*1 DIVISION WATER &GAS al. et LIGHT, MEMPHIS CRAFT et al. 1, 1978 May 2, 1977 Decided Argued November 76-39.
No. *2 BreNNAN, which Court, opinion of J., delivered Powell, J., SteveNS, joined. JJ., BlackmuN, Marshall, White, Stewart, J., Rehnquist, J., Burger, C. in which dissenting opinion, filed p. 22. post, joined, a brief filed the cause Jr., argued Graves, M. Frierson petitioners. With respondents. cause argued Daniel M. Thomas * Mayor Bruce Taubman Elliot were brief on the him *3 the Court. of opinion the delivered Powell Me. Justice home- by §C. U. under brought action is an This injunctive declaratory and seeking Tenn., Memphis, in owners of several and utility municipal a against damages relief utility service of termination employees officers its Court District The law. of due without allegedly to continued of entitlement claim respondents’ determined protected interest “property” a implicate not did utility service the event, that, in Amendment, Fourteenth the process. comported procedures utility’s termination certiorari granted We part. in reversed Appeals of Court importance question constitutional this consider Nation. throughout utilities municipal operation I is a (MLG&W)1 Division Water Gas Light, Memphis service. provides which Memphis city division Churches of the Council for the National brief Sive filed * David curiae. amicus as Christ District petitioners, one of is listed Although MLG&W municipality “a because utility itself as to the action dismissed within 'person’ not is capacity standing in that unit governmental did Appeals The Court for Cert. Pet. meaning” of 1983. § It is directed by a Board of Commissioners appointed by City Council, and subject to the ultimate control of municipal government. As a municipal utility, MLG&W enjoys a statutory exemption from regulation by the state public service commission. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 6-1306, 6-1317 (1971).
Willie S. and Mary Craft, respondents here,2 reside at 1019 Alaska Street in Memphis. When the Crafts moved into their residence in October 1972, they noticed that there were two separate gas and electric meters and only one water meter serving the premises. The residence had been used previously as duplex. The Crafts on assumed, the basis of information from the seller, that the second set of meters inoperative.
In 1973, the Crafts began receiving two bills: their regular bill, and a second bill with an account number in the name of Willie C. Craft, as opposed to Willie S. Craft. Separate monthly bills were received for each set of meters, with a city service fee3 appearing on each bill. In October 1973, after learning from a MLG&W meter reader that both sets of meters were running their home, the Crafts private hired a plumber and electrical contractor to combine the meters into gas one and one electric meter. Because the contractor did not con solidate the meters properly, a condition of which the Crafts were not aware, they continued to receive two bills Jan until *4 disturb that determination, respondents and have sought not review of the point in this Court. The individual petitioners, who are sued in both their official personal and capacities, are utility’s the president and general manager, vice president, members of the Board of Commissioners, and two employees who have had responsibility for terminating utility services. They will be referred to throughout as either “MLG&W” “petitioners.” or 2 Of those brought who the original action, only the Crafts remain. The parties sought have not review in this Court of the rulings made below with respect to the other plaintiffs. city The service fee separate ais item on regular the utility bill, as required by municipal ordinance. service Crafts’- the period, During this
uary nonpayment. for five times terminated was to went and work missed Craft occasions, Mrs. several On billing” “double the resolve to order offices MLG&W the sought Craft Mrs. Court, District by the found As problem. billing,” the “double cause the determine to faith in good explanation satisfactory a obtain to unable was but employees. MLG&W from recourse further for suggestion noted: court The to attempting was Craft Mrs. when occasion one
“On called notice, she final after termination, utilities a avert a paid had she explained offices and defendant’s the for an procedure The no satisfaction. given but was bill, adequately was management with talk opportunity tried repeatedly she although Craft, Mrs. explained bills two problems for the explanation some get 38-39. Cert. for Pet. charges.” duplicate possible customers MLG&W other Crafts February In District Western for the Court District in the this action filed certify refused District trial, After of Tennessee. defendants. judgment rendered class plaintiffs’ plaintiffs view of the was apparently court Although while utility service continued interest property no had addressed nevertheless it unpaid, remained bill disputed respond- acknowledged It issue. process due procedural procedure aof notice adequate given not been had ents concluded but management, with bills disputed discussing deprived [a] [was] plaintiffs individual of the that “[n]one circumstances did nor heard, to be possible in the except deprivation any substantial indicate court The Id., 45.4 Craft.” Mrs. of Mr. instance explanation, little advanced conclusion Court’s District In program. extension credit MLG&W’s reference than other pro- utility’s description offered opinion discussion, the earlier *5 expressed “hope,” “whether on the principles [pend- ent] jurisdiction, or on the basis a very possible limited denial of due process to Mr. and Mrs. Craft,” that credit in amount $35 be issued to reimburse the Crafts for “duplicate and unnecessary charges made and expenses cedures. First, the court listed steps involved in a termination: (i) Approximately days four after a meter reading date, a bill is mailed to the service location or other designated address by the customer. The day last to pay the net amount would be approximately days after the date, meter reading (ii) Approximately days after the meters read, a “final notice” is mailed stating that services will be disconnected within days four payment if no is received or provision other made, for payment is (iii) Electric service is then terminated the meter reader, unless the customer assures him payment is in the mail, shows paid receipt, or explains that nonpayment was due to illness. If there is no communication prior to termination, the meter reader or serviceman is instructed to leave cutoff notice giving 8/ service, information about restoration of (iv) Ap- proximately days five after the electric service cutoff, the remaining services are terminated if the customer has paid the bill or made other arrangements payment. Pet. for Cert. 34-35. The court also noted that on or about March 1973, MLG&W insti- tuted an payment “extended plan.” This generous program allows cus- tomers able to demonstrate financial hardship to pay only one-half of a past due bill with the balance to paid equal installments over the next three bills. plaintiffs in this action were participants in the plan. Id., at 36. Finally, the court observed that provided MLG&W procedure resolution disputed bills: “Credit counselors assist customers who have difficulty with payments or disputes concerning their bills with MLG&W. If those counselors satisfy cannot the customer, then the customer is referred to management personnel; generally the chief clerk in the department; then the super- visor in credit and collection. In addition, a dissatisfied appeal to the Board of Commissioners of MLG&W as to complaints regarding bills, service, termination of service or other matter relating operation of the Division. A customer may, if he so desires, be accompanied by an appropriate representative. The billing of customers, the determination as to when a final notice sent, and the termination of service governed by [are] policies, rules regulations adopted and approved by the Board of Commissioners of MLG&W.” Id., at 36-37.
