NORTON v. BERRYHILL, 1:16-cv-00357

Background

Norton applied for DIB alleging disabling multi-level spinal degeneration, chronic pain, mental symptoms, and tinnitus with an alleged onset of August 1, 2011; his date last insured was December 31, 2015.
The ALJ held a hearing, assigned an RFC for light work with postural/environmental and simple-task mental limits, found Norton unable to do past work but able to perform a significant number of unskilled light jobs, and denied benefits.
Multiple treating providers (pain-management and rehabilitation physicians, and a treating psychologist) produced clinical notes and at least one opinion that Norton was unable to work; Dr. Leber (examiner) and Dr. Guskiewicz (treating pain doctor) later opined Norton was not capable of gainful employment.
The ALJ gave great weight to two non‑examining/consultative opinions (Drs. Bigsby and Chodosh) and little weight to several treating or single‑examination opinions (including Drs. Leber, Parr, and Stevenson) without articulating particularized reasons for some.
The Appeals Council declined review (finding post‑decision treating opinions concerned a later time) and Norton appealed. The magistrate judge reversed and remanded, concluding the ALJ’s weighing of treating/consultative opinions and certain chronological errors were not supported by substantial evidence.

Issues

Issue	Norton’s Argument	Berryhill’s Argument	Held
Whether ALJ gave proper weight to treating physicians’ opinions	ALJ failed to afford controlling/considerable weight to treating doctors (Stevenson, Guskiewicz, Sassano), and did not articulate particularized good cause for discounting them	ALJ permissibly relied on objective findings and other evidence, and is tasked with RFC determination	Court: ALJ erred — good cause not shown for rejecting at least treating opinions of Stevenson and Guskiewicz; remand required for proper consideration
Whether ALJ permissibly relied on non‑examining/consultative opinions	Norton: ALJ over-relied on earlier consultative and state‑agency reviewers (Chodosh, Bigsby) while discounting treating opinions	Berryhill: non‑examining opinions support ALJ’s RFC and activities evidence justified weight	Court: ALJ’s favorable treatment of those opinions is not supported when record reviewed as a whole; error contributes to lack of substantial evidence
Whether ALJ properly handled evidence dated after date‑last‑insured (new evidence)	Norton: post‑decision treating letter (Guskiewicz, May 2016) corroborates treating doctors and Leber and should be considered	Berryhill: Appeals Council correctly treated the May 2016 opinion as concerning a later time (after last insured) and gave it no weight	Court: Appeals Council’s treatment noted; May 2016 letter may confirm earlier concerns but disability before last insured remains undecided — remand needed to resolve
Whether ALJ mischaracterized chronology and selective evidence	Norton: ALJ misread dates (e.g., Stevenson chronology) and selectively relied on daily activities to discount symptoms	Berryhill: ALJ’s misstatement is harmless because the record still supports RFC	Court: Chronology errors and selective reliance undermine ALJ’s reasoning; error not harmless and supports remand

Key Cases Cited

Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir. 1983) (definition and standard for substantial evidence)
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) (claimant must be disabled prior to expiration of insured status)
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002) (deference to Commissioner’s factual findings when supported by substantial evidence)
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) (treating-physician rule and requirement to give substantial weight absent good cause)
Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (reasons for giving little weight to treating physician must be supported by substantial evidence)
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (U.S. 2002) (duration requirement for disability and importance of date‑last‑insured)