Moore, Aaron Jacob, PD-1634-14

Background

Aaron Jacob Moore was investigated for alleged delinquent conduct occurring when he was 16; investigation began Sept. 2008.
Detective forwarded her report to the DA’s office shortly after Moore turned 18; the DA filed a petition to transfer to district court more than a year after the 18th birthday.
The juvenile court granted the DA’s petition under Texas Family Code §54.02(j)(4)(A) (burden: show by preponderance that for a reason beyond the control of “the state” it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the person’s 18th birthday) and transferred the case to criminal district court.
On appeal the First Court of Appeals construed “the state” to include investigatory (law-enforcement) delays, concluded the DA’s reliance on the detective’s delay was insufficient, vacated the district court judgment, and dismissed the case.
The State (DA) urged reversal, arguing that when “the state” refers to investigatory delay the burden should flip to the respondent and that dismissal without applying oppressive-delay factors violates separation-of-powers.
Moore (appellant) defends the appellate construction, arguing (1) “the state” includes law enforcement delays, (2) the Legislature may condition a DA’s exercise of prosecutorial benefits and (3) §54.02(j)(4)(A) is contractual-like and enforceable without violating separation of powers.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Moore)	Defendant's Argument (State/DA)	Held (lower court / issue outcome)
Scope of “the state” in §54.02(j)(4)(A)	“The state” includes investigatory delays by law enforcement; such delays are attributable and can defeat transfer	When “the state” means investigatory delays, the burden should flip to respondent and require proof of intentional oppressive delay	First Court of Appeals: “the state” includes investigatory delays; DA’s reliance on detective’s delay insufficient → dismissal
Separation of powers protection for DA duties	Separation clause does not bar §54.02(j)(4)(A); DA’s duty to prosecute is statutory and can be conditioned by legislature	DA claims juvenile-court jurisdictional rule unduly interferes with constitutionally protected prosecutorial discretion	Appellate briefing: Legislature may regulate juvenile/district jurisdiction; separation-of-powers does not invalidate §54.02(j)(4)(A) as construed by court of appeals (Moore asks CCA to affirm)
When DA’s prosecutorial duty attaches	DA’s prosecutorial duty (if protected) requires an actual criminal case; juvenile transfer proceedings are civil and jurisdictional, so DA discretion should not control waiver hearing	DA contends its prosecutorial interests extend into transfer decisions and should not be limited by juvenile procedural burdens	Lower court treated transfer inquiry as operative; Moore argues DA’s prosecutorial power comes only after juvenile court waives jurisdiction
Nature and enforceability of §54.02(j)(4)(A)	Provision is contractual-like (analogous to plea bargains/IADA): DA receives the benefit of prosecuting adults in exchange for accepting juvenile-court conditions; enforcement is appropriate and not clearly outweighed by separation concerns	DA urges that enforcing the statute as written would strip prosecutorial discretion and improperly penalize the State for investigatory delays	Moore asserts the statute is enforceable as a permissible legislative condition on a statutory prosecutorial benefit; interests favor enforcement

Key Cases Cited

Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (separation-of-powers protections for county attorney duties where constitution conferred the role)
State v. Williams, 938 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Legislature may condition prosecutor’s powers; separation-of-powers analysis applies to constitutionally assigned functions)
Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (juvenile transfer proceedings remain civil in character until waiver and transfer)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008) (courts must not render advisory opinions; jurisdictional limits are enforced)
Kent v. United States, 381 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1967) (juvenile system’s parens patriae role and distinct goals from criminal prosecution)
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (U.S. 1970) (statutes of limitations promote prompt investigation; analogous policy rationale)
Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (separation-of-powers limits on judicial overreach)