7
should
which
to terminations
respect
with
by [them]
incurred
them
afforded
been
relief
effectual
unnecessary had
been
have
MLG&W
“that
recommended
also
court
requested.”
of
notice
mail
registered
or
certified
a
send
future
the
in
and that
termination,”
to
days prior
four
least
at
termination
customer
about
information
specific
more
“provide
notice
such
extended
out
work
available
personnel
and
locations
service
hard-
genuine
in
accounts
of
adjustments
or
plans
payment
46-47.5
at
Id.,
situations.”
appropriate
or
ships
Circuit
Sixth
the
for
Appeals
of
Court
the
appeal,
On
action,
class
certify a
refusal
Court’s
District
the
affirmed
not
did
Crafts
the
accorded
procedures
the
held
but
(1976).
684
F. 2d
534
process.
due
comport
in
certiorari
of
writ
a
sought
petitioners
1976,
12,
July
On
policies
termination
whether
(i)
to determine
this
under
action”
“state
constitute
municipal
of a
municipal
a
whether
so,
if
(ii)
Amendment;
Fourteenth
deprives
nonpayment
service
of
termination
utility’s
Due
meaning
within
“property”
action”
“state
assuming
(iii)
Clause;
Process
afforded
procedures
MLG&W’s
whether
interest,
“property”
we
1977,
22,
February
On
case.6
this
in
of law
affirm.
nowWe
certiorari,
1090.
U. S.
granted
II
Although
mootness.
question
outset,
at
is,
There
briefs,
their
question
this
not addressed
have
parties
power
judicial
invoke
stipulation
not
“they
actual
present
does
which
litigation
States
United
acknowledged that
court
1974, the
on December
filed
order
its
In
new
some
“instituted
credit
recommended
issued
had
defendants
customers
notice
adequate
definitive
give more
will
which
procedures
n.
Id.,
See
infra.
49.
services.”
cut-off
impending
possible
is not
action”
“state
contention
their
have abandoned
Petitioners
Petitioners
Brief
case.
in this
present
‘case or controversy,' Richardson v. Ramirez,
As the case comes
us,
the only remaining plaintiffs are
respondents Willie S. and Mary Craft. Since the Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court’s refusal to certify a class,
the existence of a continuing “case or controversy” depends
entirely on the claims of respondents. Cf.
Iowa,
Sosna
*7
supra, at 399, 402.
It appears that
respondents no longer
desire a
hearing
resolve a continuing dispute over their bills,
as the double-meter problem has been clarified during this
litigation.7 Nor
respondents
do
aver that
there is a present
threat of termination of service.
“An injunction can issue
only after
plaintiff
has established that the conduct sought
to be enjoined
illegal
is
and that the defendant, if not enjoined,
will engage in such conduct.” United Transportation Union
v. Michigan Bar,
rule developed in Southern
Terminal Co.
Pacific
v. ICC, 219
U. S. 498
see
(1911);
Moore v. Ogilvie,
7 “Not until after the action was filed were the Crafts able to discover that they continued to receive double computer billings because MLG&W failed to combine the two accounts properly (A. 146-150), or that, as a result of the double computer billings, MLG&W had overcharged them gas for service and city service fees.” Brief for Respondents 5. not is claim that damages,8 claim respondents’ of
validity that decisions prior by foreclosed clearly soor insubstantial so proceed. case this Ill on constraints procedural places Amendment Fourteenth The interests of deprivation awork that government
the actions meaning within “property” the stature enjoying substantive underlying Although Clause. Process Due state such source independent “an by created is interest inter- that whether determines law constitutional federal law,” of entitlement” claim “legitimate of a level to the rises est Regents Board Clause. Process Due protected Sindermann, 408 Perry v. (1972); 564, 577 U. S. Roth, 408 (1972). S.U. defining In case. this clear inquiry outcome nonpayment terminate privilege utility’s public between line draws law decisional Tennessee charges, proper dispute fide bona aof subject are bills not. those *8 a has public the electricity supplying company “A aof nonpayment ato off service cut right rule a adopt company the bill service
just excep- An (1938). 237 R.L. A. 112 Annot., that effect. by MLG&W balance-claimed the 8 that “[o]f found The District double overcharges gas possible involved 1974, March, some Pre 39. Cert. Pet. for fees.” city service respect to billings with duplicate by occasioned pay the loss recovery for seek also sumably, respondents have should “which MLG&W offices visits several Craft’s Mrs. requested.” them afforded been relief effectual unnecessary had been Id., compliance their assert petitioners mootness, urging not While issued credit $35 a recommendation Court’s District not doWe case. this from damages any claim removes Crafts award an been to have suggestion Court’s District understand for initial matter a claim damages validity of damages. The below. courts by the determination
tion to
general
rule exists when the customer has a
bona fide dispute concerning the correctness of the bill.
