Lead Opinion
OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court
We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review in this case in order to address several questions related to the appellate review of a juvenile court’s waiver of its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed a murder at the age of sixteen. What, exactly, is the appellate court’s appropriate role in reviewing the adequacy of the juvenile court’s statutorily required written order transferring the child to a criminal district court for prosecution as an adult? Ultimately, we hold that the court of appeals conducted an appropriate review of the juvenile court’s transfer order, and we affirm its judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. State’s Motion to Waive Jurisdiction and Trial
On November 19, 2008, the State filed a petition in the 313th Juvenile Court in Harris County alleging that the appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by committing an intentional or knowing murder. On the same date, the State also filed a motion for the juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the appellant to criminal district court for prosecution as an adult, alleging as grounds for the transfer that, because of the seriousness of the offense alleged, ensuring the welfare of the community required waiver
At the hearing, the State called a single witness to testify: Detective Jason Meredith, the Deer Park Police officer who investigated the crime scene and interviewed a number of potential suspects, including the appellant. Meredith’s testimony on direct examination took the form of a non-chronological account of his investigation of the murder, up to and including his interrogation of the appellant. At the end of his testimony, over no objection from the appellant, the State introduced the following documents: (1) a juvenile offense report revealing the appellant’s “Previous Referral” for “MISCHIEF-$500/$1499.99,” which, subsequent testimony would show, resulted from the appellant’s alleged “keying” of another student’s vehicle; (2) a “Juvenile Probation Certification Report” detailing the positive and negative behaviors, as well as the academic history, of the appellant while he was under the observation of the juvenile-justice system; and (8) a “Physician’s Medical Assessment” prepared by the Harris County Juvenile Probation Health Services Division, which listed the findings of the appellant’s physical — but not any psychological or behavioral — examination.
For his part, the appellant elicited testimony from seven witnesses. Various family members, friends, and acquaintances testified both generally and specifically about the appellant’s disadvantaged upbringing, fractured family life, and positive personal qualities, including politeness and pliability to adult supervision. Various actors within the juvenile-justice system testified both generally and specifically about the appellant’s constructive conduct within, and positive progression through, the juvenile-justice system, characterizing him as “one of the best kids [to] come through as far as his intelligence and obedience and the way he carries himself in the facility.” The appellant also introduced into evidence, among other things, forensic psychiatrist Dr. Seth W. Silverman’s detailed and thorough
recommendation as to whether [the] facilities currently available to the juvenile court will provide adequate protection to the public, and ... the likelihood that the respondent will be rehabilitated should the court decide to use the facilities available to the juvenile court as well as the sophistication, maturity, and aggressiveness [of the appellant].
It was Dr. Silverman’s ultimate opinion that the appellant, as a “dependent, easily influenced individual” whose “thought process lacks sophistication” (a characteristic Silverman considered “indicative of immaturity”) “would probably benefit from placement in a therapeutic environment
At the close of evidence, and after both parties delivered closing arguments, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion to waive jurisdiction. At the behest of the appellant’s counsel, the court also made the following oral findings: (1) “that there is insufficient time to work with the juvenile in the juvenile system”; (2) “that the seriousness of the offense, murder, makes it inappropriate to deal with in this system”; (8) that “the respondent did have a prior criminal mischief probation”; (4) that the instant offense “actually occurr[ed] at the time respondent was on probation which ... makes the services and resources of the juvenile system look to be inadequate”; (5) “that because there is a co-respondent [certified to stand trial in the adult criminal courts], there is a logic in putting respondents, where they are a year apart or two years apart, together”; and (6) that “judicial economy, although not the driving factor, is an issue” because “sometimes it’s more convenient to hear the same matter, even though there are different people involved, in the same court for the convenience of the witnesses, the attorneys, and the system in general.”
The following day, the juvenile court signed and entered a written order waiving its jurisdiction. Closely following the language of the juvenile transfer statute, the order affirmed that the juvenile court had determined “that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding.”
[i]n making that determination, the Court ... considered among other matters:
1. Whether the alleged OFFENSE WAS against person or property, with the greater weight in favor of waiver given to offenses against the person;
2. The sophistication and maturity of the child;
3. The record and previous history of the child; and
4. The prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.4
The juvenile court also specifically found in its written order: (1) that the appellant “is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of HIS defense and to be responsible for HIS conduct;” (2) that the alleged offense “WAS against the person of another;” and that (3) “there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of’ the appellant “by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.”
