81 N.E.3d 805
Mass. App. Ct.2017Background
- Plaintiff Adrian Niles worked as a non-union HVAC controls technician for Huntington Controls and spent ~3,200 hours on two public school projects.
- Niles’ onsite duties included downloading/installing software into HVAC controllers and functionally testing/commissioning controllers before turnover.
- Huntington coded most of this time as "1-003, Tech/Commissioning" and maintained electricians installed wiring before Niles’ testing.
- Niles sued under the Massachusetts prevailing wage law (G. L. c. 149, §§ 26–27) and asserted related contract and quasi-contract claims; the trial judge granted Huntington summary judgment on all counts and denied Niles partial summary judgment on count one (prevailing wage).
- The Department of Labor Standards (DLS) had issued opinion letters (2008, 2009) concluding that on-site programming, downloading, testing, balancing, and commissioning of HVAC DDC systems constitute "construction" and are covered by prevailing wage CBAs.
- The Appeals Court held that DLS opinion letters are entitled to deference and that Niles’ onsite programming/commissioning work qualifies as construction subject to the prevailing wage law; summary judgment for Huntington on count one was reversed and remanded for factual determination of how many hours were covered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Niles’ onsite programming/downloading and testing of HVAC controllers is "construction" under the prevailing wage law | Niles: Onsite commissioning/testing is part of installation and thus construction subject to prevailing wage | Huntington: Work occurred after electricians wired components and is post-installation/service, not construction; not covered by CBAs | Held: Onsite programming/commissioning/testing of HVAC systems is construction for prevailing wage purposes; DLS opinion letters are entitled to deference |
| Whether DLS opinion letters bind the court as law | Niles: DLS interpretations should be given deference and applied | Huntington: Opinion letters lack force of law and cannot establish coverage absent a commissioner determination or formal regulation | Held: Opinion letters merit substantial deference where consistent with statute and agency role; judge erred in disregarding them |
| Whether proper job classification/pay rate exists for Niles’ work under CBAs | Niles: Commissioning work falls within scope of pipefitters/HVAC mechanic CBAs and thus has an established rate | Huntington: Niles’ duties do not fit listed CBA classifications; he is not a licensed electrician or pipefitter | Held: DLS letters concluded commissioning is covered by relevant CBAs (pipefitter/HVAC mechanic); classification question remains factual for remand |
| Appropriateness of summary judgment on prevailing wage liability | Niles: Partial summary judgment on liability appropriate because undisputed that some hours were commissioning work | Huntington: Genuine issues exist about whether work was construction and hours covered | Held: Trial court erred; partial summary judgment for liability should have been allowed as to the legal question that commissioning is covered; remand required to quantify covered hours |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullally v. Waste Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526 (2008) (purpose of prevailing wage law and agency deference)
- Teamsters Joint Council No. 10 v. Director of the Dept. of Labor & Workforce Dev., 447 Mass. 100 (2006) (agency interpretations of prevailing wage entitled to deference)
- Felix A. Marino Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 426 Mass. 458 (1998) (definition of "construction" and respect for agency interpretations when issues are fairly debatable)
- Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Division of Administrative Law Appeals, 466 Mass. 692 (2013) (procedural context for wage determinations and bidding)
- Construction Indus. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 406 Mass. 162 (1989) (wage rates and classifications administered by commissioner)
- Global NAPs, Inc. v. Awiszus, 457 Mass. 489 (2010) (distinguishing force of law of opinion letters from formal regulations)
- Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass. 443 (2004) (general practice of deferring to agency statutory interpretations)