Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870

Background

Investigator Jonathan Meachum, driving a marked police SUV, pursued motorcyclist Austin Moon after Moon repeatedly fled from police at very high speeds on highways in Texas.
Dashcam/video evidence covers the final seven seconds: Meachum slowed from ~100 mph to ~51 mph and moved his SUV left over the center line as Moon approached from behind; Moon collided with the rear of Meachum’s SUV and died.
Moon had earlier evaded police twice, at speeds reported between 100–170 mph; traffic (oncoming vehicles) was present on the roadway where the rolling-block maneuver occurred.
Moon’s survivors sued Meachum under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unreasonable seizure (Fourth Amendment), alleging Meachum intentionally positioned his SUV to stop Moon in a manner likely to kill him.
The district court granted Meachum qualified immunity on summary judgment; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding plaintiffs failed to show clearly established law that would put Meachum on fair notice his conduct was unlawful.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Meachum's rolling block was an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment seizure	Rolling block was deliberately deadly and unreasonable; thus violated Fourth Amendment	Rolling block was a reasonable use of force to end a dangerous high-speed chase threatening public safety	Qualified immunity: no clearly established law forbade Meachum's conduct under these facts; immunity affirmed
Whether precedent (e.g., Brower/Garner) clearly established a per se prohibition on deadly roadblocks	Brower and Garner establish that deliberately deadly roadblocks (or force when suspect poses no threat) are unconstitutional	Brower addressed only whether a roadblock is a "seizure," Garner is not a rigid rule and cannot be extended to high-speed chases	Precedent does not clearly establish such a per se prohibition; Brower did not resolve reasonableness or qualified immunity; Garner is distinguishable and cannot be broadly extended
Whether out-of-circuit consensus or analogous cases (e.g., Sixth Circuit motorcycle cases) clearly established law	A consensus of persuasive cases shows rolling blocks without immediate threat are unlawful, so Meachum had fair notice	Circuit authority is mixed; some circuits have reached opposite conclusions; post-action decisions and divergent rulings do not create robust consensus	No robust, binding consensus; plaintiffs failed to show law was clearly established at the time
Whether excessive-force high-speed chase precedent (Scott, Plumhoff, Mullenix) supports denying immunity	Those cases are distinguishable and do not authorize deliberate deadly roadblocks against motorcyclists	Those cases support that officers may use deadly force to end dangerous chases and justify qualified immunity here	Supreme Court high-speed-chase cases favor qualified immunity; they do not foreclose an officer’s use of force to end dangerous chases

Key Cases Cited

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (upholding officer action ending an 85-mph chase by ramming car; held no constitutional violation in context)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (officers entitled to qualified immunity after firing on fleeing vehicle at >100 mph to end pursuit)
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam) (qualified immunity where officer fired to end high-speed evasion; refusal to extend Garner rigidly)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (addressed whether a police roadblock constituted a Fourth Amendment "seizure," remanded on reasonableness)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (set limits on deadly force against non-dangerous fleeing felons but does not supply a rigid rule for high-speed chases)
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (qualified-immunity framework emphasizes need for precedent that "squarely governs" specific facts)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clarified that clearly established law must place constitutional question "beyond debate")