Nell Cady
24-41026
Bankr. S.D. Ga.Jun 4, 2025Check TreatmentDocket
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
FILED
) Dana Wilson, Clerk
) United States Bankruptcy Court
Savannah, Georgia
) 3:26 pm, Jun 04 2025
)
In re: )
) Chapter 7
NELL CADY, )
) Number 24-41026-EJC
Debtor. )
)
PAUL A. SCHOFIELD, Chapter 7 Trustee, )
)
Movant, )
)
Vv. ) Contested Matter
)
NELL CADY, )
)
Respondent. )
)
)
a)
OPINION ON TRUSTEE’S OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS
Before the Court is the Objection to Exemptions filed by Paul A. Schofield,
the Chapter 7 Trustee. (Dckt. 23). The Debtor, Nell Cady, owns a 2020 BMW X2,
which she values at $19,573.00. She has claimed three exemptions in the vehicle
under Georgia’s bankruptcy exemption statute: (1) a $5,000.00 motor vehicle
exemption; (2) a $10,517.00 “wildcard” exemption; and (3) a $1,500.00 exemption
in the vehicle as a “tool of the trade.” The Trustee does not challenge the motor
vehicle or wildcard exemptions, but he does oppose the claimed tools-of-the-trade
exemption in the BMW. The Debtor, a realtor, contends that the BMW is integral to
her occupation and thus qualifies for the tools-of-the-trade exemption.
By separate motion, the Trustee, exercising his authority under 11 U.S.C. §
704(a)(1) to “collect and reduce to money the property of the estate,” seeks turnover
of the BMW so that he may sell it for the benefit of creditors. If the Trustee sells the
vehicle, the Debtor will be entitled to receive proceeds equal to her exempt equity
in the vehicle. Whether the BMW is a tool of the Debtor’s trade, therefore, will
determine the amount of sales proceeds she receives—specifically, whether she is
entitled to receive $17,017.00 (if the Court finds that the BMW is a tool of the trade)
or only $15,517.00 (if the Court finds that it is not).
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a),28 U.S.C. § 157
(a), and the Standing Order of Reference signed by then Chief Judge Anthony A. Alaimo on July 13, 1984. This is a “core proceeding” under28 U.S.C. § 157
(b)(2)(B). The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to this
matter by Rules 7052 and 9014(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
(the “Bankruptcy Rules”).
Il. Findings of Fact
The facts in this case are undisputed. The Debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition on
December 3, 2024. (Dckt. 1). In her Schedule I, the Debtor disclosed that she is a
real estate agent employed by Six Bricks Realty in Savannah, Georgia. (Dckt. 1, p.
40, 7 1). She reported her combined monthly income at $4,354.00 and stated that her
“future income will fluctuate with market conditions[.]” (Dckt. 1, p. 41, FJ 12-13).
According to her schedules, her assets total $23,146.14, she has a single secured debt
in the amount of $355.80, and her unsecured debts total $899,677.56, comprising
$16,139.71 in priority unsecured debt and $883,537.85 in general unsecured debt.
(Dckt. 1, p. 15, ] 63; dckt. 1, p. 18; 2.1; dckt. 1, p. 37, J 6). The claims register
reflects $22,943.27 in unsecured claims.
In her Schedule A/B, the Debtor listed as her primary asset a 2020 BMW X2,
which she valued at $19,573.00. (Dckt. 1, p. 10, 93.1). She added a notation that the
vehicle was “paid for by a family member.” (Dckt. 1, p. 10, 93.1). Per her Schedule
D, the vehicle is unencumbered by any liens. (Dckt. 1, p. 18). In Schedule C, she
claimed $17,017.00 in her equity in the BMW as exempt under three separate
provisions of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a).
First, she claimed a $5,000.00 motor vehicle exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(3). Second, she claimed a $10,517.00 exemption under the “wildcard”
provision of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6).! And third, she claimed a $1,500.00
exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7), which permits a debtor to exempt up
to that amount in “any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade[.]”
0.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7). (Dekt. 1, p. 16, J 2).
On March 3, 2025, the Chapter 7 Trustee notified the Court of possible assets
to be recovered and liquidated for the benefit of unsecured creditors. (Dckt. 18). The
next day, at the Trustee’s request, the Clerk set a June 4, 2025 deadline for filing
proofs of claims. (Dckt. 19). Two weeks later, on March 18, 2025, the Debtor
received her discharge. (Dckt. 21).
On April 2, 2025, the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to the Debtor’s claimed
exemptions. (Dckt. 23). The Trustee challenges neither the Debtor’s O.C.G.A. § 44-
13-100(a)(3) motor vehicle exemption nor the O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6) wildcard
exemption. (Dckt. 23, p. 1, n. 2). But he does challenge the O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(7) tools-of-the-trade exemption. According to the Trustee, “the Debtor, as a
| The wildcard exemption allows a debtor to exempt her “aggregate interest, not to exceed
$1,200.00 in value plus any unused amount of the [homestead] exemption, not to exceed
$10,000.00, . . . in any property[.]” O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6). Here, the Debtor does not own
real property and thus has not claimed a homestead exemption.
real estate agent, cannot claim the tool-of-the-trade exemption for the [v]ehicle
merely because she may sometimes use it for travel to different properties on behalf
of clients.” (Dckt. 23, p. 1). Because “the ‘essence’ of the Debtor’s occupation is not
travel,” contends the Trustee, “she cannot claim the [vJehicle [as] a tool of her trade
for the purposes of [O.C.G.A.] § 44-13-100(a)(7).” (Dckt. 23, p. 2).
On April 11, 2025, the Debtor responded to the Trustee’s objection. (Dckt.
26). In her response, she argues that traveling to different properties is the essence
of her work as a realtor because she “is in the business of selling houses [that] are
affixed to real property and therefore by necessity she must take prospective clients
to the houses in her vehicle.” (Dckt. 26, p. 2, § 7). The Debtor also notes that she has
two nondischargeable priority debts, one to her ex-husband in the amount of
$29,000.00 and the other to the Georgia Department of Revenue in the amount of
$9,461.92.? (Dckt. 26, pp. 1-2, J 3-5). She claims that she “already has or intends
to establish repayment plans” with both of those creditors. (Dckt. 26, p. 3, 9 10). In
her view, her fresh start would be impaired if the Court were to allow the Trustee to
sell her BMW and distribute nonexempt proceeds to creditors “who will otherwise
allow her to pay the same debt over an extended period of time.” (Dckt. 26, pp. 3-4,
q 10).
