Miles, Kojuan J., 2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1396

Appellant convicted of sexual assault of a 15-year-old and compelling prostitution; jury assessed 7 and 23 years respectively; trial court ordered sentences cumulated.
Court of Appeals affirmed sexual-assault conviction but reformed compelling-prostitution judgment to delete the cumulation order, holding Section 3.03(b) does not authorize stacking those two offenses when they arise from the same criminal episode and are prosecuted together.
State sought review challenging the deletion of the cumulation order; Supreme Court granted review on whether Section 3.03(b) permits cumulation of offenses listed in different paragraphs.
The statutory question turned on the plain language of Tex. Penal Code § 3.03(b), including phrases like “both sections” and the Legislature’s piecemeal amendments to subsection (b).
The Court concluded the statute is clear and unambiguous and that the phrase “both sections” in subsection (b)(5) unambiguously refers only to human trafficking and compelling prostitution, so compelling prostitution cannot be stacked with sexual assault of a child.
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reformation (cumulation order deleted); a dissent argued the statute is ambiguous and extra-textual factors show subsection (b) offenses may be stacked across paragraphs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tex. Penal Code § 3.03(b) permits stacking a compelling-prostitution sentence onto a sexual-assault-of-a-child sentence when both arise from the same episode and action	Miles: §3.03(b) should be read to allow cumulation only for offenses grouped within the same subsection; “both sections” limits stacking to paired offenses in a paragraph	State: §3.03(b) plain language and context permit stacking across different paragraphs; “or” and legislative history support inclusive reading	Court: Affirmed Court of Appeals — statute unambiguous; subsection (b)(5)’s “both sections” limits stacking to human trafficking and compelling prostitution, so sentences must run concurrently

Parfait v. State, 120 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (statute clear and courts must give effect to text)
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (courts must not add to unambiguous statutes)
Tapps v. State, 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (give effect to each word and phrase; consult extra-textual sources only if ambiguous)
Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (if statute ambiguous, may consult legislative history and consequences)
Miles v. State, 468 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (court of appeals’ interpretation that §3.03(b) limits stacking to offenses within same paragraph)
Nguyen v. State, 359 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (legislative history can inform stacking in plea contexts)