48 A.3d 584
Vt.2012Background
- Plaintiff, a South Burlington police officer, sued the Chittenden County State’s Attorney for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with employment based on alleged misconduct aimed at undermining his credibility.
- Allegations include meetings with supervisors criticizing plaintiff, false accusations of dishonesty, and attempts to impede plaintiff’s ability to obtain warrants or file charges.
- Defendant raised official immunity as an affirmative defense; the trial court limited discovery to immunity issues and later granted summary judgment for defendant.
- Trial court held all alleged acts were barred by absolute or qualified immunity or otherwise insufficient to state a claim.
- Plaintiff appeals, and defendant defends on the basis of absolute immunity for high-ranking prosecutors; the court’s analysis centers on the scope of the State’s Attorney’s authority.
- Court ultimately holds the State’s Attorney is entitled to absolute immunity for the acts within his general authority, affirming the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State’s Attorney has absolute immunity for acts within his general authority | O'Connor contends not all acts fall within general authority or merit absolute immunity | Donovan argues as chief county law enforcement officer he is absolutely immune for acts within general authority | Yes; absolute immunity applies for acts within general authority |
| Whether Levinsky/Libercent framework governs this state-law immunity question over Muzzy | Levinsky framework should be limited or distinguished from Levinsky’s reach | Levinsky/Libercent provide the correct framework distinguishing high officials and scope of authority | Yes; the Vermont framework follows Levinsky/Libercent, dis approving Muzzy’s narrowed view |
| Whether discovery stay was proper pending immunity ruling | Plaintiff sought further discovery to rebut immunity | No additional discovery necessary; discovery stay appropriate to resolve immunity as a matter of law | Yes; stay upheld and no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76 (1987) (two degrees of official immunity; absolute for high officials, qualified for lower officials)
- Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178 (1989) (distinguishes state and federal immunity; absolute for high officials within general authority; qualified for others)
- Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279 (1990) (prosecutor acts within prosecutorial function; some statements treated as absolutely immune; footnote discussed quasi-judicial role)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (functional approach to absolute immunity for quasi-judicial acts of prosecutors)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (absolute immunity for prosecutorial decisions to prosecute or not; independence from motives)
- Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor's refusal to prosecute can be absolutely immune for policy reasons)
- Huminski v. Lavoie, 173 Vt. 517 (2001) (mem.; discussed in context of prosecutorial immunity scope)