450 U.S. 455 | SCOTUS | 1981
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal we consider the constitutionality of a now superseded Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as “head and master” of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right to dispose of such property without his spouse’s consent. Concluding that the provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidating the statute.
I
In 1974, appellee Joan Feenstra filed a criminal complaint against her husband, Harold Feenstra, charging him with molesting their minor daughter. While incarcerated on that
Mrs. Feenstra eventually dropped the charge against her husband. He did not return home, but instead obtained a legal separation from his wife and moved out of the State. Mrs. Feenstra first learned of the existence of the mortgage in 1976, when appellant Kirehberg threatened to foreclose on her home unless she paid him the amount outstanding on the promissory note executed by her husband. After Mrs. Feen-stra refused to pay the obligation, Kirehberg obtained an order of executory process directing the local sheriff to seize and sell the Feenstra home.
Anticipating Mrs. Feenstra’s defense to the foreclosure action, Kirehberg in March 1976 filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking a declaratory judgment against Mrs. Feenstra that he was not liable under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq., for any nondisclosures concerning the mortgage he held on the Feenstra home. In her answer to Kirchberg’s complaint, Mrs. Feenstra alleged as a counterclaim that Kirch-berg has violated the Act, but also included a second counter
While Mrs. Feenstra’s appeal from the District Court’s order was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Legislature completely revised its code provisions relating to community property. In so doing, the State abandoned the “head and master” concept embodied in Art. 2404, and instead granted spouses equal control over the disposition of community property. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2346 (West Supp. 1981).
II
By granting the husband exclusive control over the disposition of community property, Art. 2404 clearly embodies the
By focusing on steps that Mrs. Feenstra could have taken to preclude her husband from mortgaging their home without her consent, however, appellant overlooks the critical question: Whether Art. 2404 substantially furthers an important government interest. As we have previously noted, the “absence of an insurmountable barrier” will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 774 (1977). See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975); Reed v Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). Instead the burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the challenged classification. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979). See also Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., supra, at 151. Because appellant has failed to offer such a justification, and because the State, by declining to appeal from the decision below, has apparently abandoned any claim that an important government objective was served by the statute, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating Art. 2404.
Ill
Appellant’s final contention is that even if Art. 2404 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the mortgage he holds on the Feenstra home is none
We decline to address appellant’s concerns about the potential impact of the Court of Appeals’ decision on other mortgages executed pursuant to Art. 2404. The only question properly before us is whether the decision of the Court of Appeals applies to the mortgage in this case, and on that issue we find no ambiguity.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.
Article 2404, in effect at the time Mr. Feenstra executed the mortgage in favor of appellant, provided in pertinent part:
“The husband is the head and master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife.”
This provision has been repealed. See infra, at 458, and nn. 3 and 4.
After the District Court granted summary judgment against appellee Feenstra on her constitutional challenge to the head and master statute, she and appellant Kirchberg agreed to the dismissal with prejudice of their Truth in Lending Act claims.
Article 2346 provides that i([e]ach spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law.”
However, either spouse may renounce his or her right to concur in the disposition of community immovables. La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2348 (West Supp. 1981).
This assertion was made in the State’s brief before the Court of Appeals. 609 F. 2d 727, 735 (1979).
The State and the Governor, as appellees, subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Kirchberg’s appeal on the ground that extensive revisions in the State’s community property law, see supra, at 458, and nn. 3 and 4, had rendered moot the controversy over the constitutionality of Art. 2404. However, because these legislative changes were effective only as of January 1, 1980, they do not govern the mortgage executed by Mr. Feenstra in 1974. The suggestion of mootness was therefore rejected. 449 U. S. 916 (1980).
Nor will this. Court speculate about the existence of such a justification. “The burden ... is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification . . . Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 151 (1980). We note, however, that the failure of the State to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals and the decision of the Louisiana Legislature to replace Art. 2404 with a gender-neutral statute, suggest that appellant would be hard pressed to show that the challenged provision substantially furthered an important governmental interest.
Article 2334, as it existed in 1974, provided:
“Where the title to immovable property stands in the names of both the husband and the wife, it may not be leased, mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife’s consent where she has made a declaration by authentic act that her authority and consent are required for such lease, sale or mortgage and has filed such a declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the parish in which the property is situated.”
This Article has been replaced with a new code provision prohibiting either spouse from alienating or encumbering community immovables without the 'consent of the other spouse. See n. 3, supra.
In so ruling, we also reject appellant’s secondary argument that the constitutional challenge to Art. 2404 should be rejected because the provision was an integral part of the State’s community property law and its invalidation would call into question the constitutionality of related provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code. The issue before us is not whether the State’s community property law, as it existed in 1974, could have functioned without Art. 2404, but rather whether that provision unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of sex.
Indeed, appellant's view that some ambiguity exists concerning the applicability of the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the mortgage he held on the Feenstra home appears to be of recent vintage. Appellant Kirchberg never sought clarification from the Court of Appeals on the scope of its decision, and apparently regarded the court’s judgment to be sufficiently adverse and binding on him to warrant seeking review on the merits before this Court.
Concurrence Opinion
with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, concurringin the result.
Since men and women were similarly situated for all relevant purposes with respect to the management and disposition of community property, I agree that Art. 2404 of the Louisiana Civil Code Ann. (West 1971), which allowed husbands but not wives to execute mortgages on jointly owned real estate without spousal consent, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, post, at 477-479 (Stewart, J., concurring).
While it is clear that the Court is correct in holding that the judgment of the Court of Appeals applied to the particular mortgage executed by Mr. Feenstra, it is equally clear that that court’s explicit announcement that its holding was to apply only prospectively means that no other mortgage executed before the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals is invalid by reason of its decision.