Lead Opinion
Majority: GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
Concurrence/Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.
Dissent: CLIFFORD, J.
[¶ 1] Elizabeth Brown appeals from the Superior Court’s (Penobscot County, Cud-dy, J.) entry of a summary judgment in favor of Delta Tau Delta (DTD) and Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation (DTDNHC) on' her claims' arising out of events that occurred at the fraternal organization’s Gamma Nu chapter
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Viewed in the light most favorable to Brown, as the nonmoving party, the summary judgment record establishes the following facts. See Budge v. Town of Millinocket,
[¶ 3] On September 17, 2010, Gamma Nu hosted a party at its DTD fraternity house that was restricted to invited guests only. Brown, a UMO student, was invited to'the party by Joshua Clukey, a member of Gamma Nu. Brown arrived at the fraternity house between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m. and found Clukey. Brown and Clukey, who had both been drinking alcoholic -beverages, went upstairs to Clukey’s room, past a fraternity member whose function was to limit access to the upper floors to residents and their guests. Inside his room, Clukey sexually assaulted Brown and prevented her from leaving the room for several minutes.
[¶4] The day after the party, Brown reported the incident to the fraternity president, who told her “the fraternity had been concerned about Clukey for a while” because he had developed a drinking problem and had recently caused property damage and engaged in fights with other
[¶ 5] On September 11, 2012, Brown filed a civil complaint against Clukey, DTD,
[¶ 6] Brown’s initial complaint alleged counts of assault and false imprisonment against Clukey, and vicarious liability against both DTD and DTDNHC. Through subsequent amendments to hen complaint, Brown added counts of negligence, premises liability, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Clu-key, DTD, and DTDNHC, and requested recovery of punitive damages from Clukey.
[¶ 7] In October 2013, Clukey was dismissed from the case with prejudice following Brown’s settlement of her claims against him. On January 29, 2014, the court granted DTD and DTDNHC’s motion to dismiss with respect to the issue of vicarious liability and denied the motion in all other respects. After entry of this order, Brown’s remaining counts against DTD and DTDNHC alleged negligence, négligent infliction of emotional distress, and premises liability. On March 17,2014, the court granted DTD and DTDNHC’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that neither DTD nor DTDNHC owed Brown a duty of care. Brown appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 8] Because there is nothing in the record suggesting that Clukey was acting as an agent of DTD or DTDNHC at the time of the assault, we reject. Brown’s vicarious liability claims and focus only on her claims of negligence. We review de novo the court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of DTD based upon the legal determination that ,DTD did not owe Brown a duty of care. See Estate of Cabatit v. Canders,
A. Duty
[¶ 9] Even though the issue is fact driven, the question of duty is a legal question decided by the court, not the jury.
[¶ 10] The undisputed facts in this case do not give rise to a duty beyond that related to Brown’s premises liability claim. Specifically, the summary judgment record reveals no “special relationship” between Brown and DTD sufficient to sustain Brown’s general negligence claim, see DeCambra v. Carson,
[¶ 11] We have determined that a duty founded on premises liability exists between a university and its business invitees. Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys.,
[¶ 12] Though we have not previously addressed the question of ■& national fraternity’s duty to,its local chapter’s social invitees, courts in other jurisdictions condition the existence of a duty on the extent of the national fraternity’s control over the local chapter. In Grenier v. Comm’r of Transp.,
Ultimately, whether a national fraternity may be held liable for the actions of one of its local chapters depends both on its ability to exercise control over the local*793 chapter as well as its knowledge either that risk management policies aré not being followed or that the local chapter is engaging in inappropriate behavior.
Id. at 388. In reversing summary judgment entered in favor of the national fraternity, the court considered evidence that the fraternity provided financial resources to, imposed. risk management standards on, and maintained supervisory and enforcement authority over the local chapter. Id. at 389. It also considered evidence that the national fraternity conducted chapter leadership training and regulated member conduct through rules and regulations, including those related to the use of alcohol. Id.