Per the trial court’s order, the appellant’s case was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 178th District Court in Harris County, where he stood trial, certified as
B. The Appeal
Before the First Court of Appeals, the appellant complained that the juvenile court’s stated “reasons for waiver” were supported by insufficient evidence and that the juvenile court therefore abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction over the appellant.
In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the appellant that the evidence supported neither the juvenile court’s “sophistication-and-maturity” finding nor its “adequate-protection-of-the-public-and-likelihood-of-rehabilitation” finding.
Regarding the juvenile court’s sophistication-and-maturity finding, while the State argued that “[the appellant]’s efforts to conceal the crime and avoid apprehension demonstrate that he knew the difference between right and wrong and that his conduct was wrong,” the court of appeals pointed out that the “finding of the juvenile court ... was based on [the appellant’s ability to waive his rights and assist counsel in preparing his defense, not an
With respect to the juvenile court’s finding that “there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of rehabilitation ... by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court[,]” the court of áppeals found it significant that the appellant “had a sole misdemeanor conviction for ‘keying' a car, and while locked up in the juvenile facility was accused of four infractions.”
Thus,. of the three “reasons for waiver” that the juvenile court specifically gave in its written order, the court of appeals determined that one reason, sophistication and maturity, was supported by legally insufficient evidence. It determined that another reason, the protection of the public and likelihood of rehabilitation, was supported by factually insufficient evidence. With respect to the juvenile court’s third reason for waiving jurisdiction — that the appellant’s offense constituted a crime against the person of another, and not a mere property crime — the court of appeals regarded this as an inadequate justification, by itself, for waiver. To transfer jurisdiction to the criminal court for this reason alone was, the court of appeals ultimately concluded, an abuse of discretion.
C. The Petition for Discretionary Review
The State now challenges the court of appeals’s ruling on four fronts. It argues that the court of appeals erred:
• to apply factual-sufficiency review to any aspect of its analysis of the question whether the juvenile court abused its discretion to waive jurisdiction.
• in failing to consider whether the seriousness of the offense could, by itself, justify the juvenile court’s discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction.
• in limiting its abuse-of-discretion analysis to the reasons for waiver set forth in the juvenile court’s written order, and failing to consider the reasons that the juvenile court proclaimed orally from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing.
• in limiting its abuse-of-discretion analysis to a review of the specific reasons the juvenile court gave (whether written or oral), rather than to assay the entire record for any evidence that would support a valid’reason to waive jurisdiction, regardless of whether the juvenile court purported to rely on that evidence/reason.
Review of these various assertions necessitates a fairly global exegesis of the statutory scheme for the waiver of juvenile-court jurisdiction in Texas, as well as the abundant case law that has been generated in the courts of appeals over the past half a century.
II. THE LAW AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Kent v. United States
The transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal court for prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the exception, not the rule; the operative principle is that, whenever feasible, children and adolescents below a certain age should be “protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system[.]”
must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not assume that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely-assume that full investigation has been made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor. We do not read the [relevant District of Columbia] statute as requiring that this statement must be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of full investigation has been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.26
In an appendix to its opinion in Kent, the Supreme Court included a policy memorandum promulgated by the District of Columbia Juvenile Court that describes “determinative factors” for guiding the juvenile court’s discretion in deciding whether waiver of its jurisdiction over a particular juvenile offender is appropriate.
B. The Statutory Scheme
The Juvenile Justice Code of the Texas Family Code specifically provides that the designated juvenile court of each county has “exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings in all cases involving ... delinquent conduct ... engaged in by a person who was a child within the meaning of this title at the time the person engaged in the conduct.”
The right of the juvenile offender to remain outside the jurisdiction of the criminal district court, however, is not absolute. Section 54.02 of the Juvenile Justice Code provides that, if certain conditions are met, the “juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court ... for criminal proceedings!.]”
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony; (2) the child was ... 14 years of age or older at ■the time [of the alleged] offense, if the offense is ... a felony of the first degree!;] and (3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that, the child before the court committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings
in the proper adult criminal court.
the [juvenile] court shall consider, among other matters: (1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.35
These non-exclusive factors serve, we have said, to facilitate the juvenile court’s balancing of “the potential danger to the public” posed by the particular juvenile offender “with the juvenile offender’s amenability to treatment.”
