Ohio ex rel. Moore v. Brahma Investment Group, 17-3458

Background

From Jan 2012–May 2014 Norwood police and the FBI received numerous reports of felony drug sales and prostitution at Quality Hotel and Suites Central.
Norwood Law Director Joshua Berkowitz filed a verified nuisance petition under Ohio Rev. Code § 3767.02-.03; the state court entered an ex parte TRO and later a preliminary injunction closing the hotel.
Brahma (owner) transferred its interest in the property during the litigation; Brahma and co-owner California Pacific Hospitality removed the state action to federal court and later asserted counterclaims and a third-party complaint alleging discriminatory animus and due-process violations.
The district court dismissed the state-law nuisance claims as moot after the injunction expired and the property changed hands; it granted judgment on the pleadings for the City of Norwood and Mayor Williams on federal and state claims.
The district court concluded Berkowitz acted on behalf of the State (not the City) under Ohio law, Monell precluded municipal liability absent a policy or custom, intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine barred § 1985 relief absent conduct outside official duties, and plaintiffs failed to plead class-based discriminatory motive with specificity.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the preliminary-injunction challenge was moot and Appellants’ federal claims against the City and Williams failed as pleaded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction/standing to challenge state-court preliminary injunction	Appellants contended the preliminary injunction was wrongful and should be reviewed	Appellees argued the injunction expired by statute and Appellants no longer owned the property, so claim is moot and they lack standing	Mootness/standing: claim dismissed — injunction expired by statute and Appellants lacked ownership when appeal filed
Municipal liability under § 1983 for Law Director's actions	Appellants alleged Norwood liable for Berkowitz’s discriminatory enforcement	City argued Berkowitz acted as an agent of the State under Ohio law, and no municipal policy/custom was alleged	Affirmed for City: no Monell liability absent policy/custom and Berkowitz acted on behalf of the State
Supervisor liability for Mayor under § 1983	Appellants alleged Williams failed to supervise and was deliberately indifferent	Williams argued no facts showed deliberate indifference or an unconstitutional policy	Affirmed for Williams: plaintiffs did not plead facts showing deliberate indifference or causation
§ 1985 conspiracy and intracorporate-conspiracy exception	Appellants alleged conspiratorial, class-based discrimination (Asian-Indian/Hindu ownership)	Appellees argued allegations were conclusory, lacked specificity, and intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine applies unless officials acted outside scope of employment	Affirmed: § 1985 claim dismissed — no specific factual allegations of class-based animus, no agreement pleaded, and no showing Williams acted outside official duties

Key Cases Cited

Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (mootness and preliminary injunction jurisdiction)
Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (standing and property interest principles)
Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334 (public official acting as agent of the State)
Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652 (county official acting as state agent)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom)
Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837 (intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine and § 1985)
Estate of Smithers ex rel. Norris v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758 (elements of § 1985 class-based animus)
Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (§ 1985 requires conspiracy motivated by class-based animus)
Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534 (§ 1985 claims must be pled with specificity)
Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718 (Rule 12(c)/12(b)(6) pleading standards)
Amerson v. Waterford Twp., [citation="562 F. App'x 484"] (failure-to-supervise requires deliberate indifference)