Stephen Lenker sued his employer, Methodist Hospital, under the Americans With Disabilities Act, for failing to accommodate him. Lenker, a nurse, suffered from multiple sclerosis (“MS”). After his doctor issued a lifting restriction for him, the hospital removed him from his job as a nurse because the hospital considered lift *795 ing to be an essential part of the job that could not bе reasonably accommodated. A jury found in favor of the hospital and Lenker appeals. We affirm.
I.
Lenker was diagnosed with MS while he was stifi in nursing school, and Methodist Hospital knew he had the condition when it hired him. At the time of his hire, Lenker's MS was in remission, he had no restrictions on lifting and he was able to fully perform all of his nursing duties. One of Methodist's job requirements for a staff nurse is the ability "to manage, with assistance as appropriate, approximately 200 lbs. weight." A nurse's duties include turning patients in bed, assisting patients to and from the bathroom, helping patients walk and assisting patients who unexpectedly fall. Sometimes other staff members are available to assist a nurse with lifting, and sometimes because of staffing shortаges or because an emergency arises, a nurse may have to engage in physically strenuous lifting without assistance.
None of this was a problem for Lenker until he had been on the job for approximately six months. At that time, he suffered an MS episode that resulted in a 10 day hospitalization. When he was released, his doctor indicated that Lenkеr should not engage in any lifting. Methodist's policy at the time was to require any employee who was sick on the job or who missed more than three days of work to obtain clearance from its Occupational Health Department before being allowed to return to work. Additionally, the policy stated that if the employee was releasеd to work by the Occupational Health Department with restrictions, the employee's manager was to determine whether the employee could return to work with that restriction. As a result of the policy, a physician from the Occupational Health Department examined Lenker following his hospitalization. That doctor concurrеd with the judgment of Lenker's personal physician that Lenker should not engage in lifting. Thus, Lenker's work release contained a "no lifting" restriction. Lenker's manager subsequently determined that Lenker could not return to work as a nurse with that restriction because lifting was a necessary part of the job.
Although the hospital's policy required twelve months of service before an employee was eligible for a leave of absence, Methodist granted Lenker a leave to give him time to have his lifting restriction reevaluated and possibly removed. The hospital also gave Lenker access to its job posting board, which was not available to non-employees. Lenker's manager informed him оf his layoff status and these benefits by telephone, and the two did not talk again about Lenker's employment status. During Lenker's layoff, his physical condition worsened, and after a year on layoff status, the hospital terminated Lenker's employment. Lenker sued Methodist, claiming violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and violation of state defamation law. The district court granted summary judgment on the state law defamation claim, and the ADA claim went to trial before a jury. The jury found in favor of Methodist Hospital. Lenker appeals.
II.
Lenker claims the district court erred when it refused to grant his Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, because Methodist failed to show at trial that it engaged in an interactive process to accommodate Lenker's disability. Lenker also protests the district court's refusal to give three of his proposed jury instructions. The district court declined to give Lenker's proposed instruction regarding the interactive process in which an employer must engage to determine what accommodations might exist for the disabled employee, instead giving instructions proposed by Methodist Hospital on this same subject. The court also declined to instruct the jury that Methodist's "100% healed" policy violated the ADA, or that
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the jury could consider whether Methodist's stated reason for terminating Lenker was pretextual. We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, determining whether the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago,
A.
Lenker believes he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the hospital engaged in a directed rather than an interactive process with him once it learned of his disability. Lenker contends that Methodist failed to establish that lifting was an essential element of a nurse's job, and that he could not be accommodated. He protests Methodist's failure to assess the job of nurse and his abilities with an eye toward accommodating him. He maintains that uncontested evidence supports his view that the hospitаl refused to even consider an accommodation. Following a trial, we are limited in our review to assessing whether no rational jury could have found for Methodist. Emmel,
In determining whether a particular job function is essential, we are guided by the federal regulations:
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to:
(i) The еmployer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbent in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). See also R. 67, Court's Instruction No. 16 (detailing these factors for the jury). The jury heard evidence that Methodist considered lifting an essential function of the job, that it was part of the job description for staff nurses, that at times, staff shortages or emergencies left a nurse without assistance in a lifting task, and that the need for lifting was not always predictable because patients sometimes fell or needed assistance unexpectedly. Lenker protests that lifting comprised at most two percent of a nurse's day, that devices were available to assist in lifting patients, and that all nurses were allowed to use their judgment to determine whethеr they needed assistance in a particular situation and call for other staff to help. The jury was free to find, however, that those times of the work day when lifting was required were essential to the nurse's job, that a device to assist in lifting a patient out of bed would not help a patient walk down the hail or to the bathroom, and that at times other staff wоuld not be available to assist. In short, based on evidence presented by the hospital, the jury was certainly entitled to find that lifting was an essential function of a nurse's job.