Steele v. Clinton Electric Light & Power Co., 123 Conn.
180, 193 A. 613, 615 (1937); Annot., 112A. L. R. 237, 241
(1938); see also 43 Am. Jur., Public Utilities and Serv
ices, Sec. 65; Annot., 28 A. L. R. 475 (1924).
If the
public utility discontinues service for nonpayment of a
disputed amount
it does so
peril
at its
and if the public
utility was wrong (e. g., customer overcharged), it-is liable
for damages. Sims v. Alabama
Co.,
Water
378,
Ala.
9Tennessee's formulation of a public utility’s privilege to terminate service for nonpayment of undisputed charge is in accord with the common-law rule. generally See 64 Am. 2d, Jur. Public Utilities 63-64 §§ (1972); Annot., 112 A. L. R. (1938); Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Adequate Render Scope Service: Its and Enforcement, 62 Colum. L. Rev. (1962) 312, 326 . 10Petitioners attempt to avoid the Trigg force of by referring to several Tennessee decisions which state general rule that may ter minate service for nonpayment of undisputed charges or noncompliance with reasonable rules and regulations. These authorities, however, do not cast upon doubt exception recognized in Trigg for a customer who tenders undisputed amount, but withholds complete payment because of a bona fide dispute. See Patterson v. Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. *9 S. 2dW. 291 (1951); Farmer v. Nashville, 127 509, Tenn. 156 S. W. 189 (1913); Jones Nashville, v. 109 550, Tenn. 72 S. W. (1903); 985 Crumley Watauga v. Co., Water 99 420, Tenn. 41 S. W. (1897); 1058 Watauga Water Co. Wolfe, v. 99 429, Tenn. 41 S. (1897). W. 1060 Petitioners rely also on Lindsey v. Normet, 405 S. 56 (1972). U. There, terminate to public a permit not does law State 345- 341, Wood, 426 U. S. Bishop v. Cf. will.” “at
service Ten in utilities public other and MLG&W (1976). 347 inhabitants the of all “to service provide to obligated nessee and discrimination, without alike, location its of city the of Farmer cause,” sufficient good for except denial, without (1913), 189, 190 W. 156 S. 515, 509, Nashville, 127 Tenn. v. aof nonpayment “for except service terminate not may aggrieved An 2d,W. S. Trigg, 533 bill,” service just terminate, to threat wrongful a enjoin to able bemay Ibid. refund. or a damages for action subsequent a bring or to the of is evidence remedies local-law such availability of Although interest. protected aof recognition State’s pay upon is conditioned service continued to right customer’s Amend Fourteenth due, “[t]he properly charges of ment interpreted been never . . has 'property’. protection ment’s ownership.” undisputed rights only safeguard to peti Because (1972). 86 S.U. Shevin, 407 v. Fuentes 11respondents cause,” “for only service terminate tioners seeking a tenant required a that Oregon statute upheld during accruing rent security for post to hearing eviction of an continuance to proceeding eviction in an triable the issues continuance, limited to right legal withholding, forcible possession, physical questions held merely First, the Court misplaced. reliance This possession. intimating without process, comported procedures Oregon to failed dispute a rent during possession to continued claim a tenant’s have not did tenant Second, “[t]he interest. "property” a implicate rather, hearing; a before possession in remain security order post continuance obtain only in order security post had he interest possessory his deprived was tenant . . . hearing. [T]he Shevin, v. Fuentes hearing.” day without for one even original). (1972) (emphasis 15 67, 85 n. 407 U. S. concluded "the Court (1974), 11 134 Kennedy, U. S. 416 Arnett v. In had cause, he discharged only be employee could because protection.” constitutional entitled which interest property Kennedy, Arnett See (1976). n. Wood, 426 U. Bishop v. Regents v. Board cf. part); concurring in J., (Powell, supra, at (1972). 564, 578 Roth, U. S. *10 assert a “legitimate claim of entitlement” within protection of the Due Process Clause.
IV In determining process what is “due” in this case, the extent of our inquiry is shaped ruling the Court of Appeals. We need go no further in deciding this case than to ascertain whether the Court of Appeals properly read the Due Process Clause to require (i) notice informing the customer not only of the possibility of termination but also of a procedure for “ challenging disputed bill, 534 F. 2d, 688, and (ii) '[an] ” established [procedure] for resolution of disputes' or some specified avenue of relief for customers who “dispute the existence of the id., liability,” at 689.12 12The Court of Appeals did refer its earlier decision in Palmer v. Columbia Gas Ohio, Inc., 479 F. 2d 153 (1973), which approved a comprehensive remedy for a due violation, including investigation every protest communicated by a management official, provision aof hearing before such an official, and an opportunity to stay the termination upon the posting of an appropriate Id., bond. at 159-160, 168-169. procedures These were fashioned in response to findings, based on uncon- tradicted evidence, hostility arrogance on the part of the collection- oriented clerical employees, id., at 168. No such findings were here, made and the Court of Appeals’ ruling did not purport require a similar remedy in this case. Respondents request do certain procedures: additional “an impartial decision maker,” who be a responsible company official; oppor- “the tunity present information and rebut the records presented”; and “a written decision,” which apparently can be rendered after termination or payment. Tr. of Arg. Oral 28, 31; Brief for Respondents respond- 31. As ents have not cross-petitioned, cf. Strunk v. United States, 412 U. 437 (1973), we do not decide whether —or under what circumstances — of these procedures additional may be appropriate. We do note that the magnitude of the numbers of complaints of overcharge would be a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of more procedures formal than we approve in this case. The resolution of disputed bill normally presents a limited factual issue susceptible of informal resolution.
