2020 CO 51
Colo.2020Background
- On Nov. 27, 2015 Robert Dear attacked Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains (PPRM) Colorado Springs clinic, killing three and wounding others after shooting through the entry door and engaging police in a multi-hour incident.
- Plaintiffs (injured persons and survivors) sued PPRM under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA) alleging inadequate, foreseeably insufficient security, and sued Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) for negligent supervision/related duties as the national parent.
- Evidence in the summary‑judgment record showed PPRM had long‑standing threats (heightened after released undercover videos), limited armed security hours, non‑fortified glass doors, no perimeter fence at that location, and an expert opining that additional measures likely would have prevented or mitigated the harm.
- The district court granted summary judgment to both PPRM (arguing the shooter’s conduct predominated) and PPFA (arguing no duty/no control). A divided COA reversed as to PPRM but affirmed for PPFA. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court (majority) (1) held the plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact that Dear’s conduct might not be the sole/predominant cause such that PPRM’s conduct could be a substantial factor (so summary judgment for PPRM was improper), and (2) held as a matter of law that PPFA owed no duty to the plaintiffs (affirming summary judgment for PPFA).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robert Dear’s actions were the “predominant cause” precluding PPRM’s liability under the CPLA | PPRM’s known, escalating threats and alleged inadequate security (guarding, fencing, doors) made its conduct a substantial factor in plaintiffs’ injuries | Dear’s premeditated, intentional mass‑murderous conduct predominated as a matter of law, so landowner negligence cannot be a substantial factor | Evidence created a genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment for PPRM was improper (reversed) |
| Whether PPFA owed a duty of care to plaintiffs (as national parent) | PPFA exercised actual/apparent control, issued standards/resources, and could revoke affiliation—creating a special relationship or assumed duty | PPFA only provided non‑binding recommendations/resources, did not own or control PPRM, and thus owed no duty | As a matter of law PPFA owed no duty to plaintiffs; summary judgment for PPFA was affirmed |
| Whether the CPLA’s term “caused” requires common‑law tort causation (but‑for and proximate/substantial‑factor rules) | Plaintiffs proceeded on common‑law causation principles to show both cause‑in‑fact and legal/proximate causation | Defendants likewise proceeded under common‑law causation; argued proximate cause defeats liability | Court applied common‑law tort causation (but‑for + proximate/substantial‑factor) to the CPLA |
| Whether the appellate division misapplied the summary‑judgment standard in reviewing PPFA | Plaintiffs argued the division applied an incorrect (factual‑finding) standard | Defendants relied on division’s conclusion that no special relationship or control existed | Even if the division misstated the standard, de novo review yields the same result: no duty, summary judgment for PPFA affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- N. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm. on Anticompetitive Conduct, 914 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1996) (explains but‑for test and substantial‑factor/proximate‑cause principles)
- Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215 (Colo. 2002) (CPLA’s purpose to clarify/narrow landowner duties)
- Build It & They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, 253 P.3d 302 (Colo. 2011) (foreseeability is central to proximate cause)
- Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (no duty where alleged controller lacks sufficient day‑to‑day control)
- Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2001) (mass‑shooting cases where perpetrators’ acts were held predominant causes)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2011) (proximate‑cause doctrine limits liability to foreseeable results)
- Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 51 A.3d 367 (Conn. 2012) (national organization control facts that supported duty to a local member)
- Brown v. Delta Tau Delta, 118 A.3d 789 (Me. 2015) (national fraternity held liable where evidence showed direct control and oversight of local chapter)