The Trustee has sine objected to both claims as lacking sufficient documentation. (Dckt. 38,
This matter came on for hearing on April 15, 2025. (Dckt. 24). At that hearing,
the Court heard oral argument from counsel and took testimony from the Debtor.
Two exhibits were admitted into evidence.> According to the Debtor, she has been a
licensed real estate agent since December 2016. (Tr., p. 8).4 In 2024, she worked for
Keller Williams Coastal Area Partners from January through October, and during
that time she received only two sales commissions, in the amounts of $4,074.75 and
$13,824.00. (Tr., pp. 9-10; Ex. “T-1”). In October 2024, the Debtor left Keller
Williams and joined Six Bricks Realty. (Tr., pp. 9, 12). At Six Bricks, she received
three commissions from October through December 2024, in the amounts of
$1,475.00, $3,400.00, and $4,303.00. (Tr., p. 13-14; Ex. “T-2”). In total, then, she
made commissions on only five closings in 2024. (Tr., p. 15). The Debtor attributed
her failure to make more commissions on a cooling housing market and on her brief
attempt to work an office job. (Tr., pp. 15-16).
When asked how many times she visited the five properties sold in 2024, the
Debtor answered “[u]nbelievable amounts” and noted that she made “several
trips[.]” (Tr., p. 11). She testified that she uses her vehicle for tasks such as “showing
the house, doing the inspection, opening for the appraiser, doing the walkthrough{,]
3 Those exhibits were statements from Keller Williams Coastal Area Partners (ex. “T-1”) and from
Six Bricks Realty (ex. “T-2”) showing the Debtor’s 2024 commissions.
‘ A transcript of the hearing appears on the docket. (Dckt. 31).
and... going to closing[.]” (Tr., p. 18). Sometimes she meets clients at the houses,
and sometimes she drives them there. (Tr., p. 17). She frequently shows houses that
don’t close. (Tr., p. 15). In her view, her car is her office, and she cannot do her job
without it, especially since some houses are in rural areas outside Savannah. (Tr., p.
16). But she acknowledged that she does some work, including writing contracts,
from home. (Tr., p. 18).
At the hearing, the Trustee disputed the Debtor’s $19,573.00 valuation of the
BMW, alleging that it is actually worth $28,648.00, but that dispute is not currently
before the Court. (Tr., pp. 4, 21-22). Regardless of how the Court rules on this
matter, the Trustee intends to sell the vehicle and distribute the proceeds to
unsecured creditors. (Tr. p. 21). At stake in this dispute, then, is how much the
Debtor would receive—the amount of her exempt equity in the vehicle—from the
sales proceeds.° At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under
advisement. (Tr., p. 21).
Three days after the hearing, on April 18, 2025, the Trustee moved for
turnover of certain assets, including the BMW.° (Dckt. 28). In that motion, the
Trustee asserts that the BMW is worth $28,648.00, and thus “there exists at least
> Alternatively, the Debtor might attempt to keep the vehicle by paying the Trustee the amount of
her non-exempt equity in it. (Tr. at pp. 21-22).
The other assets at issue comprise a $500.00 Goyard bag, and three real estate commissions
earned by the Debtor pre-petition but not paid until post-petition. (Dckt. 28; Tr., pp. 5-6).
$10,266.20 in non-exempt equity” in the vehicle. (Dckt. 28, p. 2, 4 6). In a response
filed on May 14, 2025, the Debtor asserts that her $19,573.00 valuation was based
on an estimate provided by the Kelley Blue Book’s website, and that a certified
vehicle appraiser has since valued the BMW at $16,000.00. (Dckt. 37, p. 2). The
motion for turnover is scheduled for hearing on June 10, 2025. (Dckt. 33).
Conclusions of Law
This case requires the Court to determine whether a Georgia debtor may
exempt a motor vehicle as a tool of the trade under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7).
Georgia bankruptcy courts are split on that question. Some hold that a motor vehicle
can never be a tool of the trade. In Curry v. Dial Fin. Corp. (Matter of Curry), 18
B.R. 358(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (Kahn, J.), the court, citing Supreme Court of Georgia precedent discussed below, found that the Georgia exemption statute “contemplates that the [debtor] uses the tool with his hands, and that the [debtor’s] work requires some degree of manual skill.” /d. at 359. Thus, the debtor, a tile setter, was not permitted to exempt his pickup truck as a tool of the trade.’ /d. at 360. The Court has found one other Georgia bankruptcy decision adopting Curry’s rule. Conerton v. Wachovia Bank (In re Conerton), No. 03—62155,2004 WL 5846767
, at
7 That said, the court in Curry noted in passing that “[t]he tools used by the debtor in his work as
ane Setter might well be classified as tools of the trade for bankruptcy purposes.” Curry, 18 B.R.
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2004) (Bihary, J.) (“The Court is persuaded by . . . the
reasoning by Judge Kahn” in Curry).
Other courts, however, hold that a motor vehicle can be a tool of the trade—
at least in some circumstances. In Schneider v. Fidelity Nat’] Bank (In re Schneider),
37 B.R. 747(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (Norton, J.), for example, the court rejected Curry’s focus on “the intention of the legislators” and instead purported to pay “more attention to a literal reading of the statute[.]’”* Jd. at 750. Under its reading, the court allowed a traveling salesman to exempt his 1979 Peugeot because travel was the essence of his occupation. Schneider,37 B.R. at 751
. See also Mitchell v. First Franklin Fin. Corp. (In re Mitchell), No. 17-68428-—PMB,2018 WL 1442256
, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. March 21, 2018) (Baisier, J.); South Atl. Prod. Credit Assoc. v. Jones (In re Jones),87 B.R. 738, 742
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988) (Laney, J.).?
Notably, these courts do not hold that motor vehicles are always exemptible
as tools of the trade. In their view, “it is insufficient to show that the vehicle is
essential for traveling to work, even if the motor vehicle is the debtor’s sole means
of commuting.” Mitchell, 2018 WL 1442256, at *2. “Rather, a vehicle is properly classified as a tool of trade where the debtor can show that her occupation . . . is 8 The statute in question was11 U.S.C. § 522
(f), as discussed below. ° See also In re Matthews,449 B.R. 833, 836-37
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011) (Smith, J.) (permitting husband to exempt tractor as a tool of the farming trade but denying wife’s claimed exemption in tractor because she did not personally farm). uniquely dependent on [the vehicle’s] use.” Jd. (quotations omitted). Thus, in Mitchell, a debtor who worked as a law clerk and tutor was denied the exemption because her work did not uniquely depend on her use of the vehicle. /d. at *3. See also Schneider,37 B.R. at 70
(explaining that the motor vehicle must be “integral”
to the debtor’s trade).
