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National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey
730 F.3d 208
3rd Cir.
2013
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Sо, Jersey Thoroughbred clear: it’s New Horsemen’s was “No. judge’s response $20,000.00. Inc.; the sanction. That’s Association, Stephen That’s M. Swee- bankruptcy at 161. The (Intervenors it.” Appendix ney; Y. Oliver Sheila avenues for sanctions judge rejected other Court) District indeed, and, citation to him his available 105(a) subsequent in his order 11 U.S.C. Sweeney Stephen M. Sheila of other vehicles knowledge evinces Oliver, Appellants. Y. I also note imposing sanctions. explore failed themselves Collegiate National Athletic Associa through other means. request sanctions tion, association; unincorporated an however, this, colleagues my Contrary to Association, National Basketball perilously and come remand order the venture; joint National Football that sanc- position expressing close to League, unincorporated an associa under different tions be awarded should tion; Hockey League, National an un when, statutes, my reading, the bank- incorporated association; of Office already rejected those ave- judge ruptcy Baseball, un the Commissioner of an assumption no other I can make nues. incorporated doing association busi my than believe some other colleagues Baseball; Major League ness as Unit type required are here. That of sanctions (Intervenor ed States Of America however, call nor is issue our Court) I affirm the District us. would the District before aspects. in all v. Jersey; Governor of State New Rebuck, David L. Director of the New Jersey Gaming Division of Enforce Attorney ment and Assistant General ATHLETIC NATIONAL COLLEGIATE Jersey; Frank of the State New ASSOCIATION, unincorporated as- an Zanzuccki, Executive Director of the sociation; Asso- National Basketball Jersey Racing New Commission New joint venture; ciation, National Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s As unincorporated League, Football an Inc.; Sweeney; sociation, Stephen M. Hockey association; League, National (Intervenors Y. Sheila Oliver Dis association; unincorporated an Office Court) trict Baseball, an Commissioner unincorporated doing association Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s League Baseball; Major business as Association, Inc., Appellant. (Intervenor United States of America Court) in the District Collegiate National Athletic Associa- tion, association; unincorporated an

GOVERNOR OF the State of NEW Association, National Basketball JERSEY; Rebuck, Director David L. venture; joint National Football Jersey Gaming Division of the New League, unincorporated an associa- Attorney Assistant Enforcement tion; Hockey League, an un- Natiоnal Jersey; General of the of New State association; incorporated Office Zanzuccki, Director Frank Executive Baseball, un- the Commissioner of Jersey Racing of the New Commission *2 incorporated doing association busi Major League Baseball;

ness Unit (Intervenor

ed States of America Court)

the District Jersey;

Governor of the State New Rebuck,

David L. Director New

Jersey Gaming Division of Enforce Attorney

ment Assistant General Jersey; State of New Frank

Zanzuccki, Executive Director of the Jersey Racing Commission New

Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s As

sociation, Inc.; Stephen Sweeney; M. (Intervenors Y. Oliver

Sheila Dis Court)

trict Jersey;

Governor of the of New State

David L. Rebuck and Frank

Zanzuccki, Appellants. 13-1714,

Nos. 13-1715. Appeals,

United States

Third Circuit.

Argued: June

Opinion Filed: Sept. *6 Olson, [Argued], B. Mat- Esq.,

Theodore McGill, Johnson, Esq., E. Ashley thew D. FUENTES, FISHER, and Johnson, Esq., Before: Gibson E. Robert Esq., DC, LLP, VANASKIE, Crutcher, Washington, Judges. Circuit Dunn & Hoffman, S. Esq., Christopher John J. Feinblatt, Esq., M.

Porrino, Esq., Stuart THE COURT OPINION OF Slocum, the Attor- Esq., Office of Peter M. FUENTES, Judge: Circuit Jersey, of New the State ney General Trenton, NJ, Appellants Governor for activity that has sports is an Betting Rebuck, David L. Jersey, New the State of popularity over unarguably increased Jersey Division of New Director Seeking to ad- several decades. the last Enforcement, Frank Zan- Gaming illegal sports wagering dress instances of Director of the New Jer- zuccki, Executive improve its econ- its borders and to within sey Racing Commission. Jersey sought has omy, the State of New [Argued], Griffinger, Esq., R. Michael professional to license on certain Hradil, Valen, A. Esq., Jennifer R. Thomas conglom- A sporting and amateur events. P.C., Newark, NJ, for Inter- Esq., Gibbons at the sports leagues, displeased erate of Sweeney and Sheila Oli- Stephen venors gambling on prospect of State-licensed ver. contests, sued to halt their athletic [Argued], Eliot Riccio, Esq., Ronald J. contend, alongside the They these efforts. Deutsch, Mulva- Berman, McElory, Esq., intervening plaintiff, United States Morristown, NJ, LLP, & ney Carpenter law violates a fed- Jersey’s proposed New Jersey Thoroughbred New for Intervenor most states from prohibits eral law that Association, Inc. Horsemen’s licensing sports gambling, the Professional Clement, [Argued], Cand- Esq., Paul D. Act of Sports and Amateur Protection Levi, Esq., Erin Chiu, R. Esq., ice William seq. et (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. PLLC, Wash- Murphy, Esq., E. Bancroft wagering In defense of its own O’Shaughnessy, DC, ington, J. William law, Jersey leagues that the New counters Hernandez, Esq., McCarter Esq., Richard standing bring lack this case because NJ, Newark, Jeffrey A. LLP, English & injury no from the le- they suffer State’s Slate, Mishkin, Skadden, Arps, Esq., wagering on the outcomes of galization York, NY, LLP, New Meagher & Flom addition, alongside cer- games. Athletic As- Appellees Collegiate National defendants, Association, Jersey *7 sociation, intervening tain Basketball National Congress’ National Hock- League, argues beyond National Football that PASPA is the Commissioner ey League, of and Office and powers Clause enact Commerce League Baseball. Major of Baseball principles important d/b/a that it violates two system our of dual state and that underlie Fishman, Esq., [Arguеd], Office Paul J. sovereignty: one known as the Newark, Attorney, of the United States “anti-commandeering” doctrine, on the McIntosh, NJ, Esq., Peter Scott Phipps, J. Justice, impermissibly prohib- ground PASPA Esq., of Department United States DC, enacting legislation Intervenor United its the states from Washington, for States of America. known sports gambling; license the other in “equal sovereignty” principle, as the Lin, Dodrill, Esq., Elbert Christopher S. permits Nevada to license PASPA Virginia, Esq., of West Attorney General banning widespread sports gambling while Charleston, WV, Amici Curiae States for doing so. The District other states from Kansas, of and and Virginia, Georgia, West conten- disagreed with each of these Court in Virginia Support Commonwealth tions, summary judgment to the granted and Reversal. leagues, enjoined Jersey New I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK licensing betting. sports on Wagering sporting is an events activ- ity as our society almost in inscribed leagues appeal, On conclude that the we in participating watching standing Article III to enforce PAS- have themselves. New tells Jersey us that and that is constitutional. As PA sports betting in the United States —most clear, accepting Jersey’s bewill made New illegal billion dollar per $500 —is arguments require on the merits would us year industry. And involving scandals extraordinary steps, to take several includ- rigging sporting contests the interest ing: invalidating the first our for time in winning wager games are as as the old a law jurisprudence Circuit’s under themselves: Black infamous Sox scan- anti-commandeering principle, a move Series, dal of Major World even United States (“MLB”) League Baseball’s lifetime ban on made; only twice expanding principle all-time hits leader for allegedly Pete Rose suspend commonplace operations games on wagering played he come to Supremacy over state con- activity Clause mind. And the recent prosecution of Tim laws; trary to federal and making it hard- Donaghy, a National Basketball Associa- enact pursuant er laws (“NBA”) tion bet games referee who on if the Commerce such officiated, Clause laws affect problems he reminds us of differently than some others. from gambling. stem However, despite pervasiveness, its few cognizant We are questions certain states have ever gambling licensed on to this related case—whether sporting began events. Nevada alone per- sporting games’ events is harmful to the mitting widespread betting sporting integrity and whether states should be just events in 1949 and three other permitted profit license from the Delaware, Oregon, and Montana— states — activity engender strong But we views. — permitted have on types occasion limited judge are asked to the wisdom of of lotteriеs tied to the of sporting outcome law, Jersey’s PASPA or of or of events, single-game betting. but never desirability of the activities seek to forms, Sports wagering in particularly all regulate. only speak legality We wagering, State-licensed is and has been matter of these measures as a constitution See, illegal 18 Pa. e.g., elsewhere. Cons. Although al law. this “case diffi is made 5513; § Stat. Ann. Ann. tit. Del.Code [Appellants’] strong arguments” cult seq. Congress up took et Jersey’s support of New a policy law as eventually enacted PASPA 1992 in re- matter, Raich, see Gonzales sponse to increased efforts states to (2005), 9, 125 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 our begin licensing practice. is,” duty is to *8 “say Marbury what law A. The Professional Amateur and Madison, 137, 177, 1 Cranch Sports Protection of 1992 Act (1803).

2 L.Ed. “If two conflict laws other, each courts with must decide on key applies provision PASPA’s for the operation Jersey’s of each.” Id. New identically “per- most part to “States” and sports wagering sons,” conflicts with PASPA may law providing neither and, Constitution, under our yield. must advertise, sponsor, operate, promote or will affirm judg We the District Court’s lottery, ... or other sweepstakes, bet- ting, ment. or gambling, wagering scheme “prohibit gambling to conducted (through sports is directly indirectly or based of, or other- any references under law geographical by, use of or authorized wise), games competitive on more one or governmental entity” “stop or and to State professional ath- in which amateur gam- spread State-sponsored sports par- or are intended participate, letes bling.” Rep. reprinted Sen. performances or more ticipate, or on one (“Senate in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. games. of such athletes such specifically Report”). Report The Senate prohibition pri- § The 28 U.S.C. 3702. legislators’ “State-spon- notes concern with activity such any vate is limited persons gam- and sored” “State-sanctioned” compact to the law or “pursuant conducted bling. Id. at 3555. 3702(2), entity,” § governmental id. Report catalogues The Senate what the subject an addition- the states are while Committee believed were some ] al restriction: not “license! problems arising gambling. from sports by compact” authorize law or such Importantly, noted its con- the Committee 3702(1), activities, §§ 3701. id. of, for confi- integrity public cern “the and excep- three PASPA contains relevant in, sports” professional dence amateur and “grandfathering” that re- tions—a clause legali- its that “[widespread and concern grip, see id. leases Nevada from PASPA’s sports gambling inevitably zation of would 3704(a)(2), § that permitted a clause promote suspicion about controversial Jersey sports wagering in Atlan- license plays and fans to think fix was in’ lead ‘the City tic within had it chosen do so one whenever their team failed to beat enactment, year of see id. PASPA’s point-spread.” Id. at 3556. The Senate 3704(a)(3), provi- § a grandfathering and Report also its concurrence with stated Delaware permitting sion states like and Jersey’s then-director of New Division of lot- Oregon “sports to continue the limited Gaming Enforcement’s statement conducted, that they previously teries” had professionals agree law “most enforcement 3704(a)(1). § PASPA provides see id. legalization on, a negligible impact private enjoin action a viola- right of “to enhances, mar- ways illegal some Attorney tion ... Gen- [of law] kets.” Id. at 3558. This is so because sports organization eral or a ... “many new gamblers inevitably will ... game alleged to competitive

whose beyond ... seek to move lotteries wa- the basis of violation.” Id. such gers higher stakes more serious Only Appeals one Court of has decided a consequences.” Id. case under PASPA —ours. Office Report explains The Senate also Commissioner v. Markell we Baseball “[s]ports gam- conclusion permit held that did not Committee’s Delaware bling problem” to license is a single-game betting “[t]he because the national because grandfathering provision relevant for De- produces moral cannot be limit- erosion permitted only laware consisting lotteries given geographically” ed the thousands multi-game teams. 579 parlays NFL professional who earn a livelihood from (3d Cir.2009). F.3d This is sports and the millions are fans of who addressing first case constitu- PASPA’s them, legalizes “[o]nce because State tionality. extremely sports gambling, it will be diffi- cult for other States resist the lure.” sparse legislative history Act’s Finally, that PASPA *9 exempts Nevada because the Committee Report Judiciary The the Com- Senate mittee purpose clear that did wish to “threaten econ- [Nevada’s] makes PASPA’s (the omy,” or of the three other states that had Director of Gaming Enforcement past to enact limited forms of chosen Jersey”), or “New “State” under 28 U.S.C. sports gambling. Id. at 3559. § asserting Sports that the Wager- ing by Law is invalidated PASPA. The Jersey Sports Gambling B. in New Jersey Majority New Senate Leader Ste- PASPA Was Enacted Since phen Sweeney Speaker and House Sheila Although in its Jersey New discretion defendants, Oliver intervened as alongside not to exemp- chose avail itself of PASPA’s Jersey Thoroughbred the New Horse- window, one-year tion within the “[o]ver Association, men’s owner of the Mon- the course the next two decades ... Racetrack, mouth Park a business where Jersey views New voters regarding sports gambling would occur under the sports wagering evolved.” Br. of Appel- (the “NJTHA”) (col- Sports Wagering Law Sweeney, lants et al. 4. In the New lectively, “Appellants”). Legislature Jersey public held hearings The State moved to dismiss for lack of which during testimony it heard that regu- standing and the District Court ordered sports gambling generate lated would expedited discovery that question. Af- much-needed revenues for the State’s casi- the completion discovery ter and oral racetracks, during leg- nos and and which arguments, the District Court concluded expressed islators a desire to “to stanch Leagues standing. have Nat’l sports-wagering black market flourish- Christie, Collegiate v. Athletic Ass’n No. Jersey’s] within [New borders.” Br. of (D.N.J. (“N.J.Br.”). Christie, WL 6698684 Dec. et al. 2012) (“NCAA I”). Legislature ultimately The decided to hold referendum which would result constitutionality With the of PASPA amendment Constitution State’s issue, squarely then the District Court permitting Legislature to “authorize invited the pur- United States intervene by wagering ... law on the results of § suant to 28 U.S.C. The District professional, college, sport or amateur ultimately upheld PASPA’s constitu- IV, event.” athletic N.J. Const. Art. tionality, granted summary judgment ¶ (F). VII, 2(D), § The measure was ap- Leagues, enjoined Sports Wa- voters, proved Legislature gering Law from going into effect. Nat’l later enacted law that now asserted Collegiate Christie, Athletic Ass’n “Sports to be in violation of PASPA —the (D.N.J.2013) (“NCAA II”). F.Supp.2d 551 Law,” Wagering permits State au- expedited appeal This followed. sports gambling thorities license in casi- operate nos and racetracks and casinos III. WHETHER JURISDICTION: “sports pools.” seq.; N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et THE LEAGUES HAVE § seq. see also N.J.A.C. et (reg- 13:69N-1.1 STANDING law). implementing ulations subject-matter The had District Court II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY § jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. jurisdiction we appellate have over its NBA, MLB, Collegiate the National judgment juris- final under 1291. Our (“NCAA”), Athletic Association the Na- diction, however, is limited the Consti- (“NFL”), League tional Football and the tution’s “cases” and “controversies” re- (collec- (“NHL”) Hockey National League CONST., Ill, § art. quirement. U.S. 2. To tively, “Leagues”), Jersey sued New satisfy limitation, Christie, jurisdictional this Jersey’s Governor Chris Commissioner, Racing Jersey’s party invoking authority and New federal court *10 appellate jurisdiction that he or we had un she whether

must demonstrate 1292(a). case.1 standing bring the der 28 U.S.C. See id. We did explicitly standing, consider Article III they standing have Leagues argue The “drive-by jurisdictional ruling, and a subject are the of games their own because jurisdiction by which has been assumed They Law. also con- Wagering Sports ... parties binding does not create increase total the law will tend that Stoerr, available, precedent.” v. United States of amount (3d Cir.2012) (internal F.3d 277 n. 5 public’s perception thereby souring omitted). suspect games quotation as Leagues people marks and alterations by perhaps individuals Therefore, are affected rely we will not on Markell for monetary stake in their hidden competing analysis. our standing Appellants counter outcome. Standing Generally B. Law concrete, non-spec- cannot

