Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.
138 S. Ct. 1461
SCOTUS2018Background
- PASPA (28 U.S.C. §3701 et seq.) barred States from "sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], license, or authorize by law" sports‑betting schemes and allowed civil suits (AG and sports organizations) to enjoin violations; it did not criminalize sports betting.
- PASPA contained grandfather clauses for preexisting state activity (Nevada casinos, some state pools) and a one‑year option for New Jersey to legalize sports betting in Atlantic City.
- New Jersey voters amended the state constitution and the legislature enacted laws in 2012 and 2014 legalizing certain sports wagering at casinos and racetracks (2014 law framed as a partial repeal of prohibitions).
- Professional leagues and the NCAA sued New Jersey under PASPA; lower courts held the 2014 law violated PASPA’s ban on state authorization/licensing of sports gambling and rejected New Jersey’s anticommandeering defense.
- The Supreme Court took the case to decide (1) whether repeals/partial repeals count as "authorization" under PASPA and (2) whether PASPA’s anti‑authorization and anti‑licensing provisions violate the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering doctrine; the Court ultimately invalidated those provisions and found PASPA nonseverable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (NCAA / sports leagues) | Defendant's Argument (New Jersey / petitioners) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does repeal or partial repeal of state prohibitions "authorize" sports gambling under PASPA? | Repeals that result in permitting organized sports betting amount to authorization. | "Authorize" requires affirmative enabling action; a mere repeal does not equal state authorization. | Repeal or partial repeal that permits sports betting does constitute state "authorization." |
| Does PASPA’s ban on state authorization/licensing commandeer state legislatures in violation of the Tenth Amendment? | PASPA is a permissible federal regulation of commerce; it does not command states to take affirmative action. | PASPA unconstitutionally dictates what states may or may not legislate and thus commandeers state lawmaking. | PASPA’s prohibitions on state authorization and licensing violate the anticommandeering rule. |
| Can PASPA’s anti‑authorization provision be saved as a form of federal preemption? | The provision operates to regulate private actors via preemption and is therefore valid. | — | The provision cannot be understood as regulation of private actors and is not a valid exercise of preemption. |
| If anti‑authorization/anti‑licensing are invalid, are other PASPA provisions severable? | Some provisions (e.g., those regulating private actors) can survive. | The statute should be preserved to the extent possible. | The Court held no challenged provision is severable; PASPA as enacted cannot stand once those provisions are struck. |
Key Cases Cited
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal statute cannot commandeer state legislative processes)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (federal government may not compel state officers to administer federal regulatory programs)
- South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (federal tax law affecting state bonds distinguished from commandeering)
- Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (federal regulation may apply to States and private actors evenhandedly)
- Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (cooperative federalism—choice to implement federal program did not commandeer)
- FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (limited direction to state utility commissions not equivalent to commandeering)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (field preemption explained; federal regulation can displace state regulation)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress has authority under Commerce Clause to regulate certain intrastate economic activity)