*1 ruling, court’s with the district Consistent therefore, Henry MITCHELL, focused Greene properly appellants,
the Plaintiff-Appellant, by the upon alleged errors committed the analysis. in its constitutional district court circumstances, aware I am not these Under FARCASS, Superintendent, Hendry Dave theories, equity, or principles of any legal Institution, King, Inspec- Correctional J. rules, appellate including cited those Hendry Institution, De- tor Correctional majority’s waiver majority, support fendants-Appellees. position. No. 96-3026. appellants suffi I that the Since conclude Appeals, States Court of United money damages claim ciently their raised Eleventh Circuit. properly allеged that such complaint, their consequence direct of an damages were the 6,May 1997. and ad policy, properly and
unconstitutional challenged appellate briefs
equately their only during argument oral issue
and by the dis
actually addressed and decided court, agree appellants I cannot that the
trict damages money claim waived their
have Consequently, I reach the appeal. would arguments raised
merits of the constitutional would, necessary, if remand this case hearing to the district court for matter legal relat
on all relevant factual and issues money appellants’ claim for dama to the
ges.7 legally responsible prayer delivered at cognizant of the fact that the constitution- I am policy dispositive ality graduation." is appellants’ of thе instant this court con- If money damages. Even if this court were subject issue of policy did not survive cluded that unconstitutional, subject policy to find that the scrutiny, re- would then constitutional the court automatically appellants would not be enti- damages the district court. issue to mand Rather, damages. appellants money tled to remand, appellees appellants and both the On alleged prove, they as would still be opportunity argue the merits would have the complaint, prayer that the delivered in their appellants’ damages After review- claim. of ing graduation given a result of the Mandarin was hearing argu- relevant all of the evidence subject policy. appellants appellees, the from the ments the instant this court were to conclude that If wheth- would determine district court thereafter unconstitutional, contrary policy appellees, money appellants were er the entitled otherwise, majority’s would have assertion damages they requested. have they ample opportunity “argue were
Henry Mitchell, Miami, FL, pro Greene se. Djurie, Sutherland, Nikola Richard Asbill Brennan, Atlanta, GA, & Plaintiff-Appel- lant. Hubener, Attorney
Louis F. General’s Of- fice, Tallahassee, FL, Herwig, Barbara L. Maier, Justice, Peter R. Dept, Wash- DC, ington, Defendants-Appellees. HATCHETT, Judge, Before Chief ANDERSON, *, Judge, Circuit LAY Judge. Senior Circuit * Lay, Honorable Donald P. Senior U.S. Circuit tion. Circuit, Judge Eighth sitting designa-
HATCHETT, eighty other Judge: around inmates had submitted Chief requests “asking question per- the same action, rights civil In this taining subject.” provisions of the challenges to we consider Act of 1995 Litigation Reform Prison following day, January (“PLRA” Act”), Title VIII of the or “the employee report told Mitchell to to “C-Build- *3 Ap Rescissions and Omnibus Consolidated arrival, Upon ing.” his Mitchell met with Act Pub.L. No. propriations Farcass, other in- HCI officials and another 26,1996). (Apr. We hold that: 110 Stat. 1321 possession mate. Farcass had his (1) at 28 provisions of the codified requests concerning chaplaincy inmate 1915(e)(2) apply pending to eases U.S.C. services, including request. Mitchell’s passage; prior to the Aсt’s guesses requested Mitchell that the officials not violate the requirements of the PLRA do presence at his and the other inmate’s equal protection; guarantee Constitution’s meeting they because considered the two to extent the PLRA’s fee re inmates “to be the leaders.” Farcass told Ap quirements conflict with Federal Rule of requests up- the inmates that the amount of 24(a), provisions the Act’s pellate Procedure charged set him and that “some one could be control; Federal Rule Civil Farcass, however, [inciting with a riot.” 12(b)(6) govern our review of dis standards also told Mitchell and the other inmate that 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); under section missals “meeting pre- was to аddress the issue dismissing court erred district requests” they sented and that “were appellant’s First Amendment retaliation being charged anything, ... not