MIRAN, MICHAEL, PEOPLE v, KA 12-01189

AG investigated defendants for Medicaid and Medicare false billing and fraud claims.
DOH Commissioner referred Medicaid fraud investigation to the AG under Exec Law §63(3) (1978 and 2002 referrals).
Attorney General pursued a 31-count indictment charging Medicaid/Medicare fraud based on dual-eligible patients and false billing practices.
Defendants pled guilty: Miran to offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree; Esta Miran to offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree; Corporation to grand larceny in the second degree with restitution.
FBI/OIG involvement; AG continued as Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) under OIG permission; convictions upheld on appeal.
Court held that AG authority under Exec Law §63(3) extends to Medicare fraud connected to an authorized Medicaid investigation, and that §63(3) is not preempted by 42 U.S.C. §1396b(q)(3).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Exec. Law §63(3) authorizes AG to prosecute Medicare fraud arising from Medicaid investigation	People argues §63(3) permits broader investigation/prosecution.	Miran argues §63(3) prevents Medicare offenses within Medicaid investigations.	Yes; AG authorized to prosecute Medicare fraud connected to Medicaid investigation.
Whether §63(3) is expressly preempted by 42 U.S.C. §1396b(q)(3)	People contends no express preemption; permit use of Medicaid/MFCU power.	Miran contends express preemption exists.	No express preemption.
Whether conflict preemption defeats the AG’s prosecutorial authority	People maintains no conflict; authority remains.	Miran argues conflict preemption applies.	Impossibility form does not apply; impediment form does not apply; §63(3) coexists with §1396b(q)(3).
Whether the Impossibility form of conflict preemption applies	Not argued separately; court should consider.	N/A	Not applicable; compliance with both laws possible.
Whether the Impediment form of conflict preemption applies	N/A	N/A	Not applicable; §63(3) supports federal objectives and does not impede Congress’s purposes.

People v Gilmour, 98 N.Y.2d 126 (N.Y. 2002) (prosecutorial authority limitations of the Attorney General)
People v Cuttita, 7 N.Y.3d 500 (N.Y. 2006) (statutory authority to prosecute under specific statutes)
Matter of Mann Judd Landau v Hynes, 49 N.Y.2d 128 (N.Y. 1979) (broad construction of Exec. Law §63(3))
People v Zarro, 66 A.D.3d 1050 (1st Dep’t 2010) (interpretation of §63(3) aris[ing] out of" language)
People v Young, 220 A.D.2d 872 (2d Dep’t 1995) (definition of 'arising out of' in §63(3))
Arizona v United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (Supremacy Clause preemption framework; general principle about preemption)
Smith v Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992) (preemption analysis guidance among federal/state laws)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemption principles; starting presumption against preemption)
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (preemption analysis framework)
Bates v Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (statutory interpretation and preemption considerations)