Mony Preap v. Jeh Johnson
831 F.3d 1193
9th Cir.2016Background
- Class action by lawful permanent residents (named plaintiffs Preap, Padilla, Magdaleno) who served criminal sentences, reentered their communities, and years later were detained by immigration authorities without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
- § 1226(c)(1) directs the Attorney General to “take into custody any alien … when the alien is released” for certain offenses; § 1226(c)(2) bars release except in narrow witness-protection circumstances. § 1226(a) is the separate discretionary detention/bond provision.
- Plaintiffs contended that § 1226(c) applies only if the AG takes custody promptly upon release from criminal custody; delayed post-release detention must proceed under § 1226(a) with a bond hearing.
- Government argued § 1226(c) covers any alien who committed a listed offense regardless of time elapsed, and urged deference to the BIA or application of the loss-of-authority rule to avoid forfeiture of mandatory-detention authority.
- The district court certified a class of aliens detained without being “immediately detained” on release and ordered bond hearings; the government appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of the phrase “when the alien is released” in § 1226(c)(1) | "When" conveys immediacy; mandatory detention applies only if immigration custody occurs promptly at release | Phrase ambiguous; could mean any time after release | Court: "when" connotes promptness; § 1226(c) applies only to aliens taken into custody promptly upon release |
| Scope of “an alien described in paragraph (1)” in § 1226(c)(2) | Paragraph (2) depends on paragraph (1); release bar applies only to aliens detained under (c)(1)’s timing requirement | Phrase can be read to mean any alien who committed listed offenses (defer to BIA) | Court: Unambiguous that paragraph (2) depends on paragraph (1); BIA reading impermissible |
| Effect of delayed detention (loss-of-authority doctrine) | If AG fails to detain promptly, AG must rely on § 1226(a) and provide bond; no automatic mandatory-detention authority after long delay | Failure to act promptly does not defeat AG’s § 1226(c) authority; Montalvo-Murillo supports no automatic release remedy | Court: Loss-of-authority doctrine inapplicable here; delayed detention falls under § 1226(a) (bond hearing), not mandatory § 1226(c) |
Key Cases Cited
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (upholding constitutionality of mandatory detention in certain contexts and noting Congress’s interests)
- Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) (procedural rule on bond hearings after prolonged detention)
- Castañeda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (en banc) (held § 1226(c) requires prompt post-release detention; interpretation adopted here)
- In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA 2001) (BIA decision construing § 1226(c) to sweep more broadly; discussed and rejected)
- United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1990) (addressed consequences of delayed statutorily required first appearance; distinguished)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (administrative deference framework; court declined to defer because statute unambiguous)
- Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (U.S. 2003) (principles about sanctions for timing noncompliance; cited re: loss-of-authority doctrine)
- Sylvain v. Attorney General of United States, 714 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2013) (applied loss-of-authority rule to § 1226(c); contrasted)
- Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2012) (interpreted “when” as conveying immediacy but misattributed BIA stance; discussed)