[¶ 13] In Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity,
[¶ 14] As these cases illustrate, the inquiry as to the existence of a duty is fact-intensive. Here, we look to general principles of duty, with particular emphasis on the undisputed facts relevant to foreseeability, control, and the relationship of the parties, in determining whether a duty founded on premises liability exists between DTD and its local chapter’s social invitees. See Stanton,
1. Foreseeability
[¶ 15] Over a decade ago, we recognized that sexual assaults could foresee-ably occur in a dormitory room on a college campus. Stanton,
[¶ 16] The mechanisms through which DTD controls the behavior of its members, discussed below, demonstrate its' awareness of these potential problems. DTD’s “Policy on Alcohol and Substance Abuse,” which is integrated- into the MRGs, recognizes that the “well known dangers of alcohol and substance abuse” may.be manifested by “relationship problems, including
The Fraternity will not tolerate or condone any form of abusive behavior, including sexist or sexually abusive behavior, on the part of its members, whether physical, mental or emotional.... This is to include any actions, activities, or events, whether on chapter premises or an off-site location directed toward members or non-members or any actions which are demeaning to women or men.... Such behavior includes ... sexual assault.
[¶ 17] DTD’s policies recognize the self-evident potential for excessive drinking and sexual abuse within the fraternity setting. These policies would make little sense unless such activities were foreseeable. See Stanton,
2. Control
[¶ 18] The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate both DTD’s authority to control its members as well as its actual control. Through its constitution, by-laws, and administrative connection to its local chapters’ day-to-day activities, DTD exercises significant control over its individual members.
[¶ 19] DTD requires each local chapter to adopt local by-laws that do not conflict with the national constitution or by-laws. Local chapter by-laws are expected to address local risk management plans that supplement the national MRGs; implement DTD’s alcohol education program, Belts Talking About Alcohol; and require all members to sign the national code of conduct. Each chapter must provide a certified copy of its by-laws, and any amendments thereto, to the national central office.
[¶ 20] As part of the chapter accreditation process, the MRGs must be presented to the local chapters’ pledges and members by October 25 of each year. The MRGs set out the rules and regulations to which every member is expected to adhere. In addition to those provisions already discussed, they provide that:
9. Drunkenness by members and pledges will be classified as “conduct unbecoming a member of the Fraternity” as defined in ... the Fraternity’s Constitution.
10. Every chapter will implement the Fraternity’s primary alcohol education program....
11. No members ... shall purchase for, serve to, or sell alcohol beverages to any minor....
12. No member ... shall permit, tolerate, encourage or participate in “drinking games.”
The MRGs also set out specific rules and regulations pertaining to conduct by its members at social events held by the local chapter.
[¶21] The national code of conduct, which DTD requires each of its members to sign, sets out the behavioral standards to which every member is expected to conform. The code requires members to refrain from sexual abuse and the abuse of alcohol, and also prohibits physical or psychological hazing and the use of illegal drugs. DTD requires each chapter president to, among other things, enforce compliance with the code of conduct and DTD’s rules and regulations.
[¶ 22] DTD’s constitution also provides that each local chapter shall have an alumni advisor, who acts within the local chap
[¶ 23] DTD also has a comprehensive process for disciplining members who violate its rules or regulations. The MRG enforcement criteria designate three categories of MRG violations of increasing severity. All incidents of misconduct must be reported to the national office, and- a member charged with an infraction has due process rights to notice and a hearing, which necessarily run through the Arch Chapter. DTD has broad authority to impose sanctions, which may include mandating educational workshops, imposing fines, conducting membership review, revoking a chapter’s privilege to hold events with alcohol, revoking a chapter’s charter, or Suspending or expelling individual members. In short, the national fraternity does more than simply suggest that its members conform to certain norms; it enforces its rules, regulations, and codes of conduct through constant monitoring, oversight, and intervention.
3. Relationship
[¶24] The same elements by which DTD controls its members — its chain of command, its articulation and imposition of its code of conduct, ■ and its process for disciplining members who do not comply ■with its rules — also establish a close relationship between, the national fraternity and its local chapters and individual members. DTD -imposes a complex hierarchy of rules and regulations upon its local chapters and individual members, and its constitution sets out a clear- command structure to which, local chapters must adhere.