A proc- of due requirement fundamental elementary and “An *11 no- finality is be accorded is to which any proceeding in ess to circumstances, all the calculated, under reasonably tice and action of the pendency of the parties interested apprise objections.” their present to them afford Co., 339 U. Trust Hanover Central Mullane whether here is The issue omitted). (citations (1950) notify the utility municipal that requires organization of redress within an avenue availability of charge. particular contest a to he wish should simply bills MLG&W’s contained “final notice” The would service that overdue was payment that stated As date. by a certain made was not payment if discontinued only notice MLG&W “the determined, Appeals Court F. termination.” face pay or to the customer warn[ed] “flyer” enclosed also MLG&W at 2d, 688-689. to about distributed “flyer” was One 40%
“final notice.” serviced in areas resided who customers, utility’s of the are “If you part: It stated stations.” counseling “credit our bill bill, bring your utility your difficulty paying having Your for assistance. counselors credit neighborhood of a made was No mention also.” here paid may be bills A different disputed claim. of a disposition for the procedure It stated: remaining areas. in the to customers “flyer” went would utility bill your difficulty paying having you “If dispute if or there plan, utility payment to discuss like the office bill your bring due, the amount concerning Id., n. at 688 . . . .” phone , ... no assurance “there is noted Appeals flyer,” mentioned just mailed were Crafts finding Court’s the District affirmed ibid., implicitly availability of a of the apprised was never Mrs. Craft procedure for discussing dispute her management.” “with The District Court’s description repeated Mrs. Craft’s efforts to obtain information about what appeared to be unjustified double billing “good faith efforts pay for [the Crafts’] — utilities as well as to straighten out problem” clear —makes that she was adequately notified of the procedures asserted to have been available at the time.14
Petitioners’ notification procedure, while adequate apprise the Crafts of the threat of termination service, not “reasonably calculated” to inform them of availability of “an opportunity present objections” their to their bills. Mullane v. Central Co., Hanover Trust supra, at 314. The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected of, individual permit adequate preparation *12 15 for, an impending “hearing.” Notice in a case kind this 13We do not the understand District Court’s reference “an opportu to nity management” to talk with implying necessarily as that Mrs. Craft given should have opportunity been an to discuss her corporate bills with officers of Rather, point MLG&W. the was that Mrs. Craft was not in formed of opportunity the designated to personnel with meet were who duly disputed authorized to review complaining bills with customers and to correct errors. 14 Pet. Cert. 39. Mullen, secretary-treasurer William T. of MLG&W, utility processed testified that the 33,000 “high bill” complaints in 1973. App. 130. He conceded, that no however, description dispute of a resolu process tion was ever utility’s distributed to the customers, id., 162-163, at 176, and is no there indication in the record that a written account such procedure a was accessible customers who complaints had about their bills. Mrs. Craft’s case reveals opportunity the pro to invoke that cedure, if it all, depended existed at vagaries on the of “word of mouth referral,” id., at 163. 15See, g., e. McDonnell, v. 418 539, U. S. 564 (1974); Morrissey Wolff v. Brewer, 408 471, U. S. (1972); 486-487 In Gault, re 387 1, ; U. 33 (1967) Anti-Fascist Committee McGrath, v. U. S. (1951) 171-172 J., (Frankfurter, concurring). dissenting opinion of MR. Justice SteveNS asserts that the Court’s decision procedural “trivializes” process. Post, at recog- 22. While nizing that other information would be “helpful,” the dissent would hold it when requirements constitutional comport does not procedure availability of a of the does not advise the as utility service termination of proposed protesting given respondents despite no such notice unjustified. As — the deprived of were part they on their faith efforts” “good — was their due.16 notice which surely complain an error be how to about need not told
that “a homeowner
person threat
Post,
context a
at 26.
In a different
bill . . . .”
in a
protected
be told “how
interest need not
deprivation
the
ened with
make clear that
complain.”
prior
“[d]ue
the
decisions
this
But
particular
protections
the
procedural
flexible
for such
is
and calls
481;
Morrissey
Brewer, supra,
Mathews v.
situation demands.”
of a
(1976).
particular
In
circumstances
Eldridge,
U. S.
be
utility service,
left
the homeowner should
discontinue
threat
Indeed,
in this case.
the District Court
plight
described
notice
petitioners’
flaw
the constitutional
identifies
dissent’s view
paid by
the double bills were
told that
The Crafts were
unless
procedure.
the Court of
electricity
cut off. But —as
be
date their
would
certain
procedure for
them of a
notice did not advise
Appeals held—this skeletal
adequate
may well have been
disputed bills. Such notice
challenging the
given to
Here, however,
notice is
different circumstances.
under
experience, and
education,
of various levels of
of customers
thousands
continuity
service,
uninterrupted
Lay
of electric
consumers
resources.
clearly
safety,
be informed
health and
should
of which
essential
essence,
complaint.
In
availability
present
their
of an
during
where,
which hours
notice
told
recipients of a cutoff
should
disputed
appropriately
be considered.
day,
bills
and before whom
case
process due in
context of this
of the
restrictive view
The dissent’s
hearing components
between
notice and
barrier
would erect
artificial
*13
process.
guarantee of due
constitutional
of the
16
clarify
proce
regularize their notice
moved to
Petitioners have
may be
presently
the revised notice
afforded
dure,
possible
and it
that
is
by
response
suggestion made
entirely adequate. Developed in
to a
trained
part
that
Court,
“methods of contact” and states
it lists
District
any questions,
dis
up
discuss
to clear
Counselors are available
“Credit
supervisors
adjustments.