were 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). claim under section going get up, to locked were not [and] going get Farcass in- transferred.” I. BACKGROUND pro- formed the inmates that officials had to January appellant Hemy On paperwork representatives cess in order for Mitchell, prisoner proceeding pro a Florida begin visiting from black churches to HCI. se, pursuant to 42 initiated this lawsuit day, January employ- The next an HCI Farcass, against Super- Dave report chaplain, ee told Mitchell to Hendry Institu- intendent of the Correctional up meeting chaplain, Mitсhell wound with the (“HCI”), King, inspector at tion and J. chaplain superinten- assistant and assistant granted HCI. The district court Mitchell's superintendent dent of HCI. The assistant proceed pauperis motion to in forma purpose meeting stated that the was (“IFP”). complaint alleges the fol- Mitchell’s chaplain explain procedures lowing factual scenario. they comply churches had to with before Mitchell, then an In late December provide religious permitted could be ser- HCI, Naples, inmate at wrote a letter to the During meeting, someone vices HCI. Florida office of the National Association superintendent called the assistant from the People in which the Advancement of Colored super- Upon returning, room. the assistant complained religious he about the services King reported that Farcass and intendent copies of HCI. Mitchell also sent this letter placed Mitchell in administrative had ordered to several officials of Florida’s correctional investigated officials confinement while HCI system, including January Farcass. On inciting responsible for whether he was request an inmate Mitchell submitted riot. Farcass, explain “why him asking no placed being allowed to HCI officials Mitchell administra- black culture churches were day. offi- [S]panish culture tive confinement that same When [HCI] come into likе the brought property, his he found and the white churches.” In this cials Mitchell churches legal that his materials had been “smashed” request, Mitchell claimed that HCI’s reli- Later, evening, three gious comply provi- with the and “crushed.” services did cell, officers entered Mitchell’s Florida Administrative Code that correctional sion back, and handcuffed him behind his governs chaplaincy services at state correc- Mitchell, property. legal work and According to “smashed” his tional institutions. Thereafter, Mitchell submitted another in- II. DISCUSSION Farcass, request asking mate this time placed “protective manage- he be A. ment” because he feared further retaliation The first issue we аddress is whether
from the HCI staff.
1915(e)(2) applies
section
pending
cases
King
Mitchell asserts that Farcass and
prior to the enactment of the PLRA. The
First, Fifth,
rights
breached his
under the
district court’s determination of this issue
Amendments;
Eighth and Fourteenth
he
law;
was one of
we review it under the de
monetary
18,1996,
seeks
relief. On June
E.g.,
novo standard.
City
Goldsmith v.
complaint.
district court addressed Mitchell’s
Atmore,
Cir.1993).
status,
Recognizing Mitchell’s IFP
the court
pleading
assessed his
under the
passage
PLRA,
Prior to the
section
*4
804(a)
section
PLRA
that are now
permitted
a court to dismiss a case
1915(e)(2).
§
codified at 28 U.S.C.
The court
authorized under that section if “satisfied
held,
reading
complaint
Plaintiffs
“[a]fter
that the actiоn is
or
frivolous malicious.” 28
fashion,”
a liberal
“prove
Mitchell could
1915(d) (1994).
§
As amended
support
no set of facts in
of his claim that
PLRA, however,
provides
section 1915 now
Therefore,
him
would entitle
to relief.”
that a
any
court “shall dismiss the case at
court
complaint
dismissed Mitchell’s
sua
time” if it determines that
the “action or
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1
sponte pursuant
to section
“(i)
appeal”
(ii)
malicious;
frivolous or
fails
Thereafter, Mitchell moved in the district
to
may
state
claim on which relief
31,
proceed
appeal.
July
court to
IFP on
On
(iii)
granted;
monetary
or
seeks
relief
(thus
granted
the court
the motion
against a defendant who is immune from
allowing
proceed
prepay-
Mitchell to
without
1915(e)(2)(B)
§
such relief.”
28 U.S.C.A.
appellate docketing
the entire
and
$105
(West
stated,
Supp.1997). As
the district
fee)
filing
applied
filing
provi-
and
fee
complaint
dismissed Mitchell’s
under
804(a),
sions of PLRA section
see 28
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
section
(b) (West
1915(a),
§
Supp.1997).