[¶ 25] In addition to the alumni representatives that the national fraternity requires within each chapter, the national chain of command provides for a chapter advisor whose full-time job is to monitor and provide oversight of the functioning of the local chapter, to “assist the undergraduate chapter in understanding and living the Mission and Values of the Fraternity,” and to report to DTD on a regular basis. The DTD constitution provides thát the division president, an officer of the national fraternity, appoints these advisors, as well as the assistant chapter advisors. These constitutional officers provide a direct link between the national fraternity and each local chapter.
[¶ 26] Through its comprehensive articles and clearly defined power structure, DTD expressly reaches into the day-to-day affairs of its local chapters and creates a close, mutually beneficial relationship with its individual members.
B. Conclusion
[¶ 27] We conclude that the foreseeability, control, and relationship factors present here are sufficient to impose upon DTD a duty founded on premises liability. See Stanton,
[¶ 28] DTD had the, authority to control its individual members, and actually did so through implementation and enforcement of its rules and .regulations. DTD also had a close, integrated relationship with Gamma Nu, as demonstrated.by DTD’s- corporate structure. Finally, it is certainly foreseeable that turning a fraternity house over to college students, where parties and alcohol-related events are likely to occur, creates the potential for sexual misconduct — a known safety issue on college campuses.
. [¶29] We conclude that DTD had a duty to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are' reasonably safe and reasonably free from the potential of sexual misconduct by its members, for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events. Our finding of a duty does not establish-any liability on the part of DTD. Brown still has the obligation to convince a fact-finder that there was a breach of that duty, and that the breach was the cause of her injuries. -
The entry is:
Dismissal of vicarious liability claims affirmed. Summary judgment in favor of Delta Tau Delta on the premises liability claim vacated; summary judgment on the remaining counts affirmed. Summary judgment in favor of Delta Tau Delta Housing Corporation affirmed. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Because the fraternity’s local chapter is an unincorporated association of undergraduate students, it is not susceptible to being sued in its own name, though its individual members are amenable to suit for their individual negligent conduct. See K & S Servs., Inc. v. Schulz Elec. Grp. of Cos.,
. According to DTD, it was inaccurately named in the complaint; its name is actually Delta Tau Delta Fraternity, Inc.
. DTDNHC was substituted as a defendant for Delta Tau Delta Building Corp. (DTDBC), which was named in the original complaint, DTDBC is a now-defunct Maine non-profit corporation that leased property to Gamma Nu in Orono in the 1990s, but sold the property to DTDNHC in 1998.
Concurrence Opinion
eoncurring/dissenting.
■ [¶30] The Court has thoroughly researched the law and presented the facts of this case. I concur with the Court that we must vacate the trial court’s judgment. However, based on the facts and conclusions stated in the Court’s opinion, and the law the Court’s opinion cites, I must respectfully dissent from the Court’s holdings that only a premises liability claim against Delta Tau Delta (DTD) should proceed to trial and that the Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation (DTDNHC), the owner of the building, should be dismissed from-the case entirely. Because important disputes as to material facts remain, the premises liability, negligence, and" negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against DTD and DTDNHC should be left for a jury to decide.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
[¶ 31] Foreseeability is one of the touchstones for attaching legal liability. Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys.,
*797 (1) “A national fraternity knows, or should know, that social events carried on in a building that houses one of its local chapters presents the potential for sexual assault, particularly where alcohol consumption is an integral part of the event.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 15.
(2) “It is similarly foreseeable that allowing a group of eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds control over a residence where alcohol-related parties are held presents the potential for misconduct, including sexual assault.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 15.
(3) “[I]t is certainly foreseeable that turning a fraternity house over to college students, where parties and alcohol-related events are likely to occur, creates the potential for sexual misconduct — a known safety issue on college campuses.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 28.
(4) “DTD effectively handed over a residential building to a group of college students, and in doing so it should have anticipated that alcohol-related parties on the premises would follow, as could the social problems that accompany such activities. It therefore had a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a reasonably safe environment for any social invitee to an event at the fraternity house.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 27.
(5) “Imposing upon a national fraternity that integrates itself into'its local chapter and onto a college campus a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the safety of social invitees at its fraternity house is no more onerous or unexpected than the duty society imposes upon a university to exercise care in the administration of its dormitories.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 27.