There are
puted
or to make
needed
bills
you
if
are not satisfied with
management personnel available
other
App.
by
given
the Credit Counselors.”
or solutions
answers
supervisors
requires
law
that the board of
note that Tennessee
alsoWe
utility district,
division of
independent
opposed
to a
of -each
B
This Court consistently has held that “some kind
hearing
required
is
at some time before
person
finally
deprived
his property interests.”
v. McDonnell,
“[0]ur consid- requires generally due of dictates specific interest private First, the factors: distinct of three eration risk second, the action; by the official affected that will be through interest of such deprivation of an erroneous of any, if value, probable the and used, procedures finally, and safeguards; procedural or substitute additional involved function including the interest, the Government’s the addi- burdens administrative and the fiscal unnecessary- “duplicate and respondents to reimburse credit gested a termina respect to with expenses incurred [them] charges made and afforded been unnecessary relief had effectual have been should tions which in its explicit more even Appeals Court of requested.” The them as by the upon relied very notices procedures. of MLG&W’s criticism fails notice MLG&W inadequate: “[T]he dissent, post, at were found might be resolved concerning the amount dispute 'that a to mention ” 684, 688 F. 2d company,’ 534 representatives with through discussion Id., at pay or face termination.” “only warns (1976), an absence Appeals found the Court And that 688-689, and n. 4. way its statement to read only sound hearing is of a constitutional the exist dispute . . who . for customers no avenue utility “provides Id., at 689. (Crafts).” liability ence by Mrs. suggests, undermined, dissent as the findings are not These prob- billing understanding of her ultimately glean some ability Craft’s District office-—in trips to MLG&W’s time-consuming several, lem after explanation get some tried to repeatedly words, “she Court’s after they are charges.” Nor duplicate possible two bills problems authority told employee of uncertain that an by the question fact placed in investigation, attempt at explanation Craft, without apparently Mrs. Fundamental App. 91. bill. pay on the other” you have “[w]ell, customers, treatment of “courteous” simply considerations fairness, not requirement notice the constitutional post, at 25 n. informs person- designated timely meet aof provision actual correct disputed bills and to review duly authorized nel who errors.
tional procedural substitute requirement would en tail.” Id., at 334-335.
Under the balancing approach .outlined in Mathews, some procedure administrative for entertaining customer complaints prior to termination is required to afford reasonable assurance against erroneous or arbitrary withholding essential services. The customer's interest is self-evident. Utility service is a necessity of modern life; indeed, the discontinuance of water or heating for even short periods of time may threaten health and safety. And the risk of an erroneous deprivation, given the necessary reliance on computers,20 is not insubstantial.21
The utility’s interests are not incompatible affording the notice procedure and described Quite above. apart from its duty public as a service company, its own —in business expected to make all reasonable interests — efforts to minimize billing errors and the resulting customer dissatisfaction possible injury. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 583 (1975). Nor should “some of hearing” kind prove burdensome. The opportunity for a meeting with a responsible employee empowered to resolve dispute could be afforded well in advance of the scheduled date termina- tion.22 petitioners And would retain the option to terminate 20 concerned, In years recent Congress has been problems of com puter g., See, error. e. Rep. 93-278, p. No. (1973) 5 (billing errors in consumer credit transactions); Senate Committee on Opera Government tions, Problems Associated with Computer Technology in Federal Programs Industry: Private Computer Abuses, Cong., 94th 2d (Comm. Sess. 1976). Print 21 See, g., e. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Ohio, Inc., 2d, 479 F. 158; Weir, Davis 497 F. 2d 142 (CA5 1974); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co. York, New 350 Supp. 443, F. (SDNY n. 1972) (16% complaints investigated by New York Public Service Commission adjustments resulted in in favor of the customer). petitioners Because provide for at 30-day period least a between the mailing of the bill and the actual termination Brief service, for Peti tioners 28, unlikely it is procedure informal required in this case concluding opportunity this affording after service due. justly billed amount C remedies common-law available that the contend
Petitioners suit post-termination injunction, pretermination of a are sufficient refund for a action post-payment damages, procedures.23 MLG&W’s inadequacy perceived cure requires lawof Ordinarily, *16 significant of a deprivation the to prior hearing” of kind “some 371, Connecticut, U. S. 401 v. Boddie See interest. property where that recognized has occasion, this On (1971). 379 not does deprivation of the severity length potential the procedures the where loss serious of likelihood indicate to reliable sufficiently to act decision the underlying may government determination, of erroneous risk the minimize safe procedural “advance additional providing act without see (1977); 680 651, U. S. Wright, 430 v. Ingraham guards,” at 339-349.24 supra, Eldridge, v. Mathews enjoys a broad public utility The payment. delay in material occasion will “hearing,” provided structuring this of scheduling and the in discretion of presentation effective for adequate time is afforded the that termination. prior to complaint his Appeals. 23 Court of the obliquely in only was advanced contention This p. 27. (CA6), No. 75-1350 Appellees in Brief for safeguards” 24 procedural “advance held the Court Ingraham, In paddling disciplinary context required in constitutionally not were directly the observe ability teacher of the because the schools in visibility environment, the school openness of the question, infraction likelihood faculty, students other the confrontation “the assurance gave punishment, unreasonable reaction parental insignificant.” typically cause without paddled bewill a child risk that Love, U. v. Similarly, in Dixon 677-678. S., U. revocation precede hearing evidentiary need we held (1977), previous within offenses repeated traffic on based license a driver’s hearing judicial full for had “appellee period, 10-year The justified factors that have exceptions to the require- ment of prior process some present are not here. Although utility service be restored ultimately, the cessation of essential services for appreciable uniquely time works a deprivation. final Stanley Cf. Illinois, 405 U. S. 647- 648 (1972). Moreover, the probability of utility error in cutoff decisions is not so insubstantial as to dispens- warrant ing with all process prior to termination.25 injunction remedy by petitioners referred to would not be an adequate substitute a pretermination review of the disputed bill with a designated employee. Many Court’s decisions this area have required proce additional dures to further due process, notwithstanding appar ent availability of injunctive relief or recovery provisions. It thought that such remedies were likely be too bounded by procedural constraints susceptible and too delay provide an effective safeguard against an depriv erroneous ation.26 These considerations are applicable in the termination context.