Leagues show any potential injury from increase ulative test, three-part the familiar Under in legal gambling. standing, must plaintiff establish show (1) fact,” i.e., “injury an an actual or granted The District Court sum imminently injury threatened is “con Leagues, reasoning mary judgment to plaintiff; particularized” crete and to the supports holding that Markell that the (2) causation, i.e., standing, reputa traceability injury have and that Leagues injury legally cognizable defendant; (3) is harm tional to the actions of the standing. It may confer also found redressability the injury by a favorable facts the record sufficient to conclude by the decision Court. Summers Earth Sports Wagering Law will result that the Inst., 488, 493, Island negative perceptions in an increase in fans’ (2009). 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d Leagues. review de novo the We redressability Causation legal Leagues conclusion have may party be met when “a chal standing, and we review clear error lenge^] government permits action that underlying findings factual the District third-party authorizes conduct would TDI Court’s determination. Marion v. illegal be otherwise in the absence of the (3d Cir.2010). Inc., 137, 146 591 F.3d Government’s action.” Nat’l Wrestling Educ., A. The Effect Markell Dep’t Coaches Ass’n v. F.3d (D.C.Cir.2004). Here, 940-41 Markell, case, this like was a law Leagues enjoin do not purport third stop a Leagues suit state from parties games. from to fix attempting licensing betting on out single-game Leagues have sued to block the sporting come of events. Markell we Sports Law, Wagering assert analysis], always, “beg[a]n by con [our taint upon games, will result in a jurisdiction sidering we ha[d] whether is a law that definition constitutes state appeal,” hear and later concluded [the] action to license conduct that would not jurisdiction. that we did have 579 F.3d at But, contrary to otherwise occur. Leagues’ reasoning Under analysis Coaches, suggestion, Wrestling our was limited to National causation ques- injunction appeal- 1. The United States notes there we that the conclude opinion as to the District tions whether Court’s in- able final order because the merits junction an appealable final order what because describes State must do—refrain II, specify steps licensing sports gambling. does not what the State must See NCAA comply injunction, F.Supp.2d undertake to with the but at 579.

219 satisfied, however, read, redressability Fairly Sports are thus the Wager directly at Law does not arguments implicitly all aimed those the Leagues, regulates but instead the activi suspect. are prongs two may ties that occur at the State’s casinos focus on in Accordingly, we the and racetracks. thus hesitate We to con the jury-in-fact requirement, “contours of may rely clude that the Leagues solely on [which], defined, while precisely not are the existence of the Sports Wagering Law Wilson, generous.” v. very Bowman 672 injury. to show But is not say that Cir.1982). 1145, (3d Indeed, 1151 F.2d all glib we are to one of respect the main an requires that Article III is identifiable purposes of the law: to use the Leagues’ v. Students injury, trifle United States games profit. for NFL v. Governor Cf. Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce Del., 1372, (D.Del.1972) 435 F.Supp. 1378 dures, 14, 412 n. U.S. 690 J.) (Stapleton, (explaining Delaware’s (1973), 2405, 37 which may L.Ed.2d 254 sports lottery to use sought the NFL’s if plaintiff personal the a exist “has “schedules, public popularity” scores and in litigation.” stake the outcome [the] profits to “mak[e] [Delaware] [c]ould Fisher, Pitt News v. 215 F.3d The NFL”). make but for the existence of the (3d Cir.2000); Lujan see v. also Defenders thus, The Sports Wagering Law is in a Wildlife, n. 112 U.S. S.Ct. sense, as much at Leagues’ directed the (1992) 2130, 119 (noting L.Ed.2d 351 as it the events is aimed at casinos. This satisfy requirement the injury-in-fact generalized not a grievance like those “injury plaintiff the must in affect the a asserted groups environmental over way”). personal and individual To meet regulation of in wildlife cases where the burden, Leagues present this must standing, Court has found no way “in the evidence same [for] in Lujan such as or Summers. The law [they] matter on other bear[] here aims to private license individuals to proof.” Lujan, burden U.S. Leagues’ cultivate the fruits of the labor. Leagues’ counter that the in- seeing games subject terest Sports Wagering Whether C. Law wagering non-cognizable is a “claim for Leagues Injury An Causes the In psychic the loss of satisfaction.” N.J. Br. Fact (citing Steel Co. Citizens a for noted, Leagues As offer two inde- Env’t, 83, 107, Better pendent standing: bases for (1998)). 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 But the Sports Wagering Leagues’ Law makes the holding Company in Steel was that a claim object games gam- of state-licensed psychic did not present satisfaction they reputational and that will bling suffer case, injury. private redressable if such activity expands. harm We ad- plaintiff sought a into the payment each turn. dress Treasury by private company that had law, violated federal and asserted that Leagues essentially are injury was a such redressable because the object Sports Wagering Law plaintiff “psychic would feel satisfaction” Injury fact be established seeing payment made. See Steel plaintiff object is the when himself of Co., 118 S.Ct. 1003. The Thus, Leagues the action issue. here, Id. inapposite case is thus where re- Sports correct that if Wagering are dressability because is established them, injury-in-fact Law directed at Leagues very gov- assert harm from the requirement enjoin is satisfied. ernment action seek —the Ass’n, giate 475 F.3d 542-43 Sports Wagering Law. Athletic

enforcement of (3d Cir.2007) Moreover, Leagues (concluding attorney do not assert harm, public reputational standing challenge repri- but merely psychic, mand very injury. redressable because the sanction very “affeet[s] [his] real *12 reputation”); Doe v. Nat’l Med. Bd. of argue that Appellants also because the (3d Cir.1999) Exam’rs, F.3d proprietary have a interest Leagues do not (holding standing that a student had games they may their in the of outcomes that challenge requiring a rule be iden- he others profiting from prevent not seek to tified disabled because such could as label This contention relies on the from them. by sour of him who perception “people Delaware, NFL v. Governor holding in of livelihood”). can affect his future and his lottery the out- that a based on Delaware injury games Leagues’ did constitute The claim of identical come of NFL to that property. plaintiffs NFL’s of the Keene and Doe: misappropriation they at 1378-79. But here the are harmed their unwanted associ- F.Supp. (and activity they ation Leagues complain large por- an invasion of with an ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‍do interest, any public) disapprove but refer to tions of the proprietary gam- of— bling. dispute do not appropriation legal fact of their labor this Sports Wagering premise, show Law is but attack the strength of the Leagues proffered at them. evidence that the have directed Sports Wagering to tie Law to Injury In Reputational 2. Harm as reputational harm assert. ar- These Fact guments overstate what the Leagues must show to reputational demonstrate harm in The also meet their bur- Leagues and, case, this ignore context injury den a law establishing from strength the proffered evidence. by proving aimed that the games at their activity by that law threatens to sanctioned (b) Sup- In The Evidence the Record amongst cause harm reputational them ports the District Court’s Conclusion their public. fans and the Reputational Harm Will Occur

(a) Reputation Legally Harm Is a sure, at summary To be Cognizable Injury judgment stage, allegations mere of harm are specific insufficient and facts are re law, reputational a matter of

As quired. Lujan, See 504 U.S. at injury harm in fact. cognizable is a plaintiffs And a Keene, claim of fear so held Court Meese v. reputational harm must always be where that a who it concluded senator Doe, “based in reality.” at 153. F.3d produced by films a for wished to screen But the “nature and extent of eign standing facts company challenge had must depends be averred” on the nature of law of such requiring identification injury. Lujan, “political films asserted foreign propaganda” be cause could harm 112 S.Ct. 2130. No would reputation the label his one doubt, hurt that an public example, his chances at for individual 465, 473-74, reelection. forced to wear a scarlet “A” on her cloth (1987). Essentially,' ing challenge L.Ed.2d 415 has standing that action challenged Indeed, his based reputational senator unwanted asso harm. ciation import holding with an undesirable label. Our was the of our in Doe where, recognized cases reputation discounting also after all of the evidence have al injury presented prove harm is an sufficient to confer that others’ perception See, him, standing. plaintiff e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Colle- as disabled could harm concluded that reputational we his fear of ing being associated with gambling is harm based on an stigmatiz- unwanted and stigmatizing, regardless of whether gambling label was legal nevertheless based “in reali- or illegal. Before the Keene, District ty.” 199 F.3d at showing con- were studies that: (1) trast, some fans from reputational League where the harm each viewed problem as a being area associated with “foreign political Leagues, and some expressed fans propaganda” intuitive, was not as the Su- belief that game fixing most preme threatened Court held that an undisputed ex- Leagues’ (2) integrity [App. 1605-06]; pert opinion that such may stigma- labels some fans did not professional want a tize individuals was sufficient to make the sports franchise to open Vegas, Las required injury-in-fact showing. *13 some fans would be likely less to spend suggests 1862. This money on Leagues occurred; the if that spectrum wherein sufficiency the of the (3) and a large number of fans oppose the showing that must be made to establish expansion legalized sports betting. reputational harm depends on the circum- This [2293-98.] more than suffices to Here, stances of each reputa- case. the Leagues’ meet the evidentiary burden un- tional harm that from increasingly results der Keene and being associated with Doe— associating the Leagues’ games gam- with gambling is undesirable and harmful bling fairly intuitive. reputation. one’s one, For the conclusion that there is a Although the Leagues could end their link legalizing between sports gambling injury in proffer there, fact they also set and harm integrity to the Leagues’ of the forth evidence establishing a clear link be- games by has been reached several Con- Sports tween the Wagering Law and in- gresses that have passed laws addressing creased incentives game-rigging. see, gambling and sports, e.g., H.R.Rep. First, the expert State’s own noted that (1963), No. 88-1053 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. state-licensing of sports gambling will re- (noting that when in- gambling sult an increase in the total amount of involved, terests are “temptation the to fix (legal plus illegal) gambling sports. games very has become great,” [App. Second, report by 325]. the Na- turn honesty harms the games); Gambling tional Impact Study Commis- Report Senate (noting at 3555 that PASPA sion, prepared at the behest of Congress in necessary was to “maintain integrity the 1999, explains that athletes are “often is, our national pastime”). indeed, It the tempted to bet on they contests which specific conclusion reached the Con- participate, undermining integrity the gress PASPA, that enacted reflected sporting Third, contests.” App. 743. the statutory cause of action conferred to there has been at least one instance of Leagues to enforce the law when their match-fixing for games NCAA as a result games individual are target of state- wagers placed through legitimate chan- licensed wagering. See 28 U.S.C. nels, and several as a wagers result of And, presumably, it has also been placed in illegal markets for most of the part least of the conclusions of the Leagues, and players' NCAA háve affected various state legislatures that have blocked or have been asked to affect the outcome the practice throughout history. our games “because of debt.” But even if polls like in Keene were Thus, App. 2245. legal gambling more always required reputational harm leads to more total gambling, which in turn cases, Leagues have met that burden. leads to an increased incentive to fix or replete The record is attempt evidence show- fix Leagues’ matches. evidence, unpersuasive We also find permits fac- together, This contention that the increase in incentives being associated with tual conclusion rig Leagues’ games the outcome of the that, and stigmatizing label gambling is standing cannot rise to because give Sports Wagering extent par third depend on unknown actions of gam- total amount of Law will increase enjoin Leagues ties. The do not seek to Jersey’s expert expects, it bling as New games; they seek rigging individuals “negative percep- fans’ will increase some enjoin Jersey’s law. That a third game Leagues] attributed to [of tions party’s necessary action to com I, 2012 WL NCAA fixing gambling.” harm plete complained-of does ne no clear error *6. We discern injury in fact from gate the existence of an Court’s factual conclusions in the District Sports Wagering negate Law causa surveys from these re- as derived “It redressability. impossible tion ports.2 that there is standing maintain no regarding to sue action a defendant Counterarguments Appellants’ plaintiff only through which harms persons. third If principle reaction of Leagues posit true, difficult were it is to see how libel injury stig based on *14 cannot establish inducing actions or for breach of suits may wagering, ma attach to because that brought could in contract negatively think of fans not the would Thus, traceability court....” “the Id. re the that that it is is Leagues given State quirement [may met even where the be] activity against Leagues’ the the licensing question in might conduct not have been a Judge But as then-Circuit Scalia wishes. proximate cause of the harm.” Edmonson argument “public that the explained, an Co., v. Nat’l Lincoln Ins. 725 F.3d Life alleged ... reaction the' harm an [to] 406, 12-1581, 418, 4007553, No. 2013 WL ques ... to the irrational one is irrelevant (3d 2013) Aug. *7 The (citing Cir. Pitt core, injury-in-fact, constitutional tion of News, 360-61).3 at 215 F.3d no more than caus requires defacto Meese, ality.” F.2d also granting Block assert that (D.C.Cir.1986). judgment the summary Leagues was fundamentally, injury it is clear to us at here 2. More tational issue is insufficient independent match-fixing tend it 'from gambling "result[s] and scandals because the party Leagues' reputations. action of some third before Media not the tarnish the re- ” Simon, one, (quoting court.’ N.J. Br. ports effect take but to that abound. To 41-42, 1917). argument This Donaghy gambling after NBA and the Tim There, scandal, greatly overstates effect of Simon. game-fixing commentators noted indigent group brought individuals suit just integrity games the [NBA’s] that "the IRS, against asserting that the IRS's tax Adande, investiga- major took hit.” J.A. Ref designation hospitals of certain harmed them NBA, perception tion adds bad by making likely hospitals less ESPN.com, July http://sports.espn. provide would free them services. Su- go.com/nba/columns/story?id=2943704. It is preme plaintiffs Court concluded that Leagues simply hold untenable to standing specu- “purely it was lacked because reputational have identified a trifle of not lative whether the denials of services fair- legal harm an increase in even of li- from ly can be traced [the actions] IRS' sports gambling. censed instead result decisions made from Appellants rely exclusively hospitals regard implica- almost on Simon without to the tax Simon, Organiza- Kentucky Rights v. Eastern tions.” 96 S.Ct. Welfare tion, dealing 48 L.Ed.2d 1917. But here we are with a law (1976), repu- proposition that the licenses conduct that casinos could not Leagues’ effect of the studies with the notion that because the esteem improper fans, eyes in the opinion polls disputed by Appel- suffers which requires and was they Leagues to take particular, own efforts lants’ evidence. rehabilitate (1) That image. alone establishes Leagues injury to evidence that have point fact; may that the per- Leagues have economically prospering despite been been at rehabilitating successful their images and unregulated gambling sports vasive deprive See, Nevada; standing. does not them of sports gambling in state-licensed Keene, e.g., (2) S.Ct. 1862 no some individuals would have (“[T]he need to take ... affirmative steps product Leagues’ interest unless to avoid the risk of harm to reputa- [one’s] had a interest out- monetary tion a cognizable injury.”). constitutes games. these arguments, come But an appeal which sound more like to com- resort, Appellants As a last ques which, doubt, no will many monsense Leagues’ tion the commitment to their own matter, do agree policy legally not argument sports wager state-licensed are deprive Leagues standing and them, ing harms noting Leagues genuine ma- insufficient raise a issue of jurisdictions, hold events such as Cana fact. terial England, da where on licensed, they promote and that A does plaintiff not lose stand profit products that are akin to gam ac challenge injurious an otherwise sports, bling pay-to-play such as fanta simply tion because he also derive sy leagues. standing But is not defeated analy benefit Our standing some from it. plaintiffs alleged unclean hands and accounting sis is exercise and require balancing equities. does not require does decision the merits. Leagues may That the that holding believe See, AG, e.g., Denney v. Deutsche Bank *15 events in Canada England inju and is not 253, (2d Cir.2006) (noting 443 F.3d 265 negate rious to them does not that harm injury “the fact out may that that an may from an expansion arise benefits, by other suf weighed while often country. wagering the entire The same to defeat for damages, ficient a claim does promotion can of the Leagues’ be said negate see 13A standing”); also fantasy sports, accept even if that we these Wright Charles A. Miller, &Arthur Fed. are akin to gamb activities head-to-head (3d 3531.4, Juris. 3d 147 Prac. & Proc. And, ling.4 recognize, as even Appellants ed.2008). Leagues Nor must the construct subjective it the Leagues’ is not beliefs analyzing counterfactuals whether 564, 504 Lujan, that control. See U.S. at if would have done PASPA had better 112 2130. S.Ct. complete instituted ban state-licensed sports gambling or, conversely, worse if [*] [*] [*] had not Leagues standing PASPA existed. And that fans That the have may buy prohibition still is not tickets inconsistent enforce on state-licensеd Viacom, Inc., 06-2768(DMC), phrey aus- otherwise undertake under the State’s v. No. party’s 1797648, (D.N.J. pices, 20, and are thus the third actions 2007 WL June *9 truly independent of the State's conduct. 2007) (holding leagues fantasy that that re- Ass’n, Wrestling See Nat'l Coaches 366 F.3d quire entry subject an fee are not to anti- 941. laws); betting wagering Vegas and Las Ha- cienda, Gibson, 25, Inc. 77 Nev. 359 P.2d note, however, legal be- We difference 85, (1961) (holding that a 86-87 "hole-in- paying fantasy participate tween fees to entry required an fee one” contest was a wagering leagues single-game and as contem- contest, prize wager). not a plated by Sports Wagering Law. See Hum-

