Miller v. Illinois Department of Transportation
643 F.3d 190
7th Cir.2011Background
- Miller worked for IDOT since 2002 as a highway maintainer on a bridge crew and occasionally performed tasks at height.
- From the start, Miller communicated a fear of heights and limited his tasks; crew swapped duties to accommodate.
- In early 2006, after a panic attack, IDOT diagnosed acrophobia and began treating Miller as severely limited, restricting him from most bridge tasks.
- IDOT placed Miller on non-occupational disability status in June 2006 and precluded return to bridge duties despite other psychiatrists’ clearance.
- Miller sought accommodation to avoid high-altitude tasks; IDOT denied the accommodation in January 2007.
- Miller returned to work on May 1, 2007, made a remark about Ritter, was discharged June 20, 2007, arbitration found conduct unbecoming but Miller returned to work in 2008; Miller then sued under the ADA alleging discrimination and retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for IDOT, which the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regarded-as disability under ADA | Miller was regarded as disabled due to acrophobia. | IDOT did not regard Miller as disabled in a broad job class. | Genuine disputes exist; not entitled to summary judgment. |
| Essential function and accommodation for high-altitude work | Working above 25 feet was not essential; accommodation to swap tasks was reasonable. | Working at height above 25 feet is essential for bridge crew. | A reasonable jury could find that high-altitude work was not an essential function and that accommodation was reasonable. |
| Retaliation and pretext for termination | IDOT retaliated for requesting accommodation; evidence of pretext. | Termination based on conduct unbecoming; not pretext. | Evidence could support a finding of pretext; triable issue for trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (regarded-as analysis for disability; breadth of impairment in working life activity)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (major life activity framework for disability determinations)
- Kupstas v. City of Greenwood, 398 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005) (regarded-as breadth and job class considerations)
- Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1998) (broadened understanding of regarded-as analysis)
- Lenker v. Methodist Hospital, 210 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2000) (reasonableness of accommodations like helper or task rotation)
- Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2002) (essential-function and lifting/accommodation limitations)
- Miller v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (principles on essential functions and reasonable accommodations)
- Cochrum v. Old Ben Co., 102 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 1996) (limits on accommodating performing essential functions)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective knowledge standard for deliberate indifference; evidence admissibility)