Mirv Holdings, LLC v. United States General Services Administration, 454 F.Supp.3d 33

In 1959 GSA transferred jurisdiction of a DC parcel to the District but retained fee title; no explicit development restrictions were recorded then.
A 1990 Statement of Non-Disturbance between GSA and the District permitted use as a conference/training/exhibit center, overnight accommodations, ancillary uses, and “compatible use” so long as the District consented.
Developer (Conference Center Associates) obtained District approvals in the 1990s; an original plan expired in 2000. A consolidated PUD submitted in 2008/2009 added dwelling units. NCPC/GSA expressed that dwelling units may be inconsistent with the 1990 agreement, but the District/Zoning Commission approved the plan and the developer proceeded at its own risk.
Plaintiff Mirv leased the property in 2015, sought rezoning/map amendment in 2017–2018 to allow multifamily residential, and the District formally requested GSA’s position; GSA reiterated that residential use is incompatible with the 1990 agreement.
Mirv sued GSA and the District under the APA and Declaratory Judgment Act in 2018, seeking a declaration that residential and other district-authorized uses are compatible with the 1990 agreement. The federal defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; Mirv moved for summary judgment. The court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and denied Mirv’s summary-judgment motion as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing	Mirv claims concrete injuries: ~$7M past expenditures, $2M rework costs, inability to obtain financing, stalled development and lost income, threat GSA will revoke jurisdiction, and ongoing rent/taxes.	GSA argues Mirv lacks injury in fact, traceability, and redressability; alleged harms are speculative or self-inflicted.	Court: Mirv lacks standing; dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).
Past expenditures	Past sunk costs show concrete harm that supports equitable relief.	Past injuries alone cannot support prospective/injunctive relief.	Court: Past expenditures insufficient to establish standing for injunctive/declaratory relief.
Speculative future financial harm	Mirv will be unable to secure financing because GSA’s position undermines project viability.	Future financing harms are speculative and rely on third‑party actions.	Court: Speculative future injury fails the imminence and substantial-risk requirements.
Causation / self‑inflicted risk	Denied or downplayed; Mirv proceeded relying on District approvals.	GSA and record show Mirv proceeded despite prior notice GSA considered residential inconsistent—so injuries are self‑inflicted, breaking causation.	Court: Mirv’s decision to proceed despite risk severed causal nexus; harms not fairly traceable to GSA.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1994) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (three‑part Article III standing test).
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (speculative chain of future events insufficient for standing).
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (U.S. 2014) (imminence/substantial risk requirement for future injury).
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (U.S. 1974) (past exposure to illegal conduct does not alone support injunctive relief).
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1983) (plaintiff must show immediate danger of repeated injury).
Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (past injuries insufficient where plaintiff seeks prospective relief).
Clapper‑related precedent and D.C. Cir. standing authorities reflected in the opinion: Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (self‑inflicted injuries and causation principles).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary‑judgment burden principles referenced).