Morales-Santana v. Lynch
804 F.3d 520
2d Cir.2015Background
- Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962; his father was a U.S. citizen born in Puerto Rico who left Puerto Rico 20 days before his 19th birthday in 1919 and never returned. The father legitimated Morales-Santana in 1970; Morales-Santana became an LPR in 1975 and faced removal after felony convictions.
- Under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an unwed U.S. citizen mother could transmit citizenship to a foreign-born child if she had one continuous year of physical presence in the U.S. prior to birth (§1409(c)), whereas an unwed U.S. citizen father could transmit only after ten years’ physical presence, five after age 14 (§1401(a)(7) incorporated by §1409(a)).
- Morales-Santana moved to reopen removal proceedings asserting he derived citizenship through his father and that the gender-differential physical-presence rules violate equal protection (Fifth Amendment).
- The BIA denied reopening; the Second Circuit reviewed de novo and first rejected Morales‑Santana’s statutory arguments (de minimis gap, employer counted as U.S. service, Dominican Republic as outlying possession).
- Applying intermediate scrutiny to the gender classification, the court held the different physical-presence requirements were not substantially related to the Government’s asserted interests (assuring a sufficient U.S. connection; preventing statelessness).
- Remedy: Court severed the ten-year requirement (for unmarried fathers) and held that, freed of the constitutional defect, the one‑year continuous presence rule applies to unwed fathers when the other parent is non‑citizen — Morales‑Santana derived citizenship at birth. The BIA decision was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morales‑Santana derived U.S. citizenship under the 1952 INA | Father met the relevant requirements or statute is unconstitutional so relief should extend to fathers | Father did not satisfy §1401(a)(7) and statutory defenses foreclose relief | Statutory arguments (de minimis gap; employer; outlying possession) rejected; constitutional claim sustained |
| Whether the gender-based physical-presence distinction violates equal protection | The differing rules (1 year for unwed mothers vs. 10 years for unwed fathers) are discriminatory and not substantially related to important interests | The scheme furthers important interests: ensuring child’s connection to U.S. and preventing statelessness | Intermediate scrutiny applies; the gender classification fails — Government’s justifications insufficient or unsupported |
| Whether Nguyen/Fiallo deferential review applies (i.e., rational-basis) | Nguyen and subsequent precedent show heightened scrutiny applies when citizenship is at stake | Government relies on Fiallo to argue deference given immigration context | Court distinguishes Fiallo and applies intermediate scrutiny (heightened review) because case concerns claim of preexisting citizenship, not an immigration preference |
| Appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation | Extend the one‑year maternal rule to unwed fathers (equal treatment by extension) | Alternatively, contract benefits by applying ten‑year rule to unwed mothers (sever and limit) | Apply severance to remove the ten‑year requirement for unmarried parents and apply the one‑year continuous presence rule to fathers where other parent is non‑citizen; Morales‑Santana held citizen at birth |
Key Cases Cited
- Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upheld paternity/legitimation requirements; discussed standards for gender classifications in nationality statutes)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (heightened scrutiny for gender classifications)
- Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (applied rational-basis deference in immigration admission context; distinguished here)
- Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (plural opinions addressing gender distinctions in nationality law; relevant to level-of-scrutiny inquiry)
- Flores‑Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam affirmance by an equally divided Court of Ninth Circuit decision on similar INA gender distinctions)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (remedial principle: equal treatment as appropriate remedy for equal protection violations)
- Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (history of nationality statutes and transmission rules)
- Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (discussed de facto sovereignty and territorial control — cited in context of ‘‘outlying possession’’ analysis)
- Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (gender-based classifications require exceedingly persuasive justification)