U.S.C.A.
result,
As a
the court ordered Mitchell to
Products,
“Landgraf v. USI Film
511 U.S.
payment
equal
tender
twenty
a fee
to
(1994),
B.
time
amount
of the court each
clerk
filing
account
until
filing
$10
exceeds
next consider whether the
We
paid.
fees are
provisions of the
withstand
fee
Act,
filing
shall
In no
fee collected
most of which
event
concern
conditions
permitted
many
of fees
routinely
exceed the amount
of which
are
dismissed
frivolous.”).
of a civil
Clearly,
statute for the commencement
legally
had
appeal
action or an
of a civil action or
require-
rational basis to believe that the fee
judgment.
criminal
objec-
ments
thе PLRA
further
would
recently
As the
tive.
Sixth Circuit
found:
prisoner
prohib-
In no
shall a
event
bringing
appeal-
ited from
a civil action or
Congress sought
place
put
economic
judgment
a civil
criminal
prompt
prisoners
incentives
would
reason that
has no assets
“stop
filing
and think”
a complaint.
before
pay
partial
no means
which
the initial
Congress’s
for placing
rationale
the fee
filing fee.
requirements
prisoners
captured
on
1915(b) (West
Supp.1997).
28 U.S.C.A.
Kyi:
the statements of Senator
Mitchell
contends
the PLRA’s
require
prisoners
Section
will
requirements
equal protection
fee
fail
ration
very
large
pay
small share of the
al
deny
pro
basis
thus
him
review and
due
they plаce
judi-
burden
the Federal
cess under the Fifth
“The
Amendment.2
system by paying
cial
a small
step
determining
legislation
first
whether
upon commencement of lawsuits.
In do-
scrutiny
identifying
survives rational-basis
ing so,
provision
will deter frivolous
legitimate
government purpose
goal—
—a
monetary
inmate
The modest
lawsuits.
enacting government body
which the
could
outlay
prisoners
will force
to think twice
pursuing.”
have been
City
Haves v.
Mia
just
about
ease and not
file reflexive-
mi,
(11th Cir.1995).
F.3d
“The
ly. Prisoners will have to make the
step
scrutiny
second
of rational-basis
asks
law-abiding
same decision that
Ameri-
whether a rational basis exists for the enact
cans must make: Is the lawsuit worth
ing governmental body to believe that
price?
Criminals should
giv-
not be
legislation
hypothesized
further
would
*6
special
privilege
en
that other Ameri-
Haves,
purpose.”
1489
digent [litigants]
indigent
enough
[liti-
not to
and all other
filing fee is small
The
gants]
nearly
identical to
a meritorious
the distinction
deter
claim,
yet large enough to deter frivo- made Rinaldi.”
filings.
multiple
claims and
lous
inapposite.
findWe
Rinaldi
Unlike the
25,
(daily
May
Cong.
141
ed.
Rec. S7526
here,
situation
case involved
“unrea-
(citations
1995) (statement
Kyi)
i.e.,
Sen.
distinction,”
could
soned
Court
omitted).
any justification
find
for the classification the
Rinaldi,
Jersey
New
statute made. See
384
Hampton,
In addition
106 F.3d
1286-87.
309-10,
U.S. at
at 1499-1500.
In
prisoners
“of
foregoing,
we note
PLRA, however,
enacting
had
hands that
free time on their
other
ten have
ample justification (e.g., prisoners often have
Gunn,
possess.” Roller v.
litigants do not
time,
nearly
an abundance
free
five in a
.of
Cir.1997).
(4th
Moreover,
107 F.3d
environment,
unique
cost-free
in-
have
unique
have
to file mer
prisoners
incentives
centives to file meritless or frivolous law-
lawsuits,
attempt
e.g., itless or frivolous
suits)
indigent
differentiating
between
in the
obtain a “short sabbatical
nearest fed
Roller,
prisoners
litigants.
and other
Beto,
courthouse,”
Cruz v.
