delivered the Opinion of the Court.
I. Introduction
In this сase, we address Colorado's dram-shop-liability - statute, - section - 12-47-801, C.R.S. (2010). The dram-shop statute provides the sole means for someone injured by an intoxicated person to obtain a remedy from the vendor who sold or provided alcohol to the intoxicated person. Section 12-47-801 abolishes any common law cause of action against a vendor of alcohol while simultaneously creating statutory liability for such vendors under narrowly defined cireum-stances, including when the vendor willfully and knowingly serves alcohоl to a visibly intoxicated person.
The petitioners in this case are Build It and They Will Drink ("Build It"), a liquor licensee doing business as Eden Nightclub, and Rodney Beers, the owner of Build It. The respondent Michael Strauch was stabbed by an intoxicated patron of Build It after both Strauch and his assailant attended a New Year's Eve party at Eden Nightclub. The unprovoked stabbing occurred a block- and-a-half away from the nightclub.
Strauch filed a number of claims against Build It, including general negligence and premises liability claims as well as a claim under the drаm-shop-liability statute. The trial court dismissed all the claims after determining that the attack was not foreseeable, and that Build It therefore had no duty to insure Strauch's safety onee he had left the premises. The court's analysis was rooted in the common law doctrine of foreseeability, which serves as a limit on the extent of liability in the context of general tort claims. The court of appeals reversed only on the dram-shop-liability claim, on the basis that section 12-47-801 does not require or permit consideration of foreseeability in assessing liability under the statute. Strauch v. Build It and They Will Drink, Inc.,
We granted certiorari to determine whether reasonable foreseeability, an element derived from a traditional common law negligence action, may be considered in determining whether a vendor of alcohol is liable for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons under the dram-shop-liability statute. Because we agree that under section 12-47-801, it is not necessary or appropriate to consider whether an injury was a fоreseeable consequence of the sale or service of aleohol, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
II. Facts and Proceedings Below
The facts of this case involve a New Year's Eve celebration that went awry when it ended in an unprovoked stabbing by an intoxicated partygoer. On December 31, 2006, Nathan Dickerman and Michael Strauch, who did not know each other, both attended a New Year's Eve party at Eden Nightclub. Dickerman had purchased the VIP admission package, which included complimentary champagne bottles, unlimited bottle service, and access to a VIP room with an unsupervised self-serve bar. In the VIP room, guests were told to mix their own drinks, although there were employees monitoring doorways and checking wristbands. According to testimony of partygoers, patrons at Eden were stumbling into walls, falling down, throwing drinks, vomiting, taking off clothes, and passing out.
By 11:80 p.m., Dickerman was extremely intoxicated, as demonstrated by the fact that he broke a light fixture, yelled at other patrons, and vomited before being escorted out of the club by friends. Despite this behavior, Dickerman was subsequently readmitted to the club.
At 12:45 a.m., Strauch left the club with his date and began walking toward his hotel. When he was a block-and-a-half away from the club, he heard someone, later identified as Dickerman, yelling obscenities As the yelling got closer, Strauch turned around to discover a knife-wielding Dickerman standing right behind him. As Strauch continued walking quickly toward his hotel, he was
Strauch filed a number of claims against Dickerman, Build It, and Beers. Most of the claims filed against Build It and Beers were based on thеories of general negligence and premises liability, theories under which lability is limited by the concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause. Additionally, Strauch filed a dram-shop claim under section 12-47-801 on the basis that Build It served aleohol to a visibly intoxicated Dickerman. Build It and Beers filed a motion for summary judgment on all the claims, and the motion was granted on September 18, 2008. In the oral order granting the motion for summary judgment, the trial court focused on the foreseeability of the attack and the extent of Build It's duty tо insure the safety of its patrons. The trial court reasoned that going forward with the case would require the court to find that Build It's duty to insure the safety of its patrons required Build It to not only get a patron safely off the premises, but also to "actually escort him home." Additionally, the court discussed the unforeseeability of the attack, distinguishing this case from those where an establishment has notice of incidents occurring in an adjacent parking lot. Because the trial court found that there was no prior notice that an attack would occur a block-and-a-half from the premises, it ruled that Strauch could not succeed on any of his claims against Build It and Beers and granted the motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for all the claims except the statutory claim under section 12-47-801. Strauch,
Build It petitioned this court for certiorari to determine whether foreseeability of an injury-causing event is an element, or appropriate consideration in determining liability of a liquor licensee for the sale or service of alcohol under section 12-47-801. In its petition, Build It contends that by removing foreseeability from the analysis, section 12-47-801 becomes a strict liability statute. Furthermore, Build It argues that the court of appeals' interpretation will result in a "Pandora's box of claims by every victim of an intentional crime ... where the perpetrator claimed he got drunk at some bar before committing the act." This result, Build It claims, is contrary to the legislative intent to rеstrict recovery against liquor licensees and will "render licensees a virtual insurer of the safety of all persons visiting its premises."
