Monk v. Shulkin, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7329

Conley F. Monk, Jr., a Vietnam veteran, filed a VA disability claim in 2012 that was denied due to an "other than honorable" discharge; he sought administrative review and filed with the Board of Correction of Naval Records to upgrade his discharge.
Monk petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) for a writ of mandamus to compel prompt adjudication of his claim and sought certification of a class of similarly situated veterans who experienced extended VA delays.
The Veterans Court denied class certification, holding it lacked authority to entertain class actions, and later denied Monk’s individual mandamus petition as moot after his discharge was upgraded and VA awarded benefits.
Monk appealed to the Federal Circuit contesting the Veterans Court’s categorical holding that it lacks authority to certify classes or use other aggregate procedures.
The Federal Circuit considered whether Monk’s class-certification appeal was moot and whether the Veterans Court has statutory or inherent authority to certify classes or use aggregate procedures to address systemic VA delays.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Monk)	Defendant's Argument (Secretary)	Held
Whether Monk's appeal of class-certification denial is moot	Geraghty allows class-certification appeals to survive despite satisfaction of named plaintiff's individual claim	Monk's award mooted the class-certification appeal; Rule 23 inapplicable here (Genesis)	Not moot: Geraghty governs; case may be capable of repetition yet evades review
Whether Veterans Court has authority to certify class actions	Veterans Court can use All Writs Act, its rulemaking power, and inherent authority to aggregate claims	Veterans Court historically held it lacked such authority; Rule 23 does not apply in Veterans Court	Veterans Court has authority to certify class actions or employ aggregate procedures
Proper statutory basis for aggregation	All Writs Act and 38 U.S.C. § 7264 rulemaking power permit creating procedures analogous to Rule 23	Statutory provisions limiting Veterans Court jurisdiction (e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7252, § 7261(c), § 7266) constrain aggregation	All Writs Act and rulemaking grant sufficient authority; statutory limitations do not bar aggregation
Whether Court should decide appropriateness of class certification here	Monk asked for certification; issue remains after denial	Secretary argued Veterans Court merely declined aggregation as inappropriate	Federal Circuit reversed Veterans Court’s categorical refusal and remanded for determination whether class/aggregation is appropriate

Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Veterans Court may issue writs under the All Writs Act in aid of its jurisdiction)
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (All Writs Act authority extends to cases within appellate jurisdiction though no appeal perfected)
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (All Writs Act permits procedural instruments to achieve rational ends of law)
Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34 (1985) (All Writs Act fills gaps that would thwart exercise of jurisdiction)
Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (class-certification appeals survive after named plaintiff's claim is satisfied)
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013) (distinguishes Geraghty where class certification had not been sought/ruled on before individual claim mooted)
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (class actions and standing principles where named plaintiff's claim may extend over certification)
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (mootness and class-action doctrine)
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (use of procedural instruments by analogy where rules do not apply)
United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974) (district court maintained class action under All Writs Act where Rule 23 did not apply)