapon” from the of the assault doubt added)). which support claim[s] trial court dis facts in (emphasis [their] The v. claims un Owens plaintiffs’ missed the individual would entitle to relief.” [them] Ass’n, A.2d plain the of the Tiber Island Condo. der statute because none (D.C.1977). v. identify Diamond complaint tiffs could in the “which 893 See also (D.C.1996) (“Un Davis, A.2d corresponding defendant and [machine the weapon] Superior in their the Court Civil Rules or assault was involved der only plead facts sufficient respective injury plaintiff or of the relevant need death acknowledged the defendants notice of the claims put decedent.” court on need weapon plaintiff A brought involvement of a recovered them. “[t]he all.”) (internal legal the his at might potentially many plead moot not evidence Anderson, omitted); plaintiffs’ the citation deficiencies associated with Vincent (issue (D.C.1993) [SLA],” reliance on the but concluded the or not had available plaintiffs appellantfs] since “none of individual bas “whether allegations prove or her case that were sufficient to weapons es his evidence recovered, nothing to pled complaint” “really on in had actually their claims [their] of the com original). legal sufficiency with the pure speculation” (emphasis do view, The trial found “no excuse requiring plaint”). In our court to assert weapons plaintiffs] inability identify particularity [each weapon manufac was used that caused them and the which defendant’s all,” him, early stage if this fact is knowable weapons turers of those at this harm as is the contrary premature, to the usual that criticism is proceedings of the but manu defendant pleading, justify dis court’s comment that the rules and does 12(b)(6). no “surely have under Rule facturers distributors missal Indeed, men, right three at least one of whom exercising 12. its additional and killed ‘'[(Institute prosecute proceeding Complaint, alone pistol. was armed with 9mm name) (in beneficiary's ¶ its own or bullets were recovered 82. Nine-millimeter beneficiary” conjunction with to recover Complaint, bodies of victims. from the both 4-603(a)(3), § expenses, such D.C.Code belief, ¶ the bullets 87. "On information and the com- District is free move to amend by a were fired that killed Wallace and Marsh conformity plaint to include with the rules gun’ weapon' as those 'machine ‘assault under the SLA other beneficiaries with claims Liability Act.” terms are defined the Strict identity during light these whose come to Only plaintiff qualified his Lawson proceedings. likely” stating allegation by "most that he was Act, weapon but that by a covered shot alleged example, complaint 13. For allega- sufficiency affect the does not Wallace, plaintiff Laura Wal- Andre son of tion. lace, Marsh, daughter and Natasha Marsh-Williams, plaintiff Madilia were shot gave a claim weapons physically quately access to the that were set forth associated” plaintiffs’ with the individual fair notice its basis. [defendants] claims. plaintiffs point to several ave- (footnotes 47-48, 99 omit- 78 S.Ct. linking particular nues a firearm to a ted). certain in this Although we are less may open manufacturer that be to them in adequacy complaint case about the of the discovery, if “specula- and even all seem principles, under these we likewise follow way link, a arriving tive” us as at that 8(f)’s in holding Rule command that the may rejected stage. none be at this See re- pleading have satisfied Moore, 28, Arnold v. F.Supp. 980 37 time, quirements of Rule 8. At the same (D.D.C.1997) (dismissal inappropriate even however, discovery if they are unable after though prisoner-plaintiff had “fail[ed] particular particular to tie defendant to identify prison- or name the [individual they will not injury-producing weapon, be allegedly defendants who officer] assaulted proceed Act against entitled to under the [him]”; “[i]f, discovery, plaintiff after that defendant. provided still has not the names of the ..., ... may defendant officers the Court Challenges C. Constitutional amake at that time whether determination legislature pre Acts of the judgments granted should be in favor Inc., valid, Time, sumptively Regan see v. see, defendants”); contrast, of the 641, 652, 3262, 468 104 82 U.S. S.Ct. Indus., Bly Inc., v. Tri-Cont’l A.2d 663 (1984), may L.Ed.2d 487 and thus court (D.C.1995) 1232, 1236 (summary judgment invalidate an otherwise lawful enactment properly granted manufacturers dis- after “only upon plain showing legis that [the covery for “lack of evidence as to which of has exceeded its constitutional lature] products” plaintiffs’ [defendant’s] caused Morrison, bounds.” United States v. 529 injuries). 598, 607, 1740, 120 146 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. Gibson, 41, In Conley v. 355 U.S. 78 (2000). Nevertheless, 658 the defendants S.Ct. Supreme L.Ed.2d 80 argue that the violates SLA both the Com Court stated: process principles merce Clause due require the Rules applicable through [A]ll is “a short and Fifth plain statement of the claim” argument that will Amendment. their essence give that, by the defendant fair notice of what imposing strict on fire plaintiff’s grounds claim is and the arms manufacturers for conduct upon which its simplified wholly place i.e., rests.... Such lawful where it takes — manufacture, pleading” “notice is made possible production the lawful opportunity discovery ju liberal of the distribution firearms outside pretrial procedures imper the other established risdiction the statute —the SLA by the Rules to precisely missibly disclose more burdens the lawful interstate “arbitrarily” the basis of both claim and at defense and commerce of firearms and narrowly disputed tempts impose regulatory to define more scheme be Following simple yond jurisdiction facts and en issues. boundaries 8(f) guide of acting Rule it. We consider first the Commerce [Fed.R.Civ.P.] pleadings argument, “all shall be construed as to then the claim of viola so Clause justice,”14 process. argument do we have no tion of due Neither substantial [plaintiffs’] complaint persuades doubt ade- us. 8(f).

14. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. Corp. 1. Distillers Commerce Clause Brown-Forman New Auth., York State U.S. Liquor “Though phrased grant as a S.Ct. L.Ed.2d power Congress, regulatory [Com (citations omitted). long merce] Clause has been understood ‘negative’ aspect have a [or dormant] against The vice which the unjustifiably power denies States the first, anti-discrimination, component in to discriminate or burden the operates pro this test is “local economic terstate flow of articles of commerce.” tectionism, laws that would excite those Oregon Sys. Department v. Waste of jealousies retaliatory and measures the 98, 93, 114 Quality, Envtl. 511 U.S. S.Ct. designed prevent.” Constitution was C 1345, (1994); 128 L.Ed.2d 13 see District Carbone, Clarkstown, A Inc. v. Town & of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste of of York, 383, 390, 114 New 511 U.S. S.Ct. (D.C.2000). Md., Inc., 1, 16 Of (1994). 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 No serious course, “[legislation, great variety in a of that argument is made the SLA exhibits ways, may persons affect commerce and protectionism. economic Because there in it engaged constituting regula without manufacturers, distributors, legal no it, meaning of within tion of the Consti weapons or sellers of assault and machine tution.” Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Columbia,15 of guns the District 428, 424, 374 Optometry, Exam’rs U.S. does in favor of in SLA not discriminate (1963) (cita 1759, 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 983 state business or economic interests quotation and omit tions internal marks against counterparts. their out-of-state ted). particular, “the Constitution Maryland, Corp. See Exxon v. Governor of Congress conferring upon regu when 2207, 117, 125, 437 98 U.S. S.Ct. 57 commerce, of ... lation never intended (“[S]ince 91 L.Ed.2d there are no legislating cut the from on all States off refiners, producers or claims local such life, subjects health, relating to the disparate treatment between interstate citizens, safety legisla of their though the meritless.”). and local commerce would be might indirectly tion affect the commerce And, contrary to what the defendants do (internal country.” quotation of the Id. argue, “directly regu does not SLA omitted). marks Under the “two-tiered ... interstate commerce.” Brown- late[ ] Court, adopted by Supreme approach” 579, at Corp., Forman Distillers 476 U.S. directly regulates state statute [w]hen regulate 106 S.Ct. It does not 2080. interstate com- discriminates sense, imposes liability direct but instead merce, in- its effect is to favor when abnormally in tort harm caused economic interests out-of- state over firearms; dangerous and limits subset interests, generally state we have struck right of action to incurred in inqui- down the statute without further may the District Columbia. It have When, however, ry. statute if outside of the District manufac indirect effects on interstate commerce effects practices turers alter their business regulates evenhandedly, we have ex- liability, “[[legislation but ... avoid amined whether the interest [s]tate’s engaged may persons affect commerce legitimate and whether the burden on it, constituting clearly regulation in it without interstate commerce exceeds meaning local benefits. within the Constitution.” pos- § their 15. The manufacture and distribution of ma- D.C.Code 7-2504.01 as is District, -2502.02(a)(2). §§ prohibited session. 7-2502.01 & chine in the

