Nicole Harris v. Sheryl Thompson, 698 F.3d 609

Nicole Harris, an Illinois prisoner, was convicted of first-degree murder of her four-year-old Jaquari Dancy and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.
Jaquari died by asphyxiation; a loose elastic band from a fitted bed sheet was implicated, with Diante, Jaquari’s five-year-old brother, in the top bunk nearby when the death occurred.
The State’s theory was that Harris strangled Jaquari for crying, while the defense argued Jaquari self-asphyxiated; the videotaped confession obtained the day after Jaquari’s death was a pivotal piece of evidence.
Diante’s proffered testimony—that Jaquari wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that Harris was not present—was excluded after a competency hearing that incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Harris under Illinois law.
Harris pursued collateral relief, arguing the exclusion of Diante’s testimony violated the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the competency hearing; state court rulings were unfavorable, prompting federal habeas review.
This court reverses, granting the writ, to the extent the exclusion of Diante’s testimony and certain trial-counsel deficiencies violated Harris’s rights, with remand instructions for relief unless retry is pursued.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether excluding Diante’s testimony violated the Compulsory Process Clause	Harris argues exclusion deprived defense of key witness	State contends competency rules warranted exclusion	Yes; exclusion was arbitrary and disproportionately prejudicial
Whether trial counsel was ineffective at Diante’s competency hearing	Harris contends counsel failed to prepare, secure Levy, and correct burden misapplication	State contends no prejudice from counsel’s actions	Yes; deficiencies prejudiced Harris resulting in likely different outcome
Whether the Illinois appellate ruling on Strickland prejudice was an unreasonable application of federal law	Harris asserts proper Strickland prejudice analysis would have found a reasonable probability of a different verdict	State argues no reasonable probability of different outcome	Yes; the state court’s prejudice ruling was unreasonable; relief warranted

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1967) (right to compulsory process to present defense witnesses)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (due process limits on evidentiary exclusion to protect defense)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (U.S. 1986) (limits on excluding testimony about custodial interrogation to present complete defense)
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (S. Ct. 2012) (Brady materiality and defense access to exculpatory eyewitness testimony)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (materiality of exculpatory evidence and impact on verdict)
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (Brady-type materiality in withholding exculpatory evidence)
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (U.S. 2009) (when state courts overlook a federal constitutional claim, review de novo)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (deference mechanics for Strickland prejudice prong on unaddressed issues)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (prejudice prong when counsel fails to investigate mitigating evidence)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (S. Ct. 2011) (highly deferential AEDPA standard for federal review)
Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2006) (poor preparation for trial witnesses deemed ineffective assistance)