in connection with each of the traffic convictions on which . . . decision *17 was based.” 25Petitioners they assert that obligation under provide are an to non discriminatory customers, service to their provision that continued of delinquent service to a customer pending an hearing informal would involve against “discriminating ratepayer . Arg. . . of Tr. Oral It is far any clear from delay payment material in will occur from an informal conference that can be scheduled well in of the date advance termination, 22, supra. see n. event, by In as is demonstrated plan, 4, MLG&W’s delayed credit see n. supra, payment nonpayment, is not and there are means available to MLG&W to recover at least some of the see, of a hearing, g., App. costs 114, e. (imposition gross, 117 rather than net, charges payment). for late 26See, g., Lopez, e. S., 581-582, Georgia Goss v. 419 10; U. at n. North Finishing, Di-Chem, Inc., Inc. v. 601, 603, 419 U. S. (1975); 607 Fuentes Shevin, S., 85, 15; v. 407 U. at Family n. Sniadach v. Finance
21 to the resolu- unsuited particularly remedies Equitable money too involving sums disputes typically of factual tion An lawsuit.27 bringing counsel or a justify engaging small it is termination, because improper to halt an equity action even if effective, be likely less pursued28 and likely less to be of accurate same assurance provide will pursued, proce- administrative adequate would an decisionmaking as informal administrative circumstances, In an dure. these Burson, concurring); Bell (1969) (Harlan, J., v. Corp., U. 343 337, 395 S. (1971). 535, 402 536 U. S. this case because process was satisfied in intimates that due
The dissent pay- simple expedient of always termination can avoid “a customer Post, point This at 28. disputed claiming a refund . . . .” ing the bill and the means many who lack confronting individuals ignores predicament expenses. unanticipated utility Even under MLG&W’s pay additional, payment the customer must make immediate procedures, credit admirable paid be in three past bill, the balance to disputed a of one-half of Contrary charges. to the dis- installments, equal in addition to current Lindsey Normet, 405 56 U. S. v. suggestion, this Court’s decision sent’s a continued uphold procedure that conditioned tenant’s (1972), did not disputed.” he rent, obligation which payment of “the back an possession on Lindsey, certain tenant procedure upheld in Post, n. 11. Under the at 29 nonpayment of prove excluded, landlord still had to but the defenses were contrary in the lease before holding to some covenant rent due or a 10, supra. S., 65; at n. possession. 405 U. deprived See tenant could 27 utility to privilege of the understanding the common-law This informs just charges. “An reason obvious nonpayment terminate service remedy compensation of collection privilege] is that limit the [for leading an impracticable, as would be the service to actions at law against very small bills scattered of actions to collect infinite number financially irresponsible.” many mere renters consumers, of them Co., 180, 184, 123 A. Light Power Conn. 193 & Steele Clinton Electric Nashville, W., at 987. (1937); Tenn., see Jones v. Supreme Court held early 1874, the As Wisconsin injunction against public Attorney obtain could State General private persons because would be threatening wrongful termination unlikely wrongs go to correct “the which so themselves little to take action *18 Attorney average prosperity life.” up to make the measure far Co., Chicago N. R. 35 Wis. 530-531. & W. General v.
remedy, along the lines suggested above, constitutes the process that is “due.” y Because of the provide failure to notice reasonably cal- ‘
culated apprise respondents of availability of an administrative procedure to consider their complaint of erro- neous billing, and the failure to afford them an opportunity to present their complaint to a designated employee empow- ered to disputed review bills and rectify petitioners error, deprived respondents of an interest in property without due process of law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom The Chief Justice and Rehnquist Mr. Justice dissenting. join, In my judgment, the Court’s holding confuses and trivializes the principle that State not deprive person of life, liberty, property without due I law. have no quarrel with the Court’s conclusion that as a matter of Ten- nessee law a customer has legitimate claim of entitlement continued utility services as long as the undisputed portions of his utility bills are paid. For that reason, a municipality may not terminate utility service giving without the customer a fair opportunity to avoid termination either by paying bill or questioning its I accuracy. do not agree, however, this record discloses any constitutional defect in the termina- tion procedures employed by the Light, Gas and Water Divi- sion of city of Memphis (Division).