657 Head, (cita 428, 390, 374 U.S. at 114 (quoting 83 S.Ct. 1759 at S.Ct. 1677 Pike v. omitted). Church, Inc., 137, 142, quotation tion and internal Bruce marks 397 U.S. 90 (1970)). 99, 103, See Sherlock v. 25 174 Alling, 93 U.S. 23 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d State (1876) (state subjects regulation “relating L.Ed. 819 to the “declar[ing] statute health, life, citizens,” safety general principle respecting Head, persons of all 374 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 1759 re jurisdiction within the special analysis. deference in that State for ceives resulting] torts in the death of Columbia, See Smith v. District injured” parties does not offend the dor (D.C.1981); A.2d Clause); Corp. Electrolert mant Commerce v. Fron Stone 328, 331, Barry, U.S.App. Airlines, Inc., D.C. tier F.Supp.2d (1984). 110, 113 (D.Mass.2002) F.2d “benefits” (rejecting argument SLA to the District of Columbia are re “the dormant Commerce precludes Clause legislative findings flected ac regulating any activity state tort law from companied passage. The that, its D.C. Council having effects, while local also effec (a) found that “the increase homicides in tuates some external consequences”). accompanied by the District has been rely The defendants primarily on (i.e., proliferation of use of assault weapons Brown-Forman, supra, Healy and v. The guns) automatic and semi-automatic in the Institute, 324, Beer 491 U.S. 109 S.Ct. community,” with hand “[s]emi-automatic (1989), 105 L.Ed.2d 275 both of representing] growing percentage which struck price down state control or handguns by [police recovered “price affirmation” statutes that had “the (b) crime”; ... involved in handgun and] undeniable effect of controlling commercial weapons, and the manufac “[a]ssault activity occurring wholly outside the ture and weapons distribution of assault boundary of the State” that enacted them. abnormally unreasonably danger and Id. at 109 S.Ct. 2491. inBut contrast ous, pose and risks to the citizens and statutes, to these Liability the Strict Act to the District outweigh which far visitors “does not regulate price any out-of- any weapons may benefits that assault transaction, state express either its (c) bring”; man “[i]t foreseeable terms or its inevitable Phar effect.” ufacturers and distributors of assault maceutical Research & Am. v. Mfrs. of weapons that the criminal or accidental Walsh, 644, 669, 538 U.S. 123 S.Ct. weapons injury use of assault cause will added; L.Ed.2d 889 (emphasis (d) death”; and and that the manufacture omitted). quotation internal marks That and distribution of weapons these “are the risk it creates of damage awards in the among proximate rising causes of the may conceivably District affect the defen District, in expos number homicides dants’ pricing or insurance decisions relat ing the citizens and visitors to the [of] ed to a products they limited class of the high degree District to a of risk of serious manufacture is not con “direct[ ] (9), (10), (12), (13), Findings harm.” & commerce,” Healy, 491 of] U.S. at trol in legislation, 37 DCR 8483. The 336, 109 2491 that the Commerce S.Ct. short, pressing addresses a concern for Clause forbids without more. public safety by giving innocent victims of validity of the SLA thus gun violence the District a cause of depends on it “imposes whether a burden action manufacturers or dealers ‘clearly interstate conimerce that is ex by particularly danger caused putative cessive relation to the local ous firearms whose destructiveness far ” Carbone, Inc., outweighs any legitimate utility they benefits.’ C & A have. U.S. SLA, that the if govern profess alarm strong

