107 F.4th 1
1st Cir.2024Background
- Robert Nightingale, a consumer in Massachusetts, was repeatedly called by debt collectors hired by National Grid, receiving more than two calls within seven-day periods in 2017 and 2018.
- Massachusetts law (chapter 93A and its regulations) prohibits debt collectors from making more than two calls to a debtor in a seven-day span.
- Nightingale claimed these excessive calls caused emotional distress, invaded his privacy, and sought to represent a class of similarly affected Massachusetts residents.
- Defendants removed the case to federal court; the district court denied class certification and granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding Nightingale lacked a cognizable injury under chapter 93A.
- On appeal, the First Circuit reviewed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of class certification.
- The appellate court found legal error in the district court's requirement that chapter 93A injury mirror common law torts, particularly for emotional distress and privacy invasion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What constitutes a cognizable injury under ch. 93A | Nightingale argued privacy/emotional harm sufficed | Defendants: Injury must meet common law tort standards | Cognizable injury under ch. 93A need not match tort |
| Per se theory of liability | Defendant's violation and harm are distinct | Violation and injury are the same, so claim fails | Section 2 violation distinct from sec. 9 injury |
| Need for measurable/corroborated harm | Testimony on distress and privacy invasion suffices | Only measurable or medically corroborated harm allowed | Unquantified or self-reported injury can suffice |
| Predominance in class certification | Call records could provide common proof for class | Individualized inquiries into severity bar predominance | Common proof may suffice; denial vacated for review |
Key Cases Cited
- Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. 1975) (Chapter 93A injury is broader than common law tort requirements)
- Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, 840 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 2006) (Non-economic injuries, like emotional distress, are cognizable under chapter 93A)
- Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737 (Mass. 2013) (Mere statutory violation is not per se injury—must be a distinct harm)
- Armata v. Target Corp., 99 N.E.3d 788 (Mass. 2018) (Defines when a debt collector "initiates" a call under debt collection regulations)
- Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1991) (Debtors have reduced privacy interest, but still protected from harassment)
- Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.3d 1122 (Mass. 2014) (Describes "unreasonable and substantial" privacy intrusion for common law tort)
- Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978) (Emotional distress damages available for breach of legal duty)