224 Nations, foreign late with athletic seems Commerce on their contests States, among the and with the conclusion, several particu- straightforward us a L, 8,§ Art. Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const., effect proven stigmatizing given the larly well-known, As NLRB v. cl. 3. is since contests associated having sporting Laughlin Corporation, & Steel 301 Jones by is confirmed com- link gambling, 1, 615, (1937), U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed. 893 Congress’ own conclusions.5 monsense and the Commerce Clause has been construed give lati- Congress “considerable] MERITS THE IV. conduct and transac- regulating tude now the merits. We turn Morrison, 529 tions.” United States v. amici’s at centerpiece 598, 608, 120 S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d U.S. it impermissibly is tack (2000). one, may Congress regu- For states. But at least one commandeers the “substantially activity affects late that PASPA is party spectre raises the if out “arise[s] interstate commerce” authority under the beyond Congress’ also connected with commercial trans- [is] Constitution. Clause U.S. Commerce Lopez, 514 action.” United States v. Congress first thus examine whether We L.Ed.2d 626 PAS- even activities (1995). contrast, By of non- regulations concluding after governs. Only PA Id. activity economic are disfavored. may do so can we consider (striking 115 S.Ct. 1624 down law whether, pow exercising its affirmative regulating weapons possession of near ers, imposed limitation Congress exceed a schools); Morrison, see also Constitution, the anti- in the such (invalidating a law reg- sovereignty equal commandeering violence). ulating gender-motivated Condon, See, e.g., Reno v. principles. 141, 148-49, 120 Gambling Leagues’ and the Con- (2000) first, (asking, whether L.Ed.2d tests, Separately or Considered To- powers a law was within Clause Commerce gether, Substantially Affect Inter- second, and, violated whether law state Commerce Amendment).6 Tenth principles, Guided these the activity self-evident that PASPA tar Con- A. Whether PASPA Within *16 gets, wagering sports, on state-licensed gress’ Clause Power Commerce may be regulated consistent with Com 1. Law Modern Commerce Clause merce Clause. First, Congress’ wagering sports enumerated both national

Among and ability “regu- wager in are economic activities. A is powers simply Article I is that, regard- although the 6. We de novo a 5. We also United review determination note always give States’ does us ing constitutionality, intervention PASPA's Gov't V.I. v. jurisdiction, Steven, Cir.1998), intervention (3d a court treat as 134 F.3d 527 jurisdiction, separate a suit over it has begin presumption with the “time-honored standing, particularly if the intervenor Congress] a [an act of is constitutional proceedings when the enters intervenor Reno, legislative power.” exercise of 528 Advocates, See, early e.g., Disability stage. (internal quotation 120 S.Ct. 666 Living, v. Inc. New Coal. For Assisted York omitted) (quoting v. marks Close Glenwood Inc., (2d Cir.2012); 675 Fuller F.3d 161 446, 475, Cemetery, Volk, (3d Cir.1965). v. F.2d (1883)). L.Ed. Thus, indepen- the United States' intervention dently supports jurisdiction. our contingent involving contract or minations that “gambling “two involves the use having ... mutual parties, rights more upon has an effect interstate com- money or wa- respect thing to the other Riehl, merce.” States United 460 F.2d Gibson, 86; gered.” P.2d at also see (3d Cir.1972). 454, 458 gam- §§ 5:12-21 (defining N.J. Stat. Ann. bottom, At it is clear that PASPA is bling game money, as “for engaging activity aimed at an “quintessential- that is checks, property, representative ly economic” and that has substantial ef- value”). also There can be no doubt Raich, fects on interstate See commerce. operations Leagues are econom- Prohib- activities, they preside essentially ic iting licensing the state activity of this See, for-profit e.g., over entertainment. thus a “rational ... regulating means of (NFL App. self-describing its “com- commerce” this area within Con- plex business model includes a diverse gress’ power under the Commerce Clause. streams, range of revenue which contrib- 26,125 Id. at S.Ct. 2195.7 ute ... to company profitability”). Second, dispute there can no serious Does Not Unconstitution- that the professional and amateur sporting ally Regulate Purely Local Activi- events at Leagues’ the heart opera- ties “substantially tions affect” com- interstate Leagues merce. The are associations nevertheless assert comprised of thousands of clubs and mem- PASPA unconstitutional because it bers, [App. 105], turn govern which in unlimited betting activity “reaches ... operations sports of thousands of teams possibly cannot affect com interstate organized States, across the United com- [such merce ... as] casual bet peting for fans and revenue across game family Giants-Jets football between country. “Thousands Americans earn Br. of Parsing members.” NJTHA at 34. professional sports. livelihood in Tens statute, words insist PASPA participate thousands of others in col- reaches it prohib these activities because

lege sports.” In- Report Senate at 3557. its betting “competitive games” involv deed, Leagues some of the sporting hold professional “amateur athletes.” 28 abroad, affecting events commerce with argument U.S.C. 3702. This is merit- Foreign Nations. less. Third, immediately that plac- follows one, For PASPA on does its face ing wagers on sporting events also sub- Appel- reach the intrastate activities stantially affects interstate As commerce. - prohibits lants contend does. PASPA indicates, Jersey gamble Americans only gambling “schemes” and those up year. billion each $500 “pursuant carried compact.” out law or 330-31], [App. And whatever gam- effects *17 § 28 3702. The U.S.C. activities described bling sports may on games have on the in Appellants’ examples are carried out themselves, nor plainly those effects will tran- law, pursuant state pursuant or to “a state scend boundaries and affect a funda- systemic mentally industry. Accordingly, plan; orderly a ar- national connected or Congressional rangement we have deferred to ... plot, deter- artful [or] [a]n ball, 7. But see purely Federal Baseball Club Balt. v. of base are exhibitions of Clubs, affairs,” League Nat'l Baseball concluding U.S. 259 that baseball is of Prof'l 200, 208-09, 465, purposes 42 S.Ct. 66 898 L.Ed. in interstate commerce of (1922) Act). (describing “giving MLB’s business as the Sherman Antitrust (9th Dictionary Congress’ under the Com- beyond power Black’s Law plan.” “scheme”). Ed.2009) (defining Indep. merce Clause. Nat’l Fed’n See of — Sebelius, U.S.-, v. Bus. S.Ct. Moreover, entertaining that even (2012). 2566, But 183 L.Ed.2d 450 activities, these reaches somehow PASPA that the problem Sebelius was method permis is action over them Congressional regulate (forcing chosen to into economic a “rational basis” for Congress if sible activity previously individuals activity aggre in the concluding that the insurance) beyond health market for was interstate gate has substantial effect Here, method Congress’ power. of 22, Raich, commerce. activity altogether regulation, banning an an unbroken line 2195. rule of (in State-spon- the expansion this case 111, Filbum, 317 v. U.S. from Wickard sports betting), is neither novel nor sored (1942), 82, to Raich— 87 L.Ed. See, Raich, problematic. e.g., grow respectively upholding limitations 27, 2195. 125 S.Ct. marijuana personal wheat home leg it comes to consumption that when —is Impermissibly B. Whether PASPA activity, Congress economic can islating Commandeers the States activity purely that is intra regulate “even Having Congress may that concluded activity, ... where the state in character regulate sports wagering consistent with by other simi conduct combined like Clause, the Commerce we turn to PAS- situated, among the larly affects commerce operation PA’s before us. the case nations.” Nat’l foreign States or with 833, Usery, 426 U.S. League Cities v. noted, As makes it “unlawful for PASPA (1976), L.Ed.2d 245 96 S.Ct. governmental ... authorize entity by Garcia grounds overruled on other compact” sports. law or gambling on Auth., Transit San Antonio Metro. preemption classic U.S.C. This is L.Ed.2d 1016 105 S.Ct. language operates, via the Constitu (1985) (alterations omitted). And there Supremacy Clause, tion’s see U.S. Const., had a can no doubt ra be VI, art. cl. state laws invalidate that the tional basis conclude intrastate See, contrary are statute. the federal substantially affect activities at issue inter e.g., City Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Los commerce, gam reach of — given -, Angeles, bling, wagering into the sports, (2013) 186 L.Ed.2d 177 ex states, far corners of the economies that the plaining provision of the Federal documented above.8 Aviation Administration Authorization Act “ (“FAAAA”) of 1994 Appellants finally support ‘State seek may not enact enforce a law ... holding Court’s “individ- price, route, Act ual mandate” of Affordable Care is related to or service of Moreover, reaching Appellants’ reading if activities that PASPA to reach PASPA casual purely were are intrastate in nature constitu principle. between bets friends steamrolls tionally problematic, would construe we its worst, very At the we would leave for another all, language reaching acts. After as not such day question of whether con- statutory principle cardinal con "[t]he stitutionally wager. applied a local to such destroy.... struction [A]s save and not today that "no have not shown set interpretations possible between two stat of circumstances under which exists ute, by be unconstitu one of which it would [challenged] Act valid.” CMR would be D.N. valid, plain duty tional and our other *18 Phila., 612, (3d Corp. City v. 703 F.3d 623 adopt the act.” which will save Jones Cir.2013) (alteration original). Steel, 30, & Laughlin S.Ct. U.S. at 57 615. respect by directly carrier ... with to the cesses of the motor States compelling transportation preempts of property’ to enact them and enforce a federal regu- route, price, laws related to a State latory beyond program” is the inherent any with respect service motor carrier power limitations on federal within our transportation property” (quoting to the system. dual Hodel v. Va. Min- Surface 14501(c)(1)). Sports The 49 U.S.C. Wa- Ass’n, ing 264, & Reclamation 452 U.S. gering precisely says Law is what PASPA 283, 288, 2352, 101 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d 1 purported the states not do—a au- (1981). differently, Congress Stated by sports wagering. thorization law of It power directly “lacks the compel by therefore invalidated PASPA.9 to require prohibit” States acts which any Appellants do not contest of the Congress may require itself or prohibit. foregoing, but argue instead PASPA’s States, New York v. United operation Sports Wagering over thе Law 166, 180, 112 S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d 120 “anti-commandeering” princi- violates the (1992). Supreme The Court has struck which bars ple, conscript- down laws based these principles on the states into work of doing the feder- occasions, two distinguishable both argument, al The this import officials. from PASPA. then, is that anti-comman- impermissible deering may occur all a federal even when (a) regulation ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‍Permissible in a supersede does is law via law pre-emptible field: Hodel Supremacy Supreme Clause. But and FERC anti-commandeering jurisprudence Court’s modern, The first relevant incarnation of position, never this entertained let anti-commandeering principle ap- accepted it. alone peared Hodel v. Virginia Min- Surface Anti-Commandeering The Princi- ing & The Reclamation Ass’n. law issue

ple imposed there federal standards for coal mining on required certain surfaces and learns, every “As schoolchild our Consti- any state that perma- wished “assume dual system tution establishes a sover- authority regulatory nent over ... surface eignty between the States the Federal Ashcroft, mining operations” Gregory pro- Government.” 501 coal “submit a 452, 457, U.S. 115 L.Ed.2d posed permanent to the program” Federal (1991). And is well-known that all Government, which, among things, other powers explicitly conferred to the fed- required the legislature “state [to] enact[ ] government eral are reserved to the laws environmental implementing pro- states, a maxim in the text of reflected by tection standards established the [a]ct.” X; Tenth Amendment. amdt. Const., U.S. Hodel, S.Ct. 2352. If Darby, also see United States v. particular imple- state did not wish to 85 L.Ed. standards, ment the federal the federal (1941) (describing this a “truism” em- in to government step would do so. Id. at Amendment). bodied the Tenth noting upheld provisions, nei-