Here, the Debtor testified at length about the necessity of driving to and from
houses, and the Court accepts her argument that her occupation as a real estate agent
is uniquely dependent on her use of a motor vehicle. Thus, if the Court finds that
Georgia law ever allows debtor to exempt a motor vehicle as a tool of the trade, then
the Court would have no trouble permitting this Debtor to do so. The question is
whether Georgia law so allows. The Court, therefore, must decide whether to follow
Curry (forbidding the exemption) or Schneider (permitting it in some
circumstances). And that decision requires the Court to explore the statutory text and
history of Georgia’s tools-of-the-trade exemption.
A. Bankruptcy Exemptions Protect a Debtor’s Fresh Start
“One of the ‘main purpose[s]’ of the federal bankruptcy system is ‘to aid the
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life[.]’” Lamar, Archer & Cofrin,
LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709, 715 (2018) (quoting Stel/wagen v. Clum,245 U.S. 605, 617
(1918)). To that end, the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to exempt
10
certain property, as of the petition date,'° from the claims of creditors. “[E]xemptions
in bankruptcy cases are part and parcel of the fundamental bankruptcy concept of a
‘fresh start.’ ” Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 791 (2010).
For that reason, courts construe exemptions liberally in favor of debtors.
McFarland v. Wallace (In re McFarland), 790 F.3d 1182, 1186(11th Cir. 2015). The Bankruptcy Code makes a debtor’s claimed exemptions presumptively valid unless a party in interest objects.11 U.S.C. § 522
(1). Under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c), the party objecting to a debtor’s claimed exemptions “has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c). The objecting party must make that showing by a preponderance of the evidence. McFarland,790 F.3d at 1186
. Here, that burden falls on the Trustee.
Section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “an individual debtor
may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in” § 522(b)(2). 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(1). In turn, § 522(b)(2) defines exemptible property as “property that is specified” in § 522(d), which lists categories of property that a debtor may claim as exempt, “unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize.”11 U.S.C. § 522
(b)(2). In other words, States may opt out of the federal exemption scheme. McFarland,790 F.3d at 1185
. The State of Georgia has '0 See Yerian v. Webber (In re Yerian),927 F.3d 1223, 1229
(11th Cir. 2019) (“It is settled law
that a ‘claim of exemption is to be determined as of the petition date.’”).
11
opted out, prohibiting “an individual debtor whose domicile is in Georgia . . . from
applying or utilizing 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d) in connection with exempting
property from his or her estate[.]” O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(b). Instead, Georgia
debtors must use the Georgia exemptions codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a). The
parties agree that the Debtor in this case may claim exemptions only under the
Georgia exemption statute.
B. A Georgia Debtor May Exempt Tools of the Trade under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(7)
Georgia’s exemption statute allows three exemptions pertinent to this case.
First, and least important, the wildcard exemption allows a debtor to exempt her
“aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,200.00 in value plus any unused amount of the
[homestead] exemption, not to exceed $10,000.00, .. . in any property[.]” O.C.G.A.
44-13-100(a)(6). Second, and more important to the Courts analysis, the statute
permits a debtor to exempt “[t]he debtor’s interest, not to exceed the total of
$5,000.00 in value, in all motor vehicles[.]” O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(3). And third,
the provision under which this dispute arises, the statute permits a debtor to exempt
“lt]he debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,500.00 in value, in any
implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor[.]” O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7). As mentioned, the Trustee
12
does not challenge the Debtor’s entitlement to the wildcard and motor vehicle
exemptions; the sole issue in this case is whether a motor vehicle falls under the
definition of “tools of the trade” for purposes of the O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7)
exemption.
The term “tools of the trade” is nowhere defined in the Georgia exemption
statute. Mitchell, 2018 WL 1442256, at *2 (“In drafting § 44-13-100, the Georgia
legislature failed to define the phrase ‘tools of the trade.’”). “As a result, it has been
left to the courts to construe the phrase ‘tools of the trade’ and to define its outer
boundaries.” /d.
To determine the meaning of “tools of the trade,” the Court begins, as it must,
with the statutory text. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 74(2023) (“[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the statute.”). When terms in a statute are undefined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, 584 U.S. at 715. Here, the ordinary meaning of the terms “tool” and “trade” are not especially helpful.'' Merriam-Webster defines “tool” as, among other things, “a handheld device that aids in accomplishing a task” or “something (such as an instrument or apparatus) used in performing an operation or necessary in the practice '! To be sure, some courts interpreting the phrase “tools of the trade” in § 522(f)—a provision discussed below—find that “[t]he common usage of the phrase . . . does not ordinarily include motor vehicles,” Steele v. United Nat'l Bank, Sioux falls, South Dakota (In re Steele),8 B.R. 94, 95
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1980). See also Bank of Edgar v. Nowak (In re Nowak),48 B.R. 290, 291
(W.D.
Wis. 1984) (“This Court . . . believes that its imagination will not allow it to envision a 1980
Oldsmobile Cutlass as being anything other than a motor vehicle.”).
13
of a vocation or profession[.]” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online ed. 2025).
The first definition, requiring that the device be handheld, would exclude an
automobile, yet the second would seemingly include it.
So too for the word “trade,” which can be either occupation requiring
manual or mechanical skill” or “the business or work in which one engages
regularly[.]” /d.’? A realtor would arguably fall outside the former definition but
within the latter. As with “tool,” then, to privilege one definition over the other
would be to decide this case’s outcome arbitrarily. The Court is mindful that
“common words typically have more than one meaning,” so courts “must use the
context in which a given word appears to determine its . . . most likely sense.”
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
418 (2012).
Other principles of statutory interpretation provide some help in interpreting
the phrase. For example, under the associated-words canon (also referred to by the
Latin phrase noscitur a sociis—‘it is known by its associates”), “words grouped in
a list should be given related meanings.” /d. at 195. Here, the O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(7) exemption applies to “implements, professional books, [and] tools of the
trade[.]” The word “implement” does not provide much guidance, as its dictionary
'2 See also Matter of Weinbrenner, 53 B.R. 571, 577 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (“The plain meaning
of ‘trade’ [for purposes of § 522(d)(6)] is ‘an occupation, especially one requiring skilled labor.’”).