For the juvenile, there are a number of advantages to remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts. Not the least of these advantages is that, with but a few exceptions, a “child may not be committed or transferred to a penal institution or other facility used primarily for the execution of sentences of persons
Prior to January 1, 1996, Section 56.01 of the Juvenile Justice Code provided, in one phrasing or another, that an appeal “from an order entered under ... Section 54.02 of this code respecting transfer of the child to criminal court for prosecution as an adult” could be taken “by or on behalf of a child” directly from the juvenile court to the proper court of appeals.
What is lacking in our statutory scheme — as is lacking in Kent — is any express statement of the applicable standard of appellate review of the juvenile court’s transfer order. In the absence of an explicit statutory standard of appellate review, the courts of appeals have filled the void with decisional law spelling out how they will go about providing the “meaningful review” contemplated by Kent.
C. The Consensus in the Courts of Appeals
In the absence of explicit provisions in the Juvenile Justice Code that define a standard for appellate review of juvenile transfer orders, the general consensus of the various courts of appeals has been as follows. The burden is on the petitioning party, the State, to produce evidence to inform the juvenile court’s discretion as to whether waiving its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate in the particular case.
With respect to the adequacy of the written order mandated by Section 54.02(h), the courts of appeals have generally agreed, first of all, that the written order must reflect the juvenile court’s “reasons” for waiving jurisdiction.
The courts of appeals have also uniformly agreed that, absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court should not set aside the juvenile court’s order transferring jurisdiction.
The State argues that the court of appeals in this case erred in four respects. First, the court of appeals erred to conduct a factual-sufficiency review, since appeal from a juvenile transfer order is now “a criminal matter” that is “governed” by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the rules of appellate procedure that apply to criminal cases.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Factual Sufficiency Under Section 54.02
The State argues that the court of appeals erred to apply a factual-sufficiency standard to the Section 54.02(f)(4) factor, regarding “the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.”
That the appeal of a transfer order is now regarded as a “criminal matter,” under Article 44.47(c), does not in itself control the question of whether factual-sufficiency review is available on direct
Having said that, we do agree with the State’s contention to the limited extent that it may argue that sufficiency review should not apply to appellate re-view of the ultimate question under Section 54.02(a)(3), that is, whether “because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.” The discretion of the juvenile court is at its apex when it makes this largely normative judgment.
We apply a two-pronged analysis to determine an abuse of discretion: (1) did the [juvenile] court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) did the [juvenile] court err in its application of discretion? . A traditional sufficiency of the evidence review helps answer the first question, and we look to whether the [juvenile] court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles to answer the second.77
Similarly, we hold that, in evaluating a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court should first review the juvenile court’s specific findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under “traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.” But it should then review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision under an abuse of discretion standard. That is to say, in deciding whether the juvenile court erred to conclude that the seriousness of the offense alleged and/or the background of the juvenile called for criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community, the appellate court should simply ask, in light of its own analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant evidence, whether the juvenile court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. In other words, was its transfer decision essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based, or did it represent a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria? And, of course, reviewing courts should bear in mind that not every Section 54.02(f) factor must weigh in favor of transfer to justify the juvenile court’s discretionary decision to waive its jurisdiction.
B. The Seriousness of the Offense
The State complains that the court of appeals should not have concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion for waiving jurisdiction based upon the seriousness of the offense. The State points out that the juvenile court made an explicit finding of fact in its transfer order that the appellant’s alleged offense was committed against the person of another, under Section 54.02(f)(1). This finding of fact was amply supported by tbe-r&qord, the State contends, and was sufficientbby itself to provide a legitimate basis forv the trial court’s discretionary decision to \\vaive jurisdiction. The court of appeals rejected this contention because “[i]f, as the State argues, the nature of the offense alone justified waiver, transfer would automatically be authorized in certain classes of ‘serious’ crimes such as murder, and the subsection (f) factors would be rendered superfluous.”
The courts of appeals have long held that the offense that the juvenile is alleged to have committed, so long as it is substantiated by evidence at the transfer hearing and of a sufficiently egregious character, will justify the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction regardless of what the evidence may show with respect to the child’s background and other Section 54.02(f) factors.
The transfer order in this case made no findings about the specifics of the capital murder, finding no more than probable cause to believe that the appellant committed “the OFFENSE alleged.” It gave as the juvenile court’s sole reason for waiving jurisdiction that, “because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings!,]” and then it simply recited “that the OFFENSE allege [sic] to have been committed WAS against the person of another[.]”
