Murray Hooper v. David Shinn, 985 F.3d 594

Background

On Dec. 31, 1980, Murray Hooper and two others forced entry into the Redmond home; two victims were killed, one survived (Marilyn) who identified Hooper and others at lineups and at trial.
Hooper was tried (with Bracy), convicted on all counts including two first‑degree murders, and sentenced to death; the sentencing judge relied in part on Hooper’s 1981 Illinois convictions.
At trial the prosecution delayed disclosure of arrest photos and police reports relating to three other black men (the Bradfords and Ward) and failed to disclose certain post‑trial benefits paid to key witness Arnold Merrill.
Hooper pursued state and federal postconviction relief over decades; the Arizona courts rejected his Brady and sentencing claims; Hooper later obtained vacatur of his Illinois convictions in federal court, prompting renewed federal litigation.
In federal habeas proceedings Hooper raised (certified): Brady nondisclosure claims (photos/reports/Merrill benefits), a request to amend to challenge his death sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because of reliance on now‑invalid Illinois convictions, and a Martinez claim to excuse procedural default of an IAC sentencing claim; he also sought to expand COA to shackling/waiver claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas: AEDPA limited review of some Brady claims; on the merits the withheld/delayed evidence was not material; amendment to add Eighth/Fourteenth claim was futile; Martinez did not excuse default because the IAC claim lacked merit; COA expansion denied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hooper)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Brady nondisclosure — Merrill benefits (undisclosed payments/assistance to witness)	Nondisclosure of benefits was favorable impeachment evidence and material; would have undermined Merrill’s credibility and the verdict	Benefits were cumulative of extensive impeachment already presented; nondisclosure not material	AEDPA bars federal relief as state court reasonably applied Brady/Agurs; even de novo the benefits were immaterial given overwhelming evidence and heavy impeachment of Merrill
Brady delayed disclosure — photos & police reports re: Bradfords and Ward	Delay prevented more effective use to impeach ID and to build an alternative-suspect defense; prejudice from timing	Reports/photos were provided during trial and defense used them; no Brady prejudice from delay	AEDPA prevents review of some aspects; on de novo review delay was not material because defense had opportunity to use the materials and Marilyn’s ID and other evidence made reversal unlikely
Motion to amend to add Eighth/Fourteenth claim (death sentence based on invalid Illinois convictions)	Death sentence unconstitutional where an invalid aggravator was relied on; vacatur of Illinois convictions requires resentencing	Even if Illinois convictions were invalid, other valid aggravators remained and no mitigators — death sentence would stand under Arizona law	Amendment would be futile; state court properly performed harmless‑error/reweighing and two valid aggravators plus no mitigation meant no reasonable probability of a lesser sentence
Martinez — excuse procedural default of IAC sentencing claim (failure to present mitigation)	Initial collateral counsel was ineffective for not raising trial‑level IAC, so Martinez permits federal review; IAC was substantial	Post‑conviction counsel was not ineffective because the underlying trial‑level IAC lacks merit; without a substantial IAC claim Martinez does not apply	Martinez inapplicable: Hooper cannot show Strickland prejudice at trial level (mitigation now proffered is weak and speculative), so Seplow’s omission did not constitute cause to excuse default
Shackling & waiver-of‑presence claims (COA expansion)	Shackling was not based on an individualized determination and was visible; this coerced waiver of presence at voir dire	Trial court’s restraint decision was reasonable given record; no evidence jurors saw shackles; claim was rejected on direct appeal	COA not expanded: state court’s shackling finding was reasonable, no evidence of visible restraints, and the waiver theory fails if shackling was proper

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable, material evidence)
Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (materiality standard and categories of nondisclosure requests)
Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (definition of "reasonable probability" that nondisclosure affected outcome)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor must disclose deals/benefits given to witnesses)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (cumulative-materiality review of suppressed evidence)
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (harmless‑error/reweighing when an invalid aggravator is found)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (due process test for prejudicial evidence at capital sentencing)
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108 (2016) (Romano test reaffirmed; no automatic vacatur for improperly admitted sentencing evidence)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (when ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims must be raised in initial collateral review, ineffective post‑conviction counsel can establish "cause")
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for counsel ineffectiveness)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (prejudice inquiry requires reweighing aggravation against available mitigation)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for habeas relief for trial error: "substantial and injurious effect")
O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) ("grave doubt" harmless‑error standard)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (judge may not find death‑eligibility aggravators in lieu of jury)