In contrast to this defendants interest, any require the SLA would them to alter their upheld, mental effect will is “incidental on interstate commerce national practices have on a legal business clearly in relation ... excessive [and not] given level. But limita- international Pike, U.S. local benefits.” to the Act on the reach of the we have tions Only firearms the 90 S.Ct. 844. fanciful, described, espe- that fear seems “abnormally classified Council cially mainly it stems from concern since dangerous” designed unreasonably broader remedies the with the —those intimidate, kill or and for no essentially to sought i.e., injunctive and “abate- have — private cov purpose hands —are other alleged negligence relief—for the ment” Act, only attaches by the ered nuisance,17 claims we have re- public injuries resulting from the death or event, the fact that jected any here. in the weapons of one of discharge these tort, “product Lability exposure of Columbia—and then when otherwise,” may also strict whether link has been established between by actors in commercial decisions affect specific manufacturer and states, manufacturers, other such as ... Moreover, injury. assault caused implicate the Commerce does a law “originally distributed to weapons in the conditions Clause. Differences agency ... officer” are enforcement from state to doing and risks business reach, § 7- from the excluded statute’s part result of state are the inevitable 2551.03(a), by persons as are firearms used but the regulation, state economic or who injured committing while crimes have effects that these differences on 7- injured themselves.16 Section decisions, those that commercial even (e). limitations, 2551.03(b), Given these trade, by are not involve interstate apparent why not to us the SLA’s effect is nearly so direct as ‘affect themselves than greater commerce is on interstate in commerce’ the constitutional sense. liability imposing other state that of laws Works, Niagara v. Mach. & Tool Bowman defective or in tort on manufacturers of (7th Cir.1987) Inc., 1052, F.2d 1056 832 See, dangerous e.g., abnormally products. original). in (emphasis Sons, Inc., 136 Squibb v. E.R. & Tigue 891, 467, 897 518 Misc.2d N.Y.S.2d 2. Due Process 431, aff'd, A.D.2d (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987), 139 “A in person who motion sets nom. 825 sub 526 N.Y.S.2d aff'd injury in one the means is State which Co., Eli 73 N.Y.2d Hymowitz Lilly & consistently may, in inflicted another 941, 1069 487, 539 N.E.2d 541 N.Y.S.2d clause, liable process be made the due (1989) (holding that of the tradi relaxation injury employed means that whether the requirement product tional identification irresponsible responsible agent or an be provide to innocent tort law to a forum Masci, Young v. 289 U.S. “clearly instrument.” drug not a victims of DES was 253, 258, 599, L.Ed. 53 S.Ct. 77 1158 puta to the “in relation excessive” burden (1933). seen, and, hence, imposes As we the SLA was not have local benefits” tive Clause). on out-of-state manufacturers of the Commerce violative of extent, incorporates plaintiffs ultimately broad reforms de- seek 16. To that statute assumption risk. defense common-law national and international business fendants' policy according plaintiffs’ own practices ("By the Appellees at 71 17. See Br. for to Div. preferences."). they request, injunctive relief 'abatement' District) (there ucts, or out manufactured within whether firearms are none state, dangerous that their side a are so injuries persons caused to innocent liability in face strict manufacturers should “discharge weapon assault [an] from the products contribute tort for or machine in the District Colum Gore, fact, (2001) (em affirmed a § the State. bia." D.C.Code 7-2551.02 within added). impose penal “economic right state’s The defendants neverthe phasis manufacturers, an ties” on out-of-state argue less the SLA constitutes take the form of impose penalties its own attempt the District “whether judicially on oth fines or policy gun regulation legislatively choices as to authorized ma damages,” long er states where the manufacture of so imposed punitive lawful, thereby violating due “supported by chine penalties such They rely principally on process. protecting BMW its own con interest State’s Gore, Am., 559, 572, Gore, N. Inc. v. 517 U.S. at 116 S.Ct. sumers.” U.S. Gore, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 S.Ct. vio the SLA would 1589.18 Under —or from precisely more on two sentences manu penalized if it process late due The first is the Court’s statement Gore. that was lawful facturers “for conduct principles “it from ... of state follows impact that had no where it occurred and comity may sovereignty and State residents.” Id. at on or its [the District] impose economic sanctions violators added); see (emphasis S.Ct. changing of its laws with the intent of Farm, 422,123 538 U.S. S.Ct. also State tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other (for damage purposes, punitive States.” Id. at 116 S.Ct. 1589. The may pro conduct be out-of-state “[l]awful second, link, providing process the due specific if it “a nexus to the bative” “ punish person because he has *[t]o sum, plaintiff”). harm suffered him to do plainly done what the law allows by legisla is raised process no due issue process violation of the most basic is due injuries suffered tion that seeks to redress ” sort.’ Id. at 573 n. 116 S.Ct. 1589 resulting visitors by District residents and (citation omitted). of a manufacture and distribution from the lethal class of firearms whose particular pun- The defendants first of all confuse See, utility. outweighs nature far their punitive dam- ishment —and issue of v. Smith & Wesson e.g., City Boston a ages before the Court Gore—with (D.Mass. 246, 250 F.Supp.2d 66 Corp., authority permit compensation to state’s (“As 1999) seeking relief plaintiffs here are injuries ju- victims for suffered within its injured in Massa only parties behalf In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. risdiction. chusetts, does holding of the Gore case 408, Campbell, Co. v. 538 U.S. 123 S.Ct. apply.”). not 1513, also 155 L.Ed.2d 585 which punitive damages applied dealt with Conclusion VI. Gore, made that distinction ex- the Court reasons, judgment foregoing For the (ex- 416, at 1513 plicit. See id. 123 S.Ct. part is affirmed Superior of the Court served plaining purposes” the “different re- and the case is part, and reversed damages). punitive compensatory consistent proceedings for further manded looks in vain in either Gore or State One opinion. this may suggestion Farm for a that a state ordered. prod- So permissibly not decide that certain consequen- only recovery for "all direct provide any award of SLA does not 18. The damages.” § permits D.C.Code 7-2551.02. damages; by tial punitive its terms it 660