C. Appellate Review of the Reasons/Facts Cited in the Transfer Order
There is an inherent tension between the broad discretion that the juvenile court is afforded in making the normative judgment of whether to waive jurisdiction, on the one hand, and Kent’s, insistence upon the primacy of appellate review in order to assure that the juvenile court’s broad discretion is not abused, on the other. The legislative response to this inherent tension was to mandate, in Section 54.02(h), that the juvenile court “shall state specifically in its order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the eourt[.]”
Given this legislative regime, we think it only fitting that a reviewing court
D. Application of Law to Fact
The juvenile court did not “show its work” in the transfer order in this case. The only reason specifically stated on the face of the transfer order to justify waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is that the offense alleged is a serious one. The only fact specified in the written transfer order in support of this reason is that the offense that the appellant is alleged to have committed is an offense against the person of another. We agree with the court of appeals’s conclusion that a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction based on this particular reason, fortified only by this fact, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
It is true that the juvenile court found other facts that would have been relevant to support transfer for the alternative reason that the appellant’s background was such as to render waiver of juvenile jurisdiction appropriate. First, without going into any relevant detail, the juvenile court’s order found that the appellant was sophisticated and mature enough to have been able to waive his constitutional rights effectively and assist in the preparation of his defense at trial, just as an adult would.
Moreover, even were we to regard the recitation of these conclusory facts in the written transfer order to constitute an acceptably implicit indication that the juvenile court also considered the appellant’s background as a reason for the transfer, we would nonetheless uphold the court of appeals’s judgment. First, with respect to the appellant’s sophistication and maturity, we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence was legally insufficient to support such a finding, since the State offered no evidence at the juvenile hearing to inform the juvenile court’s consideration of that Section 54.02(f) factor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals did not err to undertake a factual-sufficiency review of the evidence underlying the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction over the appellant. Because the juvenile court made no case-specific findings of fact with respect to the seriousness of the offense, we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence fails to support this as a valid reason for waiving juvenile-court jurisdiction. Even had the juvenile court cited the appellant’s background as an alternative basis to justify his transfer, the court of appeals was correct to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to support this reason against the findings of fact made in the transfer order
Notes
. Tex. Fam.Code title 3, Juvenile Justice Code (hereinafter, "the Juvenile Justice Code”).
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(d). The appellant complains that "[p]rior to the hearing, the State failed to conduct the statutorily mandated diagnostic or social evaluation!.]” Appellant’s Response to the State's Brief on Discretionary Review at 1. But the appellant did not raise this issue as grounds for reversal on direct appeal, and we have no occasion to speak to it. See Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 16.
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(a).
. Id. § 54.02(f).
. See Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(h) ("If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver[.]”).
. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 27.
. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hidalgo v. State,
.Id. at 30.
. Id. at 34.
. Moon v. State,
. Id. at 370-71 (citing In re G.F.O.,
. Id. at 374.
. Id.
. Id. at 376.
. Id. at 377.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 376-77.
. Id. at 378.
. Id. at 375 (citing R.E.M. v. State,
. Id. at 378.
. Hidalgo,
.
. See id. at 561,
. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. at 565-67,
. Acts 1967, 60th Leg., ch. 475, § 4, p. 1083-84, eff. Aug. 28, 1967 (currently codified at Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(f)). See Robert O. Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision: Draftsman’s Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family Code, 5 Tex. Tech. L.Rev. 509, 562 (1974) ("Most of the procedural safeguards incorporated in [§ 54.02] are probably required as a matter of federal constitutional law by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kent v. United States,
. Tex Fam.Code § 51.04(a).
. Id. § 51.03(a)(1).
. Id. § 51.02(2)(a).
. Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014) (defining “original jurisdiction” as "[a] court's power to hear and decide a matter before any other court can review the matter”). See also id. at 981 (defining "exclusive jurisdiction” as "[a] court’s power to adjudicate an action or class of actions to the exclusion of all other courts").
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(a).
. Id.
. Id. § 54.02(f). These are the factors that derive from the Kent appendix. See note 27, ante. They are "intended to guide the [juvenile] court’s discretion in making the determination to transfer." Dawson, 5 Tex Tech. L.Rev. at 564. Initially, Section 54.02(f) embraced all six of the Kent factors, but the statute was amended in 1996 to remove two of them. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, § 34, p. 2533, eff. Jan. 1, 1996.