14
definition—“a device used in the performance of a task”—is broad. MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online ed. 2025). But the inclusion of “professional
books” lends some weight, however slight, to the notion that a tool of the trade must
be a small, handheld device.
Likewise, under the whole-text canon, “the judicial interpreter [must] consider
the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its
many parts.” Reading Law at 167. In other words, “[t]he entirety” of a statute
“provides the context for each of its parts.” Jd. And under the presumption of
consistent usage, “a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.” Jd.
at 170. Applying these principles here, the Court finds it noteworthy that the Georgia
exemption statute has separate exemptions for motor vehicles (O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(3)) and for tools of the trade (O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7)). Curry, 18 B.R.
at 359(“A separate provision addresses the exemptions permitted for motor vehicles.”). The separate motor vehicle exemption could support an inference that the General Assembly did not intend to allow a debtor to exempt a motor vehicle as a tool of the trade.'? Bolstering that inference is the relatively low amount of the tools-of-the-trade exemption: as most recently amended in 2017, the Georgia exemption statute allows a debtor to exempt up to $5,000.00 in a motor vehicle but only up to $1,500.00 in tools of the trade. But see Schneider,37 B.R. at 750
(rejecting such an inference).
15
Although these features of the exemption statute are suggestive—indicating
that a motor vehicle falls outside the scope of tools of the trade—they are not
dispositive. The Court finds the language of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) ambiguous
as to whether a motor vehicle may qualify for the tools-of-the-trade exemption. To
help answer that question, the Court must peer behind the statutory language and
consider the history of Georgia’s tools-of-the-trade exemption.
C. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) is Modeled on 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6)
The first salient fact about O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7)’s history is that it’s
nearly identical to a federal exemption set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Section
522(d)(6) provides an exemption, currently in the amount of $3,175.00, in “[t]he
debtor’s aggregate interest . . . in any implements, professional books, or tools, of
the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(6). This language differs from O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) only in the
amount of the exemption and the placement of a comma after the word “tools.”
What’s more, the same language appears a second time in § 522. Under §
522(f)(1)(B)i), a debtor may avoid a lien to the extent it “impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled” if the lien is “a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest in any .. . implements, professional books, or
tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor[.]” 11 U.S.C.
16
§ 522(f)(1)(B)(ii). Thus, bankruptcy cases addressing tools of the trade can arise
either in the context of an objection to a debtor’s claimed exemptions, as in this case,
or in the context of a debtor’s motion to avoid a lien on tools of the trade.
The Supreme Court has never interpreted the meaning of “tools of the trade”
under either § 522(d)(6) or § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii), but the Seventh Circuit issued an
influential decision in 1987. See Matter of Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1987).
In Patterson, the joint debtors were farmers. They initially filed under Chapter 11
but later converted their case to Chapter 7. After the conversion, the debtors’ tractor
and 51 cows were liquidated, and they sought to avoid the bank’s lien so they could
receive additional proceeds from the sale. In their view, the tractors and cows were
tools of the trade exemptible under § 522(d)(6), and they also took advantage of the
wildcard exemption. Then they turned to § 522(f) to avoid the bank’s lien. The
bankruptcy judge granted the debtors’ motion to avoid the lien, and the district court
affirmed except as to the cows, which the district court found were not tools of the
trade. Jd. at 1141.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Posner, found
that neither the tractor nor the cows were tools of the trade, and the court’s reasoning
is instructive. Rejecting the debtors’ argument that tractors and cows are
“instrumentalities for turning raw materials . . . into salable products,” the court
observed that ‘‘a businessman’s secretary is by the same token a tool of the trade,”
17
and “indeed, all capital and labor inputs are tools in [that] sense[.]” /d. at 1146. If
the exemption had “so capacious a definition,” then it would really encompass “the
capital assets of [a debtor’s] business, even though it is to those assets that creditors
primarily look for repayment” of debts. Jd.
Moreover, the court found it significant that the federal exemption made
“explicit mention of so petty an item as ‘professional books,’ which rarely (though
sometimes) will have a substantial value[.]” Jd. And, when Patterson was decided,
the § 522(d)(6) exemption was limited to $750.00, which the court also found worthy
of note:
[I]f, for example, a printing proprietorship goes bankrupt,
what sense would it make to allow the owner to exempt
$750 from the auction of a million dollar printing press?
The purpose of the tools of the trade exemption is to enable
an artisan to retain tools of modest value so that he is not
forced out of his trade. Although as a matter of semantics
farm “implements” could be thought to cover machinery
and vehicles as well as hand tools, this would be an
incongruous interpretation. There would be no point in
allowing a debtor to exempt $750 worth of equipment that
might have a market value of many thousands of dollars.
He would have to sell it anyway, and probably he could
not replace it; certainly he could not continue to use it in
his trade.
18
Id. (emphasis in original).'* In the court’s view, both the inclusion of professional
books and the low dollar amount of the exemption were inconsistent with the
debtors’ broad interpretation of tools of the trade.
But the “strongest evidence,” the court found, was the history of the federal
tools-of-the-trade exemption. As the court explained, “[s]tates have long granted an
exemption for tools or implements of the trade, and in interpreting these exemptions
state courts have generally distinguished between personal hand tools of modest
value, on the one hand, and machinery on the other.” /d. at 1146-47. And, the court
added, “[t]here is no indication that Congress, by taking over a familiar term from
state law as the basis for a modest federal exemption that would be an alternative to
the state exemptions . . . meant to expand it.” /d. at 1147. After all, “[i]f Congress
had .. . such an intention, it probably would not have imposed a $750 ceiling—for
what, to repeat, could be the purpose of allowing a farmer to exempt a tiny fraction
of the value of a piece of heavy farm machinery or of a herd of cattle?” Jd. “Few
farmers [would] be able to use the wild-card exemption to jack this figure up.” Jd.
In view of this history, alongside the statutory text, the court held that neither
the debtors’ tractor nor their cows were tools of the trade for purposes of § 522(d)(6):
'4 See also Metzig v. Bank of the West (In re Meizig), 33 B.R. 620, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)
(“Arguably, Congress, by providing a specific exemption in tools of trade to the aggregate value
of $750.00, was seeking to preserve to an automobile mechanic, a plumber, or some other
tradesman who possessed only a nominal amount of tools a means to continue his livelihood.”).