The Court focuses on two aspects of the Division’s collection procedures. First, according to the Court, the Division’s standard form of termination notice did not adequately inform the customer of the availability of a procedure for protesting a proposed termination of service unjustified. Ante, at 15. Second, the Division did not afford its customers an adequate
23 authority the had employee who with an to meet consider Ante, we 18. at Whether disputes. billing to settle Crafts between the dispute unusual describing the the evidence opera- concerning general the evidence Division, the the for I no basis find procedures, collection of the Division’s tion its justified; is criticisms Court’s that either of the concluding proved has been violation that a constitutional conclusion extraordinary. truly Crafts dispute between the of the the details
Although the Division’s describes record obscure, Division are Division Each month in some detail. customary practices Termina- 2,000 customers.1 service of about terminates tions„are customer advising notice preceded by a written cutoff to avoid made must be payment by date which and collec- contact thé credit requesting the bill.2 difficulty paying having if he is department tions 3 legend: prominent The notices contain a “PHONE 523-0711 CENTER” INFORMATION or 40 30 by are answered number phone the listed Calls to delay empowered of whom employees, all Division made representations on days based for cutoffs three callers direct employees also These phone. over customers on disputes to resolve who are authorized to credit counselors payment up extended can set basis and who permanent more difficulty.4 in financial for customers plans 1 February through September 1973 from During the six months App. delinquent 74. 11,216 cutoffs. there were so-called 2 in an enclosed department is contained the credit request to contact The neighborhood location appropriate "flyer” identifies which also credit assistance. visited 1976). (CA6 2d 534 F. See refer employees also center Information and 161. App. 126 sends unit that special bill to complain high about a who customers Id., in the meter. possible or defects leaks to check investigators The District Court did not find that the Division's notice was defective in any respect or that its regular practices were not adequate to handle the problems. Crafts’ unusual dispute Crafts’ with the Division stemmed from the use of two sets of meters to measure utility consumption in parts different *20 Ante, of the Crafts’ home. Crafts, believing they The were being billed twice for the same utilities, pay did not on the second In account. fact, the two independ- accounts were ent; because the Crafts pay refused to on the balance second account, the Division terminated their service on several occasions.5 The District Court expressly found that the Division sent a final notice before each termination.
The District Court did not find that Craft was Mrs. unable to meet with department credit personnel possessing adequate authority to make an adjustment in her bill.6 was She suc- cessful in working out a deferred-payment arrangement but apparently was unable to have the amount of bills reduced. The record therefore indicates that Mrs. Craft did meet with 5The judge evidently trial accepted the Division’s claim that it was engaged in “split billing” billing.” rather than judge “double The did express “hope,” “simple as a matter of equity,” that the Division would $35 issue a credit duplicate of to cover unnecessary charges and expenses respect incurred with to termination, challenged but the amounts by the Crafts as the result billing” considerably “double larger were $35. than The duplicate reference charges apparently to concerns per $2.50 city month service fee which charged was on each set of meters duplex in the they until after were unnecessary consolidated. expense apparently reference covers both the lost time from work while Craft Mrs. trying straighten was out billing their and the cost attributable to the termination. appears The District Court persuaded to have been those costs could have been avoided if given the Crafts help been had more early stages in the dispute. of their 6The District Court stated that “procedure opportunity for an talk management with the was adequately explained to Mrs. Craft.” The District Court was evaluating explanation the Division’s proce of its dures; the court’s statement- does not mean that Mrs. Craft never met responsible official able to dispute. resolve her simply authority but adequate having employees Division her error in any there any them that persuade failed bills.7
I notice the Division’s objection to constitutional The Court’s Central from Mullane v. statement entirely on the classic rests 314: Co., Trust Hanover U. requirement fundamental elementary
“An finality accorded which is be proceeding circum- under all calculated, reasonably is notice pendency of the parties interested apprise stances, to their present them an afford the action objections.” characteristics two essential identifies
That statement impend- recipient of inform the must notice: It adequate recipient in time to afford given must loss; it ing course, must, essentials *21 These to defend. understand. layman can terms which expressed be two basic these unquestionably satisfied Division’s notice The requirements.8 essen- in which these two may situations there be
No doubt double-billing problem was remembering that the Crafts' It worth is only a have been effected could eventually the solution solved, and that on Mrs. Craft testified Moreover, employee empowered to do so. Division office the Division’s being cut off went to after she that direct examination that she She was told on one payments her account. with the record words, Id., at 91. In other as well. pay on the other account had correctly it dispute, as did resolve the Crafts’ the Division an official of procedures 5, supra. The Division’s would See n. turned out. employees, federal like if we Division even assumed unconstitutional occasionally The mistakes. make occasionally discourteous judges, are resolution a a correct or courteous guarantee does not Clause Due Process dispute. every it allows is a cutoff imminent customer It tells the by con protest, by paying under a cutoff enough time avoid customer legal action. by beginning a center, or tacting information tials would not be sufficient to constitute fair notice. For if example, the notice describes a threatened loss which can only follow prescheduled a hearing, it must also inform the recipient of the time place hearing. I do not But understand the Court require municipal utilities to schedule a hearing before each termination notice is mailed. The Court seems to Ias assume, do, hearing that no kind is necessary unless the customer has reason to believe he has been overcharged. Such a may protest his bill in either of ways: two may He directly communicate with the utility, or he seek relief in court. In this case the Court finds the Division's notice constitutionally defective because it does not describe the former alternative.
The Division must “advise the availability customer of the procedure of a for protesting proposed of utility termination Ante, at 15. That advice is much unjustified.” service as less valuable to the customer explanation than an legal of the remedies that are available wrongful if a termination should occur. Yet the wisely avoids holding that the customer given must be of legal sort advice. The advice the require Court does wholly unnecessary in all but the most unusual For situations. surely homeowner need not be told how complain about an error in bill; is, it course, helpful to include telephone number and office address in the termination notice, but our govern- democratic ment would cease function if, the Court seems to' assume, our citizenry were unable to find such information on their own initiative. Court's holding that the Division’s notice was constitutionally defective paternalistic rests on a predicate *22 I accept. that cannot accepting
Even the Court’s predicate, a notice which advises to call customers the “information center” should be adequate; if it not, seems clear advising that customers to call, during normal business hours, “dispute resolution cen- by personnel ter” manned the same would cure the constitu- objection. magnitude tional of this small are Distinctions they appropriate rulemaking; concern of administrative identify are too trivial to constitutional error.
