Michelle Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc.
709 F.3d 995
9th Cir.2013Background
- Gilstrap, disabled, alleges United failed to provide requested wheelchair assistance on two United flights (2008 and 2009).
- Allegations include physical injuries and emotional distress from walking in airports without adequate aid and hostile treatment by United agents.
- Plaintiff asserts California tort claims and a Title III ADA claim; no direct ACAA claim is pleaded.
- District court granted Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding all state claims preempted by the ACAA and ADA terminal rule interpretations.
- Court analyzes ACAA preemption (field and conflict) and ADA Title III applicability to airport terminals under FAA amendments and regulations.
- On appeal, court holds ACAA preempts state standards of care for airport-assistance duties but not state remedies; ADA Title III does not cover airline terminals under aircraft control.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ACAA preempt state-law claims? | Gilstrap argues ACAA does not preempt state tort claims. | United contends ACAA field/conflict preempts state claims. | ACAA field preempts state standards of care; remedies may survive. |
| Are airline-assistance duties per ACAA 'pervasively regulated' to preempt state standards of care? | California law should apply for negligence elements if not displaced by pervasive federal rules. | ACAA regulations set the standard of care for disability assistance and preempt state standards. | Two-part framework adopted: field preemption losses state standards where pervasive; remedies may survive. |
| Do ACAA and regulations preempt California claims based on how airline staff interacted with Gilstrap? | Hostile conduct could be actionable under California tort law independent of ACAA standards. | APA dictates staff conduct is not governed by ACAA standards; preemption may apply to the duty element only. | Hostile interactions not fully preempted; remaining elements may proceed under California law. |
| Does Title III of the ADA apply to airport terminals when operated under air carriers? | Terminals within airports might be covered as places of public accommodation. | Airports terminals used for aircraft transportation are excluded from Title III; covered by ACAA. | ADA Title III does not apply to airline-controlled terminals; ADA claim properly dismissed. |
| Is there a private right of action under the ACAA that would foreclose state-law remedies? | Private action exists implied by some circuits (not necessary here). | ACAA does not create a private right of action; private remedies may be preempted by conflict preemption. | Court does not decide private right of action; focuses on field and conflict preemption of state-law claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Newman v. American Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (ACAA merits discussed prior to other treatments)
- Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (FAA preemption considerations in early FAA field preemption)
- Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009) (developed field preemption framework within FAA context)
- Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007) (pervasive regulations for preemption discussed)
- Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (two-component FAA preemption: standards of care vs. remedies)
- Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (Supreme Court, 1984) (field preemption and conflict with federal standards related to safety)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (Supreme Court, 2001) (conflict preemption where state claims rely on federal regulatory scheme)
- Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593 (2d Cir. 2011) (ACAA implied action discussions; private action not universally adopted)