(6) “DTD had the authority to control its individual members, and actually did so through implementation and enforcement of its rules and regulations. DTD also had a close, integrated relationship with Gamma Nu, as demonstrated by DTD’s corporate structure.” Court’s Opinion II28.
(7) “DTD had a duty to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are reasonably safe and reasonably free from the potential of sexual misconduct by its members, for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events.” Court’s ' Opinion ¶ 29. '
(8) “DTD is a national non-profit corporation organized in New York and doing business in Indiana; Gamma Nu is its local chapter at UMO.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 5.
(9) “DTDNHC is an Indiana nonprofit corporation that, holds property for DTD and leases the fraternity house to Gamma Nu.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 5.
(10) “Because the fraternity’s local chapter is an unincorporated association of undergraduate students, it is not 'susceptible to being sued in its own name, though its individual members are amenable to suit for their individual negligent conduct.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 1 n. 1.
(11) “The same elements by which DTD controls its members — its chain of command, its articulation and imposition of its code of conduct, and its process for disciplining members who do .not comply with its rules — also establish a close relationship between the national fraternity and its local chapters and individual members.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.
(12) “DTD imposes a complex hierarchy of' rules and regulations upon its local chapters and individual members, and its constitution sets' out a clear command structure to which local chapters must adhere.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 24.
(13) “Brown and Clukey, who had both been drinking alcoholic beverages, went upstairs to Clukey’s room, past a fraternity member whose function was*798 to limit access to the upper floors to residents and their guests. Inside 'his room, Clukey sexually assaulted .Brown and prevented her from leaving the room for several minutes.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 3.
(14) “The day after the party, Brown reported the incident to the fraternity president, who told her ‘the fraternity had been concerned .about Clukey for a while’ because he had developed a drinking problem and had recently caused property damage and engaged in fights with other fraternity brothers.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 4.
[¶ 32] These facts and conclusions, quoted from the Court’s opinion, support the three theories of liability against both defendants. They also support several inferences from the facts that, according to the reasonable dispute as to material fact standard, are sufficient to avoid a summary judgment. Those inferences are:
[¶ 33] First, DTDNHC’s ownership of the Orono chapter’s real estate, and creation of the local chapter as an unincorporated association of students, is part of a sophisticated legal mechanism, managed by DTD, to attempt to immunize its local chapter real estate from court process and liability for foreseeable lawsuits claiming injury from underage drinking,. excessive drinking, sexual assaults, and other claims that, as the Court recognizes, are the foreseeable result of ceding control of the real estate to eighteen- to twenty-two-year-olds.
[II34] Second, considering, the risks that the Court recognizes are foreseeable, DTD knows or should know that its so-called member responsibility guidelines will not be enforced,
[¶35] Third, the stairs monitor, who apparently was tasked with watching for potential problems, allowed a person who was known to be destructive and have a drinking problem — and who had been drinking that night — to take a young woman upstairs to the bedroom areas of the fraternity.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 36] The record demonstrates that DTD and DTDNHC are closely related entities, with DTDNHC being DTD’s agent for owning the real estate of its local chapters. As the owner of the real estate, DTDNHC, like DTD, is charged with knowledge of the foreseeable risks from use of its real estate, and'is responsible when there is injury resulting from a breach of the duty of care to guard against those foreseeable risks. To hold otherwise, as the Court suggests, would declare that an. owner of a premises is not liable for a premises liability claim.
[¶ 37] To establish liability for DTDNHC, one need look only to the principal precedent cited by the Court, Stanton,
[¶ 38] We have long held that owners of educational institution property have a legal duty to exereise reasonable care toward students and others reasonably anticipated to be on the premises. See Schultz v. Gould Acad.,
[¶ 39] Our opinions in Schultz,
[¶ 40] In our prior opinions, we have not established any distinct elements separating a negligence claim from a premises liability claim. “A prima facie case of negligence requires a plaintiff to establish the following elements: a duty owed, a breach of that duty, and an injury to the plaintiff that is proximately caused by a breach of that duty.” Stanton,
[¶ 41] To prevail on her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Brown will have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) DTD and/or DTDNHC were negligent;
(2) Emotional distress to Brown was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendants’ negligent conduct; and
(3) Brown suffered serious emotional distress as a result of the defendants’ negligence.
See Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 7-70 at 7-95 (2015 ed.).
[¶ 42] The above discussion demonstrates that Brown is entitled to a trial on her negligence claims against DTD and DTDNHC. If she proves negligence, then it is likely that Brown would be able to prove foreseeability and serious emotional distress if, as the record suggests, Brown was sexually assaulted, held against her will, and placed in fear of an imminent, more serious sexual attack. Certainly, at this pretrial stage, there remains a dispute of material fact as to these issues.
[¶ 43] Accordingly, with fact disputes remaining, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment should be vacated and Brown’s claims of premises liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress should proceed to trial against both DTD and DTDNHC.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
[¶ 44] Because I agree with the Superi- or Court that Delta Tau Delta Fraternity, Inc. (DTD) did not have a duty of care running to social invitees of members of the fraternal organization’s Gamma ■' Nu chapter located on the University of Maine at Orono campus, I respectfully dissent.' Í agree with ’the Court’s determinations that the entry of summary judgment in favor of Delta Tau Delta National Housing Corporation was proper, and that DTD did not have a duty of care for purposes of Brown’s negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. I disagree, however, that DTD had a duty of care to, prevent the intentional torts of a member against that member’s social invitee for purposes of a premises liability claim. The undisputed facts demonstrate that (A) DTD did not have control of the premises or the resident members of the local chapter; (B) there was no special relationship between DTD and Brown, the injured party in this case, that would create a duty in DTD to protect her — a member’s social invitee — from the member’s intentional torts; and (C) DTD did not assume a duty. Finally, even if there were a duty, I disagree with the overly expansive ’description of that duty provided by the Court'in its opinion.
. I. EXISTENCE OF A- , DUTY OF-CARE
[¶ 45] To succeed in a premises liability claim, which is a particularized application of general negligence law, Brown must first establish the existence of a duty in DTD “to use reasonable care to -all persons lawfully on the premises.” Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co.,
[¶ 46] There are- no material disputes regarding the facts that are relevant in determining whether DTD had a duty of care, and the court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of DTD on the- legal question of duty is reviewed de novo. See Estate of Cabatit v. Canders,
[¶ 47] For purposes of determining, as a*matter of law, whether there is a duty, the relevant considerations are the degree of control exercised by the defendant, the foreseeability of injury, and the relationship of the parties. Hughes v. Beta Upsilon Bldg. Ass’n,
[¶ 48] There is no real question that the type of injury suffered by Brown was. foreseeable. See Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys.,
[¶ 49] In a premises liability case, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was in control of the premises: See Stewart v. Aldrich,
[¶ 50] In each of the cases cited by the Court, the duty of care under consideration was a general negligence duty of care not connected to control of the premises. See Grenier v. Comm’r of Transp.,
[¶ 51] DTD is not the possessor, • or even the owner, of the premises at issue and did not have control over the premises. An entity that is not in possession or control of the premises can be held liable in premises liability only if that party “negligently create[d] a dangerous condition on the land,” in which case the party “may be liable for reasonably foreseeable harms.” Colvin v. A R Cable Servs.-ME, Inc.,
[¶52] A national fraternity that does not own;' possess, or control the house occupied by its members has no duty in premises liability to a local chapter’s social invitees. See Ostrander v. Duggan,
[¶ 53] Here, DTD may have had some influence on its individual members’ conduct, and it did have an affiliation with the owner of the premises, but neither of those facts demonstrates that DTD had the authority to control activities on the premises or its members’ intentional conduct toward those members’ social invitees. See Sha-
B. Relationship Between DTD and Social Invitees of DTD Members
[¶ 54] I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that a special relationship existed. The Court speaks only of the relationship between DTD and its members. The pertinent question, however, is whether there is a special relationship between DTD and Brown, who seeks to recover damages based on her status as a social invitee of a local chapter member when DTD did not itself invite her to the premises.