Among important corollaries compelled adopt flow ther the states to from the is that foregoing standards, legislative pro- required law “commandeers the them nor “to straightforward provision, operation 9. This eral Su- is not to be confused with field Clause, premacy operates wagering, preemption topic we part laws are foreclosed stand-alone fed- discuss at below. IV.B.2.d *19 funds,” the states to enact new measures. required them nor coerced any state expend Baker, First, in v. regula- South Carolina in the federal “participat[ing] into upheld validity of laws Supreme Court any in manner whatsoever.” tory program by pro- “directly regulated the States 288, 2352. The Court 101 S.Ct. Id. at outright the issuance of bearer Congress hibiting could further concluded 511, 1355, 505, 108 S.Ct. preempt bonds.” 485 U.S. completely chosen to have (1988). rules, These 99 L.Ed.2d 592 assuming oversight of the by simply field issuers, debt re- applied private that the also Id. It thus held itself. regulations a substantial quired to a the states to “amend posed no obstacle Amendment Tenth [comply].” number of statutes order Congress “chose to allow system by which 1355. The Court Id. at 108 S.Ct. role.” Id. regulatory the States this result did not run afoul the later charac- concluded As the Court 101 S.Ct. 2352. not Hodel, Amendment because it did “seek scheme there did not Tenth terized in which control or influence the manner anti-commandeering principle violate parties” but was “merely compliance regulate private made with States it because consequence regu- “an precondition simply to contin- inevitable standards activity,” subsequent In lating in an otherwise a state id. regulation ued state States, cases, explained regula- that the the Court preempted field.” Printz United 898, 926, permissible tion in Baker was because 521 U.S. (1997). “subjected a State to the same simply L.Ed.2d 914 private parties.” legislation applicable year, Mississip- in F.E.R.C. v. The next York, S.Ct. 2408. requiring upheld provision pi, the Court Condon, Then, utility regulatory commissions to Reno v. state unanimously rejected an anti-commandeer- whether to enact certain stan- “consider” energy efficiency leaving to ing challenge prohibiting dards for but to a law the ultimate choice of whether disseminating personal the states information standards or not. 456 U.S. adopt departments those of motor obtained state 742, 746, 769-70, 102 S.Ct. complained vehicles. South Carolina (1982). upheld The Court L.Ed.2d 532 required employees its to learn its the act outright commandeering of despite law its comply provisions expend resources the state resources needed to consider and and, indeed, effectively the federal law standards, because the study the federal govern- operation blocked the of state laws definitely require the enact- law did not that information. 528 ing the disclosure of of federal stan- implementation ment or U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 666. The Court 764, 102 dards. Id. at S.Ct. 2126. agreed require “that the will time and [act] Court, simply noting had part employees” effort on the but “pre-empted it could have regulated where rejected anti-commandeer- otherwise entirely” but instead chose to the States because, ing challenge like the law Bak- the states to leave some room for maneu- er, require the law not the States “d[id] ver, “only beyond step the case as one saw sovereign capacity their Hodel.” Id. citizens!,] require own d[id] Legislature^] to enact laws or [State]

(b) Prohibitions on Permissible State require regulations, and d[id] Action: Baker Reno in the officials to assist enforcement private individ- pair regulating of anti-commandeer- federal stаtutes a different cases, 666. More- upheld affirmative uals.” Id. at the Court over, effectively the law did not “seek to prohibitions control[ ] on state action regu- in which contrary and even influence the manner States invalidated state laws *20 229 Baker, 167, 175, (citing Id. ment coercion.” at private parties.” from Id. 112 late 1355). 514-15, 108 at S.Ct. S.Ct. The Court also emphasized 485 U.S. 2408. anti-commandeering principle the was (c) Impermissible Anti- designed, part, stop Congress to from Commandeering: New line of blurring accountability the between Printz York and federal and state officials and from skirt- foregoing, responsibility by for its choices foisting In contrast to the the Court 168, them portions struck of a on the states. Id. at 120 has twice down federal S.Ct. The anti-commandeering grounds. law on 666. States, was in New v. United first York applied The then principles, Court these dealt a law meant to with Printz, provisions to invalidate the orderly disposal encourage of low- Brady Act that local required authori- by radioactive level waste states. background ties of certain states run at 112 S.Ct. 2408. The “most persons seeking purchase checks on to' aspect complex system severe” guns. The Court held that “may law, by the established referred measures requiring neither issue directives provision, provided “take-title” particular problems, States to address nor particular a had that if not been able command the States’ officers to admin- arrange disposal for the of the radioac regulatory ister or pro- enforce federal date, by specified waste tive then that gram.” 521 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2365. would have to title to take the waste The Court was also troubled that these request generator. at the of the waste’s provisions required “absorb the 153-54, 112 (citing Id. at S.Ct. 2408 of implementing financial burden a federal 2021e(d)(2)(C)). Court, U.S.C. regulatory program” “tak[e] blame that “Congress may based the notion for its ... defects.” Id. at 117 S.Ct. simply the legislative ‘commandeer 2365. by processes directly compel the States date, To issue in schemes at New them ling to enact and enforce a federal ” York and Printz remain the two that regulatory program,’ id. 112 S.Ct. Court down Supreme has struck under Hodel, (quoting anti-commandeering doctrine. Our 2352) (alterations omitted), S.Ct. struck yet Court has had occasion consider down the take-title did provision because it anti-commandeering challenge.10 an just compel that: the states either enact regulatory program, expend resources Violates Whether taking 176, 112 title to the waste. Id. at Anti-Commandeering Principle 2408. The noted that S.Ct. Con (a) Anti-Commandeering gress may encourage enact measures Supremacy Clause the states to act and law “hav[e] state regulation” Appellants’ arguments that PASPA pre-empted federal but con vio- principles take-title provision anti-commandeering cluded lates run distinguishing eneourage- problem: the line into an not a single “crossed immediate complete 10. Three other These cases constella- cases are relevance, tion Court’s modern anti- marginal so we do not elaborate commandeering jurisprudence but Marked, deal length. on them at See also 579 F.3d applicability labor cer- of federal laws to (rejecting argument at 303 that PASPA employees. League tain State Cities, See Nat’l sovereignty principles set forth in violates the 2465; Garcia, U.S. at Gregory). 1005; Gregory, is violated when sovereignty a state’s involved have reviewed that we case following policy dif- PASPA, oper- precluded that, simply like law federal law that set forth It ferent than contrary state laws. ated to invalidate (as Sports Jersey to do with its seeks applying the case been has thus never *21 Law), revolutionary. Wagering would a state to invalidate Clause Supremacy (James 44, at 323 The Federalist No. is See proscriptions to federal contrary law ed.1996) Madison) (B. (explaining Fletcher regulation over the to direct tantamount “all the Supremacy that Clause sovereignty, without of their states, invasion to an in Con- proposed authorities contained forego- commandeering. Most of toor annulled, have been ... would attempting to stitution Congress ing cases involved have been Congress and the new would on state a federal scheme directly impose condition impotent in to the same laws reduced the federal anything, If officials. Confederation]”). Articles of [the of invalidat- with had the effect Baker Reno and by prohibit- laws contrary state ing certain why it is not hard to see And In- action, survived. and both ing state law does not invalidating contrary state and deed, in New York both Justices other sovereignty a state’s or implicate notion that the anti- Prints disclaimed states. Con wise commandeer the When sus- somehow commandeering principle via the operates a law that gress passes Supremacy operation pends contrary invalidate Supremacy Clause to laws. For ex- otherwise valid Clause laws, what telling state it is not the states explained in Prints ample, do, doing some barring it is them from requires “all structure our Constitutional to do. Anti-commandeer thing want enact, enforce, ... state officials challenges to statutes worded like ing a fashion as not law such interpret state See, consistently have thus failed. PASPA law, operation of federal to obstruct States, Kelley v. 69 F.3d e.g., United reality that all state [is] and the attendant (10th Cir.1995) constitu (upholding 1510 obstruction, even constituting such actions carrier stat tionality of intrastate motor Acts, invalid.” ipso are legislative facto ute, preempted that it state law noting 2365; see also 521 U.S. the states to doing “compel[ so did not ] York, 112 S.Ct. 2408 voluntarily by enacting act or administer permits Clause (noting that the Commerce Cali ing regulatory program”); a federal preempted state law Congress to “hav[e] Ass’n v. Dump Truck Owners fornia [law]”). by federal (E.D.Cal. Davis, F.Supp.2d 2001) Supremacy constitutionality that the (upholding the fact light of against answer to FAAAA an anti-comman provision is the Constitution’s Clause that, challenge, noting under unlike the deering had made life difficult problem that Prints, the FAAAA lack of laws New York and of Confederation —the the Articles merely preempts provision, uniform national insofar as to enforce a mechanism ”).11 law, states what not to do Appellants’ position “tell[s] policies accepting — note, express preemption pro- is an Leagues numerous mobile service” 11. As Monsanto, vision); MacDonald v. F.3d prohibit from enact- States laws are framed (5th Cir.1994) (noting law enforcing contrary stan- laws to federal dards, impose enjoy stating shall not or con- regulations all differ- “State these See, labeling any requirement e.g., effect qualities. Farina v. tinue in preemptive ent (3d Cir.2010) Nokia, pesticides preemption provi- (noting packing” is a F.3d sion). provi- operation and other The of these provides that "no State statute by Appellants’ question entry sions is called into any authority to shall have operation Su- everyday view that the charged by any commercial of or the rates sure, Supremacy To be Clause force a federal regulatory program.” Pñntz, laws that are otherwise with elevates 117 S.Ct. 2365. See, Congress’ power e.g., to enact. York, 166, 112 Neto S.Ct. 2408 the District Court correctly As not, (noting Congress may consistent reasoned, the fact that PASPA sets forth a Clause, “regulate Commerce prohibition, while the New York/Pñntz governments’ regulation of interstate com action(s) regulations required affirmative merce”). But we that Congress have held part on the states, significance. is of may prohibit state-licensed con it is Again, hard to see how can sistent with the Clause. Commerce state, “commandeer” a or how it can be beyond argument Con to regulate found regulates, how a state if *22 gress’ authority on the hinges thus notion require it does not it anything to do at all. that the pursu invalidation of a law The distinction is palpable from the Su to the ant Commerce has the same Clause preme Court’s anti-commandeering cases “commandeering” as the effect federal themselves. State requiring laws affirma laws struck York and down New Printz. may may constitutional, acts or tive not be turnWe now to this contention. F.E.R.C., compare 102 2126 (upholding S.Ct. statute because re (b) PASPA is Unlike the Laws Struck quirement expend states resources Down in New York Printz considering federal standards was not Appellants’ analogize efforts to Printz, commandeering) with PASPA to provisions struck down in 904-05, 117 (finding S.Ct. require 2365 unavailing. Neiv York and Pñntz are Un perform ment states background problematic like the title” provision “take unconstitutional). checks On the other the background requirements, check hand, prohibiting statutes the states from require does not or coerce the taking certain actions have never been to lift finger—they are not re require struck down even if they the ex laws, pass quired any to take title to penditure of some time and effort or the thing, checks, to conduct background contrary modification invalidation of funds, any any way expend to in enforce laws, Baker, see U.S. at law. They required, federal are not even 1355; Reno, F.E.R.C., like the states were in to expend 666. As carefully the District Court considering regulatory resources demonstrated, in all its anti-commandeer let regimes, adopt alone to them. Simply cases, Court has been put, we discern PASPA no “directives with conscripting concerned the states into requiring particular the States to address II, problems” affirmative and no to the action. See NCAA “eommand[s] States’ officers ... to administer or en- at *17.12 WL premacy anti-commandeering “limiting] power Clause raises parens sion states’ to sue as concerns. patriae any ... does not commandeer branch government imposes of state because no them”); duty affirmative circuits that considered of kind Fra- have anti- States, commandeering challenges, although ternal Order Police v. United ad- (D.C.Cir.1999) dressing (rejecting fundamentally laws that F.3d are different PASPA, similarly commandeering challenge from have found to a this dis- statute that See, significant. e.g., anything tinction "not force state to do Connecticut v. did officials Conn., Physicians implement” statutory Health provi- Servs. 287 F.3d affirmative to (2d Cir.2002) sion). (holding provi- that a place having governing affir- no law how importance Recognizing distinction, same Ap- wagering authorizing is the sports command mative/negative Second, ignores impose by argument law. PASPA does pellants assert that, reality, requirement the states the lack an affirmative an affirmative act, repealing prohibition activity not mean it by them an doеs prohibiting provisions.13 We anti-sports wagering affirmatively authorized law. The that the affirmative agree prohibited to do that is not right properly applied, if not requirement, authority act of the state derives not from the ex- may permit Congress “accomplish rights people. but from inherent commandeering actly doctrine Indeed, what Legislature needed to the states from “re- by stopping prohibits” Sports Wagering Law itself be- enact existing law.” Conant Wal- pealing repeal any contention that mere lies (9th Cir.2002) (Ko- ters, 629, 646 309 F.3d Jersey’s was New ban on zinski, J., But read concurring). we do not [it] sufficient to “authorize law.” The Jersey from re- prohibit PASPA to Jersey’s amendment to New Constitution sports wagering. pealing its ban affirmatively did not au- purport itself indeed sports wagering thorize but PASPA, Under shall- unlawful “[i]t gave Legislature power “author- entity to sponsor, governmental for ... a *23 by law” such activities. N.J. Const. ize advertise, license, operate, promote, or au- ” ¶ (F). Thus, IV, VII, 2(D), § Art. a by compact sports thorize law or wa- Jersey Legislature itself saw a mean- (em- 3702(1) gering 28 scheme. U.S.C. repealing ingful distinction between added). Nothing these words phasis authorizing sports wagering on and it ban keep any law in requires that states law, any undermining contention that is is issu- place. prohibited All that alone was to af- the amendment sufficient affir- gambling “license[s]” ance of firmatively sports wagering authorize gam- mative law” of “authorization] —the Wagering required. Law was Sports bling that to schemes. contend Cf Robles, 338, v. 7 821 Hernandez N.Y.3d may repeal the extent a state choose (2006) 770, 1, N.E.2d 5-6 N.Y.S.2d 855 prohibition sports gambling, affirmative a “authorizing” (rejecting as “untenable” construction of that is same as that ac- law, precludes relation silent on the mat- tivity, PASPA re- a domestic and therefore marriages, gambling just legality as it of same-sex pealing prohibitions on ter unions). affirmatively licensing argu- permitting bars it. This as such respects. ment numerous itself a difference between problematic saw and basically, general sports gambling activity Most it that PASPA ignores “authorizing by a of state speaks only auspices law” which occurs under authorization, see and chose to sports gambling approval scheme. We do not Smith, Coyle impermissible rely Coyle did not on comman- Appellants also turn Instead, Supreme deering. a law the Court down the where the Court struck down struck grant- change being power requiring Oklahoma to not the loca- statute as traceable no Constitution, capital years by Congress pertaining tion within seven of its ed in the of its state,” Union, policies] "purely into the to the internal admission U.S. (1911), principle that all to lessen and in violation оf the L.Ed. equal footing into the Union. significance of the "affirmative act” re- are admitted on 565, 579, quirement Coyle, 221 31 S.Ct. 688. we distill from the anti-comman- concerns, But, despite deering N.J. PASPA does raise of these cases. Br. Coyle neither the modern anti-commandeer- Court's citation in Mew do York, ing see U.S. at cases. private activity And, reach the extent to the extent we entertain the no- it “pursuant is conducted to State tion straightforward that PASPA’s prohi- law.” bition may on action be recast present- options, two options these are also short, Appellants’ attempt to read quite unlike the two coercive choices avail- requirement into PASPA the states able in New pass a law to deal with York— affirmatively keep must ban on sports radioactive expend waste or resources in gambling in their books rests a false taking title to it. Neither of PASPA’s two equivalence between repeal authoriza- “choices” affirmatively requires the states tion and the term law” “by reads out of the law, to enact a and both choices leave statute, ignoring the fundamental canon much room for the states to make their that, as plausible statutory between two Thus, policy. PASPA, own under on the constructions, ought prefer we the one hand, may one repeal sports its that does not raise a series constitution- ban, a wagering move that will result Martinez, problems. al See Clark v. the expenditure of no resources or effort 371, 380-81, by any hand, official. On the other a state (2005). L.Ed.2d 734 keep complete choose ban on sure, To be we seriously take the argu- sports gambling, but is left up each many ment that affirmative commands can state to decide how much of a law enforce- easily prohibitions. recast as For ex- ment priority wants to make of ample, background check rule of gambling, or what exact contours of Printz could be recast as requirement prohibition will be. that the states issuing hand- refrain permits gun background unless checks are agree We easy these are not conducted by their officials. anti-com- And it perhaps choices. (although true *24 mandeering principle may be circum- there is no textual support or other for the idea) easily. vented so But the distinction be- Congress may suspected that have tween blanket PASPA’s ban and that Printz’s most states keep would choose to command, if even the latter is recast a prohibition sports as actual on gambling on prohibition, books, remains. say PASPA does not permit the rather activity than that “you may to states only license sports go unregulated. to on But the that fact gambling you your if conscript Congress gave officials a the states hard tempt or policing into regulations” federal or ing they other- choice does not mean that were impose any wise given all, condition the states no choice at or that the choices carry out an or implement affirmative act are otherwise unconstitutional. Unit See a federal they may regulate Martinez-Salazar, scheme before ed States issue a 304, 315, license. It simply bars certain 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (“A acts under and all circumstances. hard is not choice the same as And if choice.”); F.E.R.C., affirmative commands always no see also U.S. at be recast prohibitions, prohibi- as then the (upholding 102 S.Ct. 2126 a choice in myriads tions of routine federal expending laws between to state resources con may always rephrased as affirmative sider abandoning federal standards or field commands. This Appellants’ shows that regulation). to federal And however hard argument proves PASPA, too much—the the in anti-com- choice is it is near nowhere cases, view, mandeering under imperil as provisions coercive as the in York plethora currently acts that punished unwilling as states to enact termed prohibitions regulatory states. scheme and that did mus- pass (c) York, 173- Regulating as State Neto PASPA

