Missourians for Fiscal, etc. v. James Klahr, 892 F.3d 944

Background

Missouri law (Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 130) defines a "campaign committee" for ballot measures and requires such committees to be formed no later than 30 days before the election; committees must appoint a treasurer, keep records, open a depository, file a statement of organization, and file periodic disclosure reports.
Missourians for Fiscal Accountability (MFA) formed 13 days before the 2014 general election to support a ballot measure, sought an injunction against enforcement of the 30-day formation deadline, and received a temporary restraining order allowing pre-election activity.
District court granted summary judgment for MFA, holding the 30-day formation deadline unconstitutional as it created a "blackout period" burdening core political speech; MEC appealed.
This Court reviewed the challenge as facial, applying First Amendment doctrine to assess whether the formation deadline is a disclosure requirement (exacting scrutiny) or a speech restriction (strict scrutiny).
The MEC argued the rule is a disclosure/organizational requirement and that MEC’s practice of accepting late formation with a $1,000 fee mitigates any burden; the court rejected that view and treated the rule as a speech restriction.
Holding: the 30-day formation deadline is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest (it disproportionately burdens timely political speech and has only modest disclosure benefits), is overbroad, and is severable from the remainder of chapter 130; judgment for MFA affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 30-day formation deadline is a disclosure requirement subject to exacting scrutiny or a speech restriction subject to strict scrutiny	The deadline functions as a precondition that prevents or significantly burdens speech and thus is more than a disclosure rule	The deadline is merely an organizational/disclosure requirement; MEC’s practice of permitting late formation with a fee avoids a speech ban	Court: not a disclosure law; it prohibits or significantly burdens speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny principles
Whether the formation deadline furthers a compelling governmental interest	MFA: state’s asserted interest (preventing circumvention of disclosure regime) is not the anti-corruption interest that justifies restrictions on political speech	MEC: preventing circumvention of disclosure requirements is a valid interest that justifies the rule	Court: even assuming the interest is compelling, MEC failed narrow tailoring; burden on speech is substantial while disclosure benefits are modest
Whether MEC’s informal practice of allowing late formation with a $1,000 fee renders the statute constitutional	MFA: the fee-plus-public Consent Order still imposes a significant and punitive burden and creates a choice to speak and accept penalties or stay silent	MEC: late formation with a fee means the statute is effectively a disclosure rule and is not a flat speech ban; constitutional avoidance supports that interpretation	Court: MEC cannot rely on informal enforcement; the fee/punitive public reprimand does not remove the burden and may chill speech
Whether the statute is facially invalid and, if so, severable from chapter 130	MFA: the deadline is overbroad and facially unconstitutional; the rest of chapter 130 can operate independently	MEC: (implicit) invalidating deadline would disrupt statutory scheme	Court: statute is facially unconstitutional (at least overbroad) but severable under Missouri law; remainder of chapter 130 upheld

Key Cases Cited

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (political expenditures are core First Amendment speech and restrictions require heightened scrutiny)
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (government may require disclosure and disclaimers but may not suppress political speech)
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (law imposing burdens that create a choice between speech and discriminatory burdens triggers strict scrutiny)
Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (heightened scrutiny applied where a law’s burdens on political speech are functionally coercive)
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (government bears burden to justify restrictions on political speech)
Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussion of scrutiny for campaign-related requirements)
Phelps-Roper v. Ricketts, 867 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2017) (facial-challenge principles and overbreadth analysis)
National Right to Life Political Action Committee v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2003) (prior ripeness discussion of a registration deadline)