Nelson v. Colorado
137 S. Ct. 1249
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were convicted in Colorado, ordered to pay court costs, fees, and restitution, then later had their convictions reversed or vacated; the State had retained or collected money based solely on those convictions.
- Nelson paid/ had withheld approximately $702; Madden paid about $1,977; the State would have no legal claim to those funds absent a valid conviction.
- Both defendants sought refunds in their trial/postconviction courts; Colorado appellate courts initially ordered refunds, but the Colorado Supreme Court held refund authority exists only under the statutory Exoneration Act and reversed.
- Colorado’s Exoneration Act (2013) permits compensation and refund of costs, fees, and restitution only for certain exonerees (felony, incarceration) and requires proof of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held Colorado’s scheme—conditioning refunds on an Exoneration Act claim and a high proof burden—violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as measured under Mathews v. Eldridge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State must refund fees, costs, and restitution taken solely because of a conviction later invalidated with no retrial | Nelson/Madden: Yes — once conviction is invalidated, presumption of innocence is restored and State cannot keep funds taken solely on that conviction | Colorado: No — money became public (or victims’) funds when lawfully exacted; refunds require statutory authority (Exoneration Act) | Held: Yes — due process requires refund without imposing the Act’s demanding procedures; reversal restores presumption of innocence and entitlement to return of such exactions |
| Whether Colorado may limit refund remedies to its Exoneration Act (clear-and-convincing proof of actual innocence, felony/incarceration requirement) | Plaintiffs: The Act’s burdens and eligibility limits are inadequate to protect property interests after reversal | Colorado: The Act provides sufficient process and is the exclusive statutory remedy; historic practice supports withholding absent statute | Held: The Act’s requirements create an unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation and are not sufficient under due process |
| Proper procedural-due-process framework to apply (Mathews v. Eldridge vs. Medina v. California) | Plaintiffs: Mathews applies because issue concerns post-conviction deprivation of property with no further criminal process | Colorado/Concurrence: Medina applies because refunds are part of criminal process and require historical-practice analysis | Held: Majority applies Mathews (balancing test); concurrence prefers Medina but reaches same judgment on different grounds |
| Whether restitution (paid to victims) must be refunded like state fees/costs | Plaintiffs: Restitution is also an exaction tied to invalid conviction and must be refundable | Colorado/Concurrence: Restitution is akin to a civil judgment in favor of victims; historical practice and equitable considerations may allow withholding/refund exceptions | Held: Majority treats restitution as refundable under same due-process principles (though concurrence expresses reservations and limits) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (procedural due-process balancing test applied)
- Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (framework for assessing criminal procedural rules)
- Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (reaffirming presumption of innocence after reversal)
- Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (presumption of innocence foundational in criminal law)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (reversal for insufficiency restores status quo ante)
- Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (state procedural rules may violate due process when more favorable rules have long application)
- Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216 (historical common-law practice requiring restitution after reversal)
- Bank of United States v. Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 8 (early recognition of restitution obligation upon reversal)
- Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (equitable nature of restitution on reversal)
- United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226 (Court of Appeals treating government as an escrow agent in restitution context)