We granted certiorari to determine whether an injury must be foreseeable to a liquor licensee for liability under the dram-shop statute. Because we conclude that the plain language of section 12-47-8011 does not include foreseeability, we decline to read an additional element into the statute. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
III. Analysis
a. - Standard of Review
This casе requires us to determine whether section 12-47-8011 imports reasonable foreseeability into an analysis of liability under the statute. Because the issue is one of statutory interpretation, we review de novo. Clyncke v. Waneka,
b. - The Dram-Shop-Liability Statute
Section 1247-801, also known as the dram-shop-liability statute, provides the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated person against a vendor of alcohol beverages. Charlton v. Kimata,
Section 1247-801 contains two subsections which are relevant to this case. The first is subsection (1), which includes a legislative declaration that abolishes any common law cause of action and also provides:
[That in certain cases the consumption of aleohol beverages rather than the sale, service, or provision thereof is the proximate cause of injuries or damages inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person except as otherwise provided in this section.
Therefore, subsection (1) establishes the general rule that consumption of aleohol is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries except under the cireumstances described later in the statute. Subsection (8)(a) eliminates civil liability for a liquor licensee for any injury or damage "suffered because of the intoxication of any person due to the sale or sеrvice of any alcohol beverage to such person," except when:
(I) It is proven that the licensee willfully and knowingly sold or served any alcohol beverage to such person who was under the age of twenty-one years or who was visibly intoxicated.
Thus, subsection (8) provides an exception both to the general rule that consumption of alcohol is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person and to the general rule of non-liability for alcohol vendors. Accordingly, liability occurs when a liquor licensee willfully and knowingly serves an underage or visibly intoxicated person and, because of the intoxication, another person suffers an injury. Civil action under section 12-47-801 is further limited by a one year statute of limitations and a lability cap of one hundred fifty thousand dollars
c. History of Common Law Dram-Shop Liability in Colorado
In order to fully understand the issue in this case, it is necessary to examine the historical interplay between common law and statutory dram-shop liability in Colorado and the role that the concept of foreseeability has played. At common law neither an intoxicated person nor a person injured by an intoxicated person had a remedy against the provider of the alcohol. Lyons v. Nasby,
The wisdom of the common law rule was brought into question, however, by "the shift from commingling aleohol and horses to com
The predecessor to section 12-47-801, which is identical to the current statute in all aspects pertinent to our analysis, was enacted on the heels of case law that expanded the liability of an alcohol vendor. In 1986, this court recognized a common law dram-shop action against vendors of alcoholic beverages by third parties injured by intoxicated persons. Largo v. Crespin,
In a traditional negligence claim such as the one we recognized in Largo, the concept of foreseeability is central to establishing proximate cause. - "Foreseeability is the touchstone of proximate cause," acting as a guidepost to delineate the extent to which a defendant may be held legally responsible for a plaintiff's injury. Walcott v. Total Petroleum, Inc.,
Our decision to permit a common law action against a liquor licensee was grounded in the concepts of proximate cause and foreseeability. We expressly rejected the old common law rule that the consumption of alcohol is a superseding cause of the injury, breaking the chain of causation betweеn the vendor's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. Largo,
d. Analysis of the Current Dram-Shop-Liability Statute
Even as our decisions in Largo and Floyd expanded an alcohol vendor's liability, we acknowledged that the impact would be short-lived. In 1986, while Largo and Floyd were pending in our court, the General Assembly responded to the lower appellate court decisions recognizing a common law right of action against vendors of alcohol. As
The plain language of the statute makes no mention of reasonable foreseeability. Nevertheless, the legislative declaration focuses on proximate cause, raising the question of whether liability under the statute requires or allows -an independent assessment of foreseeability as part of a proximate cause limitation. Consequently, it is necessary to closely examine the terms of the statute.