19
To regard cows and other livestock as “tools” or
“implements” does particular violence to the English
language, and there is no indication that the terms are
being used in a technical sense. There would be no
semantic violence in regarding the [debtors’] tractor as a
tool of the farming trade . . . but, while the question is a
close one, we think the tractor is no more a tool of the trade
in the statutory sense than the cow is. The tractor is not a
modest implement but an expensive piece of machinery. It
is one of the principal capital assets of a small farm. To
exempt it would be like exempting the airplanes owned by
an air charter service. This can’t have been what Congress
had in mind in allowing an exemption limited to $750. The
relevant tools of the trade are the rakes and other hand
tools that [one joint debtor] continues to own, and to use
as a dairy hand following the bankruptcy.
Id. Because the debtors could not claim the tools-of-the-trade exemption, the court
found that the bankruptcy court should have denied their motion to avoid the bank’s
lien, and it remanded the case for further proceedings. /d. at 1148.
Patterson, of course, is not binding on this Court, for three reasons. First,
Patterson arose in a different jurisdiction—the Seventh Circuit is not the Eleventh
Circuit. Indeed, many bankruptcy courts outside the Seventh Circuit permit debtors
to exempt motor vehicles as tools of the trade.'° Second, the court in Patterson was
15 See, e.g, Nazarene Fed. Credit Union v. McNutt (In re McNutt), 87 B.R. 84, 86-87(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting Patterson’s “all or nothing approach” because “trades and uses of implements change and evolve; prior definitions and concepts should be consistent with changes in technology and trades”). Cf Parrotte v. Sensenich (In re Parrotte),22 F.3d 472, 475-77
(2d Cir. 1994) (permitting Chapter 12 debtors to exempt cattle as tools of the trade under Vermont law); Heape v. Citadel Bank of Independence (In re Heape),886 F.2d 280, 283-84
(10th Cir. 1989) (permitting Chapter 7 debtors, both farmers, to avoid lien on livestock as tools of the trade under § 522(f)). The Debtor in this case relies on Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Dubrock (In re Dubrock),5 B.R. 353
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980), where a Kentucky bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s motion to
20
interpreting the federal exemption in § 522(d)(6), whereas this Court must interpret
the Georgia exemption in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7). And third, this case involves
a BMW, not a tractor and cows. But Patterson, by highlighting the symbiotic
relationship between § 522(d)(6) and the state-level exemptions for tools of the
trade, provides a clue that the Court should look deeper into the history of Georgia’s
exemption statute.
D. Under Georgia’s Early Exemption Statutes, Tools of the Trade were Limited to
Small, Handheld Instruments
The modern Georgia exemption for “implements, professional books, or tools
of the trade” has antecedents dating at least as far back as 1822. In that year, the
General Assembly passed an act “[t]o exempt from sale for debts contracted after a
given time, certain articles chiefly necessary for the subsistence of the [debtor’s]
family,” proclaiming in the prefatory clause that “it does not comport with justice or
expediency to deprive innocent and helpless women and children of the means of
avoid a lien on his automobile, claiming it as an exempt tool of the trade. (Section 522(f) does not
explicitly allow debtors to avoid liens on motor vehicles, so debtors sometimes try to do so by
claiming the vehicle as a tool of the trade.) The debtor was a realtor, and the court held that the
automobile was a tool of his trade because “[a] salesman of real estate must have constant and
immediate access to reliable transportation, for not only himself but his clients.” /d. at 354-55. No
bankruptcy court in Georgia has squarely addressed a realtor’s ability to exempt a motor vehicle,
but Schneider, in permitting a traveling salesman to exempt his car, cited Dubrock approvingly.
See Schneider, 37 B.R. at 751. Like Patterson, Dubrock is not binding on this Court.
21
subsistence.”'® The act permitted a debtor to exempt the following items: “[t]wo beds
and bedding, common bedsteads, a spinning wheel and two pair of cards, a loom,
and cow and calf, common tools of his trade and ordinary cooking utensils, and ten
dollars[’] worth of provisions.”"”
In Lenoir v. Weeks, 20 Ga. 596 (1856), the Supreme Court of Georgia
interpreted the meaning of “common tools of [] trade” under the 1822 act. In that
case, an attorney sought to exempt his law library from levy and sale, but the superior
court denied his claimed exemption. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia
affirmed, explaining as following:
The word tool is defined to be some simple instrument
used by the hand, and the object of the Legislature
obviously was, to exempt articles of small value and of
frequent and daily use by a poor mechanic, upon whose
manual occupation of these tools his family depended for
a subsistence. It was never intended that the debtor should
be protected in carrying on an extensive trade with a large
capital, even in tools, while his creditor was suffering for
the money justly due him.
What [are] the other articles protected by the Act? Two
beds and bedding, common bedsteads, a spinning wheel
and two pair of cards, a loom and a cow and calf, common
tools of his trade and ordinary cooking utensils. Did the
Legislature intend to depart so far from the strict and
appropriate meaning of the term []“common tools,” as to
extend it to all the utensils of a distillery, the looms,
'6 See Acts of the General Assembly of the [S]tate of Georgia, passed at milledgevilee [sic], at an
annual session, in November and December, 1822 [volume 1],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlgl 5654590#text (last accessed May 27, 2025).
'7 Supra n. 16 (emphasis added).
22
spindles, &c. of a cotton or woollen factory, the forges and
other instruments of a manufactory of iron, and other
complicated and expensive machinery, costing thousands
of dollars? No such construction can be adopted without
doing violence to the meaning of the Act.
Lenoir, 20 Ga. at 597. The court was thus “entirely satisfied that a lawyer’s library”
did not fall within the meaning of “common tools of trade, within the true intent of
the [1822] Act.” Jd.
Georgia codified its tools-of-the-trade exemption in 1860. On December 9,
1858, the General Assembly provided for the election of three commissioners “to
prepare for the people of Georgia a Code, which should, as near as practicable,
embrace in a condensed form the laws of Georgia, whether derived from the
common law, the Constitution, the statutes of the state, the decisions of the Supreme
Court, or the statutes of England, of force in this state.” Wilensky v. Central of Ga.
Ry. Co., 136 Ga. 889,72 S.E. 418, 419
(1911).'® The resulting Code, prepared by
Richard H. Clark, Thomas R.R. Cobb, and David Irwin, was adopted by the General
Assembly in 1860 and went into effect in 1863. /d.’’ Its exemption statute provided
as follows:
18 See Acts of the General Assembly of the [S]tate of Georgia, passed in Milledgeville, at an
annual session in November and December, 1858 [volume 1],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlgl_ 3263291 9#text (last visited May 27, 2025).
