Nielsen v. Preap
139 S. Ct. 954
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- Two consolidated class actions (Preap and Khoury) challenged the government’s use of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to mandate detention without bond for certain criminal aliens who were not arrested immediately upon release from criminal custody.
- Plaintiffs were members of classes detained after varying delays post-release; district courts certified classes and ordered bond hearings under § 1226(a).
- Ninth Circuit held that § 1226(c)’s mandatory-detention rule applies only to aliens arrested "when the alien is released," so those arrested later are entitled to § 1226(a) bond hearings.
- Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split and to interpret whether the phrase "when the alien is released" limits § 1226(c) to immediate post-release arrests.
- The Court addressed jurisdictional defenses (8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(b)(9), 1252(f)(1)) and mootness arguments before reaching the statutory interpretation question.
- Holding: § 1226(c) covers aliens who fall within the predicates in subparagraphs (A)–(D) regardless of whether they were arrested immediately upon release; the Ninth Circuit judgments were reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of § 1226(c): who is an "alien described in paragraph (1)" | "Described in para. (1)" requires the alien to have been arrested immediately "when released," so delayed arrests are governed by § 1226(a) and permit bond hearings | The adjectival predicates (A)–(D) define the aliens; the adverbial clause "when the alien is released" modifies the arrest verb, not the noun, so anyone meeting (A)–(D) is "described in paragraph (1)" regardless of timing | The Court held § 1226(c) covers any alien fitting (A)–(D); delayed arrest does not exempt an alien from mandatory detention under § 1226(c) |
| Relationship between § 1226(a) and (c): separate authorities or (c) as a limit on (a) | Plaintiffs: (a) and (c) create distinct arrest-release regimes; if not arrested under (c) immediately, detainee falls under (a) | Government: (c) constrains (a) (i.e., (a) is the general authority; (c) narrows release authority for those described in (1)) | The Court read (c) as a limitation on (a): (a) supplies general arrest authority and (c) strips release discretion for aliens described in (1) |
| Effect of failing to arrest "when released": forfeiture of (c) authority? | Delay in arrest means (c) authority is lost and detainee must get bond hearing under (a) | Even if (c) required immediate arrest, courts should not infer that a missed timing provision nullifies the substantive statutory authority; officials may act late and still invoke (c) | The Court rejected a time-forfeiture rule: failing to arrest immediately does not nullify § 1226(c) mandatory-detention authority |
| Canon of constitutional avoidance and surplusage concerns | Plaintiffs: narrow reading avoids serious due-process doubts and rescues clauses from surplusage; late, prolonged detention without hearings raises constitutional problems | Government: statutory text is clear; canons inapplicable where ordinary textual analysis yields a clear meaning; transition rules and "when released" perform nonredundant functions | Court: text and structure are clear for the Government’s view; constitutional-avoidance canon inapplicable because statute is not ambiguous; surplusage and transition-rule concerns do not overturn textual reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens during removal proceedings)
- United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990) (statutory timing requirement for hearings does not automatically bar later action when statute specifies no consequence)
- Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003) (courts do not readily infer congressional intent to limit agency power solely from a timing specification)
- County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (exception for inherently transitory claims; preserves jurisdiction where harms elude review)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (due-process limits on post-removal-period detention and use of procedural protections)
- United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (courts should not impose coercive sanctions absent statutory specification of consequences for noncompliance)