The remaining question is whether Lenker could be accommodated, and whether the hospital engaged in an interactive process with him to determine appropriate accommodations. The hospital offered evidence that Lenker could not
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always be assisted in carrying out this function because of staff shortages and emergencies. Thus, not only was the lifting function essential, but Lenker could not he accommodated as a nurse. This did not relieve the hospital of its duty to accommodate Lenker in other ways if possible.
1
Because Lenker could not be accommodated as a nurse, the hospital made its internal job postings available to him so that he could apply for other jobs in the hospital more suited to his abilities. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp.,
B.
The district court rejected Lenker's proposed jury instruction regarding the interactive process. The controversial part of Lenker's instruction states that "if you find the interactive process was one directed by the defendant and not truly interactive, then this is a violation of the ADA on the part of the defendant." Lenker relied on Excel in support of this instruction. In Excel, the court found that an employer's procedure for accommodation was directive as opposed to interactive where, in part, the plant nurse unilaterally determined that employees could not be accommodated in certain positions.
With regard to this court's other instructions that fully advise the jury as to what constitutes an interactive review process, the court believes that the language contained in its instructions does properly reflect the language in the statute; that the statute specifically does not reference in this context a directive process as opposed to an interactive process as being a violation forbidden. For that reason, the court declined to use the plaintiff's tendered Instruction 17.
Tr. at 784. Although this explanation is somewhat cryptic, we believe the court was declining the instruction because the statute says nothing about a directed versus an interactive process, and other instructions adequately addressed the requirement for an interactive process.
Our review of the other instructions reveals that they did, in fact, adequately address the interactive process. The remaining instructions informed the jury of the employer's duty to analyze the job involved, determine its purpose and essential functions, as well as the duty to consult with the employee to determine the precise job-related limitations imposed by the disability and how those limitations cоuld be overcome with a reasonable accommodation. The court also instructed the jury that the employer was obliged to identify, in consultation with the employee, potential accommodations, and to assess the effectiveness each would have in en *798 abling the individual to perform the essential functions of the position. The jury was also instructed that the employer was to consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and then select the accommodation most appropriate for both the employee and the employer. Based on this Court's decisions, the court also advised the jury that making these determinatiоns is a cooperative process, and both the employer and the employee must make reasonable, good faith efforts:
Neither party should be able to cause a breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability. A party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in gоod faith. A party that fails to cominu-nicate, by way of initiation or response, may also be acting in bad faith.
R. 67, Court's Instruction No. 22. See Feliberty v. Kemper Corp.,
C.
The district court also declined to give Lenker's "100% healed" instruction, which reads, in relevant part:
Additionally, if you find that the Plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidеnce that the Defendant Hospital has a policy that required the Plaintiff to be "100% healed" or that he must be "cured" of his disability before he could return to work as a nurse, then you shall find that this is a per se violation of the ADA and should find for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
H. 66, Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 37. The district court rejected the instruction because it wаs unnecessary in light of other instructions given and because it did not accurately reflect the law as it related to the issues presented in this case. Lenker relies on Excel in support of this instruction. Excel cited favorably a district of Minnesota case for the proposition that a policy that requires an employee to be 100% healed before returning to work is a per se violation of the ADA because it does not allow a case-by-case assessment of an individual's ability to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation. See Heise v. Genuine Parts Co.,
Lenker claims there was testimony that Methodist Hospital had such a policy. He cites stаtements from hospital personnel that an employee with a lifting restriction would not be allowed to return to work until the restriction was removed because lifting was an essential function of the job that could not be accommodated. This is a far cry from saying that Lenker's MS must be 100% healed before being allowed to return to work. The district court was сorrect that the "100% healed" instruction was not an accurate reflection of the law as applied to the facts of this case. Instead, Lenker's real objection to the hospital's policy was that it decided, without consulting Lenker, that lifting was an essential job function that could not be reasonably accommodated. Other instructiоns addressed this issue, and it was for the jury to decide whether Methodist was justified in its blanket assessment that nurses who could not lift could not be accommodated as nurses. It was also for the jury to decide whether the hospital adequately accommodated Lenker in other ways, such *799 as giving him access to internal job postings, and placing Mm on layoff status to give Mm time to recover Ms ability to lift.
D.
The district court also rejected Lenker’s proposed instruction on the issue of pretext. Lenker’s instruction tracked the language of the
McDonnell Douglas
case, using a burden shifting analysis.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
In
Bultemeyer,
we explained that in a disparate treatment claim under the ADA, the plaintiff could use either direct proof or rely on the burden-shifting method defined in
McDonnell Douglas.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The hospital also tried to accommodate Lenker by allowing him to go on layoff status so that he would have time to possibly regain his ability to lift if his MS went into remission.