Nell Cady, 24-41026

Background

Nell Cady, a real estate agent, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and owns a 2020 BMW X2 valued at $19,573 (Debtor's valuation).
Cady claimed exemptions for the BMW under three provisions of Georgia law: a $5,000 motor vehicle exemption, a $10,517 wildcard exemption, and a $1,500 tools-of-the-trade exemption.
The Chapter 7 Trustee objected only to the tools-of-the-trade exemption, contending a realtor's car does not qualify.
Cady argues the car is essential to her trade, as showing properties is central to her work as a realtor in the Savannah area.
The court’s decision turns on whether Georgia law allows a motor vehicle to be exempt as a tool of the trade under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7).
Procedurally, this is a contested matter on the Trustee's objection to Cady's claimed exemption, with the court issuing findings after an evidentiary hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument (Schofield, Trustee)	Defendant’s Argument (Cady, Debtor)	Held
Can a realtor’s vehicle be claimed as a tool of the trade under Georgia’s exemption statute?	A motor vehicle is not a tool of the trade for a realtor; statute historically limits to small, handheld instruments.	The car is integral to realty work, which requires transporting clients to properties; thus, it is a tool of the trade.	No; Georgia law does not permit a motor vehicle to be exempt as a tool of the trade.
How should ambiguous statutory language be interpreted regarding tools of the trade?	Statutory history and precedent show intent to restrict to items like hand tools, not vehicles.	The language can evolve; modern reality means tools and trades can change over time.	Georgia Supreme Court precedent is binding; tools-of-the-trade means small, handheld items.
Does the existence of a separate motor vehicle exemption bar claiming a car as a tool of the trade?	Yes; separate exemptions indicate legislative intent not to overlap—motor vehicles are not covered as tools of the trade.	No; the statute does not expressly preclude vehicles as tools of the trade if they are essential to the trade.	The existence of a separate exemption for vehicles supports the Trustee’s view.
Should exemptions be interpreted liberally in favor of debtors?	Yes, but statutory context and state Supreme Court decisions set limits.	Yes, and the exemption should adapt as trades and tools evolve.	Exemptions are construed liberally, but not in contravention of clear legislative and judicial history.

Key Cases Cited

Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp. (Matter of Curry), 18 B.R. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (Georgia's tools-of-the-trade exemption limited to small, hand-operated items)
Lenoir v. Weeks, 20 Ga. 596 (Ga. 1856) (Georgia Supreme Court interprets 'tools of the trade' as small, hand-held items for manual trades)
Kirksey v. Rowe, 114 Ga. 893 (Ga. 1902) (Explains tools of the trade are typically instruments of manual operation, not vehicles)
Burt v. Stocks Coal Co., 119 Ga. 629 (Ga. 1904) (Tools-of-the-trade means only simple and inexpensive appliances used in trade)
Schneider v. Fidelity Nat’l Bank (In re Schneider), 37 B.R. 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (Contrasts approach to tools-of-the-trade exemption, allowing vehicles in some circumstances)
Matter of Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1987) (Tools of the trade exemption under federal law generally does not include large machinery or vehicles)