Nasedra K. Lumpkin v. Attorney General, State of Florida, 703 F. App'x 715

Plaintiff Nasedra Lumpkin, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a § 1985 complaint alleging a conspiracy by state actors (Florida, the Attorney General, two assistant prosecutors, and a state judge) to violate his constitutional rights by filing an unlawful charging instrument and affidavit and by tainting the jury.
Lumpkin was granted in forma pauperis status in district court; the district court screened and dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
The district court did not specify a § 1985 subsection; Lumpkin’s complaint lacked allegations of preventing an officer from performing duties and did not allege racial or other class-based discriminatory animus.
The court construed Lumpkin’s pleadings liberally and considered potential § 1983 claims but found legal barriers: the State is not a “person” under § 1983; the judge has absolute judicial immunity; prosecutors and the Attorney General have prosecutorial immunity for initiating prosecution and presenting the State’s case.
Lumpkin’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, bringing Heck v. Humphrey bar to his § 1983 claim.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed dismissal, concluding amendment would be futile.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1915 screening applied	Lumpkin challenged application of § 1915	Defendants applied § 1915 because Lumpkin was a prisoner proceeding IFP	Court: § 1915 applied and screening proper
Whether complaint states a claim under § 1985	Lumpkin alleged a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights (unlawful charging instrument, tainted jury)	Complaint lacks allegations of preventing officer duties, federal-court testimony deterrence, or class-based discriminatory animus	Court: No viable § 1985 claim under any subsection
Whether § 1983 claim can proceed against named defendants	Lumpkin asserted constitutional torts against State and state officials	State is not a § 1983 “person”; judge and prosecutors are immune for judicial/prosecutorial acts	Court: § 1983 claim fails due to Eleventh Circuit precedent and absolute/prosecutorial immunity
Whether § 1983 claim is barred by Heck	Lumpkin seeks relief that would imply conviction invalidity	Defendants assert Heck bar applies	Court: Heck bars § 1983 relief because success would necessarily invalidate conviction

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997) (standard of review for § 1915 dismissals parallels Rule 12(b)(6))
Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015) (accept factual allegations as true on motion to dismiss)
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008) (liberal construction of pro se pleadings)
McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing scope of § 1985(2) regarding federal-court testimony)
Childree v. UAP/GA AG Chem., 92 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 1996) (§ 1985(3) requires class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus)
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2005) (judicial immunity applies unless judge acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (States are not "persons" under § 1983)
Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity for conduct in initiating prosecution and presenting the case)
Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) (§ 1983 claims implying invalidity of conviction are barred)
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 91 S. Ct. 1790 (1971) (discussing intent to deprive equal protection as element for § 1985(3))