. Hidalgo,
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(h)
. There are other exceptions to this general rule not implicated in this case, including an exception for “temporary detention in a jail or lockup pending juvenile court hearing,” id. § 51.13(c)(1), as well as one for "transfer ... under Section 245.151(c), Human Resources Code.”'Id. § 51.13(c)(3); see also Tex. Hum. Res.Code § 245.151(c) (the Texas Juvenile Justice Department "shall transfer” an adjudicated juvenile offender "to the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the completion of the person’s sentence” when, pursuant to court order under Tex. Fam.Code § 54.1 l(i)(2) and Tex. Hum. Res.Code § 244.014(a), the juvenile court determines that "the child’s conduct” while under State supervision "indicates that the welfare of the community requires the transfer”).
. See Tex. Fam.Code § 54.04(c) ("If the court or jury does not so find, the court shall dismiss the child and enter a final judgment without any disposition."). In keeping with the Juvenile Justice Code's stated purpose to "remove, where appropriate, the taint of criminality from children committing certain unlawful acts[,]” Tex. Fam.Code § 51.01(2)(B), the juvenile-justice equivalent of a "conviction” for delinquent conduct is referred to instead as an "adjudication,” Tex. Fam.Code § 54.03, and the juvenile-justice equivalent of a "sentence” for an adjudication is instead referred to as a "disposition.” Tex. Fam.Code § 54.04.
. Hidalgo,
. See Acts 1973, 63d Leg., ch. 544, § 1. p. 1483, eff. Sept. 1, 1973.
. Id.
. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 262, § 48, p. 2546, eff. Jan. 1, 1996.
. Id. at § 85, p. 2584 (emphasis added).
. Id.
. Matter of Honsaker,
. Matter of P.B.C.,
. Faisst v. State,
. See In re J.R.C.,
. Matter of M.I.L.,
. E.g., Matter ofJ.R.C.,
. See, e.g., Matter of J.R.C.,
. See e.g., In re J.R.C.,
. Matter of Honsaker,
. In re W.R.M.,
. See note 54, ante. Early case law seemed to contemplate that greater specificity might be necessary to satisfy Kent ’s emphasis on meaningful appellate review. See In re J.R.C.,
. E.g., Matter of Honsaker,
. See, e.g., Matter of M.D.B.,
. See, e.g., Matter of I.J., Jr.,
. See, e.g., Matter of P.A.C.,
. See, e.g., L.M. v. State, S.W.2d 808, 813 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, ref’d n.r.e.) ("Although all of the factors enumerated in section 54.02(f) must be considered by the [juvenile] judge, each one need not be present in a specific case.”); Matter of E.D.N.,
. See, e.g., Moore,
. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.47(c).
. Brooks v. State,
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(f)(4). See Moon,
. Indeed, in light of Article 44.47(d), it is arguable that factual sufficiency remains a viable claim on appeal from a transfer order, notwithstanding that it is now a "criminal matter.” After all, factual sufficiency was a "claim[] under the law that existed before January 1, 1996, that could have been raised on direct appeal of a transfer under Section 54.02, Family Code.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.47(d).
. Matlock v. State,
. State's Brief on the Merits at 12-13.
. See In re R.R.,
. See Tex. Fam.Code § 54.03(f) ("The child shall be presumed to be innocent of the charges against the child and no finding that a child has engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may be returned unless the state has proved such beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
. In re R.R.,
. See In re C.H.,
. See In re C.H.,
. See Matlock,
. The State does not take issue with the court of appeals's formulation of the difference, under current law, between legal- and factual-sufficiency analyses;
"Under a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence favorable to the challenged finding and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not reject the evidence. * * * Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence presented to determine if the [juvenile] court’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust.”
Moon,
.Whether the offense is serious enough, and/or the juvenile’s background demonstrates, that waiver of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is warranted to ensure the welfare of the community is, in many respects, similar to the question of whether the nonexclusive Keeton factors warrant a jury's prediction, at the punishment phase of a capital-murder trial, that the accused will probably commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Even before Brooks was decided, we insisted that this special issue, while not "wholly normative in nature,” is nevertheless too “value-laden” to be amenable to a factual-sufficiency review. McGinn v. State,
. In re J.R.C.S.,
. See Hidalgo,
.Moon,
. Appellant's Response to the State's Brief at 13 (citing Kent,
. The earliest case to so hold was In re Buchanan,
.The other two Subsection (f) findings of fact, stated equally conclusorily in the juvenile court’s transfer order, corresponded to the sophistication-and-maturity factor (Section 54.02(f)(2)) and the prospects-for-adequate-public-protection-and-rehabilitation-of-the-ju- . venile factor (Section 54.02(f)(4)). Both of these factors seem far more relevant to the background-of-the-child reason for concluding that the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings than to the seriousness-of-the-offense reason — the latter of which was the only Section 54.02(a)(3) reason that the juvenile court actually provided in its transfer order to justify the waiver of jurisdiction.