'9 See University of Georgia School of Law, Digital Commons, A Service of the UGA Law
Library, 1860 Code, Preface & Contents, https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/18/ (last
visited May 27, 2025).
23
The following property of every debtor, who is the head of
a family, shall be exempt from levy and sale by virtue of
any process whatever, under the laws of this State; nor
shall any valid lien be created thereon, except in the
manner hereinafter pointed out, but shall remain for the
use and benefit of the family of the debtor:
1. Fifty acres of land, and five additional acres for each of
his or her children under the age of sixteen years. This land
shall include the dwelling-house, if the value of such
house and improvements does not exceed the sum of two
hundred dollars; Provided, that none of the above land be
within the limits of a city, town, or village, and does not
include any cotton or wool factory, saw or grist mill, or
any other machinery propelled by water or steam, the
value of which exceeds the sum of two hundred dollars;
And provided, also, that such land shall not derive its chief
value from other cause than its adaptation to agricultural
purposes; or, in [lieu] of the above land, real estate in a
city, town, or village, not exceeding five hundred dollars
in value.
2. One farm horse or mule.
3, One cow and calf.
4, Ten head of hogs and fifty dollars’ worth of provisions,
and five dollars’ worth additional for each child.
5. Beds, bedding, and common bedsteads sufficient for the
family.
6. One loom, one spinning-wheel, and two pairs of cards,
and one hundred pounds of lint cotton.
7. Common tools of trade of himself and his wife.
8. Equipment and arms of a militia soldier, and trooper’s
horse.
24
9. Ordinary cooking utensils and table crockery.
10. Wearing apparel of himself and family.
11. Family Bible, religious works, and school books.
12. Family portraits.
13. The library of a professional man, in actual practice or
business, not exceeding three hundred dollars in value, and
to be selected by himself.”
The Code of the State of Georgia, Part II (“The Civil Code”), Title 3 (“Of Relations
Arising from Other Contracts”), Chapter 2 (“Of Debtor and Creditor”), Article 4
(“Insolvent Debtors”), Section III (“Property Exempt from Sale”), § 2013 (emphasis
added).”' The seventh listed exemption permitted an insolvent debtor to exempt from
levy and sale any “common tools of trade of himself and his wife.”
In Kirksey v. Rowe, 114 Ga. 893,40 S.E. 990
(1902), the Supreme Court of
Georgia was again called upon to interpret the meaning of the tools-of-the-trade
exemption. At that time, the exemption was codified at § 2866 of the revised Code
adopted December 15, 1895, but its language was identical to that in the 1860
20 Evidently the General Assembly was unhappy with the Lenoir decision holding law books non-
exemptible.
2! See University of Georgia School of Law, Digital Commons, A Service of the UGA Law
Library, 1860 Code, Pt. 2. Titles 1-5 (Pages 316-444),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/18/ (last visited May 27, 2025).
25
Code.” In Kirksey, the debtor sought to exempt a horse not used on a farm, a half-
interest in a two-horse wagon, and a “set of harness.” /d. at 990. The superior court
denied all three exemptions. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The court reversed as to the horse—permitting the
exemption”?—but affirmed as to the half-interest in the two-horse wagon” and as to
the harness.
Pertinent to the matter now before this Court, the court held that “a set of
harness, whether double or single, does not fall within the descriptive words
‘common tools of trade.’” Jd. Citing several legal dictionaries, the court explained
that “the usual meaning of the word ‘tool’ is ‘an instrument of manual operation’;
that is, an instrument to be used and managed by the hand, instead of being moved
22 See University of Georgia School of Law, Digital Commons, A Service of the UGA Law
Library, 1895 Code Vol. 2, Civil Code. Titles 3-4 (Pages 221-502),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/28/ (last visited May 27, 2025).
23 Although the exemption statute permits a debtor to exempt a “farm horse,” the court interpreted
that term to “apply to quality, and restrict value,” not to “prescrib[e] the kind of work in which the
exemption was to be employed.” Kirksey, 40 S.E. at 990. The court held that “[cJertainly a horse used in drawing a dray, and not worth over $40, may properly be regarded as coming within the descriptive term ‘farm horse,’ notwithstanding his actual employment may be urban rather than rural in character.” /d. 24 Section 2866(5) of the 1895 Code permitted a debtor to exempt “one one-horse wagon[.]” The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the superior court that “a half interest in a two-horse wagon cannot be exempted as ‘one one-horse wagon’” because “[n]o amount of reasoning can alter the fact that a half interest in a two-horse wagon is not ‘one one-horse wagon,’ nor, indeed, a wagon of any kind.” Kirksey,40 S.E. at 990
.
26
and controlled by machinery.” /d. In other words, a tool is “[a]n implement used by
the hand in working” or “{a] hand instrument necessary to one’s trade.” Jd.
According to the court, one legal dictionary “cite[d] a number of cases in
which such articles as sewing machines, pianos, violins, cornets, guns, etc., have
been held to be tools, within the meaning of exemption statutes[.]” Jd. But in the
court’s view, “[s]ome of [those] decisions evidently [went] further than [the Georgia
exemption] statute would authorize in classifying as tools articles which are more
properly designated as appliances or machines.” /d. In Georgia, the court explained,
“the word ‘tool’ was intended to have a more restricted interpretation,” as evidenced
by the statute’s specific exemptions for “looms, spinning wheels, cotton cards, and
sewing machines[.]” /d. The Court also quoted Lenoir at length in support of its
holding that the harness was not exemptible as a common tool of the trade. /d. at
991.
In Burt v. Stocks Coal Co., 119 Ga. 629,46 S.E. 828
(1904), the Supreme
Court of Georgia for the third time addressed the tools-of-the-trade exemption.
There, the debtor, a dentist, sought to exempt his dentist’s chair. The superior court
denied the exemption, and the Supreme Court affirmed, citing Lenoir and Kirksey
for the proposition that the exemption for common tools of trade “has uniformly
been construed to refer, not to tools in common use by the debtor, regardless of their
27
value, but to those simple and inexpensive appliances used in his trade.” Burt, 46
S.E. at 829,
In 1933, Georgia adopted a new code, The Code of Georgia of 1933, which
largely replicated the exemptions established in 1860, with three notable changes
having been made in the interim. First, by 1933 a debtor’s total exemptions were
capped at $1,600.00 in value.*® Second, by 1933 a debtor could exempt “(fifty
bushels of corn, 1,000 pounds of fodder, one one-horse wagon, one table and a set
of chairs sufficient for the use of the family, and household and kitchen furniture not
to exceed $150 in value.”2° Third, a debtor could exempt “[o]ne family sewing
machine; this exemption to exist whether [the] person owning said machine is the
head of a family or not, and to be good against all debts except for the purchase
See The Code of Georgia of 1933, Title 51 (“Homestead and Exemptions”), Part |
(“Constitutional Homestead”), Chapter 51-1 (“Exemptions Allowed and to Whom Granted”), §
51-101 (“What is exempt, and who may claim exemption”) (“There shall be exempt from levy and
sale... the property of every head of a family . . . realty or personalty, or both, to the value in the
aggregate of $1,600[.]”), available at University of Georgia School of Law, Digital Commons, A
Service of the UGA Law Library, 1933 Code, Titles 40-53 (Pages 1192-1419),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/32/ (last visited May 30, 2025).