WAGNER, Judge, concurring, complaint Chief in cause the did not indicate that defendant). had a contract with part, plaintiff dissenting, part. (cid:127) To a motion to withstand dismiss view, my In the trial court properly claim, plaintiff failure to state a a must plaintiffs’ dismissed the individual claims “ ‘outline adumbrate’ violation of the Act, Liability under the Strict D.C.Code provisions upon statute constitutional (the Act) § 7-2551.02 set forth in their relies, plaintiff Sutliff, which the Inc. v. Complaint.1 Third Amended Under this (7th Co., Donovan 727 F.2d 654 Cir. Act, manufacturer, importer or dealer of 1984), and connect the violation to the weapon subject an assault defendants; Przybylski, named Patton v. injuries if plaintiffs without fault (7th Cir.1987).” 697, 701 822 F.2d Brown proximately discharge from resulted Conine, (7th v. lee F.2d Cir. weapons particular one of the of that man 1992) added). Here, (emphasis the com ufacturer, importer or dealer. D.C.Code injuries plaint plaintiffs’ fails to connect case, § 7-2551.02. In as the trial court this any of the named defendants. Even under concluded, plaintiffs allege any did em pleading” liberal “notice standard twenty-five one of named defen 8(a)(2) R. Super. bodied Ct. Civ. and its (1 100) dants and one to one-hundred counterpart, necessary federal “it is still manufacturer, DOE defendants is im complaint that a ‘contain either direct or porter weapon or dealer of the that actual allegations respecting inferential all the ly caused them harm.2 Even at the en necessary material a ” elements sustain argument, plaintiffs/ap banc counsel for theory.’ recovery legal under some viable pellants they had to concede that still can Choice, Inc., Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for any not tie of the individual defendants to (11th Cir.2001) (quoting 253 F.3d weapon any harm to one caused Plywood Litigation, In re Antitrust Thus, plaintiffs them. did not and cannot (5th Sept.8, F.2d Cir. Unit A plead predicate facts to hold 1981)). Identifying party for a liable named defendants liable for their particular wrong one the most funda allege under the Act. The failure to requirements adequately mental for an essential element of the cause of action Stevens, pleaded claim. See Elmore v. created the Act is fatal to plaintiffs’ (D.C.2003). Elmore, A.2d 44 court this pleading, and defendants are entitled to rejected inadequate a complaint precedents. dismissal under our rules and alleged any never that the defendant did (failure 12(b)(6) Super. See Ct. R. Civ. thing connected with claims. grant Hall, state a claim on relief can 46; which be 610 F.2d see also McDonald ed); Beards, (1st Cir.1979) (“[The Way also v. 16, see Bible Church court’s] denied, 419, (D.C.1996), 680 A.2d cert. stringent’ pro complaints se be ‘less 1155, 1335, conjure unpled 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d require up does not us to Carver, (affirming Hurney dismissal of breach of v. allegations.”