Miller v. Racine County, 2:22-cv-00595

Background

Miller has prior Racine County OWI convictions (1989, 1991, 1992) he says were based on refusal to submit to warrantless blood draws ("implied consent" convictions).
He was later convicted in 2005 of first‑degree reckless injury, served prison time, and was released to extended supervision in 2014.
On February 4, 2022, Miller was stopped, admitted drinking and possession of marijuana; probation officers Bly and Butler recommended revocation and the matter led to an Oconto County prosecution for OWI 5th/6th and revocation of supervision.
Miller sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming counties, probation officials, supervisors, an administrative law judge, and defense attorneys, asserting his old implied‑consent OWI convictions are unconstitutional under Birchfield/Dalton/Forrett and that use of those convictions violated his Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights. He sought injunctive relief and $100 million in damages.
The court screened the complaint and a proposed supplement, concluded the claims failed to state a claim, dismissed the case, denied the motion to supplement and appointment of counsel, and assessed a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Issues

Issue	Miller's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity and use of 1989–1992 Racine OWI convictions	Those convictions were based on implied‑consent refusals and are unconstitutional under Birchfield/Dalton/Forrett, so they cannot be used as priors or to enhance current charges.	The convictions are long final; Miller cannot obtain § 1983 damages for allegedly invalid convictions without first having them reversed or invalidated.	Dismissed: claims time‑barred and barred by Heck; Miller must first reverse/invalidate convictions before seeking § 1983 damages.
Probation officers’ recommendation to revoke supervision (Bly, Butler, Thoreson, Wiersma)	Officers knowingly used unconstitutional prior convictions and recommended revocation/returned Miller to prison.	Decisions to investigate/recommend revocation are quasi‑judicial and covered by absolute immunity; supervisors lacked personal involvement.	Dismissed: probation/parole actions initiating revocation are absolutely immune; supervisory claims not plausibly pled.
Actions of administrative law judge (Kerig) revoking supervision	Judge relied on unconstitutional priors to revoke and return Miller to prison.	Judicial acts (holding revocation hearings) are core judicial functions entitled to absolute judicial immunity.	Dismissed: ALJ is immune for judicial acts.
Federal interference with pending Oconto County prosecution	Miller sought federal relief to challenge use of priors and to enjoin state prosecution.	Federal courts should abstain under Younger; constitutionality of statute/prior use must be litigated in state court defense and appeal.	Dismissed/abstained: Younger prohibits federal interference absent extraordinary circumstances; Miller must raise issues in state court.
Claims against defense attorneys (Spansail, Nepomiachi) and ineffective assistance	Attorneys failed to press implied‑consent issues and acted in concert with prosecutors; Miller alleges ineffective assistance/ Sixth Amendment violations.	Court‑appointed or retained defense counsel do not act under color of state law for § 1983; ineffective assistance is addressed via habeas corpus.	Dismissed: attorneys are not state actors for § 1983; ineffective assistance claims belong in habeas proceedings, not § 1983.

Key Cases Cited

Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.) (§1915A screening standard and liberal construction for pro se pleadings)
Booker‑El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896 (7th Cir.) (pleading standards cited for dismissal analysis)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Sup. Ct.) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Sup. Ct.) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.) (§ 1983 elements require state action and deprivation of federal right)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (Sup. Ct.) (bar on § 1983 damages for claims that would imply invalidity of outstanding convictions)
Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.) (probation/parole revocation‑related actions entitled to immunity)
Coleman v. Dunlap, 695 F.3d 650 (7th Cir.) (rationale for judicial immunity)
Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.) (judicial immunity applies to acts within judicial capacity)
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (Sup. Ct.) (public defenders do not act under color of state law for § 1983 by performing traditional lawyer functions)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (Sup. Ct.) (habeas is the proper vehicle to challenge lawfulness of confinement and ineffective assistance consequences)
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (Sup. Ct.) (federal courts must abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances)
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (Sup. Ct.) (holding about warrantless blood draws and implied‑consent statutes cited by Miller)
Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814 (7th Cir.) (applicable statute of limitations and supervisory liability standards)