ter. See (upholding provision and Reno Conduct —Baker disposal sites with waste states permitting Additionally, PASPA is remark non-compliant to states more charge ably prohibitions similar to taxing such to the states statute in and Reno. Baker’s upheld action Baker states); compliant City see also benefit of regulations prohibited the states from issu (5th EPA, 325 F.3d Abilene v. bonds, ing required which turn bearer Cir.2003) long that as “the (explaining as regulations to issue new and invali states regu- federal implementing alternative ones; old Reno’s anti-disclosure dated the Consti- latory program offend does prohibited the states from dis provisions federalism, the fact guarantees tution’s information, seminating certain necessitat difficult, expensive is the alternative expenditure comply of resources is insufficient unappealing or otherwise federally imposed prohibitions. with the violation”). Amendment establish a Tenth To the extent PASPA makes unattrac punishment punitive no imposes repeal anti-sports tive for states to disagree suggestion tax. We also laws, wagering requires which in turn en face under PASPA choices states states, forcement effort PASPA expansion are as coercive Medicaid as Sebelius, requires simply is that the states enforce struck down provision participate unwilling maintain, threatened states is laws choose regula- complex in a and extensive plainly therefore intrusive than the less funding the loss of tory program with laws in Baker and Reno. PASPA also ten percent to over of their amounting effect, cases, two like the laws those Sebelius, budget. 132 S.Ct. at overall rendering any contrary inoperative laws. Finally, attempt note that we persuaded by Appellants’ are not We on state-sanctioned equate a ban arguments inap- that Baker and Reno are by Congress to plan to a force first, contend, posite. They Reno banning activity into alto- regulation because involved different gether far too much credit to Con- gives private way states in same strong-arming powers. The attend- gress’ parties. But that the regula- overstates of regulating ant field reality Reno, at issue in which were directed tions *25 activities, gambling, prosti- such certain as incidentally pro- at state and DMVs use, tution, always drug and states have private persons hibited from further dis- prohibitions, regardless gravitated towards seminating they may from the data obtain Indeed, noted, as Congress’ efforts. all See 528 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 666. DMVs. state-spon- prohibited but one state broad Indeed, the Reno Court did “not address gambling at time PASPA was sored question general applicability whether Congress, prohibiting state- enacted. requirement is a constitutional for federal schemes, may indeed have made licensing regulation of the States.” Id. at it harder to turn their backs on for states And, mentioned, as PASPA they made previously (although the choices operate private on individuals insofar does it in PASPA it made less hard for New engaging from in prohibits as it them Jersey), already very that choice was but gambling. private But in- state-sponsored hard, very be unlikely and made to issuing from prohibited cannot be (as dividuals begin Jersey’s history with licenses, nev- because have regulation also il- sports gambling lustrates). Second, do we find no er been able to so. from distinguish basis PASPA the laws ence the manner in regulated which States ground in Reno and Baker that the private parties,” U.S. at 120 S.Ct. solely regulate partici- latter states as possibly cannot great weight bear the pants uniquely the market. are DMVs that Appellants upon would hoist it. Most institutions; states thus obtain infor- regulation federal inevitably influences the through partici- mation not as DMVs manner in which regulate private states market, pants but in their unique If parties. enough were to violate the activity. role as authorizers of commercial anti-commandeering principle, then Hodel regulates PASPA different: is no it and wrongly F.E.R.C. were decided. In- permit-issuing by prohib- states’ activities deed, (or Baker, nowhere in Reno from iting altogether, issuanсe the license quoted, where that (quot- line was see id. Baker, inas where the state was essential- Baker, prohibited ly issuing the bearer bond. 1355)), suggest did the Court that the ab- Third, we decline to draw distinction sence of an attempt to influence how states between PASPA the laws at issue in regulate private parties required was ground Reno Baker that PAS- violating avoid the anti-commandeering regulation PA involves a of the states as principle.15 Supreme states. The Court’s anti-com- mandeering contemplate cases do not such (d) Sports Wagering Law Conflicts distinction.14 Policy Respect With Federal With Despite very the fact that PASPA is Sports Gambling There- activity similar to prohibition on state Preempted fore Reno, unanimously in upheld Appellants Alternatively, to the extent PAS- insist certain statements that opin- PA coerces the into keeping place states support ion its view that PASPA is uncon- bans, their sports-wagering that coercion stitutional. insist under upheld fitting as exception into the Reno a law if requires is unconstitutional drawn in anti-commandeering cases for govern the states according to Con- laws impose federal standards over gress’ instructions or if it “influences” the conflicting rules, in areas where Con ways in which the states gress may preempt otherwise the field. 18, 40, own citizens. See N.J. Br. at view, Under this gives states the 43, 45-46, 52. But no one contends that choice implementing of either a ban on PASPA requires to enact sports gambling complete accepting laws, and we have held also does deregulation per of that field require existing states to maintain Hodel, Reno, example, laws. And one line from standard. that the upheld law there did not implementing “control or influ- choice was certain minimum- And, arguably, gress imple- Court’s Tenth does not enlist the States in the *26 jurisprudence against Amendment cautions regulatory program. mentation of a federal drawing lines between activities that are “tra- may To strike down law that cause confu- government ditional” to state and those that prohibition sion to whether as comes from Garcia, are not. See government the federal or from a State’s (calling choice, S.Ct. 1005 such distinctions "unwork- considering before whether law able”). States, actually put commandeers the is to the Indeed, cart before the horse. the parties spar rejected simply The over the Court in Reno how accountabil- the notion that 15. ity anti-commandeering raising specter accountability problems concerns of cases of weigh enough anti-commandeering here. But New York and make is to find an vio- Printz implicated clear that are not when Con- lation. See 528 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 666. Freez preempted. in world See Mich. Canners & regulations living

safety Ass’n, Agric. Mktg. Bargain Inc. v. & government enforced ers the federal where ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‍Bd., 461, 469, ing them. (1984).16 81 L.Ed.2d 399 clear that federal makes

PASPA provisions And there are other in federal sports gambling to is policy respect with PASPA, law, protect- outside of aimed at activity should not occur under that such sports pall of from the of ing integrity noted, license. As of a state auspices wagering and that further demonstrate from engag- individuals prohibits PASPA disfavoring sports-gam- policy federal of “pursuant ing sports gambling scheme PASPA, Indeed, in bling. enacting Con- 3702(2). § law. to” 28 U.S.C. state gress explicitly noted that the law was words, if provision even other n “complementary to and consistent with 3702(1), § Jersey, were ex- offends New respect with to current Federal law” [then] 3702(2) PASPA, § would still cised from sports wagering. Report Senate at 3557. Law plainly Sports Wagering render the has, Congress example, for criminalized private parties inoperative prohibiting attempts to'fix the of a sporting outcome engaging gambling pursu- from schemes event, § place- 18 U.S.C. barred the Thus, the authority. ant federal to gambling through of a bet sports ment sports wagering that policy respect to place wire communications to or from a 3702(2) stop § clear: to private evinces is illegal, such are bets 18 U.S.C. where resorting as a parties from to law § trans- proscribed and interstate The sports. Sports cover for portation carrying of for means out Law, purporting permit to Wagering lotteries, 1301,1307(d).17 §§ 18 U.S.C. 3702(2), “authorizes individuals skirt [private parties] engage in conduct that Appellants contend that has forbids, [and therefore] federal incor- preempted [Act] not state law but instead accomplish- an porated prohibi- the[ ] ‘stands as obstacle certain extent full purposes ment and are legal execution tions tied to whatever is under ” and objectives Congress,’ of accord- state law. But PASPA itself is tied to Rather, law. ingly prohibits conflicts with PASPA and PASPA en- argu- ignore govern- Jersey asks we this there would be "no cost to the federal bill,” not raised the United ment because it was ment ... enactment of this Senate may States below. it is axiomatic we But Report proof that PASPA seeks to record, any ground apparent on the affirm upon responsibility foist the states the considering particularly de novo when banning sports wagering. But this statement Congressional constitutionally enactment. import taken context. it was out of may The United decide not advance States require spend- that PASPA would no "direct not, particular arguments, may but we consis- id, funds, ing receipts” but Senate duty tent with to de- our to "save Report itself clear that Justice De- makes Steel, stroy,” Laughlin Jones & partment already-earmarked would use funds un- that choice declare use permit it to "enforce the law without utiliz- Congress. constitutional act of The same officials,” prosecutions State criminal arguments be said that the United report id. at 3557. For a issued well before reading Leagues' States opinions in New York and delineat- Printz changed throughout litigation and should ed contours of modern anti-commandeer- discounted, see, e.g., Arg. Oral therefore Tr. ing jurisprudence, Report the Senate is re- (June 26, 2013). 71:14-19 markably clear in that it seeks to increase the government's policing sports role in point to a in the Sen- statement *27 that, obligation along wagering, pass that to not Report ate wherein the Committee notes Office, according Congressional Budget states. to the the pursuant govern private parties, to state law. gaging requiring schemes 3702(2). sure, § resources, To be some of expenditure 28 U.S.C. of or giving the provisions the other cited tie themselves to choices, hard enough states were to violate state law—but the Tenth Amendment does anti-commandeering principles, then what require Congress leave room less Hodel, F.E.R.C., Baker, of and Reno The F.E.R.C., govern. for states 456 overriding contrary of state law via Cf. (noting U.S. at 102 S.Ct. 2126 Supremacy Clause result in influenc- problem there no Tenth Amendment if changing policies, but there is Congress the States to enter the “allow[s] nothing anti-commandeering eases they promulgate[ regulations ] field if con- suggest principle is meant to standards”). sistent apply merely operates when a law via attempt distinguish also Supremacy Clause to contrary invalidate PASPA from other preemptive schemes. Missing state action. here is an affirma- They preemptive note that schemes nor- tive command that the states enact or mally impose either an affirmative federal carry aout federal scheme and PASPA is non-regulation, standard or a rule of simply nothing only like the two laws impose that PASPA does not an affirma- struck down under the anti-commandeer- possibly tive federal standard and cannot ing principle. important points Several but- be construed as law aimed at permitting first, tress oper- our conclusion: PASPA unregulated sports gambling because its simply ates law of pre-emption, via aim stop spread sports gam- was Clause; second, the Supremacy But, bling. legislative PASPA’s text and only stops doing thus the states from history goal reflect that its mod- more and, something; finally, policy PASPA’s est—to ban pursuant stopping sports gambling state-sanctioned scheme—-because was concerned independent prohibi- is cоnfirmed state-sponsored gambling carried with private pursuant tion activity legitimacy it a label of that would make understood, such law. When so it is clear activity appealing. Whatever else we that PASPA does not commandeer the may think Congress’ were secret inten- states. PASPA, enacting nothing tions in we know of speaks to a desire to ban all Equal C. Whether PASPA Violates Moreover, wagering. argument once Sovereignty of the States ignores again impose that PASPA does Finally, Appellants’ we address conten- directly private federal standard indi- tion that equal PASPA violates the sover- viduals, them, telling essentially, thou shall eignty by singling of the states out Nevada engage sports wagering under the preferential allowing treatment of a auspices state-issued license. See 28 that State maintain broad state- 3702(2). U.S.C.

