939 F.3d 72
2d Cir.2019Background:
- Randy Mudge, a New York–licensed teacher, received a one‑year suspension of his licenses after a Part 83 proceeding finding past sexual misconduct with former students.
- Middleburgh Central School District hired Mudge as a substitute in 2011 despite knowledge of the prior suspension; he later became a permanent substitute.
- NYSED employees Daniel Harder (OSPRA attorney) and Anne Zugalla (investigator) sought Mudge’s Middleburgh employment application and sent a February 2012 letter stating NYSED had “commenced an investigation.”
- Harder reviewed the application, concluded no basis for a new investigation (application did not require disclosure of prior suspension), but NYSED did not notify Middleburgh it would not pursue the matter.
- Following NYSED’s contact and public Board discussion, Middleburgh removed Mudge from its substitute list and he has since been unable to secure comparable public‑school employment; Mudge sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) procedural due process (deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to use his teaching license) and (2) a stigma‑plus claim.
- The district court denied qualified immunity; on interlocutory appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding the asserted rights were not clearly established and directing entry of summary judgment for the defendants.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mudge was denied procedural due process by being prevented from meaningfully using his teaching license | Mudge: NYSED’s investigation/letter interfered with his right to a "meaningful opportunity" to seek employment under his license | Zugalla/Harder: No clearly established constitutional right existed; thus qualified immunity applies | Court: Right not clearly established in Supreme Court/2d Circuit; qualified immunity applies; summary judgment for defendants |
| Whether NYSED’s notice that it had "commenced an investigation" constituted a sufficiently derogatory, public statement to support a stigma‑plus claim | Mudge: The statement implied new sexual misconduct, harmed reputation, caused termination, and blocked reemployment | Zugalla/Harder: Mere notice of an internal investigation without details or false factual allegation is not clearly stigmatizing; no clearly established law defeated immunity | Court: Not clearly established that such a notice supports stigma‑plus; defendants entitled to qualified immunity; summary judgment for defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (establishes qualified immunity standard)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (contours of clearly established rights)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (prongs of qualified immunity and sequencing)
- Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (state law property interests vs. federal due process)
- Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (limits on "liberty" interest from non‑rehire)
- Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241 (2d Cir.) (district court holdings insufficient to clearly establish federal right)
- Simon v. City of New York, 893 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.) (what sources count to clearly establish law)
- Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.) (elements of stigma‑plus claim)
- Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.) (proximate relationship between stigma and adverse action)
- Donato v. Plainview‑Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623 (2d Cir.) (stigma interfering with professional practice)