405 U.S.
eral
at 234 n. 2.
F.3d
1079, 1084,
missals under Rule LAY, Judge, concurring: Senior Circuit complaint allegations as true. pleased I am Judge to concur in Chief E.g., Management Fla. v. South Water Dist. (1) opinion holding (11th Cir.1996). Hatchett’s excellent that Montalvo, F.3d provisions of the PLRA do not a “To state first amendment claim for re prisoner’s equal a protection rights, violate taliation, prisoner not allege a need violation procedural mechanism for separate of a and distinct constitutional (IFP) pawpеris dismissal of in suits forma right____ gist The of a retaliation claim 1915(e)(2)may §in applied found be retroac- penalized exercising that a however, I tively. separately, write to note Evans, right speech.” Thomas v. free my constitutionality concern as to the (11th Cir.1989). 1235, 1242 Bridges F.2d 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § sponte which allows sua Russell, (11th 757 F.2d Cir. complaint dismissal of an IFP that fails to 1985), we reversed dismissal com of a upon may grant- state claim which relief plaint alleged prisoner-appellant where the ed. him officials transferred facil another ity grievance against he because filed This pos- case comes us in an unusual supervisor alleging court, his work racial discrimi On ture. June the district duties; assignment natiоn in the process, summarily work without service of dis- actively encouraged sign other inmates pro complaint failing missed Mitchell’s se treatment; petition protest relief, of this applying to state claim for the dis- 12(b)(6). prepared grievance a similar on behalf of missal standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. On view, July another inmate. In our it granted does the district court appear beyond prove appeal IFP, doubt that assessing Mitchell can Mitchell leave him no set of pursuant facts would entitle him relief fees to the new 1915(b). only his Amendment claim for First retaliation. issues decided 1157; Bridges, 757 F.2d at see also Wild district court related whether Mitchell had Bracknell, 1467, 1468 berger v. F.2d filed sufficient to withstand dis- Newsome, Cir.1989); Wright v. January 28, missal under the new act. On (11th Cir.1986). Accordingly, reverse expedited appeal we this court ordered appointed district and remand for further Although counsel. issues re- proceedings on this garding the issue. PLRA were not raised briefed court, requested
in the district this court constitutionality III. counsel address CONCLUSION 1915(b), effect, any, and the if retroactive reasons, For foregoing we that: hold *8 1915(e)(2). §of amI informed that one of (1) provisions easily the PLRA’s the reasons court took this this action is that pass review; equal protection rational basis in several hundred cases the district courts to extent the those conflict awaiting of the Eleventh Circuit are a deci- Appellate with Federal Rule of constitutionality the retroactivity sion on and 24(a), controls; the PLRA the district addition, of the In PLRA. it should be obvi- court concluding was correct in that 28 liberty ous that the court took this because 1915(e)(2) case; § applied in this pro petitioner appeared this se in the district 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure court, and of importance because the of these govern standards our of review dismissals litigants. to all IFP issues 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); under section the and courts, district dismissing Litigants however, court erred in Mitchell’s and district First pursuant by Amendment retaliation claim not path should be confused the of this
1491
typically
respond
to
to
chal- were
not
constitutional
Additional
litigation.
Neitzke,
PLRA,
324, 109
I
including
one
the
490
these suits. See
U.S.
lenges
by
(“Dismissals
this
today, are
foreclosed
grounds
not
articulate
at 1831
on these
S.Ct.
concurring opin-
opinion. I write this
court’s
sponte prior to
are often made sua
the issu
my
the substance
to note
concern with
ion
process,
spare prospective
so as
ance of
ease,
I
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),used in this
which
§
expense
the inconvenience and
defendants
constitutionally
Since this
flawed.
feel
complaints.”).
answering
such
Section
its
issues on
raised the constitutional
court
1915(d)’s successor,
1915(e), ap
§
28 U.S.C.
own,
opinion
be
it
to me our
should
seems
plied
complaint,
here to Mitchell’s
allows
еxpanded
consider this additional constitu-
complaint
sponte
a
not
courts
dismiss
sua
tional concern.
frivolousness,
only
for
for
but also
failure to
section,
my
Congress
in
that
this
It is
view
granted.
a claim which
can be
state
relief
indigents1
other
deprived prisoners and
has
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).2
§
While courts
28 U.S.C.
procedural right that noninst
significant
aof
seemingly
recognized that this
innocu
have
enjoy,
has
paying litigants
itutionalized
change
significant expansion
is a
ous
justification
rational
for
provided
not
see,
power,
e.g., Douglas DeBruyn,
v.
court’s
treatment.
differential
(S.D.Ind.1996),
F.Supp.