sponsored sports gambling. We hold that PASPA does not violate Equal Sovereignty Cases—North- anti-commandeering doctrine. Al- Shelby County west Austin though many principles set forth in centerpiece Appellants’ equal anti-commandeering may abstractly cases sovereignty argument is the support Appellants’ position, be used to analysis Voting Rights Act result Court’s doing expan- so would undue (“VRA”) in sion Mu- anti-commandeering doctrine. Northwest Austin If attempting way to influence nicipal Utility District Number One v. *28 li- 2504, permits Nevada to 193, 174 PASPA because

Holder, 129 S.Ct. 557 U.S. do (2009), County, gambling. We decline to Shelby cense L.Ed.2d 140 — Holder, First, fundamentally -, the dif- 133 so. v. U.S. VRA Alabama (2013). represents, In It the ferent from PASPA. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Austin, Supreme explained, Court was “an uncommon Supreme the Court Northwest utility district to rule in an area congressional power” a small of asked exercise VRA, constitutionality § 5 the of of “the Framers of the Constitution intended pre- district to obtain required keep for themselves ... which the States before it authorities Shelby clearance elections.” power changes to the manner reg- could make The County, at 133 S.Ct. The was elected. district its board ulation of via the Commerce pre- from the sought exemption had an thus not of the same nature as Clause is but the district requirement, clearance pursuant regulation of elections eligible are court held that states Indeed, Amendments. Reconstruction Austin, Act. Nw. under the such “bailouts” uniformity treat- guarantee while the 196-97, 129 S.Ct. 2504. On at amongst the states cabins some of ment Court stated appeal, direct Const., see, Congress’ powers, e.g., U.S. § “federalism concerns” be- 5 raises I., (requiring uniformity § el. 1 art. cause it “differentiates between 9,§ imposts); (requir- id. cl. 6 duties States.” Id. at S.Ct. uniformity ports), ing regulation explained “[distinctions Court also limits guarantee no such the Commerce justified in can be states] [between only makes Clause. This sense: Con- such as when enacts some cases” gress’ exercises of Commerce Clause au- which have subse- “remedies for local evils thority are aimed matters of national appeared.” (citing South Car- quently Id. finding concern and national solutions will 301, 328-29, Katzenbach, olina v. differently; necessarily affect states ac- (1966)). 15 L.Ed.2d Clause, cordingly, the “[u]nlike Commerce However, ultimately de- did powers [C]ongress[,] other does equal § sover- cide whether 5 violated require uniformity.” Morgan geographic can- eignty invoking instead the principle, 373, 388, Virginia, on of avoidance construe constitutional (1946) (Frankfurter, 1050, 90 L.Ed. 1317 provision permit the VRA’s bailout J., concurring). Id. at exemption. district to obtain Second, Jersey us would have hold 129 S.Ct. 2504. differently treating can laws asked to revisit Shelby County, when “only” survive if are meant to “reme- 5,§ reit- constitutionality the Court dy local evils” in a manner that is “suffi- equal principles” erated the sov- “basic ciently problem related to the that it tar- Austin and ereignty set in Northwest forth position gets.” N.J. Br. 55. This 4(b) VRA, which set invalidated overly requires broad in exis- forth to determine what a formula used equal tence of a one-size-fits-all test for by § jurisdictions preclear- covered are which, analysis, forego- as the sovereignty ance. 133 2630-31. Never- shows, proposition in the perilous is a theless, despite § 5 survived once more And context of the Commerce Clause. sovereignty equal concerns. expressed equal statement that Northwest Austin’s Id. at 2631. yield ap- when local evils sovereignty may immediately after pear was made ask that we lever regulatory age “[distinctions strike down all statement these statements to *29 deed, it justified noteworthy can in some cases.” 557 U.S. is that Appellants be do added). 203, 2504 (emphasis 129 S.Ct. 3704(a)(2), § not ask tous invalidate Thus, be but of appear local evils one grandfathering provision Nevada that sup- in a departure of cases types posedly equal creates sovereignty equal from is sovereignty principle Instead, problem. arewe asked to strike permitted. 3702, general down prohibition PASPA’s Third, sports gambling. state-licensed nothing Shelby County Appel- there is in equal sovereignty why, do prin- explain indicate lants if pref- PASPA’s ciple meant with the force apply is same erential treatment of Nevada violates the of of outside the context “sensitive areas equal-sovereignty doctrine, solution is Shelby state and local policymaking.” not to only exemption. strike down County, 133 at 2624. We best S.Ct. “had The remedy Jersey seeks—a com- majority says what the respect [Court’s] plete invalidation of PASPA —does far rather than read the lines.... If between statute, more violenсe to the and would be leg, the Justices are our let them pulling a particularly given odd result the law’s say Cmty. so.” Sherman v. Consol. Sch. purpose curtailing gam- state-licensed Wheeling Twp., Dist. 21 980 F.2d bling on sports. Jersey That New seeks (7th Cir.1992). treatment, preferential Nevada’s and not

Fourth, accepting equal even complete preferences, ban on the under- sovereignty in principle applies the same mines invocation Appellants’ equal in manner the context of Commerce sovereignty doctrine. legislation,

Clause we no con- have trouble cluding passes Ap- PASPA muster. Grandfathering Clause pellants’ argument exemp- that PASPA’s Cases also argue PAS- remedy tion not properly does local evils PA’s for Nevada exemption is invalid un- “targetfed] because it in States which City der the in Supreme analysis Court’s legal absent,” sports wagering was N.J. Dukes, New Orleans v. omitted), Br. at (emphasis again dis- (1976), L.Ed.2d 511 torts PASPA’s purpose being wipe Creamery, Minnesota Clover Leaf out sports gambling altogether. When the 101 S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d 659 purpose true stop considered —to (1981), grandfathering in provisions eco- spread of state-sanctioned gam- But legislation. nomic in both cases the bling is clear that in regulating states —it upheld the provisions: already which sports-wagering existed Dukes, push an ordinance that cart banned would have been irrational. Targeting vendors from New Orleans’ historic dis- practice states where the did not exist trict, grandfathered but of a those certain sufficiently thus more than related to vintage, 2513; 427 U.S. at problem, precisely it is tailored to Leaf, Clover banning statute the sale problem. If anything, address Appel- non-recyclable milk in containers but quarrel lants’ seems to PASPA’s grandfathering non-recyclable paper con- goal actual rather than with the manner tainers, operates. which it upholding Two cases economic ordi-

Finally, Appellants ignore another fea- private parties nances aimed have little ture distinguishes PASPA from say state sovereignty. Ap- far about While singling VRA—that out a handful treatment, pellants states for contend that disfavored Dukes Clover favorably single Creamery treats more In- support position state. be- Leaf and our resolution of its upheld temporary grandfather- dispute of this cause clauses, indication strict was no us well within the there merits leave upheld clauses were that the either case set forth the Constitution bounds *30 legislatures that the temporary, indeed intact the state-federal balance preserves in fu- them the to rescind obligated were power. ture, supposedly temporal even that legal is- Having examined thе difficult was the basis of the the laws quality of that by the we hold parties, sues raised in than a statement holdings, other Court’s in Con- nothing PASPA violates U.S. had in Dukes legislature that the passing Con- The law neither exceeds stitution. target only particu- a “initially” chosen to powers any nor violates gress’ enumerated 305, 96 products. 427 U.S. lar class of implicit in the principle of federalism S.Ct. 2513.18 in our anywhere Amendment else Tenth that is no case there Appellants note Ap- structure. The heart of Constitutional grandfa- “permitted

where a court on PASPA pellants’ constitutional attack is justification to serve as a thering rationale on two that —while their reliance doctrines principle fundamental violating for each importance of undeniable —have N.J. at 59. But it equal sovereignty.” Br. notably used intrusive been to strike down why ease: to this hard see not and, indeed, extraordinary federal laws. in Supreme Court cases modern only two Extending Appellants as principles these sovereignty applied equal have times changes propose significant would result in principle.19 day-to-day operation Suprem- to the acy in our structure. Clause constitutional V. CONCLUSION Moreover, daylight see much between we inches, constitu- game If is a baseball invali- exceedingly intrusive statutes may described as adjudication tional anti-commandeering dated cases have degrees. questions we matter of straightforward and PASPA’s much more generis. sui many ways are in addressed stopping mechanism of states nor standing the merits issues Neither lending imprimatur gambling on easy an solution permit we tackled have sports. controlling pro- case that resorting to Jersey other state that New “Eureka!” moment. Our a definitive vides may legalize gambling wish to an from prece- role answer thus is distill their borders are not left without therein. within principles dent and the embodied adjudication gave redress. once But are confident that our Just PASPA we by disfavoring River over other does decision in Delaware Union them states Nor our County support exemp- v. Water & of their on Nevada's Commission Bucks attack Basin See, support per- e.g., Authority the notion that tion. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Sewer invalid, grandfathering Transp. Chicago, are 2 clauses S.Ct. manent given simply (1883) (explaining case we remanded L.Ed. why development the law may imposed record as whatever restriction have been grandfathering provision. ability operation at issue contained over Illinois' (3d Cir.1981). River, PAS- bridges Chicago 641 F.2d 1096-98 such re- over history pur- legislative is clear as PA’s disappeared was strictions once Illinois ad- state); pose exemptions, thus own Coyle, behind its mitted intо the Union as a River Basin. (holding survives Delaware that Con- require gress may Oklahoma change capital rely "equal as a condition of admission on the so-called its also Union). speak footing” into But PASPA does not principle, the notion entry the Union. may into the to conditions of admission into not burden a new state's preferential con- Jersey upholds treatment PASPA as a constitutional sports, Congress may text of congressional authority. exercise of again or, broadly, choose do so more I.

may altogether. choose to undo PASPA It place Congress’ is not our to usurp role I agree my colleagues that an ap- may simply because have become propriate starting point for addressing Ap- unpopular forty-nine law. The pellants’ claims is v. Virginia Hodel Sur- not enjoy do PASPA’s solicitude Mining Ass’n, & Reclamation face easily Congress’ authority invoke should 69 L.Ed.2d desire. (1981). so Hodel, the Court reviewed the *31 constitutionality of the federal Surface judgment The District AF- Court’s Mining Act, Control and Reclamation a FIRMED. comprehensive statutory scheme designed VANASKIE, Judge, concurring regulate against Circuit the harmful effects of in part dissenting and in part. 268, surface mining. coal Id. at 101 S.Ct. act permitted 2352. The states I agree my colleagues with wished to permanent regulatory exercise Leagues standing have challenge authority mining over surface coal to sub- Law, Jersey’s Sports Wagering Stat. N.J. plans mit that met federal standards for 5:12A-2, §Ann. and the Professional 271, approval. federal Id. at 101 S.Ct. (“PAS- and Amateur Act Sports Protection addition, the federal government PA”), 3702, :§ 28 U.S.C. does not violate created a program federal enforcement for the principle “equal I sovereignty.” states that did not approval obtain federal join parts therefore III and IV.C of the 272, plans. for state Id. at 101 S.Ct. 2352. majority’s in I agree decision full. also Applying the framework set forth in the that, ordinarily, Congress has the authori case, since-overruled League National ty regulate gambling pursuant to the 833, Usery, Cities v. 426 U.S. 96 S.Ct. Clause, join part Commerce I thus 2465, (1976), by 49 L.Ed.2d 245 overruled Yet, the majority opinion IV.A of as well. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit ordinary PASPA is no federal statute that Auth., 528, 1005, 105 S.Ct. 83 directly regulates interstate commerce or (1985), the L.Ed.2d 1016 Court concluded substantially affecting activities such com “ did the act not ‘States Instead, prohibits merce. PASPA states ” challenged provisions States’ because the from authorizing sports gambling and governed private individuals’ and thereby how must directs treat such business’ activities and because “the States Indeed, activity. according to col my compelled are not to enforce the stаn- leagues, essentially gives the dards, funds, expend any or to states the of allowing totally unregu choice in participate regulatory pro- federal betting sporting lated prohib events or gram in any manner whatsoever.” Id. at such iting gambling. all Because this con 287-88, 101 S.Ct. 2352. The Court further gressional principles directive violates ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‍the explained that of federalism as articulated the Su

preme [i]f Court State does wish to submit New York v. United States, 144, 2408, proposed permanent program 505 112 that com- U.S. S.Ct. 120 (1992), plies implementing 120 L.Ed.2d and Printz v. Act and United States, 898, 2365, 521 regulations, regulatory U.S. 117 S.Ct. 138 the full burden (1997), 914 L.Ed.2d I will respectfully dissent be borne the Federal Govern- Thus, part majority’s from that can opinion suggestion ment. there be no 242 tence,” legisla- County Oregon, v. [74 Lane U.S. Act commandeers