. Tex. Fam.Code § 54.02(h).
. Dawson, 5 Tex. Tech. L.Rev. at 564-65.
. In re J.R.C.,
. Cf. State v. Cullen,
. In any event, it is doubtful that the Legislature meant for the sophistication-and-maturity factor to embrace the juvenile’s ability to waive his constitutional rights and assist in his defense. It is true that a great many of the courts of appeals seem to think that it does. The juvenile court’s transfer order in ' the early case of In re Buchanan included such a finding.
. See Moon,
. Id. at 377-78. See Cain v. State,
. Neither the State nor the appellant has contested the propriety of the court of appeals’s ultimate disposition; neither party argues that the court of appeals erred, even in light of its holding that the juvenile court abused its discretion to waive jurisdiction, to declare that the cause remains "pending in the juvenile court.” Moon,
It has been suggested that, rather than affirm the court of appeals's reversal of the juvenile court's transfer order, we should first remand the cause to the court of appeals with an order that the court of appeals remand the cause to the juvenile court for additional specific findings of fact to determine retroactively whether its original transfer order was valid. In State v. Elias,
Dissenting Opinion
filed a dissenting opinion in which Hervey, J., joined.
For almost forty years, the tendency among the courts of appeals has been to hold that a juvenile transfer order need not specify in detail the facts supporting the order. The court of appeals in this case broke rank with the weight of that
A. What the Statute Requires
1. The Text
The Family Code provides that, for a child above a certain age who commits one of the types of offenses listed, a juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction if,
after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.1
In making this determination, the juvenile court must consider, among other matters:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given-to offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of pro- ■ cedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.2
A juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction must “state specifically ... its reasons for waiver and certify its action.”
2. The Transfer Order Need not Detail the Facts
In construing a statute, we give effect to the plain meaning of its text unless the language of the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.
3. The Four Statutory Factors are not Individually Subject to a Sufficiency Review
The court of appeals treated the four statutory factors outlined above as individually subject to a sufficiency review,
Attempting to conduct a sufficiency review on the four factors individually creates myriad problems, especially when a factual sufficiency review is involved. If one conducts a factual sufficiency review of each factor individually, how does one account for the possible cumulative effect of multiple factors? That is, if two or more factors are supported by legally sufficient but factually insufficient evidence, must all of the factors be disregarded as insufficient, or can multiple factors that are indi
And conducting a sufficiency review of individual factors is not enough to resolve the transfer question because, at least in the Court’s estimation, proof of an individual factor is not necessarily enough to support a transfer. If it were, appellant’s transfer would clearly be supported because the first factor, whether the alleged offense is against a person or property, has been definitively established in the State’s favor. Under the Court’s reasoning, because proof of an individual factor is not necessarily enough, the appellate court must still decide whether the factors as a whole, and any other relevant factors, are sufficient to justify either the “seriousness of the offense” or “background of the child” reasons for transfer (or both). This results in a two-tiered approach to sufficiency: first analyzing the sufficiency of the individual factors, and then assessing the sufficiency of the factors as a whole. The closest analogue to this two-tiered approach is the test for constitutional speedy-trial violations, in which the individual factors are subject to a bifurcated standard of review and the balancing of those factors is subject to de novo review.
Moreover, the nature of at least two of the four statutory factors suggests that a .sufficiency review of the individual factors is inappropriate. The first statutory factor — whether the alleged offense was against person or property — is just a question of law. The question is simply wheth- . er the offense alleged is a crime against a person, a crime against property, or a crime that falls within neither of those categories. The answer to that question can be resolved by looking solely to the State’s charges. The fourth statutory factor — the prospects of protecting the public and rehabilitating the child — calls for predictions, and as such, would not seem to be the sort of issue that would be subject to a factual sufficiency review.