4
579 n.
936
of the IFP stat
nothing
legislative history
the earlier version
in
Under
the
the stat
ute,
empowered and
the
court was
district
wаs aware of the
ute indicates
application sua
an IFP
instructed to dismiss
meaning
change.
Cong
real
or
if
was frivolous
sponte
it deemed
suit
(daily
Sept.
ed.
Rec. S14413-S14419
1915(d) (1994).
§
This
malicious. 28 U.S.C.
1995);
(daily
Cong.
Rec. S7525-S7527
ed.
prin
with the established
rule was in accord
25,1995).
May
may
patently
ciple that a
frivolous
The difference between dismissal
frivo-
subject
juris
want of
matter
be dismissed
for failure to state a
lousness
dismissal
12(b)(1). Neitzke
Fed.R.Civ.P.
diction under
by
Supreme
in
explained
was
Court
claim
6, 109
Williams,
n.
490 U.S.
S.Ct.
v.
1915(d)
Neitzke,
interpreted §
which
(1989) (cit
1827, 1832 n.
tections
unwarranted dismissal
are not
fail
frivolous but nonetheless
to state
erally
paying plaintiffs
accorded
under the
simply
justified
a claim
cannot be
when
330, 109
Federal Rules.” 490 U.S.
S.Ct. at weighed against
procedural right
IFP
1834.
litigants are
Depriving
group
dеnied.
one
of
right
retaining
this
while
it for another
protection
that
recognized
from
Neitzke
opposition
stands in stark
to established
sponte
for
sua
dismissal
failure to state a
principles
equal
of
access to courts for all
meaningful right:
claim is a
litigants,
original pur
which of course is the
12(b)(6),
plaintiff
a
Under Rule
an
with
pose
§
Coppedge
behind 28 U.S.C. 1915. See
arguable
ordinarily
claim is
no-
accorded
States,
447,
438,
v. United
pending
369 U.S.
82 S.Ct.
tice of
motion to
for
dismiss
917, 922,
(1962) (noting
21
opportunity
failure to state a claim and an
L.Ed.2d
that the
purpose
amend
before the motion
of the IFP statute
“to
was
assure
upon.
procedures
is ruled
These
him equality
alert
litigants”);
of consideratiоn for all
legal theory underlying
the defen-
Yeager,
Rinaldi v.
384 U.S.
cf.
challenge,
meaning-
enable him
dant’s
1497,
(1966) (rul
1500,
S.Ct.
district evil world “a dark and
prison conditions to be the free world” alien to
completely evidence”). While supported
“amply are a burden lawsuits
many prisoner judicial system, limited over and to
state serves as a deterrent by the courts
view abuse might otherwise authorities who necessary also as a power, and serves
their con provide humane to them to
inducement prisoners.4
ditions America, STATES
UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellee, Defendan-Appellant. GUNBY, L.
Chester
No. 94-8334. Appeals, Court
United States
Eleventh Circuit.
May (1996). process inherent The adversarial Judge the Second Circuit Jon Newman of 4. Chief litigation a claim challenged failure to state courts for dismissal for has standard letting large num- challenge. them to “avoid meeting suits before tool in is a useful appeals impair complaints and ber of frivolous Neitzke, S.Ct. at 1834. U.S. at mer- of the few conscientious consideration their justification provided a rational has Jon O. New- that are filed.” Hon. itorious cases and differentiat- denying this tool the courts man, Looking Litigation: Nee- Pro Se Prisoner nonindigent litigants. indigent between Haystacks, Brook. L.Rev. dles in