(quoting (1st Cir.1979)). Here, plain and tortious interference with 602 F.2d 993 contract 12(b)(6) identify complaint contract claims under Rule tiffs’ failure to the the be- manufacturing, complaints par- importing, mar- 1. Each of the amended added business of ty distributing, selling, dealing plaintiffs. keting, or in fire- regularly soli- "[e]ach arms” and that sells or complaint alleges plaintiffs purchase of its firearms in the District 2. The do not cits the through revenue from firearms know the status of the 1 100 DOE derives substantial defendants, “engaged, District.” but that each has in the used or consumed in the held that the simply Supreme caused the Court of the firearm which manufacturer a claim un set forth adequately complaint any claim under the negates harm them the 8; it did not relieve R. Civ. der Fed. Liability Act. Strict identifying obligation of the Conley decision Supreme The Court’s placing wrongdoer the defendant as Gibson, 99, 78 S.Ct. 355 U.S. it. See against of the claim it on notice majority quoted the L.Ed.2d 80 Elmore, (citing Ker A.2d at 46 supra, 824 support does not opinion p. Passenger Corp., v. National R.R. anen in this case complaint conclusion that the (D.C.2000)). 703, 713 a motion to dis- sufficient to withstand must plaintiff fundamental that a It is claim under our for failure to state a miss put information to disclose sufficient in- Conley local strict statute. against the claim on notice of defendant com- a class action discrimination volved Keranen, A.2d at 713. supra, him. their employees against railroad plaint imposes strict question Act in here The factu- The was whether more union. issue injuries resulting liability only for death or alleged al about the discrimination details discharge particular of a kind from the failure required to avoid dismissal for was link has only then when the weapon, and a claim. Id. at 78 S.Ct. 99. state manu- specific between a been established complaint alleged, among other inju- caused the and the facturer petitioners came to be dis- things, how § 7-2551.02. Plaintiffs have ry. D.C.Code demoted, charged “[djespite re- requisite connection be- alleged Union, pleas by petitioners, peated any of they harm sustained and tween the according plan, nothing did acting Therefore, in this case. the defendants discriminatory them these protect failure to is deficient for complaint discharges give pro- and refused to them out the facts to make plead predicate comparable given to that white em- tection This court of action. statutory cause repre- failed to ployees”; that the Union costly a defendant into should not force and, faith; good them in sent discovery there is no show- pre-trial when rights union’s failure violated their under out a cause of plaintiff can make ing Railway Act fair representa- Labor com- allegations action from the agent. Id. at bargaining tion from their F.2d at 654 Sutliff, supra, 727 plaint. was 78 S.Ct. 99. The defendant Union omitted). (citations reasons, I For these clearly placed on notice of identified of the from Part Y.B. dissent respectfully forming the alleged acts or omissions reach and I would not majority opinion, liability. plaintiffs’ claim of basis for the the Act challenges to the constitutional argument specific that more Rejecting the However, join I in Part V.C. addressed general required support facts were of the opinion I A. of the through Parts IV. discrimination, Supreme allegations of court. require Rules held that the Federal Court “ plain ‘a statement short fair give the defendant claim’ will is and claim

notice of what it rests.” Id. at grounds upon which (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 78 S.Ct.

8(a)(2)). met pleading standard was Conley, Conley; it is not met here.

Case Details

Case Name: District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp.

Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Date Published: Apr 21, 2005

Citation: 872 A.2d 633

Docket Number: 03-CV-24, 03-CV-38

Court Abbreviation: D.C.