that the (1869); by directly the States 19 L.Ed. 101 processes 71] Wall. tive 559, 580, Oklahoma, to enact enforce a them v. U.S. compelling Coyle program. 688, 695, (1911), regulatory 55 L.Ed. federal S.Ct. ability States impair do post- 2352. Even at 101 S.Ct. Id. effectively sys- “to function Garcia, explained that the the Court States, 421 Fry tem.” v. United U.S. presented Tenth no issue Hodel act at [1792], [542], n. at at 95 S.Ct. merely “because it problem Amendment (1975) ]; n. 7 Na- L.Ed.2d [44 standards a with federal compliance made League Usery, tional regulation Cities to continued precondition Printz, [2465], [833], field.” pre-empted U.S. in an otherwise (1976) 926, 117S.Ct. 2365. L.Ed.2d 245 To the ]. [49 contrary, they offer the States vehicle out, later, year majority points theAs remaining active an area over- 742, 102 Mississippi, in FERC v. riding concern. (1982), 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 constitutionality of two upheld the Court 765-66,102 Id. at Utility Regulatory Poli- of the Public titles Subsequently, *32 (“PURPA”), which directed state Act cies down in cases provisions struck two based to “consider” certain authorities regulatory on of At principles. violations federalism regulate to en- approaches standards and York, case, in a issue the first New was procedures, certain ergy prescribed and federal statute that intended to incentivize require the state authorities to but did not provide to low disposal “States for the of specified implement standards. adopt generated level radioactive waste within Hodel, 745-50, 102 2126. As in S.Ct. Id. at York, at borders.” New 505 U.S. Congress that had au- the observed Court 170, 2408. “an 112 S.Ct. As alternative to at thority the field issue—in preempt to regulating Congress’ pursuant to di- case, Id. energy regulation. at FERC’s rection,” provided one of “incentives” 765, explained: Court S.Ct. “option taking title to and of simply should be invalid PURPA possession of low level radioactive because, to out of deference state au- for all becoming waste and liable dam- Congress a intru- thority, adopted less ages as a re- generators waste suffered] sive scheme and allowed States to prompt- sult of the State’s failure do so in regulating the area on continue 174-75, ly.” 2408. At the Id. 112 S.Ct. suggest- that condition consider outset, the characterized the Court issue the condi- ed federal standards. While “concerning] it the circum- before as in tion here is affirmative nature —that Congress may which use the stances under is, pro- it directs the States to entertain is, implements regulation; as of State in posals nothing this Court’s cases — may direct or Congress whether otherwise suggests that the nature of the condition in a regulate partic- motivate States constitutionally improper makes one. 161, way.” particular ular or a Id field nothing “directly There is PURPA S.Ct. legisla- to enact a compelling” the States York held the “take The Court in New short, tive because the two program. title” because it provision unconstitutional simply condition con- challenged Titles “ legislative process- ‘commandeer[ed] pre-empti- in a tinued involvement state by directly compelling es of States consideration federal ble area regu- a federal them to enact enforce proposals, they do not threaten the ” in “separate independent latory program’ princi- States’ violation exis- 176, regula- Id. at 112 S.Ct. administer enforce federal pies of federalism. Hodel, tory program.” Id. (quoting 2352). explained that The Court Later, Condon, in Reno v. Congress authority “even where (2000), L.Ed.2d 587 pass requir- under the Constitution laws majority “remarkably case the regards as acts, ing or certain it lacks the prohibiting (Maj. similar” to the judice, matter sub directly compel States to re- power 223-24), Op. at a unanimous Court held prohibit quire or those acts.” Id. Privacy the Driver’s Protection Act added). (emphasis It fur- 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“DPPA”), generally law applicable ther elaborated allocation of “[t]he regulates disclosure resale Clause, in the power contained Commerce private persons personal states and example, Congress regu- authorizes department information contained state directly; late interstate commerce it does records, of motor vehicle run “did not afoul not authorize principles the federalism enunciated com- governments’ regulation interstate York ... and Printz.” Id. at added). (emphasis merce.” Id. first 666. After deter Second, Pnntz, mining reviewed the DPPA was a proper exer temporary statutory provision cise congressional authority federal under the Clause, required certain rejected state law enforcement of Commerce the Court background ficers checks on argument to conduct South Carolina’s the act purchasers potential handgun part оf a violated federalism principles because Printz, regulatory “require scheme. time part would and effort 148, 150, Observing U.S. at 117 S.Ct. 2365. employees.” Id. at “ *33 Finding that Federal Government not S.Ct. 666. New York and ‘[t]he Printz compel the to inapplicable, States enact administer a the Court relied instead on ” 933, Baker, regulatory 505, 108 federal at program,’ id. South Carolina 485 U.S. York, 1355, (1988),1 (quoting 117 2365 New 505 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 592 S.Ct. 99 188, 112 2408), “upheld prohibited U.S. at the Court held a statute that S.Ct. States “Congress that issuing unregistered cannot circumvent that from bonds because activities,’ by conscripting ‘regulate[d] offi the law prohibition State’s state rather directly.” cers Id. at 117 2365. than to control or ‘seeking[ing] S.Ct. influence explained Congress regulate pri The Court further the manner in which States ” “may Reno, categorically parties.’ issue vate at 120 neither directives 528 U.S. Baker, requiring particular (quoting the States to address 666 485 U.S. at S.Ct. 514- 1355).2 nor problems, command States’ offi The Court further cers, subdivisions, political explained: or those of their majority implement regis- 1. The Baker to also characterizes as determine how best "remarkably prohibition system. similar” to PASPA’s Such tered bond "commandeer- 223-24.) is, however, (Maj. Op. ing” of state action. consequence at an inevitable regulating activity. Any a state Baker, Court observed: regulation compliance. demands That wishing activity engage to in The nonetheless contends that State certain [intervenor] legisla- has commandeered must take administrative and sometimes process legislative comply tive and administrative because action to with federal legislatures activity many regulating had to is a amend sub- standards com- monplace presents stantial number of statutes in order to issue no constitutional registered in bonds form and because state defect. Baker, 514-15, officials had to devote substantial 108 S.Ct. 1355. effort York, 178, 112 at New (quoting not States require does

The DPPA 2408). ultimately con- capacity plurality The sovereign in their S.Ct. regu- DPPA The own citizens. were conditions cluded the Medicaid as the owners data the States lates that “Con- unduly coercive and reiterated require It not South bases. does gress may ‘conscript state simply laws Legislature enact Carolina the national bureaucratic [agencies] into ” require does regulations, (quoting 2606-07 army.’ Id. at in the enforce- to assist state officials FERC, S.Ct. regulating pri- statutes ment of federal in (O’Connor, J., in concurring judgment individuals. vate dissenting in part part)). 151,108 Id. S.Ct. opinion Roberts’ Chief Justice While recently, in Federation Most National concerning expansion provi- the Medicaid — Sebelius, Business v. Independent of U.S.-, garnered signatures in sions Sebelius L.Ed.2d 450 dissenting justices, the four three (2012), down, as violative the Court struck justices princi- also invoked the federalism Clause, a in the Spending provision of the in ples concluding that of New York and Affordable Care Patient Protection expan- in funding the Medicaid conditions (“ACA”) fed- Act that would have withheld compelled states impermissibly sion grants to unless eral Medicaid govern Congress by coerc- directed re- expanded eligibility their Medicaid the expanded participation states’ quirements accordance with conditions (Scalia, Kennedy, program. Id. 2660-62 (plu- in the ACA. Id. at 2606-07 Thus, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). York, rality). Justice Quoting New Chief justices expan- found the Medicaid seven Roberts, three-justice plurali- writing for unconstitutional, citing the federalism sion ty, “‘the observed that Constitution principles part articulated in New York as upon never to confer been understood Impor- for their conclusion. ability require States basis govern according Congress’ seven-justice rejection instruc- tantly, ” York, tions.’ (quoting Id. at 2602 New based, part, expansion Medicaid 2408). plurality U.S. at York, represents signal clear that, then explained princi- based on principles enunciated *34 ple, York PHntz had struck down New to a class York are not limited narrow New federal statutes that “commandeer[ed] Congress specifically di- of cases which legislative appa- State’s or administrative affirmatively to legislature rects a state ratus purposes.” plu- for federal Id. The legislation. enact United States Cf. that, rality authority also noted within (3d Richardson, Cir. 658 F.3d Clause, Spending Congress may 2011) binding (observing that if not even power akin create “inducements exert Court, of a “the splintered due to votes “pressure to undue influence” where is, majority justices [a of] collective view of (in- compulsion.” into Id. [would] turn[] course, authority”). persuasive omitted). quotations Recognizing ternal “ simply Constitution does ‘[t]he II. give Congress authority require ” clearly New York and PHntz established plurality regulate,’ States to observed government that the cannot direct federal Congress is true whether di- “[t]hat legislation legislatures to state enact rectly regulate or commands State to implement policy. state officials to federal indirectly adopt feder- coerces a State to particular al is true that the two statutes regulatory system of its own.” Id. It under If objective review those cases involved con- of the federal govern- gressional commands states affirma- ment is to require regulate states to in a York, tively legislation, see enact New 505 manner that effectuates policy, any federal or affirma- distinction between federal directive that tively regulatory scheme, enforce a federal commands take affirmative action Printz, see 521 U.S. at prohibits S.Ct. 2365. and one that states from exercis- Printz, Nothing in or however, New York sovereignty illusory. Whether limited principles of federalism upon stated as a engage command to in specific which those cases relied to situations in or action as a prohibition against specific action, Congress directed affirmative activi- government’s federal interfer- ty part Rather, on the of the states. ence sovereign with a state’s autonomy general principle by Moreover, articulated the Court the same. recognition in New York was that untenable, such a distinction is as affirma- tive engage commands to in certain con- Congress

even where authority has the duct can rephrased be a prohibition under pass the Constitution to laws re- against not engaging in that quiring prohibiting acts, conduct. or certain Surely the structure of Our power directly lacks the Federalism compel does not turn on the phraseology require prohibit States to used or those acts. Congress commanding the states how to of power allocation contained in the regulate. interpretation An Clause, of federalism Commerce for example, author- principles permits congressional nega- izes Congress regulate interstate tive commands to governments state will directly; commerce does not author- eviscerate the constitutional lines drawn in ize regulate govern- New York and Printz recognized regulation ments’ interstate com- limit Congress’s power to compel state merce. carry instrumentalities to out poli- federal York, New 112 S.Ct. 2408 cy- (citations added) omitted). (emphasis Here, disputed addition, it cannot be that PASPÁ In politi- PASPA implicates the “regulate[s] governments’ regulation accountability cal concerns voiced of interstate commerce.” See id. States Court in New York and Printz. regulate gambling, York, in part, by licensing the Court observed that authorizing activity. such By government prohibiting when federal preempts states from licensing authorizing sports impose area with a federal law to its view gambling, issue, PASPA dictates the manner in on an it “makes the decision full which states must interstate com public, view of the and it will merce and thus principles contravenes the officials that consequences suffer the if the set forth in federalism New York and decision turns out to be detrimental or *35 York, Printz.3 168, unpopular.” New 505 U.S. at agree view, my colleagues Congress 3. I practicable. Contrary with that majority’s to the authority the under the Supremacy simply give Commerce Clause the Clause does not events, gambling sporting to ban Congress power on and that the the what .tell states a gam- such ban could include state-licensed and the can cannot do in absence of a bling. part company my colleagues I validly-enacted deregu- with regulatory federal or 13-14, because that what latory explained pages not PASPA does. In- scheme. As at stead, conscripts infra, regulatory deregu- states as foot there is federal no or implement congressional policy latory soldiers to sports wager- scheme on the of matter Instead, wagering choice sporting ing. congressional that events there is the di- prohibited greatest should be to the extent rective that not states allow it. contrast, sports gam- or license fails authorize

112 S.Ct. understandably Federal bling, Government citizens will explained, “where its may regulate, it reg- though the States state directs blame state officials even bear the brunt of who will state officials puppet gambling ulation has become of offi- the federal while public disapproval, strings government, whose federal regulatory program cials devised who cut) (or in PASPA. reality pulled by are from the electoral may insulated remain regulate and some States can authorize 169, Id. at of decision.” their ramifications casi- e.g., gambling, forms of lotteries recognized also 2408. The Court S.Ct. nos, gambling other of but not forms where Con- in situations Printz by Con- implement policy choices made “imple- officials to gress compels state Thus, accountability aris- gress. concerns regulatory program, a federal ]ment regu- ing from PASPA’s restraint state can take credit for Congress of Members concluding counsel in favor of lation also having to ask ‘solving’ problems without it of principles federalism. violates for the solutions pay their constituents taxes” and that higher suggest govern- with federal states I do the federal position taking of put “are ... may prohibit ment certain actions program’s] burden- blame for federal [the governments it If Con- state can. —indeed Printz, 521 and for its defects.” someness problem within gress identifies falls Although at 117 S.Ct. 2365. may authority, provide its realm of it “direct[] the States to PASPA does not itself directly properly federal solution or York, 169, 112 regulate,” New regulate comply or incentivize states to regu- a federal “implement[ ] or if example, For with federal standards. Printz, latory program,” (or deregu- Congress chooses to on state prohibition its late) directly, require to re- licensing sports gam- authorization and enacting regulations frain own from their bling similarly diminishes the accountabili- that, Congress’s judgment, would expense at the ty of federal officials оbjectives. Illustrating policy thwart its directly regulat- state Instead officials. point, in Mor- this Court held banning sports gambling, Airlines, Inc., ales v. Trans World states, passed responsibility to 374, 112 S.Ct. 119 L.Ed.2d PASPA, which, may not authorize or under (1992), Deregula- Airline that the federal for such activities. issue state licenses Act, “prohibited tion States games of Jersey regulates law routes, rates, any ‘relating law enforcing 5:8-1, § chance, seq., Ann. et see N.J. Stat. preempted air carrier” services’ lotteries, 5:9-1, seq., § et state see id. set guidelines regarding advertising fair state, see id. casino within attorneys organization forth of state 5:12-1, result, seq. et would be As general. Id. to believe Jersey natural for New citizens There, explained, as the Court governs sports gambling law state purpose prohibition against be further sup- well. That would belief regulation further was ensure “[t]o of New ported by the fact that voters would not undo federal the States recently a state constitu- Jersey passed own.” deregulation regulation their sports gam- permitting tional amendment Thus, a state Id. S.Ct. 2031. bling representatives *36 contrary regulatory to a or law federal legislature subsequently enacted here, the Su- Law, deregulatory scheme is void under Sports Wagering issue to regulate Jersey premacy Clause.4 activity. such When New preemption Unlike Morales other United States Code makes it a federal crime to use wire communications to trans- legislation in which federal limits cases sports mit bets in interstate commerce case, governments, of in this actions state unless the transmission is from and to a or regulating there is no federal scheme sports betting state where See legal. gambling by which to deregulating sports 1084(a)-(b). Thus, § U.S.C. under preempt regulation. pro- state PASPA section, law, law, state rather than federal regulatory no or vides federal standards determines the specified whether conduct Instead, requirements of its own. it sim- falls within the criminal Second, statute.6 op- ply prohibits “sponsoring], states from “schejme another prohibits any federal law erating], li- advertising], promoting], to by bribery sport- influence ... any censing], authorizing]” gambling or on 224(a). But, ing § contest.” Id. that same 3702(1). And, § sports. 28 U.S.C. PAS- section expressly indicates that it “shall dereg- PA be a certainly cannot be said to not be indicating construed as an intent on part measure, Congress occupy of to field in its to ulatory purpose was operations which this section to the exclu- spread state-sponsored stem the of sports any State,” sion of and further disavows gambling, let it go unregulated.5 not See any attempt to preempt otherwise valid (“The (1991) No. S.Rep. pur- 224(b). § state A laws. Id. federal third pose spоrts 474 is to prohibit gam- of S. statute carves out an exception gen- to the by, bling conducted or authorized under prohibition eral federal against transport- of, governmen- any the law State or other mailing or material and broadcasting (“Senate entity.”); tal id. at 4 bill relating information to lotteries for those an important public purpose, serves to conducted or authorized states. Id. stop spread State-sponsored sports 1307(a)-(b). § however, That exception, gambling....”). pertain transportation does not to the- or tickets, mailing “equipment, or materi- Moreover, contrary majority to the opin- (d). 1307(b), § sports al” for lotteries. Id. suggestion, ion’s other federal re- statutes Thus, sports while state lotteries violate lating sports gambling do aggregate not § that section not provide does to form the foundation of a regula- federal it, inferring together basis for tory interpreted scheme that can be as PASPA, provides regulatory federal preempting regulation sports gam- preempts regulation scheme that First, bling. sports gambling private parties.7 Section 1084 of Title Fur- Significantly, majority opinion position, open 4. certainly does not to debate wheth- repeal any gambling er a state's cite case of ban on that sustained federal statute "authorizing” would akin regulate state's purported the states under events, sporting action that PAS- Commerce Clause where there was no under- explicitly PA forecloses. lying regulation deregu- or federal scheme of sense, lation. this stands alone Accordingly, repealed existing if a state an telling the states that not events, wagering sporting ban on aspect of interstate commerce that implicated. law would not be prohibited. believes should be prohibition pri- 7. PASPA extends its majority reasons PASPA does "sponsor, persons persons vate to the extent battling sports the states in advertise, commandeer operate, promote [sports gam- gambling because the states retain the choice bling] pursuant compact law of a repealing outlawing 3702(2). their laws such activi- governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. ty, observing “require that PASPA does applies only [] Because the federal statute keep law, place.” (Maj. law the states persons pursuant who act to state 232.) Op. Contrary majority's sup- directly .regulate persons. cannot be said to