26 See The Code of Georgia of 1933, Title 51 (“Homestead and Exemptions”), Part II (“Statutory
or Short Homestead”), Chapter 51-13 (“Property Exempted from Sale”), § 51-1301 (“Exempt
items enumerated”), available at University of Georgia School of Law, Digital Commons, A
Service of the UGA Law Library, 1933 Code, Titles 40-53 (Pages 1192-1419),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/32/ (last visited May 30, 2025).
28
money.”?’ The exemption for a debtor’s “common tools of trade of himself and wife”
remained unchanged.”®
Georgia passed its modern exemption scheme in 1980, two years after
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598. The General Assembly found that the 1978 bankruptcy reforms had “significant ramifications for Georgia debtors and creditors,” particularly “the option... for states to elect between allowing Georgia debtors to claim the property exemptions authorized by the federal law and state law exemptions,” and for that reason it was necessary “provide temporarily reasonable property exemptions for bankruptcy purposes” pending further study by the General Assembly.*? The Governor of Georgia signed the legislation on March 24, 1980. Matter of Boozer,4 B.R. 524, 526
(Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980) (Robinson, J.). Codified at Georgia Code Annotated § 51-1301.1,°° the
27 See supra n. 26.
28 See supra n. 26.
29 See Acts and resolutions of the General Assembly of the [S]tate of Georgia 1980 [volume 1],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlg] 406881 155#text (last visited May 27, 2025).
3° Technically, the 1980 legislation left intact the 1933 exemptions then codified at Georgia Code
Annotated § 51-1301 and simply added the new exemption scheme as an alternative at § 51-
1301.1. See supra n. 29 (“Code Title 51, relating to homesteads and exemptions, as amended, is
hereby amended by adding following Code Section 51-1301 a new Code section to be designated
Code Section 51-1301.1 to read as follows: 51-1301.1. Alternative exemption. In lieu of the
exemption provided in Code Sections 51-1301 or 51-101, any debtor who is a natural person may
exempt, pursuant to this chapter, for purposes of bankruptcy, the following property ... .”). The
1980 exemptions were originally due to sunset on July 1, 1981. fd. (“Code Sections 51-1301.1 and
51-1601, added by this Act, and this Act shall stand repealed in their entirety effective July 1,
1981.”).
29
exemption statute initially permitted, as relevant here, an $800.00 motor vehicle
exemption and a $500.00 exemption in “any implements, professional books, or
tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor[.]”?!
Eventually, the exemptions enacted in 1980 became permanent and were codified at
O.C.G.A § 44-13-100; the tools-of-the-trade exemption has been amended only as
to its dollar amount.
E. The General Assembly Did Not Materially Change the Meaning of the Tools-of-
the-Trade Exemption when it Enacted the Modern Georgia Exemption Statute
What lessons can be drawn from this statutory history? Most obviously,
Lenoir, Kirksey, and Burt all stand for the proposition that a “common tool of the
trade,” for purposes of the early Georgia exemption statutes, had to be a small,
handheld instrument—or, at least, a “simple and inexpensive appliance,” as Burt put
it. Taken at face value, then, those three Supreme Court of Georgia decisions suggest
that, at least under the old exemption statutes, motor vehicles would not have been
considered tools of the trade because they were not small, handheld, simple, or
inexpensive.
But perhaps those cases shouldn’t be taken at face value. It is a striking fact
that the early exemption statutes surveyed here for the most part lacked dollar limits.
3! Supra n. 29.
30
The 1822 act mentioned only a single dollar amount ($10.00 worth of provisions),
and the 1860 Code had only four such limitations ($200.00 for improvements to real
property or $500.00 for real estate in an urban area, $50.00 worth of provisions,
$5.00 worth of provisions for each child, and up to $300.00 in a professional’s
library). Absent any dollar limitation on “common tools of the trade,” it makes sense
that the Supreme Court of Georgia restricted that phrase to mean only small,
handheld devices—otherwise, debtors might have sought to exempt heavy
machinery used in factories, thereby thwarting creditors in a manner unforeseen by
the General Assembly.
That caveat aside, a question arises as to whether the cases Lenoir, Kirksey,
and Burt remain good—indeed, binding—law in Georgia. When the General
Assembly enacted the modern exemption scheme in 1980, did it intend to ratify the
Supreme Court of Georgia’s definition of “common tools of the trade” set forth in
those cases? Under the prior-construction canon, “[i]fa statute uses words or phrases
that have already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of
last resort . . . they are to be understood according to that construction.” Reading
Law at 322. See also Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, 584 U.S. at 721-22 (quoting Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)) (“When . . . judicial interpretations have settled
the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a
31
new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial
interpretations as well|[.]’”’).
Here, where the early exemption statutes allowed a debtor to exempt
“common tools of trade of himself and his wife,” the modern statute uses the phrase
“tools of the trade of the debtor[.]” Thus, the General Assembly deleted the adjective
“common,” added the article “the” before “trade,” and dropped the gendered
language “of himself and his wife.” The Court finds these changes merely cosmetic,
not substantive. In this respect the Court disagrees with the decision South Atl. Prod.
Credit Assoc. v. Jones (In re Jones), 87 B.R. 738 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988) (Laney,
J.). There, Judge Laney cited Kirksey and Burt but made much of the fact that the
word “common” was deleted:
... Burt is the most recent case on the meaning of “tools
of the trade” from the Georgia state courts, and it was
decided in 1904. The current Georgia statute does not
contain the modifier “common” before “tools of the
trade.” Therefore, these cases are not necessarily
indicative of the meaning of the current statute and no
reported Georgia case has discussed the meaning of “tools
of the trade” in said statute.
