Monica Raab v. City of Ocean City NJ
833 F.3d 286
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- In Nov. 2011 Monica Raab sued Officer Jessie Ruch and the City of Ocean City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state claims for events arising from Ruch’s detention/force on May 10, 2010.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Ocean City (municipal liability dismissed) but left several claims against Ruch intact; those surviving claims later settled for $150,000 (fees to be determined later).
- The District Court entered an Order of Dismissal that stated the settlement terms were incorporated and that the court would retain jurisdiction over the settlement; the court later said it had not seen the settlement terms when issuing the order.
- Raab moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Ocean City also sought fees after prevailing on summary judgment. The District Court denied both fee motions.
- Raab appealed the denial (arguing she is a "prevailing party" entitled to fees because the dismissal incorporated and retained jurisdiction over the settlement); Ocean City cross-appealed the denial of its fee request for prevailing defendants.
- The Third Circuit reversed as to Raab (holding the dismissal’s incorporation/retention language gave the settlement judicial imprimatur, making Raab a prevailing party) and affirmed as to Ocean City (no abuse of discretion in denying defendant fees because Raab’s claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a settling plaintiff is a "prevailing party" under § 1988 when the court’s dismissal order incorporates the settlement and retains jurisdiction | Raab: The District Court’s dismissal incorporated the settlement and retained jurisdiction, giving judicial imprimatur and thus prevailing-party status | Ruch: The court hadn’t seen the settlement and later disavowed it; incorporation language should be ignored and no judicial imprimatur existed | Held: Incorporation + retention of jurisdiction in the dismissal order supplied the necessary judicial imprimatur; Raab is a prevailing party under § 1988 |
| Whether a district court may sua sponte retain ancillary jurisdiction over enforcement of a settlement in a Rule 41 dismissal | Raab: Court may retain ancillary jurisdiction by incorporating settlement terms in dismissal order | Ruch: Retention invalid absent party consent and court review; local rule forecloses sua sponte retention | Held: Court may, in its discretion, retain ancillary jurisdiction in a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal; local rule does not forbid it and parties’ consent is not required here |
| Whether Ocean City, as a prevailing defendant, is entitled to fees under the "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" standard | Ocean City: Raab’s claims lacked factual foundation and fees are proper | Raab: Claims had a reasonable factual basis (e.g., Ruch’s prior performance notice) and were not frivolous | Held: District Court did not abuse its discretion; Raab’s claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, so defendant fees denied |
| Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Raab fees despite not having seen settlement terms | Raab: The dismissal language controls; lack of court review of settlement terms does not defeat judicial imprimatur | Ruch/Ocean City: The court’s later statements show it did not intend to incorporate terms; plaintiffs cannot rely on an order the court disavowed | Held: The unambiguous dismissal order (incorporating terms and retaining jurisdiction) established judicial imprimatur regardless of whether the court had reviewed the settlement; reversal for Raab and remand to calculate fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (congressional fee-shifting requires a material, judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (a dismissal order that incorporates settlement terms or retains jurisdiction supplies ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (plaintiff must receive some merits-based relief to prevail; magnitude of relief affects reasonableness, not entitlement)
- Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (settlement can support fee awards; § 1988 is not limited to fully litigated victories)
- Truesdell v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (Third Circuit treats "prevailing party" broadly and recognizes judicial imprimatur through court orders incorporating settlements)
- Kokkonen-related authority: CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC, 136 S. Ct. 1642 (judicial imprimatur requirement reiterated)
- Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20 (standards for municipal liability and supervisor liability evidence)
- Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (fees to prevailing defendants allowed only if plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (standard governing fee awards to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases)
- E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746 (factors for assessing whether defendant-fees are appropriate, e.g., plaintiff’s prima facie case, settlement offers, timing of dismissal)