Section 12-47-801 begins by not only abоlishing any common law cause of action against a vendor of alcohol beverages, but also by reinstating the common law rule that consumption is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person. In doing so, "the legislature assigned the legal responsibility for [negligent] acts to [the intoxicated] person even though other causes, i.e., the provision of alcohol, led to the result." Charlton,
Nevertheless, the legislature did not completely shield liquor licensees from Hability. Instead, the dram-shop statute permits liability under limited cireumstances, which are demarcated by a description of the circumstances under which the exception to the reinstated common law rule applies. As it applies to liquor licenseеs, the statute reads that the consumption, rather than the sale, service, or provision of alcohol is the proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries, except when a liquor licensee willfully and knowingly serves an underage or visibly intoxicated person. Therefore, it follows logically that when there is a willful and knowing sale of aleohol to a visibly intoxicated person, the sale of alcohol is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Because the criteria for proximate cause has been defined by the statute, the statute, rather than a common law foreseeability analysis, controls in assessing liability under section 12-47-801. Subsection (8) provides the elements that must be proved to establish that a liquor licensee's sale or service of alcohol is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, and that consequently, the liquor licensee is liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, a plaintiff filing a dram-shop claim against a liquor licensee must prove that the licensee "willfully and knowingly sold or served" alcohol to an underage or visibly intoxicated patron and that the plaintiff suffered injuries "because of the [patron's] intoxication."
By defining proximate cause in terms of the cireumstances under which it exists, the statute has eliminated foreseeability from the proximate cause analysis. Under the common law, proximate cause, and in turn, liability, depended upon a finding that injury was a foreseeable result of the sale. In contrast, under section 12-47-801, proximate cause and liability require only willful, know
We decline to read an additional element of foreseeability into the analysis because the legislature has expressly provided the requirements for liability under thе statute, and they do not include a requirement that injury was foreseeable by the vendor who served the intoxicated person. Accordingly, sending the question of foreseeability to the jury would contradict the plain language of the statute. So long as there is willful service and injury resulting from intoxication, there is no requirement that the injury be a foreseeable consequence of the sale or service of alcohol.
To the extent that Build It argues that our cases have continued to address foreseeability еven after the enactment of section 12-47-801, we note that the case cited for this argument addressed foreseeability not in regards to dram-shop liability under 12-47-801, but in regards to a tavern's general duty to protect patrons on the premises from injury. In Observatory Corp. v. Daly, we expressed a lack of concern over the dram-shop claims premised on the tavern's service to a visibly intoxicated person.
Our understanding that foreseeability is not an element or appropriate consideration under section 12-47-801 does not transform the statute into a strict liability statute. Liability under section 12-47-801 turns on proof that the liquor licensee "willfully and knowingly" served a visibly intoxicated person. As a result, liability depends on a finding that the liquor Hcensee had a particular mental state. In fact, this standard requires proof of a relatively high level of fault, because it turns on the licensee having actual knowledge of the patron's intoxicated state and willfully serving alcohol to the person anyway. It would not be enough that the licensee "should have known" that the persоn was visibly intoxicated. In addition to the high level of fault required, the cap on liability and the limited period for filing a claim will prevent a landslide of claims against vendors of alcohol beverages.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Notes
. The statute of limitations for a general tort action is two years. § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2010).
. Nevertheless, since 1879, Colorado has provided a narrow exception to the common law rule which provides a cause of action for furnishing alcohol to a habitual drunkard after appropriate potice has been given regarding the individual's status as a habitual drunkard. § 13-21-103, C.R.S. (2010); see also Largo v. Crespin,
. The language of the original bill supports our conclusion that the legislature was particularly focused on overruling the court of appeals' decision, which we subsequently affirmed, regarding proximate cause. The bill in its original form declared that the statute should be interpreted to modify the holdings of Floyd and Largo "in favor of a finding that in certain cases thе consumption of alcoholic beverages, including fermented malt beverages, rather than the sale, service, or provision thereof is the proximate cause of injuries or damages inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person except as otherwise provided in this section." S.B. 86, 55th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1986) (original version). The enacted version of the statute and its current embodiment replace the language about the Floyd and Largo cases with a broader statement that "any commоn law cause of action against a vendor of alcohol beverages is abolished."
. Build It argues that in Sigman we used language implying that a proximate cause determination is still necessary under the statute. In that case, while addressing an argument that the statute was void for vagueness, we stated that "Under subsection (3)(a)(I), the sale or service of alcoholic beverages by a vendor may be the proximate cause of injuries inflicted on a third party by an intoxicated patron if the vendor 'willfully and knowingly' sold or served any liquor to a minor or to a patron 'who was visibly intoxicated.'" Sigman,
. The trial court's foreseeability analysis appears to come from the language in the Observatory case discussing the tavern owner's general duty to protect persons legitimately on the premises.