Finally, the non-exclusivity of the four statutory factors also raises the issue of the juvenile court importing its own factors and how we would conduct a sufficiency review in that context. This is not a mere hypothetical question because, in the present case, the transfer order included two factual conclusions that are not covered by the four statutory factors: (1) that appellant was charged with murder and (2) that there was probable cause to believe the offense had been committed. The first is undeniably true as a legal matter and the second is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. The fact that a trial court can import its own factors suggests that conducting a sufficiency review of an individual factor is myopic at best. The real, relevant question is whether the matters considered by the trial court are sufficient to justify a transfer on
4. Factors Two and Four are Relevant to the Seriousness-of-the-Offense Reason for Transfer
The Court also errs when it concludes that the second and fourth statutory factors are relevant only to the “background of child” reason for transfer. The statutory language does not limit the purpose for which the four statutory factors may be considered, and the second and fourth factors in particular may well be relevant to the “seriousness of the offense” reason for transfer. The second factor — the sophistication and maturity of the child — relates to the seriousness-of-the-offense reason for transfer in two ways. First, the more sophisticated and mature the child, the more blameworthy his conduct is likely to be.
With respect to the fourth factor,, the circumstances of the crime and the background of the child are both relevant to determining whether society can be protected and the child can be rehabilitated. As we have explained in the capital murder context, the circumstances of the offense are highly relevant to determining whether a defendant poses a future danger to society, and sometimes are sufficient by themselves to do so.
B. The Statute Was Satisfied
The juvenile court’s transfer order states that “because of the seriousness of the offense, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding.”
Moreover, the transfer order stated that the juvenile court had considered the four statutory factors, and the transfer order found three of those factors in the State’s favor. With regard to the first factor, the court found and that this offense was one against the person. With regard to the second statutory factor, the juvenile court found that appellant was “of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of his defense and to be responsible for his conduct.”
The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates the seriousness of appellant’s offense. Appellant pretended to be a drug seller and set up a fake drug deal in order to accomplish a robbery. He pursued and shot the victim as the victim fled. Appellant sent instructions by text message to a co-conspirator both before and after the offense. Text messages sent before the crime asked a co-conspirator if he was ready to begin and to bring a gun. In text messages after the crime, appellant attempted to cover up his involvement, saying: “Don’t say a word.” “Tell them my name is Crazy, and you don’t know where I live.”
The offense appellant was charged with — murder—is one of the most serious crimes in the Penal Code, but under the evidence presented, appellant’s conduct — a murder in the course of a robbery — could have been charged as capital murder, the offense that carries the most serious punishment in this state.
This Court and the court of appeals not only arrive at the wrong result by applying the wrong standards; there are other flaws in those courts’ analyses. In analyzing the sophistication-and-maturity factor, the court of appeals and this Court focus on appellant’s ability to waive his constitutional rights and assist in his defense. But
G. Conclusion
I would hold that the court of appeals improperly overturned the juvenile court’s decision and that the juvenile court did not err in transferring appellant to adult criminal court. I respectfully dissent.
. Tex. Family Code § 54.02(a)(3).
. Id. § 54.02(f).
. Id. § 54.02(h).
. Boykin v. State,
. See Court's op. at n. 54.
. State v. Colyandro,
. See e.g. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 4(a) (requiring a subsequent application to contain sufficient “specific facts” establishing circumstances that would constitute an exception to the general rule prohibiting subsequent habeas applications).
.
. Id. at 561,
. Id.
. Id.
. See Moon v. State,
. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. arts. 37.071, § 2(b) (special issues in a death penalty case), 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (deadly-weapon finding).
. See Keeton v. State,
. See Cantu v. State,
. See Gonzales v. State,
. See McGinn v. State,
. See Roper v. Simmons,
. See Penry v. Lynaugh,
. See Ex parte Sosa,
. Devoe v. State,
. The exact wording of this portion of the juvenile court's order is as follows:
After full investigation and hearing at which hearing, the said CAMERON MOON, FATHER, MICHAEL MOON were present; the court finds that the said CAMERON MOON, is charged with a violation of apenal law of the grade of felony, if committed by an adult, to wit: MURDER committed on or about the 18TH day of JULY, 2008; that there has been no adjudication of THIS OFFENSE; that he was 14 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged OFFENSE having been born on the 26TH day of FEBRUARY, 1992; that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding.
. Emphasis added.
. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2).
. See Moon,