[IT 55] A national fraternity such as DTD may well have a special relationship with its own members, but that relationship does not automatically translate into a special relationship with social invitees of those members for purposes of premises liability. This is not a case involving a local fraternity’s hazing of its pledges, cf. Grenier,
[¶ 56] For purposes of premises liability claims, “[o]nly when there is a special relationship, may the actor be found to have a common law duty to prevent harm to another, caused by a third party.” Belyea v. Shiretown Motor Inn, LP,
[¶ 57] Only “[c]ertain narrowly defined, special relationships give rise to an affirmative duty to aid and protect, such as the relationship between a common carrier and passenger, employer and employee, parent and child, or innkeeper and guest.” Estate of Cilley v. Lane,
[¶ 58] In distinguishing among relationships to determine whether a duty exists, we have held that, although an innkeeper has a duty to a guest to proactively prevent an assault if it is reasonably foreseeable, it does not have a similar duty to a patron of a lounge that operates on the inn’s premises because there is no special relationship. Belyea,
[¶ 59] Here, DTD did not invite Brown to the premises, and for purposes of premises liability, she- was not, as the social invitee of a fraternity member, in a special relationship with DTD, which did not own, possess, or control the local chapter house in which the intentional torts occurred. Unlike an innkeeper in a direct contractual relationship with a lodger, see id., or a boarding school or University that provides housing for its students, see Stanton,
[¶ 60] I would conclude that, in addition to failing to demonstrate the necessary degree of control oyer the premises in DTD, Brown has provided . insufficient facts to support the existence of a duty because no special relationship has been shown to exist between Brown and DTD.
C. Assumption of Duty
[¶ 61] The facts presented on summary judgment also do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether, although no duty otherwise existed, DTD voluntarily assumed a-duty of care to pro
II. SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE
[¶ 62] Finally, the extent of the dpty defined by the Court today is distinct from the duties determined to exist in Stanton and Schultz. In Stanton, the University was determined to have “a duty to reasonably warn and advise students of steps they could take to improve their personal safety” in college dormitories — not a duty to prevent any individuals’ commission of torts against other individuals.
[¶ 63] If the Court is correct that the duty imposed is “no more onerous or unexpected than the duty society imposes upon a university to exercise care in the administration of its dormitories,” Court’s Opinion ¶27, then the duty imposed must be similar to the duty to warn of steps that could improve personal safety, see Stanton,
[¶ 64] The duty that the Court adopts today is, instead, a more expansive duty “to exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to provide premises that are reasonably safe and reasonably free from the potential of sexual misconduct-by [the fraternity’s] members, for all social invitees to chapter-sponsored events.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 29. This broad and vaguely defined duty is fundamentally at odds with basic principles of tort law. The duty of reasonable care in providing a reasonably safe premises “is not one of absolute care or of an insurer.” Simmons, Zillman & Gregory, Maine Tort Law § 8.02 at 8-3 (2004 ed.). On the summary judgment record presented, the Court can only'be understood' to suggest that a national fraternity is such .a general insurer, given that the Court has not identified which facts presented on summary judgment would, if believed, demonstrate any breach of the amorphous duty announced. See Estate of Cabatit,
[¶ 65] Thus, even if any duty did exist, I would conclude that the scope of that duty could not be so broad, as to. require DTD, which was not present at the social gathering, to generally insure against the risk of sexual misconduct being committed on the premises by a member against a social invitee during the event. The evidence presented by Brown to estáblish a prima facie case is inadequate to demonstrate a breach of any appropriately limited duty that could be imposed on DTD for purposes of premises liability. .
III. CONCLUSION
[¶ 66] In summary, I would hold that a national fraternity does not have an expansive duty of care in premises liability running to a social invitee of an individual member of á local chapter to protect against the potential of sexual misconduct by that member when the national fraternity does not own or exercise control over the premises, does not have a special relationship with the member’s social invitee, and has not assumed a duty by undertaking to provide security for or other oversight of the building. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
. Even in ordinary negligence cases unrelated to premises liability, national fraternities and building associations have consistently been determined not to have a duty to a local chapter's social invitees when they do not provide oversight or exercise control. See Shaheen v. Yonts,