National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389

Congress enacted PASPA in 1992 to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling, making it unlawful for a "governmental entity" to "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact" sports betting. 28 U.S.C. § 3702.
New Jersey had long prohibitions on sports wagering; voters approved a 2011 constitutional amendment permitting the Legislature to "authorize by law" limited wagering at Atlantic City casinos and certain racetracks.
New Jersey enacted a 2012 regulatory scheme (the 2012 Law) authorizing and licensing sports wagering; courts enjoined that law as violating PASPA in Christie I (730 F.3d 208).
In 2014 the Legislature passed SB 2460 (the 2014 Law), framed as a partial repeal: it removed certain state prohibitions to allow sports wagering at casinos and racetracks for persons 21+, but retained bans on wagering on New Jersey college teams and collegiate events in NJ.
Sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2014 Law. The district court held the 2014 Law violated PASPA; on rehearing en banc, the Third Circuit affirmed, holding the 2014 Law "authorizes by law" sports gambling and that PASPA is not an unconstitutional commandeering of the states.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2014 Law violates PASPA by "authorizing by law" sports gambling	Leagues: the 2014 Law selectively removes prohibitions and thus authorizes sports wagering (and effectively licenses it by limiting venues and persons).	New Jersey: the statute is a repeal (not an affirmative authorization) consistent with Christie I; repeal is permitted and does not equate to "authorization by law."	The en banc court held the 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling in violation of PASPA because it permits conduct otherwise fully prohibited and selectively empowers certain venues/persons.
Whether PASPA impermissibly "commandeers" state legislatures in violation of the Tenth Amendment	New Jersey: if repeal is treated as authorization, PASPA effectively forces states to keep prohibitions, which commandeers state lawmaking.	Leagues/United States: PASPA prohibits certain state acts but does not coerce states to enact or enforce federal programs; it regulates state activity without commandeering.	The court reaffirmed Christie I: PASPA does not unconstitutionally commandeer the states; it prohibits certain state actions but does not impose a coercive obligation to legislate or enforce.

National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Christie I" — earlier Third Circuit decision construing PASPA and anti‑commandeering arguments)
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal statute impermissibly commandeering states struck down)
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (interim federal directives to state officers violate anti‑commandeering)
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (permissible federal regulation in a pre‑emptible field that leaves states a choice)
F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (similar principle regarding federal standards and state choice)
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding federal prohibition that regulated state activity)
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding federal restriction on state release of DMV data as regulation of state activity)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permit prospective suits against state officers to enjoin ongoing federal‑law violations)