II pronouncement process requires The Courtis due “that provision of to a presentation is designated employee of that he complaint a customer’s ante, overcharged or being charged rendered,” for services not equally is divorced from the case. facts this processes Division of excess 30,000 complaints more than charges employees each it year, designated has scores investigate complaints. Except hear and those for the Crafts’ troubles, nothing suggest there is in the record to that customers or employees, Division’s are denied access to these employees power that the lack the with appropriately deal no complaints. Indeed, meritorious as already there noted, by finding either the courts below that the Crafts them- responsible did not meet empowered selves officials dispute.9 resolve their pronouncement the Court’s in this is there-
Although case fore it cannot For it gratuitous, be dismissed as harmless. municipal kind they provide warns utilities that unless “some ibid., unconstitutionally. they may acting hearing,” con- procedural or what, why, safeguards Just additional stitutionally required is most difficult to discern.10 supra. nn. 6 and See reading A of the and this indicates careful decision below Court’s decision modified as affirmed the has as well Sixth Circuit’s view thought procedural Appeals in a context. The Court of Columbia Palmer by earlier this case was controlled its decision (1973). Ohio, Inc., Palmer Gas 2d 153 cutoff F. ordered that by utility personally notices be delivered servicemen sent certified Id., requested. mail, receipt at 159 and return 166-167. The notice had programs credit possible to tell customers about available as well Ibid. The Palmer dispute-resolving procedures. specified court also *23 deciding In that more is due, the Court relies on two quite different hypothetical considerations. First, the Court stresses the fact that “may disconnection or heating of water Ante, threaten health safety.” Second, at the Court discounts the protection value of the by afforded the available judicial remedies disputes typically because the “factual sums money [involve] too small to counsel justify engaging Ante, or bringing a lawsuit.” at 21. Neither of these exam- ples by is disclosed this record. The involved dispute Crafts’ only a relatively they small amount, but did obtain counsel they thereafter billing problems. encountered no
Although the Division’s terminations number 2,000 about each month, the record does not reveal actual case of harm to health or safety. The District Court found that the Divi- sion does not discontinue service when there illness a home. Since a customer can always by avoid termination simple expedient of paying disputed bill claiming refund,11 it is surprising not emergency the real case is utility’s hearing by officer had written, to certified mail —a send — response every individual to complaining authorizing customer before Id., 159-160, cutoff. at n. Although and 167-169. the Division’s failure procedures to observe these was the Appeals’ foundation of the Court of ruling below, quite .clearly the Court approve does not the lower court’s procedures view that constitutionally these mandated. 11If objection there is no constitutional requiring pay a tenant to disputed charge in possession home, order retain of his I do under why stand objection there should be a more requiring payment serious charge of a lesser Lindsey order to Normet, retain In service. sought U. S. a tenant possessory brought to defend a action his nonpayment landlord for ground of rent premises on the were uninhabitable therefore there obligation pay was no the rent. State permit law did not such possessory a defense in a action. In order to litigate particular dispute, bring tenant had to his own action against the landlord. If the tenant paid disputed rent, had not in fact prevail the landlord possessory would in the Thus, action. in order to possession retain litigating while dispute, only the tenant not had to pay (a requirement accruing upheld rent supra, 65), in Lindsey, does emergency a true all.12 When it exists at rare, if indeed will safety, health threat a serious present *24 consult- step of important the take to motivation ample have bill disputed of his the amount if suit even filing or counsel ing sufficiently utility service of loss A potential small. hardly can deprivation a constitutional qualify to grievous judi- the counsel of aid the invoking justify to petty be too for the petty too disputes billing routine Conversely, ciary. constitutional extraordinary hardly merit can or the bar bench protection. specific in a counsel consult not does customer if the Even far provides nevertheless remedy damages case, potential the termination unjustified an against protection significant more hearing.” of kind “some requirement vague the does than the mistakes, liability damages threat Without qualify neither today would required procedures informal terminating by collection to enforce power ultimate utility’s other theOn power. exercise nor deter service danger procedures, informal specific without even hand, to attention careful ensure itself by liability will substantial liability utility’s potential The disputes. customer genuine protec- pretermination real customers provides therefore later. until recovered not be may damages though tion even demonstrated is not innovation procedural for a need disputed. If he which obligation rent, the back pay had also but action possessory in the lose he would rent, the back pay did he suit own his prosecuting he while possession lose would therefore which procedure a sustained Thus, Court landlord. against status maintain charge in order disputed payment of required the dispute. litigating quo while may forestall full his pay bill is unable who Even Perhaps this 4. 5-6, Ante, n. at payment. partial by a termination make unable who customers those benefit for the rule its fashions current, undis pay cannot persons if such But payment. partial even a over dispute fide bona despite a may terminated bills, their service puted utility service. free right to constitutional has a one bill; for no past judicial the record in this proceeding, justified but rather is of hypothetical gleaned on the basis information examples, ante, before legislative reports. from cases not us, See justifications 18 nn. 20 suggest These that the Court’s product rule is the of policy new determination rather than a traditional construction of the Constitution. judges As we experience have appraising the fairness of legal remedies judicial proceedings, but no ability we have similar the cost scheduling balance of billing thousands conferences against the benefit of providing protection additional to the occasional customer who be unable to unjusti- forestall an fied termination.
It is an unfortunate fact that when the State assesses taxes *25 operates it utility, occasionally overcharges the citizen. It also unfortunate that effective collection procedures some- require times the citizen pay unjust charge order to forestall a serious deprivation property. But if the State given has the citizen fair notice and afforded him procedural entirely redress which is adequate when invoked his lawyer, the demands of the Due Process Clause are I satisfied. do not requires believe Constitution employ State- to pro- simple cedures that are so every person lay always can act effectively without the assistance of counsel.
I respectfully dissent.