Id. at 742. Respectfully, the Court fails to see how the deletion of the word
“common”—imeaning “of or relating to a community at large”——materially changes
the meaning of the phrase “tools of the trade”. MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (online ed. 2025).
32
On balance, the Court finds that the General Assembly intended to ratify the
holdings of Lenoir, Kirksey, and Burt when it passed the modern exemption statute
in 1980. Those cases having been decided by this State’s highest court, the
legislature is presumed to have been on notice of them, yet it did not substantively
change the exemption’s language. Moreover, the General Assembly has amended
the exemption statute no fewer than nine times since 1980.7? And the split of
32 In 1981, the exemption statute was amended to, among other things, delete the sunset provision
for the 1980 exemptions. See Acts and resolutions of the General Assembly of the [S]tate of
Georgia 1981 [volume 1], https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlg]_ 416200087#text (last visited May
30, 2025) (The 1980 act “is hereby amended by striking in its entirety Section 4 of said Act, which
reads as follows: Section 4. Code Sections 51-1301.1 and 51-1601, added by this Act, and this Act
shall stand repealed in their entirety effective July 1, 1981.”). In 1988, the statute, by that time
codified at O.C.G.A. 44-13-100, was amended to add an exemption for undistributed public or
nonprofit retirement or pension plan funds. See Acts and resolutions of the General Assembly of
the [S]tate of Georgia 1988 [volume 1], https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlgl_ 485432255#text (last
visited May 30, 2025). A 1989 exemption made minor stylistic changes. See Acts and resolutions
of the General Assembly of the ([S]tate of Georgia 1989 [volume 1],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dig_zlgl_ 495388147#text (last visited May 30, 2025). In 1995, the
statute was amended to create a broader exemption for individual retirement accounts. See Acts
and resolutions of the General Assembly of the [S]tate of Georgia 1995 [volume 1],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlgl 563510980#text (last visited May 30, 2025). A 2001
amendment changed the amounts of certain exemptions “and the standards, practices, and
procedures connected therewith[.]” Acts and resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of
Georgia 2001, volume 1, https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_ggpd_y-ga-bl407-b2001-bv-p1 #text (last
visited May 30, 2025). In 2012, the General Assembly increased the amount of the homestead
exemption from $10,000.00 to $21,500.00 (where it remains). See Acts and resolutions of the
General Assembly of the State of Georgia 2012 [2012], https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_ggpd_y-ga-
b1407-b2012-bv-p1-bbk-p2-belec-p-btext#text (last visited May 30, 2025). In 2013, the amount of
the motor vehicle exemption was increased from $3,500.00 to $5,000.00 and to make a minor
stylistic change. See Acts and resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 2013:
volume one [2013], https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_ggpd_y-ga-bl407-b2013-bv-p1-belec-p-
btext#text (last visited May 30, 2025). In 2015, the General Assembly increased the amount of the
wildcard exemption. See Acts and resolutions of the first session of the 153rd General Assembly
of the State of Georgia 2015: volume one, book — two [2015],
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_ggpd_y-ga-bl407-b2015-bv-p1-bb-p2-belec-p-btext#text (last
visited May 30, 2025). And in 2017, the statute was amended to create an exemption for assets in
health savings accounts. See Acts and resolutions of the first session of the 154th General
33
authority among bankruptcy courts on this issue dates to the early 1980s, when Curry
and Schneider were decided. Yet at no point in the past 45 years has the legislature
seen fit to change the language of the tools-of-the-trade exemption. The Court finds
that the phrase “tools of the trade” in O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7) must be interpreted
in light of Lenoir, Kirksey, and Burt.
To be sure, the Court does not hold that the modern tools-of-the-trade
exemption is limited to those items that would have been exemptible in, say, 1904,
when Burt was decided. In that respect, the Court agrees with Judge Norton’s
analysis in Schneider:
Within recent time no Georgia state court has interpreted
“tool of the trade” in the exemption section. Many of the
Georgia decisions were rendered prior to the more modern
mechanical or technological age we now live in. We must
recognize that trades and uses of implements may change
and evolve, and prior definitions and concepts must be
revised to be consistent with technological or trade
changes and uses.
Schneider, 37 B.R. at 750-51. In other words, the exemption’s scope can change
with the passage of time and the advent of new technologies. No doubt many skilled
workers today use tools undreamt of by legislators a century or more ago. We no
Assembly of the State of Georgia 2017: volume one, https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_ggpd_y-ga-
b1407-b2017-bv-p1-belec-p-btext#text (last visited May 30, 2025).
34
longer live in Kirksey’s world of two-horse wagons and harnesses. And not only
have tools changed—the universe of trades has likewise grown.*?
But it does not follow that a motor vehicle is a tool of the trade. Without
attempting to define the precise contours of the tools-of-the-trade exemption, the
Court finds that Lenoir, Kirksey, and Burt preclude a debtor from exempting a motor
vehicle as a tool of the trade under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(7). The Court agrees
with Curry about the continuing validity of these Supreme Court of Georgia
decisions:
[I]n Georgia a tool of the trade is an implement used by a
person in that person’s work. Tools of the trade may be far
more sophisticated today than they were when the
Supreme Court of Georgia considered the question, but the
term still contemplates that the person uses the tool with
his hands, and that the person’s work requires some degree
of manual skill.
Curry, 18 B.R. at 359. This interpretation is only bolstered by the statute’s grouping
of tools of the trade with implements and professional books, by the separate motor
vehicle exemption, and by the relatively low dollar amount of the tools-of-the-trade
exemption. Bringing together these disparate threads, the Court finds that the Debtor
33 Georgia requires a license to practice such professions as certified public accountancy,
architecture, chiropractic, dentistry, professional engineering, land surveying, law, pharmacy,
psychology, medicine and surgery, optometry, osteopathy, podiatry, veterinary medicine,
registered professional nursing, and harbor piloting. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-7-2(2), 14-10-2(2), 43-1-24.
35
cannot exempt her BMW as a tool of her trade as a realtor under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(7).
IV. Conclusion
As mentioned, the Court fully accepts the Debtor’s testimony that she cannot
perform her job as a realtor without using a motor vehicle. If the Georgia exemption
statute allowed a debtor to exempt a motor vehicle as a tool of the trade, then the
Court would permit her to claim that exemption in this case. But the statute does not
so allow. Consistent with this Opinion, the Court will, by separate order, sustain the
Chapter 7 Trustee’s Objection to Exemptions. (Dckt. 23).
Dated at Savannah, Georgia, this 4th da Co.
United States Bankruptcy Court
Southern District of Georgia
36