248 York, example to in New is not deference state PASPA indicating federal

ther subjects generally applicable a law subject, a fourth federal stat laws on the regulation federal as states to same transport wagering to it a crime ute makes York, parties. See New private interstate commerce but in paraphernalia (“This litigation betting materials to be at S.Ct. to apply not does to or revisit the presents apply no occasion sporting events states where used 1953(a)-(b). holdings [concerning generally ... § Id. cases legal. betting such is laws], as this is not a case result, applicable prohibition As a the federal Congress subjected State to sports gambling not which does state-authorized applicable private legislation the same to regulatory a federal scheme emanate from In to its restrictions parties.”). addition expressly implicitly preempts or state governments relating state conflict with federal on actions that would regulation Instead, PASPA also forbids “a attempts sports gambling, im to policy. PASPA to advertise, sponsor, policy by telling person operate, to plement federal sports gambling “pursu if done they may regulate promote” not an otherwise governmen activity. compact af to the law or The Constitution ant unregulated 3702(2) § (emphasis Congress power. entity." no New tal such See U.S.C. fords (“The added); Thus, York, 178, 112 PAS- supra see also note predicated gives private parties au PA’s reach to is Congress the Constitution directly sponsorship, to authorization of thority to matters state’s advertisement, promotion of pre-empt contrary regulation. operation, state law.8 sufficiently sports gambling pursuant interest state Where federal is Congress legislate, Accordingly, cannot be said to strong cause directly....”). “subject[ legis ... States[s] so to the same ] must do parties,” applicable private lation New preempting regula- In state addition York, for 505 U.S. at regulation, tion with some cir- federal 3702(2) whether state law determines cumstances, Congress regulate states any particular reaches individual. applicable directly part generally as See, York, generally Nor more e.g., law. 505 U.S. does Reno stand cases). (collecting That is that a violation of “anti- proposition S.Ct. 2408 DPPA, commandeering” what did with the oc- principles federalism expressly Congress requires found in Reno to be curs when affirma- the Court Reno, generally activity by governments. It applicable. See tive (“[W]e DPPA, need in upholding S.Ct. 666 not ad- true that the question general appli- require dress whether Court noted that it not “d[id] cability requirement Legislature is a constitutional for South enact Carolina States, regulation regulations, require because laws or and it not d[id] federal generally DPPA The officials to assist in the enforcement applicable. indi- regulates regulаting private DPPA of entities of federal universe statutes Reno, suppliers to the market viduals.” participate ”). Yet, context, however, for motor information.... 666. Read that state- vehicle Reno, like that the suggest principles unlike the DPPA in but the act ment does accountable, though majority, According to a state would cials would be held even policy prohibits presumably run afoul of PASPA if it mere- would regu- prohibit sports gambling. taking effective ly refused to states from measures sense, market, however, resulting police activity. unregulated por- late and this this grave consequences for PASPA is indeed coercive. tends which state offi-

249 York comply regulations of federalism articulated New with federal is not to Printz are limited situations necessarily fatal to a federal law that Congress to compels states enact “‘regulate[s] activities,’ state rather than regulation. laws or enforce federal The ‘seeking]'to control or influence the man- preceding two sentences statement regulate ner in which private States par- First, make that clear. recog- Reno, ties.’” 528 at 120 S.Ct. require nized that “the DPPA not d[id] Baker, (quoting 514-15, 666 485 U.S. at sovereign capacity regu- States in their 1355) (second origi- alteration in here, late own Id. But citizens.” nal). states in “require does their sover- regulation direct federal of inter- eign regulate their own capacity to citi- state obviously commerce under the DPPA id., zens,” because it they dictates how distinguishes Reno from New York and must regulate sports gambling. Pursuant Printz, where the federal statutes at issue PASPA, “sponsor, oper- states not in those required cases states to enact ate, advertise, license, promote, or author- legislation and enforce policy, federal re- 3702(1). activity, ize” such 28 U.S.C. spectively. But it distinguishes also Reno Thus, govern accordingly, states must even from this by refraining recognized, if that means case. As the Court providing regulatory governs scheme that DPPA regulatory “[t]he established] gambling. Reno, 144, 148, 151, scheme.” above, As S.Ct. 666. discussed howev-

Second, explained the Court in Reno er, PASPA is regulatory not itself a that, regulates DPPA “[t]he States as scheme, nor does it combine with several personal owners of data bases” of infor- other criminal Reno, scattered statutes in the mation in motor vehicle records. code to (emphasis regulatory S.Ct. 666 create federal scheme. added). regulat- The fact that the DPPA Congress regulated And while could have as “suppliers ed states to the market for sports gambling directly under the Com- information,” id, motor clearly vehicle in- Clause, just it regulated merce motor dicates that the Court the DPPA viеwed DPPA, vehicle information under the did it congressional regulation as direct of in- Instead, not. pa- chose to set federal commerce, terstate id. at may regulate rameters as to how states (recognizing that motor vehicle infor- sports gambling. result, any As a reliance mation, DPPA, in the context of the uphold misplaced. Reno to PASPA is commerce”), “an article of than rather provide sup- Hodel and FERC also no requirement federal for to reg- the states Hodel, port for upholding PASPA. York, activity, ulate such see New permitted statute issue states to submit (“The U.S. at 112 S.Ct. 2408 alloca- a state regulatory plan approv- power tion of contained the Commerce regulate al if wished to surface coal Congress regu- Clause authorizes mining; if states did seek obtain late directly; interstate commerce does approval, pro- then federal enforcement not authorize Hodel, gram would take effect. governments’ regulation interstate de- 101 S.Ct. 2352. The Court commerce.”). Although the Court de- termined that the federal statute did clined to find that New York and Printz legislative process “commandeer!] merely the DPPA governed because it because had a States” states choice “require would time and effort on the implement regulation about whether part of it clarified employees,” federally mandated action let conformed federal standards or compelled exercise of Missis- the burden of involve bear government the federal (cid:127) 2352; see sovereign powers,” Id. at id. at

regulation. sippi’s *39 925-26, Printz, at 117 S.Ct. also PASPA does indeed suffer S.Ct. (“In ... we concluded that the Hodel a the obverse of such constitutional Reclamation Mining and Control Surface prohibits it exercise of states’ defect: present [a not Tenth Act 1977 did of sovereign powers. FERC is thus distin- it problem because mere- Amendment] guishable inapposite. and federal standards ly compliance with made Finally, recognized by majority, regula- to continued state precondition a in our decision the Commissioner Office of (ci- pre-empted field.” tion in an otherwise (3d Markell, 579 F.3d 293 Baseball v. of omitted)). provided If a PASPA tation Cir.2009), reject to does not bind us imple- either similar choice to states —to PASPA on challenge to federalism sports gambling regulation ment state case, grounds. In that determined that we or allow federal federal standards met statutory concerning the extent phrase perhaps it regulation to take effect—then to PAS- grandfathered under it muster. But pass would constitutional types sports operate PA could certain inapplicable Therefore Hodеl is does not. Id. at 302-03. unambiguous. was to the case at hand. unambiguous language result As a addition, I Titles and III upholding in PASPA, unpersuasive Dela- f[ou]nd “we FERC, on focused PURPA argument that sovereign ware’s its status merely required titles the fact that those permitted implement to requires that suggested states “consider betting at 303. proposed its scheme.” Id. to continued as a condition standards” however, our con- finding, That related to FERC, 456 U.S. at regulation. state its gave clusion that PASPA clear notice of 2126; 765-66, at see also id. S.Ct. “'alteration usual constitutional [of] (“In short, two S.Ct. 2126 because the respect sports wagering,” balance’ with challenged simply condition contin- Titles requirement thus and satisfied the in a pre-emptible ued state involvement Ashcroft, Gregory 501 U.S. pro- area of federal consideration (1991). 2395, 115 See L.Ed.2d posals, they do threaten the States’ Markell, Yet, here, at we 579 F.3d existence, separate and independent dealing question are not of which ability impair do of the States to au- sovereign or federal —has the —state system.” effectively in a federal function thority or “al- under either the “usual” (citations omitted) (internal quotation regulate constitutional tered” balance to omitted)). Here, PASPA does not marks sports gambling. Congress does have provide suggested federal standards authority regulate sports gambling approaches that states must consider case, when it itself. In this howev- does so regulation sports gambling. Rath- er, we are faced with the issue of whether er, strips any regulatory choice Furthermore, authority Congress regulate governments.9 from state regulate sports gambling. titles in FERC did “not while the PURPA how states correct, majority that the two "choices” I to discern the "room” that is asserts fail presented policy "repeal its to make their own accorded the states PASPA—to keep sports wagering. wagering complete It to me that the [or] ban seems completely unregu- sports wagering” only choice to allow ban on much room —“leave (a policy.” sports wagering for the own lated result that states to make their foster), 233.) certainly (Maj. Op. majority's Even did not intend to ban if reading affording sports wagering completely. of PASPA as these choices Thus, rejection of involving our Delaware’s “sover- or affecting interstate commerce solution, eign argument bearing provide status” has no on and wishes to a policy Furthermore, regulate may itself, activity the issue before us. Mar- commercial York, case, see New provides guidance kell no this be- even activity cause there we addressed the mean- commerce, involves interstate see ing of statutory exception to PASPA Reno, 666; relating grandfathered states found at Baker, 514, 108 S.Ct. 1355. In 3704(a)(1). Markell, 28 U.S.C. 579 F.3d. addition, Congress may provide states a pass at 300-01. We did not upon the issue *40 about implement choice whether to state Congress may constitutionally of whether regulations consistent with federal stan restrict can regulate how states under dards or let regulation preempt 3702(1). § law, Hodel, 288, state see 101 sum, In no supports permitting case law 2352, require states ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‍to “con Congress to policy objec achieve federal sider” federal approaches standards or tives dictating regulate how states regulation in deciding regulate how sports gambling. directly regu Instead of area, FERC, pre-emptible see at U.S. lating state activities interstate com 765-66, Furthermore, 102 S.Ct. 2126. merce, PASPA to control or “seek[s] influ Congress may “encourage regu State to the manner regulate ence in which States York, a particular way,” late in private parties,” Supreme a distinction the 2408, at in areas —even recognized significant. Court has See I, outside the scope Congress’s Article Reno, (inter 150, 120 U.S. at S.Ct. 666 powers by “attaching] conditions — omitted) (“In Baker, quotation nal marks funds,” receipt of federal South Dako upheld prohibited we statute that States Dole, ta v. 483 U.S. 107 S.Ct. issuing from unregistered bonds because (1987). But, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 what Tegulate[d] activities,’ the law state rather Congress may “regulate not do is state ‘seekfing] than to control or influence the governments’ York, regulation.” See New manner in which regulate private States S.Ct. 2408. Whether ” Baker, parties.’ (quoting 514- commanding machinery use of state York, 1355)); see also New regulate or commanding the nonuse of (“The U.S S.Ct. 2408 allo machinery to regulate, state the power cation of contained in the Com explicit” Court “has been that “the Consti merce Congress Clause authorizes to tution has been never understood to confer directly; interstate commerce upon Congress the ability require the Congress does not authorize to regulate govern according Congress’ States to governments’ regulation state of interstate instructions.” Id. at 112 S.Ct. 2408. commerce.”). Because that exactly what PASPA does Moreover, here, I the principles no conclude violates legal principle exists for federalism articulated in New finding York and a distinction between the federal Therefore, I Printz. would reverse government compelling governments granting summary District Court’s order to exercise them sovereignty to enact or judgment per Plaintiffs and vacate the hand, enforce laws the one and restrict- injunction. manent governments exercising sovereignty enact or enforce laws on the other. both scenarios the feder- government

al regulating how states

regulate. problem If identifies Id. notes mostly foregoing. but consistent with the

Case Details

Case Name: National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Sep 17, 2013
Citation: 730 F.3d 208
Docket Number: 13-1713, 13-1714, 13-1715
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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